Less is more or more is more? Union dissolution and re-partnering as an engine for fertility in a demographic forerunner context – a register based completed cohort fertility approach

Extensive literature theorizes the role of re-partnering on cohort fertility and whether union dissolution can be an engine for fertility. A large share of higher-order unions is non-marital cohabitations. Yet, most previous completed cohort fertility studies on the topic analyze marital unions only and none have measured cohabitations using population-level data. We use Finnish register data to enumerate every birth, marriage, and cohabitation from ages 18-46 in the 1969–1972 birth cohorts, and analyze the relationship between the number of unions and cohort fertility for men and women using Poisson regression. We show that re-partnering is driven by cohabitations. Re-marriage is positively associated with cohort fertility, compared to individuals in a single intact marriage. However, when measured using marriages as well as non-marital cohabitations, re-partnering is negatively associated with fertility, compared to individuals in a single intact union. This negative association increases with socioeconomic status. “Serial cohabitation” is a strong predictor of low fertility. Men see a slight “re-marriage premium” in fertility and a (non-marital) “re-partnering penalty,” compared to women. Thus, re-partnering is likely not an efficient engine for fertility. Further, marriage and cohabitation are far from indistinguishable in a country often described as a second demographic transition forerunner.

Birth Spacing and Fertility in the Presence of Son Preference and Sex-Selective Abortions: India's Experience Over Four Decades

Since the advent of prenatal sex-determination technologies in the mid-1980s, India has experienced an increasingly male-biased sex ratio at birth, presumably from sex-selective abortions. Abortions lengthen birth intervals, but we know little about how birth spacing has changed or the effects of these changes. I show that, although the overall length of birth intervals increased from 1970 to the mid-2010s, well-educated women with no sons had the most substantial lengthening, as well as the most male-biased sex ratios. Furthermore, most of these changes took place immediately after the introduction of prenatal sex-determination technologies. Consequently, some women without sons now have longer birth intervals than those with sons, reversing India's traditional spacing pattern. Women with low education continue short birth spacing when they have no sons, with only limited evidence of male-biased sex ratios. Because of the rapid lengthening of birth intervals, period fertility rates substantially overestimated how fast cohort fertility fell. Moreover, predicted cohort fertility is still 10%–20% above the period fertility rate. If the lengthening of birth intervals arises from repeated abortions, the associated short pregnancy spacing may counteract any positive effects of longer birth spacing. There is, however, no evidence of this effect on infant mortality. Judging from sex ratios, sex-selective abortion use is not declining.

The Association between Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Cohort Fertility: Evidence from Brazil

Brazil’s Bolsa Família Programme (BFP) aims to combat poverty and social inequalities through monetary transfers to families. A much-discussed indirect effect of the programme was its correlation to the fertility of the beneficiary families. In this paper, we use a cohort fertility approach with parity progression ratios that differs from existing literature, which mainly used period fertility measures, to better understand the relationship between fertility and the BFP. This study analyses the relationship between the BFP and the reproduction of Brazilian women. We use data from the 2010 Brazilian micro-censuses, the only census after the start of the BFP in 2004, to reconstruct the childbirth history of women with incomplete reproductive cycles (women aged 25 to 29), and estimate parity progression ratios (PPRs) and cohort fertility rates (CFR). In addition, we estimate propensity score matching (PSM) models comparing fertility outcomes of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the programme. Our results show distinct differences in CFRs and PPRs. On average, BFP beneficiaries had more children than women not covered by the programme. This finding remained consistent even after controlling for educational gradients and other covariates. Our empirical findings show that women opt for a “rational” strategy, where they tend to have children in more rapid succession up until three children. These findings contradict the recent literature that has not found any correlation between BFP and fertility. The results also suggest that cohort analyses may fill certain gaps left by previous studies of period fertility. This paper is one of a few that have analysed the relationship between a conditional income transfer programme and cohort measures in Brazil.

Not Just Later, but Fewer: Novel Trends in Cohort Fertility in the Nordic Countries

With historically similar patterns of high and stable cohort fertility and high levels of gender equality, the Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland are seen as forerunners in demographic behavior. Furthermore, Nordic fertility trends have strongly influenced fertility theories. However, the period fertility decline that started around 2010 in many countries with relatively high fertility is particularly pronounced in the Nordic countries, raising the question of whether Nordic cohort fertility will also decline and deviate from its historically stable pattern. Using harmonized data across the Nordic countries, we comprehensively describe this period decline and analyze the extent to which it is attributable to tempo or quantum effects. Two key results stand out. First, the decline is mostly attributable to first births but can be observed across all ages from 15 to the mid-30s. This is a reversal from the previous trend in which fertility rates in the early 30s increased relatively steadily in those countries in the period 1980–2010. Second, tempo explains only part of the decline. Forecasts indicate that the average Nordic cohort fertility will decline from 2 children for the 1970 cohort to around 1.8 children for the late 1980s cohorts. Finland diverges from the other countries in terms of its lower expected cohort fertility (below 1.6), and Denmark and Sweden diverge from Finland, Iceland, and Norway in terms of their slower cohort fertility decline. These findings suggest that the conceptualization of the Nordic model of high and stable fertility may need to be revised.

CHILDBIRTH POSTPONEMENT AND AGE-RELATED INFERTILITY IN SERBIA

Childbirth postponement has been a widely discussed topic since the 1990s, and was pushed to the top of the demographic agenda with the emergence of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) paradigm. Mechanisms of childbirth postponement mostly explained by economists or sociologists were understood as rational-based decisions of individuals (or couples) trying to cope with the requirements of modern society. These mechanisms explained by income and consumption rationale (Becker, Modigliani), or by liberal and postmodern values (Van de Kaa, Lestheage), barely mention the physiological limitations of the individual choice. These limitations given by the human species reproductive span, with no exception, affect everyone trying to make an optimal reproductive choice. There are two main effects of fertility postponement on births and fertility rates. The first effect arises when couples postpone childbearing to a later age during a certain period and fewer births take place than in the absence of such postponement – the ‘tempo effect’. The second is a negative effect of fertility postponement on completed fertility and increased childlessness attributable to the age-related increase in infertility. This second negative effect in particular is our field of interest. The decline in cohort fertility due to postponement has been mostly studied using data on age at first birth and subsequent fertility, as well as models of fecundity, pregnancy loss and time to conception by age, which we will try to apply to the period data. Using period data, we will try to quantify the potential number of births that would occur in the absence of childbirth postponement in Serbia during the past two decades.

Fertility in the Yamal–Nenets Autonomous Okrug

The article is devoted to the analysis of fertility indicators in the Yamal–Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Along with the total fertility rate for all births, the author traces the dynamics of birth order-specific fertility rates, as well as actual cohort fertility rates estimated by 2010 All-Russian census data. Particular attention is paid to the differences between these indicators in urban districts and municipal areas of the region. When considering the possible relationship of fertility indicators with the implementation of regional measures of demographic policy, special attention is paid to third and subsequent births, the level and dynamics of which can be influenced by the amount of regional maternal (family) capital, which is larger in the Yamal–Nenets Autonomous Okrug than in other federal subjects of Russia. The results of the analysis show that the Yamal–Nenets Autonomous Okrug is among regions with a relatively high level and a young model of fertility. To a greater extent, this manifests itself in the second, third and subsequent births.

Why the Standard TFR gives a Misleading Impression of the Fertility of Foreign Women: Insights from Switzerland

Since 1971 the Swiss Federal Statistical Office has published annual fertility data split by nationality (Swiss/foreign). These indicate that the TFR for women of foreign nationality has been 0.5 children higher than for Swiss women for most of the period since 1991. However, statistics from household registration (STATPOP) and the Families and Generations Surveys (FGS) in 2013 and 2018 indicate that foreign women, approaching the end of their reproductive lives, have slightly smaller families than women of Swiss nationality. The purpose of this paper is to reconcile these contradictory fertility measures. To do this, we design a novel methodology for tallying the fertility of cohorts of Swiss and foreign nationals through their reproductive life. In addition to birth registrations and population totals by age (the input data for calculating the TFR) we also include estimates of how many children women have at the time of their immigration, emigration and naturalisation. Using these input data, we compile the fertility profiles of Swiss and foreign women aged 15-49 (cohorts 1966-2003). These correspond well with the FGS and household register data. Several processes impact the final fertility of the two sub-populations. Women frequently immigrate into Switzerland in their 20s. Often arriving childless, they commonly start childbearing soon after immigration. However, there is still a flow of low-fertility women into the country in their 30s and 40s, lowering the average fertility of the foreign population. By contrast, Swiss women start childbearing later and a significant proportion remain childless; however, after starting childbearing they have a higher propensity than foreign women to have a second and third child. Naturalisation and fertility are interlinked; women with children are more likely to naturalise than those without, which then boosts the average fertility of the Swiss population. We confirm that the standard TFR gives an inflated impression of the ultimate (cohort) fertility of foreign nationals and under-estimates that of Swiss women, and we describe how this happens. Fundamentally, the TFR is a measure of childbearing intensity, not an accurate estimate of completed cohort fertility, especially for a mobile population.