scholarly journals Three Decades of Lowest-low Fertility in Spain, 1991 – 2018

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Esteve ◽  
Mariona Lozano ◽  
Diederik Boertien ◽  
Ryohei Mogi ◽  
Qi Cui

There are plenty of theories on low fertility, but few studies have aimed to measure and quantify the relative importance of various obstacles to fertility for explaining differences between desired and actual fertility. We aim to fill this gap by using data from the 2018 Fertility Survey (14,556 women and 2.619 men) for Spain, a country with one of the lowest levels of fertility in the world. Data on ideal family size, intended fertility, and reported reasons for not yet having (more) children allow us to estimate the extent of unrealized fertility as well as the reported relative importance of economic, health, and partnership related reasons for unrealized fertility. Results confirm that observed fertility is clearly below desired fertility in Spain. Material reasons - associated with job insecurity, instability, economic resources - are the main reported reasons why women and men do not have the desired number of children. These reasons are followed by those related to partnership (not having a stable partner), and health (difficulties in conceiving). Estimates based on actual fertility, employment, and partnerships shows that having a stable partner between the ages of 25 and 35 is a proximate determinant of the transition to the first child.

2021 ◽  
pp. 0192513X2110160
Author(s):  
Amir Erfani ◽  
Roya Jahanbakhsh

The fertility influence of spousal intimate relationships is unknown. Drawing on the Giddens’s theory of transformation of intimacy, this study proposed a hypothesis that couples supporting egalitarian intimate relationships, with a greater risk profile attached to the relationship, and having less attachments to the external normative pressures shaping marital relations, are more likely to have low-fertility intentions and preferences. Using data from a self-administered pilot survey ( n = 375 prospective grooms and brides) designed by the authors, and employing multivariate regression models, we found that the lower attachment to external social forces in mate selection was associated with the lower ideal number of children, and those with a greater spousal relational egalitarianism and a higher risk profile attached to their relationships preferred lower number of children and were less likely to intend to have children after marriage. The study sheds new light on the determinants of low fertility.


2017 ◽  
pp. 47-66
Author(s):  
Tinne Steffensen

Relatively low fertility and an increased age at first birth, along with the development of assisted reproduction technologies have increased attention to when and how many times Danish women give birth. While some argue that family formation has become increasingly plural and differentiated, others maintain that the nuclear family remains the ideal family for the majority of women. In this article, I investigate family formation trajectories for a random sample of 1,500 women born in 1973 and 1974. For this sample, I perform sequence analysis of longitudinal registry data on civil status, fertility, education and income through the ages 22 to 37. Focusing on timing, order and duration in the sequences studied, I identify seven distinct clusters (i.e. typologies) of family formations in Denmark. The majority (68 percent) of the women’s trajectories represent varieties of the nuclear family. For all clusters, my results confirm the event of the first child as a constituting factor of the nuclear family, which often precedes marriage. However, the identified clusters also show great variation when it comes to age at birth of first child, socio-economic status and overall turbulence in their trajectories.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir Erfani

SummaryPersistent low fertility rates are an increasing concern for countries with low fertility like Iran. Informed by the Theory of Planned Behaviour, this study examined the immediate factors influencing fertility intentions, using data from the 2012 Tehran Survey of Fertility Intentions. The findings show that more than half of young married adults in Tehran intend to have no more children. The multivariate analysis results indicate that individuals who view childbearing as being detrimental to their personal life, feel less normative pressure to have a/another child, and believe their childbearing decision is not contingent on the presence of economic resources required for childbearing, are more likely to want no (more) children or to be unsure rather than to want a/another child. Attitudes and normative pressure are dominant factors influencing the intention to have a first child, while the intention to have a second child is mainly affected by attitudes and perceived constraints. The policy implications of the results are discussed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 31-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anneli Miettinen ◽  
Ivett Szalma

Using data from Eurobarometer Surveys 2001–2011 we examine trends and correlates of childlessness intentions and ideals across Europe over the past decade. We distinguish childlessness as a personal preference (personal ideal number of children is zero) from intended childlessness (intention to have no children) as these reflect somewhat different dimensions of childlessness as a conscious decision. We find that, on average, childlessness as a personal preference is relatively rare in Europe, although in some western European countries a sizeable proportion of young adults express a desire to have no children. Intentional childlessness is slightly more common than ideal childlessness is, since about 11% of currently childless young adults aged 18 to 40 years in Europe intend to have no children. We analyse factors related to childlessness intentions and ideals on the individual and country levels. A weaker individual socioeconomic position influences the intention to remain childless through various channels, such as unemployment or low socioeconomic status. Associations between individual’s social position and ideal childlessness are less clear. Results also indicate that macro-economic conditions do not have a direct impact on intentional childlessness, whereas a higher prevalence of traditional family values in a country is related to a lower likelihood of individuals considering childlessness to be their ideal family form.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Kei Sakata ◽  
C. R. McKenzie

Abstract This paper argues that the expectation of having to provide care for aging parents in the future may be a major factor contributing to the current low fertility rate in Japan. Using data from the 1998 and 2008 National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ) surveys and a Poisson-logit hurdle model, this paper examines whether the expectation of having to look after parents in the future affects a couple's current family planning. The first-stage model of a couple's family planning decision is a logit model which examines the decision of whether or not to have any children, and then in the second stage a Poisson model is applied to explain the number of children a couple has conditional on the couple having at least one child. The empirical evidence presented suggests that there are strong generational effects, and that for the post-war cohort, an increase in the probability of having to look after a parent increases the probability of a couple being childless.


2005 ◽  
Vol 70 (5) ◽  
pp. 801-822 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Raymo ◽  
Miho Iwasawa

In Japan, unlike in most other industrialized societies, the decline in marriage rates has been most pronounced among highly educated women. Theoretical interpretations of this distinctive pattern of change have typically emphasized increasing economic independence for women and reductions in the gains to marriage. In this paper, the authors develop and evaluate an alternative explanation that emphasizes women's continued dependence on men's economic resources and decline in the relative supply of highly educated men. Using data from four rounds of the Japanese National Fertility Survey, the authors decompose the observed decline in marriage rates into changes in the propensity to marry and changes in the educational composition of the marriage market. Results indicate that change in the availability of potential spouses accounts for one-fourth of the decline in marriage among university-educated women and explains a substantial proportion of the growing educational differences in marriage. The conclusion is that the relatively large decline in marriage among highly educated Japanese women likely reflects both increasing economic independence and continued economic dependence on men.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Catherine E. Bolten ◽  
Richard Marcantonio

Abstract Post-war Sierra Leone has experienced a population explosion that has raised questions among rural farmers about the relationship between family size and poverty. Agricultural decline and the high cost of schooling are not prompting parents to articulate a desire for smaller families; rather, they highlight that the uncertainty around articulating the “right” number of children is unresolvable because the ability to send children to school is predicated on increasing agricultural outputs that decline precisely because population pressure has reduced soil fertility. Bolten and Marcantonio conclude that this renders family size the heart of a paradox, where there is no optimal number of children.


2014 ◽  
Vol 281 (1796) ◽  
pp. 20141733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Alvergne ◽  
Virpi Lummaa

The negative wealth–fertility relationship brought about by market integration remains a puzzle to classic evolutionary models. Evolutionary ecologists have argued that this phenomenon results from both stronger trade-offs between reproductive and socioeconomic success in the highest social classes and the comparison of groups rather than individuals. Indeed, studies in contemporary low fertility settings have typically used aggregated samples that may mask positive wealth–fertility relationships. Furthermore, while much evidence attests to trade-offs between reproductive and socioeconomic success, few studies have explicitly tested the idea that such constraints are intensified by market integration. Using data from Mongolia, a post-socialist nation that underwent mass privatization, we examine wealth–fertility relationships over time and across a rural–urban gradient. Among post-reproductive women, reproductive fitness is the lowest in urban areas, but increases with wealth in all regions. After liberalization, a demographic–economic paradox emerges in urban areas: while educational attainment negatively impacts female fertility in all regions, education uniquely provides socioeconomic benefits in urban contexts. As market integration progresses, socio-economic returns to education increase and women who limit their reproduction to pursue education get wealthier. The results support the view that selection favoured mechanisms that respond to opportunities for status enhancement rather than fertility maximization.


2020 ◽  
pp. 18-28
Author(s):  
Dhanendra Veer Shakya

This study attempts to analyze the levels and patterns of cohort fertility in Nepal in 2016 using data on parity progression ratios (PPRs). Simple PPRs, rather than synthetic PPRs or birth history of women, are used in this study from distribution of women by age and children ever born. Data on PPRs are used from 2016 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey to estimate cohort fertility of currently married and all women separately. Fertility is analyzed for different birth cohorts of women, specifically for birth cohorts of age groups 45-49, 20-24, 25-29, and 30-34 years, beside overall span of reproductive ages (15-49) for different purposes. The PPRs data are employed in this study in three different ways such as PPRs itself, proportion of women with at least ‘N’ number of children ever born (CEB), and cohort fertility rates. All three measures are implied to estimate cohort fertility of both currently married and all women separately. Fertility patterns are almost similar in all the three methods and other the measures show that the level of cohort fertility is still a little higher in Nepal, although it is declining gradually over time. The completed cohort fertility is estimated at around 4 in Nepal in 2016. The contribution of this article will be to check fertility level by applying this simple, but less common, method in estimating cohort fertility.


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