scholarly journals Pakistan Civil-Military Relations in the Context of External Politics

2017 ◽  
Vol II (I) ◽  
pp. 45-62
Author(s):  
Shaista Taj ◽  
Nazim Rahim ◽  
Muhammad Shoaib Malik

Pakistan's military establishment defends its prominent role in the society due to the set of complex threats and a series of conflicts which Pakistan has been facing. At the time of its creation, Pakistan found itself in the midst of instability due to the adverse policies of its rival neighbors. Pakistan has the decisive position in the global power politics. The disconcerting situation develop due to the sense of guardianship. The army believes that the civilian government lacks the vision and political insight which enables state to operate the affairs other than the security issues without soliciting military institutions.

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald S. Travis

How the U.S. military establishment interacts with other parts of the American government and the people impacts American national power. Because civil–military relationships are influenced by the context of the environment and the “kind of war” being waged, there are a variety of ways that military and civilian leaders can work together to improve the nation’s security. This article proposes an alternative civil–military relations model called pragmatic civilian control. It integrates Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control theory with traditional American political philosophy and concepts established by Morris Janowitz, while accounting for current geopolitical conditions.


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M. Lyons

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.


Unity Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 120-125
Author(s):  
Pragya Ghimire

Military diplomacy has been an important security and foreign policy tool for many centuries. However, in the age of globalization, its importance has grown more rapidly than ever because of the recognition that country’s survival and development also depend on a peaceful and stable national and regional environment. Some of the significant practices in the past reflect that various tools of military diplomacy could be implemented to strengthen country’s overall diplomacy, including bilateral and multi-lateral contacts of military and civilian defence officials of foreign countries; preparing bilateral/multilateral security and defence agreements; exchanging experience with foreign military and civilian defence officials; providing military assistance and support to other countries, such as aid, materials and equipment when there is need and request during the disaster or humanitarian crises. However, these tools of strengthening military diplomacy will not be as effective as expected if there is no effective civil-military relations and synergies between a country’s national security and foreign policy. Moreover, it will require strong expertise and good command of civilian diplomats on security issues and military diplomats on foreign policy issues. To strengthen its military diplomacy to contribute to Nepal’s overall diplomacy and foreign policy, it will require more military attaché in Nepal foreign diplomatic missions of vital security and development interest. Moreover, Nepal should continue building synergies between its national security, foreign and development policies as well as strengthening military diplomacy both at bilateral and regional levels.


Author(s):  
Donald S. Travis

Post-9/11 civil-military challenges associated with sustained military operations against assorted enemies in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other regions around the world are examined through the Clausewitzian concept known as the "paradoxical trinity" of the people, the military establishment, and the civilian government. As America's wars are conducted by a consortium of land forces that General Peter Schoomaker once characterized as a "new strategic triad" composed of the Army and Marines with Special Operations Forces (SOF), the Clausewitzian framework is employed to help reassess three interrelated lessons drawn from the Vietnam War: the legality of war, the use of advanced weapons and their associated strategies, and the persistent debates over how best to employ military power focused on conventional versus unconventional forces' roles, missions, and tactics. Potential futures of landpower and civil-military relations are identified and discussed to challenge current political and military policies and stimulate further inquiry.


Author(s):  
Risa Brooks

This chapter argues that adaptation of emerging technology—artificial intelligence (AI), among other forms—will introduce new stresses and tensions in civil-military relations across a variety of domains and contexts. Specifically, the analysis highlights four areas of potential stress. The first area is the organizational implications of technological change and innovation for military institutions and civilian actors. The second is the opportunities and obstacles emerging technology poses for civilian oversight of the military. A third area includes how the introduction of technology in advisory processes at the senior level may affect tensions in strategic assessment and the provision of military advice in those processes. A final issue is the evolving character of the profession of arms and the diminution of the military’s exclusive domain of expertise relative to civilian actors.


Author(s):  
Naila Salihu

Civil–military relations is traditionally concerned with the nature and interaction among three societal actors namely military institutions, political elites, and the citizenry. The nature of this complex relationship and whether it is harmonious to prevent military intervention in politics depends on how these societal actors cooperate on certain societal variables. Civil–military relations of West African countries are influenced by those countries’ colonial and postindependence experiences. The military establishments of most African states were birthed from colonial armies. Historically rooted pathologies about the role of the security and defense forces in society created deep cleavages between state and the military, and their relations to political authority on the one hand, and society on the other. The use of African armies for political and imperialist purposes during the colonial era and their roles in the struggle for independence were important factors in shaping the behavior of African armies after independence. Most colonial states did not attain independence with indigenous, nationalist-oriented military institutions. The transition of colonial regiments into the national armies of newly independent states were met with challenges in terms of establishing legitimacy and effectiveness, as these institutions had been set up under conditions that were not ideally suited to the needs of new states. Most postindependence African leaders missed the opportunity to build democratic and national militaries; instead, they maintained the status quo, as these leaders appeared more interested in building large armies for the purposes of regime stability. Successive political leaders resorted to deleterious devices such as patron–client systems, ethnic manipulation, and politicization of the military. These practices undermined the professionalism of the security apparatus and provided breeding grounds for pretorian tendencies. As the military became conscious of their political power, coups d’état became a common feature in the political dispensation of West African states. Frequent military interventions in West Africa often came with destabilizing consequences such as devastating military rules, intra-military conflicts, insurgencies, and even civil wars. Even in those countries where civil wars did not occur, the military were influential in the political landscape, in which autocratic regimes ruled with an iron hand and often used the military to inflict severe hardship on the citizens. With the return to constitutional democracies from the late 1980s, it was widely expected the role or influence of the military in the political space would be diminished as those states became more professional and democratic. However, coups d’état have reduced in the region, rather than going away completely, and the military as a state institution with a monopoly over legitimate force remains a very strong political actor, even under civilian governments. Former metropoles have been providing defense and security assistance programs to West African states for diverse reasons, including maintaining strategic hold on former colonies. Some of these interventions that aim at professionalization of the military have produced mixed outcomes in the region. In Anglophone West Africa, the British colonial policy of indirect rule contributed to the class division between the upper class (civilian politicians) and the lower class (the military and common people). This, coupled with the use of the military as agents of repression to safeguard colonial interests, created a popular dislike and negative image of colonial armies. State militaries went on to become destabilizing forces in political processes across the region. After independence, United Kingdom maintained a fluctuating presence in its former colonies due to its imperial past and strategic interests. In French West Africa, Africans were recruited from French colonies into the French army serve France’s military interests. African soldiers played diverse roles in their countries’ struggles for independence, which led to the military’s having a central role in the politics of postindependence Francophone states. France’s Africa policy differs from that of other former colonial powers in terms of its postindependence engagements with former colonies. In other parts of West Africa, Portuguese colonialism contributed to the creation of a central role for national liberation forces, which metamorphosed into postindependence military and political actors, with destabilizing consequences.


2021 ◽  
pp. 79-90
Author(s):  
Daniel N. Mlambo

Lesotho offers an exciting case study for the analysis of the interface between power, politics and instability. Since gaining its independence from Britain in 1966, Lesotho has over the last five decades been plagued by persistent political instability that has paved way for the breakdown of the rule of law, gross human rights violations, underdevelopment and insecurity where at times the security sector like the Lesotho Defence Force has taken over several key institutions in the country. Political instability in the tiny kingdom has been a daunting agenda for all concerned actors, including political parties, civil society, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and other continental stakeholders. While the security sector of any state is of importance, it becomes problematic if it becomes involved in a state’s political affairs. The repercussions of such trajectories of governance have been quite profound for democratic stability and security. Using a qualitative methodology, supplemented by secondary data, this article seeks to unearth Lesotho’s political instability, the role of its security forces and continental actors in its continuous internal governance crisis post the colonial era. The article rightfully shows that The power, possessed by both the military and police, has made them have a robust role in state affairs rather than institutions, mandated to safeguard Lesotho’s citizens. The legitimacy of the security sector underpins restructuring, transparent and accessible security sectors enhance healthy civil-military relations. Restructuring a state’s security and political dynamic reforms is not an easy task, it requires a state managerial and dedication prowess and assistance from different role players and therefore an ample amount of time and effort is invested in the coordination of this process.


2004 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez

AbstractThis paper analyzes the conditions in which the governments of Argentina and Brazil founded security institutions in the early 1990s, while they were democratizing. It advances the hypothesis that international cooperation in the security field is often linked to the evolution of civil-military relations. Civilian leaders in both countries established institutions and sought international participation deliberately to achieve civilian control and gain leverage over the military establishment, which they sorely distrusted. The need to stabilize civil-military relations at home was therefore the prime motivating force behind the emergence of security institutions in the Southern Cone. Three mechanisms were at work: omnibalancing, policy handling, and managing uncertainty. These mechanisms are derived from three different schools of thought: realism, organizational-bureaucratic models, and theories of domestic political institutions. Besides explaining the sources of nuclear bilateral cooperation, this argument also serves as a critique of two prominent theories in international relations that attempt to explain cooperation and peaceful relations among democracies: neoliberal insti-tutionalism and democratic peace theory.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-189
Author(s):  
Marc R. DeVore

AbstractFew issues are more important yet less understood than outside interventions in intra-state conflicts. Under what circumstances do intervening states further their interests and when, contrarily, do they plunge into quagmires? France is a critical case. It is, statistically, the world’s second intervenor and earned the sobriquet of Africa’s gendarme through frequent interventions in African wars. The ability of such a medium-sized state to intervene with greater regularity and ostensible success than larger powers raises questions about how France manages its interventions. Do French interventions draw on the French Army’s distinctive ‘school’ of population-centric counterinsurgency, which emphasises the need to militarise governance in pursuit of comprehensive victories? Or do the French Fifth Republic’s civil-military institutions encourage policymakers to carefully regulate force’s employment in pursuit of limited ends? This study draws on declassified archives to test which approach most characterises French interventions. To preview my conclusions, strategic satisficing – the use of minimal force for short durations to produce satisfactory outcomes – distinguishes the Fifth Republic’s interventions from other powers’ practices and prior French counterinsurgencies. This particular form of interventionism enables France to influence a large number of intra-state conflicts and maintain a network of security agreements with African states.


1982 ◽  
Vol 38 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 302-316
Author(s):  
Veena Kukereja

It is interesting to note that, although the Pakistani and Indian political systems share many common features relating to history, military organization and an overall areal culture, the two systems have displayed contrasting patterns of civil-military relations. The armies of both the countries inherited the British Indian military traditions of non-involvement in politics, but in Pakistan the Army eroded this tradition by intervening decisively and frequently whereas in India, the principle of civilian supremacy remains intact. Their post-independence development, composition, and relationship with the civilian authority has been markedly different. This had a direct bearing upon the divergent roles of the armies of the two countries. Given the variety of hypotheses that have been suggested as explanations for the contrasting behaviour of the two successor armies of British India, this article would examine several variables and relationships in comparative perspective under two sets of theoretical explanatory variables that are too often kept separate. These are: 1 the internal features of the military establishment1 and 2 the external or environmental variables.2


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document