Appraising Myanmar's Democratic Transition and Evolving Challenges

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 196-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. GANESAN

AbstractDemocratic transitions in Asia have received widespread interest in the political science literature since the 1990s. The Thein Sein-led government that came into power in 2010 in Myanmar has undertaken wide ranging reforms that has altered the country's political landscape. They include evolving a working relationship with the political opposition, freeing political prisoners, and the granting of amnesty to political exiles to encourage their return, the negotiation of ceasefire agreements with almost all of the ethnic insurgent armies and the inauguration of the Myanmar Peace Centre. Nonetheless, the county continues to suffer from ongoing developments that retard the process of democratization as well. A confluence of interest between the NLD, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations also prompted attempts to change the 2008 Constitution and its by-laws that prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from running for the country's presidency. That attempt and the potential for reform were scuttled by the August 2015 ‘coup’ against Thura Shwe Mann. The NLD's overwhelming victory in the November elections has significantly strengthened Suu Kyi's position and all major political actors including those from the military have been conciliatory towards the election outcome and there is cause for cautious optimism. After 6 months in power, the policy priorities of the new government are also clearer.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Benjamin H. Beets

<p>Historically, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and Myanmar’s Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) held tremendous levels of domestic political influence. Following independence in the 1940s, both countries experienced a short and unstable democratic period. Largely due to the weakness of civilian institutions, and the special place of the TNI and the Tatmadaw in society, both militaries became the most dominant political actors in their respective countries. In 1998, President Suharto’s government fell, which instigated a period of political reform whereby the TNI removed itself from the political realm. It would seem as if democratisation has seen the TNI lose significant political clout. However, is it this simple? Does democratisation mean a total loss of political influence for the military?  This paper seeks to understand to what extent the TNI lost political influence in the democratic era and whether similar developments are likely for Myanmar’s Tatmadaw. To answer this question, this paper will review literature on influence, democracy and civilmilitary relations in order to produce a thematic framework of indicators that can be used for further analysis on the TNI and the Tatmadaw. Once a framework has been laid, this paper will investigate the Indonesian experience, focusing on pre-democracy (1945-1998), before shifting to see how influential the TNI is in the democratic era (1998-2015). The Tatmadaw’s political influence will then be examined in the junta period (1948-2015). Once the Tatmadaw current state is understood, this paper will provide informed judgements on the likely influence of the Tatmadaw in a future democratic Myanmar.  This paper found that in the post-Suharto era, the TNI still retains political influence as a result of its strong standing in Indonesian society, involvement in off-budget income generation, and a strong internal security role, as well as weak civilian institutions. Although the TNI no longer have a dominant role in Indonesia politics, they certain hold a level of political influence in Jakarta. With Myanmar heading toward democratisation, after fifty years of junta rule, will the Tatmadaw follow a similar trajectory? This paper is timely. November 8, 2015 will see democratic elections take place in Myanmar. The most popular political party, the National League for Democracy, led by democratic icon Aung San Suu Kyi, is likely to do very well in the election. At the same time, Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution indirectly bans her from becoming president, provides the Tatmadaw with 25 percent of the seats in parliament and gives the military a veto option, even in the supposedly democratic era.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Benjamin H. Beets

<p>Historically, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and Myanmar’s Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) held tremendous levels of domestic political influence. Following independence in the 1940s, both countries experienced a short and unstable democratic period. Largely due to the weakness of civilian institutions, and the special place of the TNI and the Tatmadaw in society, both militaries became the most dominant political actors in their respective countries. In 1998, President Suharto’s government fell, which instigated a period of political reform whereby the TNI removed itself from the political realm. It would seem as if democratisation has seen the TNI lose significant political clout. However, is it this simple? Does democratisation mean a total loss of political influence for the military?  This paper seeks to understand to what extent the TNI lost political influence in the democratic era and whether similar developments are likely for Myanmar’s Tatmadaw. To answer this question, this paper will review literature on influence, democracy and civilmilitary relations in order to produce a thematic framework of indicators that can be used for further analysis on the TNI and the Tatmadaw. Once a framework has been laid, this paper will investigate the Indonesian experience, focusing on pre-democracy (1945-1998), before shifting to see how influential the TNI is in the democratic era (1998-2015). The Tatmadaw’s political influence will then be examined in the junta period (1948-2015). Once the Tatmadaw current state is understood, this paper will provide informed judgements on the likely influence of the Tatmadaw in a future democratic Myanmar.  This paper found that in the post-Suharto era, the TNI still retains political influence as a result of its strong standing in Indonesian society, involvement in off-budget income generation, and a strong internal security role, as well as weak civilian institutions. Although the TNI no longer have a dominant role in Indonesia politics, they certain hold a level of political influence in Jakarta. With Myanmar heading toward democratisation, after fifty years of junta rule, will the Tatmadaw follow a similar trajectory? This paper is timely. November 8, 2015 will see democratic elections take place in Myanmar. The most popular political party, the National League for Democracy, led by democratic icon Aung San Suu Kyi, is likely to do very well in the election. At the same time, Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution indirectly bans her from becoming president, provides the Tatmadaw with 25 percent of the seats in parliament and gives the military a veto option, even in the supposedly democratic era.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-188
Author(s):  
Godfrey Maringira

This article argues that, through the coup, the military has become more visible in national politics in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. The current situation under President Mnangagwa marks a qualitative difference with the military under Mugabe’s rule. Currently, in now being more prominent, the military is politics and is the determinant of any political transition that may be forthcoming in Zimbabwe. However, if it deems it necessary, the military accommodates civilian politicians into politics in order to ‘sanitize’ the political landscape in its own interests. Simultaneously, despite their involvement in the coup, ordinary soldiers feel increasingly marginalized under Mnangagwa’s government.


Author(s):  
A. Dzhumadullaeva ◽  
◽  
E. Zulpykharova ◽  

The article considers the fact that the Seljuk state was founded by the Oghuz Seljuks, as well as the internal social policy of the Seljuk empire as a prerequisite for a crisis in the country (late XI and early XII centuries). The Seljuks combined the fragmented political landscape of the eastern Islamic world and played a key role in first and second crusades. Strongly Persianized in culture and language, the Seljuks also played an important role in the development of the Turkic-Persian tradition, even exporting Persian culture to Anatolia. The resettlement of Turkic tribes in the northwestern peripheral parts of the empire with the military strategic goal of repelling the invasions of neighboring states led to the gradual Turkization of these territories. Sultans handed out nobles and ordinary warriors to the nobility - ikta, which made it possible for the sultan to maintain power. At the end of the XI century, large conquests ended, bringing the nobility new lands and military booty, which led to a change in the political situation in the country. Know began to strive to turn their possessions into legally hereditary, and their power over the Rayyats - into unlimited; the owners of large Lenas raised rebellions, seeking independence (Khorezm in the 1st half of the XII century). To provide the army with land (ICT), wages, gifts, food, weapons, uniforms, medicines, the Sultan's government went to any expense. The widespread use of ICT in the army has allowed the creation of a stable mercenary army, specializing in the change of people's squads


1999 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul W. Posner

The constraints imposed on Chile’s democratic transition by the military regime, plus the impact of structural reform and the political renovation of the dominant parties of the center and left, have made the traditional party allies of the popular sectors unable or unwiIIing to represent those constituents in the political arena. This argument is substantiated through an overview of pacted democratic transitions, an analysis of the evolution of party-base relations in Chile, and a consideration of the institutional impediments to further democratic reform.


2018 ◽  
Vol 164 (5) ◽  
pp. 358-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ojas Pujji ◽  
S L A Jeffery

Burn excision is the gold standard treatment for full thickness and some deep partial thickness burns. Early burn excision (24–96 hours) has been shown to improve patient outcomes. However, in the military setting, transporting the patient to a centre which can provide this procedure can be delayed. Especially as control of airspace in the future may be hampered due to the political landscape. For this reason, focus on how to achieve safer burn excision prior to repatriation should be addressed. This paper considers the barriers to early burn excision in the military setting and offers potential solutions for the future.


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Napoleon Bamfo

Abstract African nations never seriously addressed the issue of term limits for incumbents until newly-drafted constitutions did so in the early 1990s. Since then, however, some incumbents have initiated campaigns to circumvent that measure. Some of those initiatives have been successful; others have not. Incumbents attempting to stay in office longer than what constitutions originally allowed used to be a time-honored strategy that African leaders regularly employed throughout the post-independent period until the early 1990s. The autocratic and single-party regimes that littered Africa's political landscape epitomized the extent to which political incumbents would go to keep anybody else, including members of their own party, from winning the highest political office.The response of opposition groups and the military, which assumed a guardianship role, to this wanton aggrandizement of power was a spate of military coups, counter-coups, and sabotage or destabilize those regimes. African nations paid dearly for this wave of instability to which almost all political systems became associated. This period of uncertainty and decay reminiscent of Africa's recent history is being re-invented following unsuccessful attempts of political incumbents in Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia to seek additional terms. Even as these efforts were being resisted, incumbents elsewhere were succeeding at securing additional terms. This paper examines the impact this recent trend among incumbents for term extension will have on the building of political institutions in Africa. If history were to serve as a guide, that spells an ominous foreboding.


ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanaa Ahmed

AbstractDespite a rich history of judicial review, the activism witnessed during the tenure of former Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry (2005-2013The Chaudhry court’s activism is mapped against the historic trajectory of judicial review in Pakistan, particularly the cases pertaining to military takeovers and administrative law. It is contended that the seeming expansion of the frontiers of judicial review merely mark the renegotiation of political power between the judiciary, the military as well as political and economic elite. Further, it is argued that the economy was the most convenient amphi­theatre for this battle for greater political relevance by and among the political actors in contemporary Pakistan and not, as alleged, what was actually being fought over.


Author(s):  
Holger Albrecht ◽  
Kevin Koehler ◽  
Austin Schutz

Abstract This research note introduces new global data on military coups. Conventional aggregate data so far have conflated two distinct types of coups. Military interventions by leading officers are coups “from above,” characterized by political power struggles within authoritarian elite coalitions where officers move against civilian elites, executive incumbents, and their loyal security personnel. By contrast, power grabs by officers from the lower and middle ranks are coups “from below,” where military personnel outside of the political elite challenge sitting incumbents, their loyalists, and the regime itself. Disaggregating coup types offers leverage to revise important questions about the causes and consequences of military intervention in politics. This research note illustrates that coup attempts from the top of the military hierarchy are much more likely to be successful than coups from the lower and middle ranks of the military hierarchy. Moreover, coups from the top recalibrate authoritarian elite coalitions and serve to sustain autocratic rule; they rarely produce an opening for a democratic transition. Successful coups from below, by contrast, can result in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and generate an opening for democratic transitions.


2020 ◽  
Vol V (IV) ◽  
pp. 41-48
Author(s):  
Kausar Shafiq ◽  
Abdul Basit Khan ◽  
Ali Shan Shah

The denial of the institutionalization of political power by various civilian as well as martial law regimes has been a constant problem in Pakistan. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the first person who could do so in an effective manner, but his eternal departure in the early phase of the history of Pakistan changed the entire course of the country, and the successor leadership had to pursue self-serving politics just to prolong their rule. The same is the case with the rule of General Pervaiz Musharraf (1999-2008), which converted the parliamentary system envisaged by the 1973 constitution of Pakistan into a quasi-presidential system just to prolong the military dictatorship. The subsequent rule of the Pakistan Peoples' Party (2008-2013) was a tough period for the political leadership since the preceding dictatorship had completely altered the socio-political landscape of the country; however, the political wisdom of Mr. Asif Ali Zardari helped the country to sail smoothly during the aftershocks of the martial law regime. In that perspective, the current study intends to analyze the political developments in Pakistan during the third rule of the Pakistan Peoples' Party over the country during the period 2008-2013.


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