scholarly journals Coup Agency and Prospects for Democracy

Author(s):  
Holger Albrecht ◽  
Kevin Koehler ◽  
Austin Schutz

Abstract This research note introduces new global data on military coups. Conventional aggregate data so far have conflated two distinct types of coups. Military interventions by leading officers are coups “from above,” characterized by political power struggles within authoritarian elite coalitions where officers move against civilian elites, executive incumbents, and their loyal security personnel. By contrast, power grabs by officers from the lower and middle ranks are coups “from below,” where military personnel outside of the political elite challenge sitting incumbents, their loyalists, and the regime itself. Disaggregating coup types offers leverage to revise important questions about the causes and consequences of military intervention in politics. This research note illustrates that coup attempts from the top of the military hierarchy are much more likely to be successful than coups from the lower and middle ranks of the military hierarchy. Moreover, coups from the top recalibrate authoritarian elite coalitions and serve to sustain autocratic rule; they rarely produce an opening for a democratic transition. Successful coups from below, by contrast, can result in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and generate an opening for democratic transitions.

1999 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul W. Posner

The constraints imposed on Chile’s democratic transition by the military regime, plus the impact of structural reform and the political renovation of the dominant parties of the center and left, have made the traditional party allies of the popular sectors unable or unwiIIing to represent those constituents in the political arena. This argument is substantiated through an overview of pacted democratic transitions, an analysis of the evolution of party-base relations in Chile, and a consideration of the institutional impediments to further democratic reform.


Author(s):  
N. Rogozhina

The political development of Thailand in XXIth century is characterized by a deep split of the society into opponents and supporters of democratization. The latter are consolidated around the figure of Taksin Sinavatra, the former prime minister. He was overthrown by the military in 2006, but still enjoys the support of the popular majority he gained due to his economic policy aimed at improving the life conditions of the poor in periphery regions. The triumph of his parties in elections since 2001 caused the new power balance in politics traditionally viewed as a focal area of the political establishment – the representatives of the Bangkok upper and middle classes only. The marginalization of their position in the political system and the impossibility of coming to power through elections determined their integration into the anti-government movement, for the purpose of cancelling the representative democracy system that doesn’t meet the interests of the traditional political elite finding itself in a “minority” and unwilling to be under the reign of a “majority”. The deepening of the political crisis provoked the military into undertaking the coup d’état in May 2014 and establishing an authoritarian regime, which ensured the accrescency of power for the traditional elite. Nevertheless, as the author concludes, the future political development of Thailand seems unclear. The power of military in cooperation with their civilian followers is unlikely to reconcile the society, split by class differences and political aspirations. The contemporary political development of Thailand reflects the situation when the “populace” doesn’t want just to remain under control any longer, and the “upper strata” refuses to be under the rule of the electoral majority. The main question raised today is not of the Taksin's destiny, but of an alternative for the Thailand's future political development – restricted democracy directed by upper classes, or representative democracy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 196-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. GANESAN

AbstractDemocratic transitions in Asia have received widespread interest in the political science literature since the 1990s. The Thein Sein-led government that came into power in 2010 in Myanmar has undertaken wide ranging reforms that has altered the country's political landscape. They include evolving a working relationship with the political opposition, freeing political prisoners, and the granting of amnesty to political exiles to encourage their return, the negotiation of ceasefire agreements with almost all of the ethnic insurgent armies and the inauguration of the Myanmar Peace Centre. Nonetheless, the county continues to suffer from ongoing developments that retard the process of democratization as well. A confluence of interest between the NLD, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations also prompted attempts to change the 2008 Constitution and its by-laws that prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from running for the country's presidency. That attempt and the potential for reform were scuttled by the August 2015 ‘coup’ against Thura Shwe Mann. The NLD's overwhelming victory in the November elections has significantly strengthened Suu Kyi's position and all major political actors including those from the military have been conciliatory towards the election outcome and there is cause for cautious optimism. After 6 months in power, the policy priorities of the new government are also clearer.


Significance Opposition victories, especially those that remove long-standing authoritarian regimes, have been associated with democratic strengthening, with transfers of power shown to boost public support for democracy and demonstrate that the political elite is willing to share power, bolstering democratic norms and values. Impacts Evidence of further opposition victories will encourage authoritarian leaders to deploy more intense pre-election repression. Ruling parties at risk of losing polls may try to exploit the pandemic to postpone elections, especially in more authoritarian settings. While transfers of power have often strengthened democracy, they largely disrupt rather than bring an end to political corruption networks.


Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

This article examines the role that military intervention can play in ending genocide and the political, moral, and legal debates that surround it. The first section briefly examines how genocides have ended since the beginning of the twentieth century, and explores the place of military intervention by external powers. The second section examines whether there is a moral and/or legal duty to intervene to end genocide. The third section considers the reasons why states intervene only infrequently to put an end to genocide despite their rhetorical commitments. Historically, once started, genocides tend to end with either the military defeat of the perpetrators or the suppression of the victim groups. Only military force can directly prevent genocidal killing, stand between perpetrators and their intended victims, and protect the delivery of lifesaving aid. But its use entails risks for all parties and does not necessarily resolve the underlying conflict.


2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 555-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTHONY W. PEREIRA

Authoritarian regimes in Latin America frequently expanded military court jurisdiction to prosecute political opponents and protect members of the armed forces and police engaged in repression. What happened to the military courts after the recent transitions to democracy in the region? Why did some democratic transitions produce broad reform of military justice while most did not? This article first reviews contending theoretical explanations that offer answers to these questions, comparing those answers with actual outcomes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. It then argues that the “mode of transition” perspective, which attributes variation in the extent of military justice reform to the autonomy and strength of the military in the democratic transition, best explains the outcomes in these cases. However, the military's autonomy and strength should be specified. In the area of military justice, the relevant factors are the military's propagation of an accepted legal justification for past uses of military courts and the creation of congressional support for the maintenance of existing military court jurisdiction. Both of these factors are present in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, where little or no reform of military justice took place under democratization, and absent in Argentina, where broad reform did occur.


Author(s):  
Catherine Gegout

Chapter three locates European military intervention alongside the military interventions and political and economic presence of other regional and international actors. African states have agency in their own foreign policies, but African security organizations are dependent on European funding for the deployment of troops, and they cooperate with the European Union. The United Nations is present in Africa, but it often has to act alone: European actors are not always there to support UN missions. However, Europeans are keen on reinforcing UN capacity to fight militias. China is increasingly an important economic partner of Africa, and now becoming a security actor there. European actors are trying to develop relations with China on African security affairs. The United States is an important security actor in Africa, with military bases there. Its role and motives are studied in detail, as it influences the decisions of European actors to intervene.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 10-24
Author(s):  
Jorge Battaglino

Argentina has a deeply rooted tradition of rejecting participation by the military in internal security and legislation that prohibits such involvement. The current construction of a threat from drug trafficking and terrorism and the proposal of intervention by the armed forces to contend with them is the result of a narrative justifying the implementation of various government policies. Exploration of the mechanism of discursive threat construction, or securitization, from the critical perspective of the Copenhagen School demonstrates how security discourse and practices allow actors and institutions to mobilize resources, control agendas, and use violence with greater discretion. Argentina tiene una arraigada tradición de rechazo a la participación de los militares en temas de seguridad interna y posee, además, una legislación que prohíbe tal involucramiento. La construcción actual de la amenaza del narcotráfico y el terrorismo y la propuesta de intervención de las fuerzas armadas para enfrentarlas son el resultado de un discurso que es funcional a la implementación de distintas políticas por parte del gobierno. Una examinación de la dinámica de la construcción discursiva de la amenaza, o la securitización, a partir de la perspectiva crítica de la Escuela Copenhague evidencia cómo el discurso y las prácticas de la seguridad permiten a actores e instituciones movilizar recursos, controlar agendas y utilizar la violencia con mayor discrecionalidad.


Author(s):  
Valerio Vignoli

Abstract Various studies explored under which conditions junior coalition partners are able to have an impact on foreign policy outcomes. However, these parties do not always manage to get what they want. In this situation, they face a dilemma: defecting or staying? In the Italian context, as far as Military Operations Abroad (MOA) are concerned, the latter option has invariably prevailed. In particular, Italy's involvement in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999) and Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011) raised considerable contestation from junior partners that did not result in the termination of the respective cabinets. Employing extensive qualitative data, including a set of original interviews with relevant policymakers, this article aims to understand why junior partners did not defect in these two cases. The empirical findings highlight a variation in parties' motivations according to their ideological leaning: while extreme-left parties were afraid of being punished by their own voters for leaving the cabinet because of the participation in the operation in Kosovo, the far-right and autonomist Lega Nord did not consider opposition to the military intervention in Libya as a salient issue. Therefore, the article has considerable implications for the research agendas on the party politics of military interventions and government termination.


1997 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 1069-1083 ◽  
Author(s):  
NIGEL JOHN ASHTON

This article reinterprets the post-Suez British role in the Middle East through a comparison of the military interventions in Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in 1961. Moreover, it places these operations in the broader context of the debate about British decline. It is argued that in addition to the familiar constraints on British action imposed by limited resources and the changing international climate, the projection of power in the region proved to be a great test of nerve for British ministers and officials. Paradoxically, this proved to be true as much of the successful interventions in Jordan and Kuwait as of the earlier failure over Suez. Utilizing very recently released documents from British and American archives, the article aims to shed light on the dynamics of decline at the microcosmic level, in the belief that insights gleaned here may well be of value in revising macrocosmic theories of the process.


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