Nation-Building, Democratic Transitions and the Military Generals in Zimbabwe and Sudan

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-46
Author(s):  
Legend L.E. Asuelime1
1999 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul W. Posner

The constraints imposed on Chile’s democratic transition by the military regime, plus the impact of structural reform and the political renovation of the dominant parties of the center and left, have made the traditional party allies of the popular sectors unable or unwiIIing to represent those constituents in the political arena. This argument is substantiated through an overview of pacted democratic transitions, an analysis of the evolution of party-base relations in Chile, and a consideration of the institutional impediments to further democratic reform.


2019 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 332-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darin Christensen ◽  
Mai Nguyen ◽  
Renard Sexton

abstractDemocratic transitions are often followed by conflict. This article explores one explanation: the military’s strategic use of violence to retain control of economically valuable regions. The authors uncover this dynamic in Myanmar, a country transitioning from four decades of military rule. Fearing that the new civilian government will assert authority over jade mining, the military initiated violence in mining townships. Using geocoded data on conflict and jade mines, the authors find evidence for this strategic use of violence. As Myanmar started to transition in 2011, conflicts instigated by the military in jademining areas sharply rose. The article also addresses alternative explanations, including a shift in the military’s strategy, colocation of mines and military headquarters, commodity prices, opposition to a controversial dam, and trends specific to Kachin State. With implications beyond Myanmar, the authors argue that outgoing generals can use instability to retain rents where plausible challengers to state authority provide a pretense for violence.


Asian Survey ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 818-830 ◽  
Author(s):  
David W. Chang
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 196-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. GANESAN

AbstractDemocratic transitions in Asia have received widespread interest in the political science literature since the 1990s. The Thein Sein-led government that came into power in 2010 in Myanmar has undertaken wide ranging reforms that has altered the country's political landscape. They include evolving a working relationship with the political opposition, freeing political prisoners, and the granting of amnesty to political exiles to encourage their return, the negotiation of ceasefire agreements with almost all of the ethnic insurgent armies and the inauguration of the Myanmar Peace Centre. Nonetheless, the county continues to suffer from ongoing developments that retard the process of democratization as well. A confluence of interest between the NLD, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations also prompted attempts to change the 2008 Constitution and its by-laws that prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from running for the country's presidency. That attempt and the potential for reform were scuttled by the August 2015 ‘coup’ against Thura Shwe Mann. The NLD's overwhelming victory in the November elections has significantly strengthened Suu Kyi's position and all major political actors including those from the military have been conciliatory towards the election outcome and there is cause for cautious optimism. After 6 months in power, the policy priorities of the new government are also clearer.


2017 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan D. Ablard

In 1918 an anonymous conscript writing toLa Protesta, an anarchist paper known for its anti-militarism, complained about life in the Argentine navy. The military was a “school of vice” where everyone was reduced to a number and was subject to the most cruel and random subordination. The conscript fumed, “You even lose control of your hair.”


Author(s):  
Holger Albrecht ◽  
Kevin Koehler ◽  
Austin Schutz

Abstract This research note introduces new global data on military coups. Conventional aggregate data so far have conflated two distinct types of coups. Military interventions by leading officers are coups “from above,” characterized by political power struggles within authoritarian elite coalitions where officers move against civilian elites, executive incumbents, and their loyal security personnel. By contrast, power grabs by officers from the lower and middle ranks are coups “from below,” where military personnel outside of the political elite challenge sitting incumbents, their loyalists, and the regime itself. Disaggregating coup types offers leverage to revise important questions about the causes and consequences of military intervention in politics. This research note illustrates that coup attempts from the top of the military hierarchy are much more likely to be successful than coups from the lower and middle ranks of the military hierarchy. Moreover, coups from the top recalibrate authoritarian elite coalitions and serve to sustain autocratic rule; they rarely produce an opening for a democratic transition. Successful coups from below, by contrast, can result in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and generate an opening for democratic transitions.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Mouataz El Esrawi

This is a study on Egypt’s brief interlude of civilian rule that lasted for just over a year between June 2012 and July 2013. In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), ascended to the presidency in what was hitherto Egypt’s most democratic election. Morsi, the first civilian to hold the highest office in the state, was ousted from power in July 2013 in a military coup that was led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This study seeks to explain the downfall of the Morsi regime, through emphasizing the dynamic interplay of three factors: 1) the regime’s mismanagement of relations with powerful and autonomous state institutions (particularly the military) and with broad segments of Egyptian society; 2) its inability to reverse the deterioration in Egypt’s economic performance; and 3) its mishandling of Egypt’s external relations with powerful regional and international players. The thesis contends that while none of the aforementioned factors singlehandedly explains why Egypt’s democratic experiment under Morsi (imperfect as it was) fumbled, their complex interplay created a powerful platform that the military, and its allies within the state and society, exploited to bring down Morsi and the MB. The thesis hopes to contribute to the literature on the domestic and international conditions that can often lead to the faltering of democratic transitions. Keywords: Egypt,


2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 555-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTHONY W. PEREIRA

Authoritarian regimes in Latin America frequently expanded military court jurisdiction to prosecute political opponents and protect members of the armed forces and police engaged in repression. What happened to the military courts after the recent transitions to democracy in the region? Why did some democratic transitions produce broad reform of military justice while most did not? This article first reviews contending theoretical explanations that offer answers to these questions, comparing those answers with actual outcomes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. It then argues that the “mode of transition” perspective, which attributes variation in the extent of military justice reform to the autonomy and strength of the military in the democratic transition, best explains the outcomes in these cases. However, the military's autonomy and strength should be specified. In the area of military justice, the relevant factors are the military's propagation of an accepted legal justification for past uses of military courts and the creation of congressional support for the maintenance of existing military court jurisdiction. Both of these factors are present in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, where little or no reform of military justice took place under democratization, and absent in Argentina, where broad reform did occur.


Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol

This chapter more broadly analyzes the universe of democratic transitions. It explains why we tend to romanticize democratic transitions like most romantic comedies glamorize love: The people gather in a central square, start protesting, topple the dictatorship, hold elections, and live happily ever after. It further discusses why the on-the-ground facts often fail to live up to this simple ideal, why history is littered with failed attempts to democratize, and why even successful democratic transitions are often painfully long and violent. Ideally, of course, it would be enlightened civilians—not military leaders—who would depose an authoritarian government and promote, in concert with civil society, the conditions necessary for democratic development. But in many cases, civilian institutions are unable or unwilling to enable democracy, leaving the military to take charge.


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