scholarly journals Development of Moral Beliefs in Some Principal Upanishads

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-266
Author(s):  
Binita Kar
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauris Christopher Kaldjian

The communication of moral reasoning in medicine can be understood as a means of showing respect for patients and colleagues through the giving of moral reasons for actions. This communication is especially important when disagreements arise. While moral reasoning should strive for impartiality, it also needs to acknowledge the individual moral beliefs and values that distinguish each person (moral particularity) and give rise to the challenge of contrasting moral frameworks (moral pluralism). Efforts to communicate moral reasoning should move beyond common approaches to principles-based reasoning in medical ethics by addressing the underlying beliefs and values that define our moral frameworks and guide our interpretations and applications of principles. Communicating about underlying beliefs and values requires a willingness to grapple with challenges of accessibility (the degree to which particular beliefs and values are intelligible between persons) and translatability (the degree to which particular beliefs and values can be transposed from one moral framework to another) as words and concepts are used to communicate beliefs and values. Moral dialogues between professionals and patients and among professionals themselves need to be handled carefully, and sometimes these dialogues invite reference to underlying beliefs and values. When professionals choose to articulate such beliefs and values, they can do so as an expression of respectful patient care and collaboration and as a means of promoting their own moral integrity by signalling the need for consistency between their own beliefs, words and actions.


Author(s):  
Joshua May

Even if we can rise above self-interest, we may just be slaves of our passions. But the motivational power of reason, via moral beliefs, has been understated, even in the difficult case of temptation. Experiments show that often when we succumb, it is due in part to a change in moral (or normative) judgment. We can see this by carefully examining a range of experiments on motivated reasoning, moral licensing, moral hypocrisy, and moral identity. Rationalization, perhaps paradoxically, reveals a deep regard for reason, to act in ways we can justify to ourselves and to others. The result is that we are very often morally motivated or exhibit moral integrity. Even when behaving badly, actions that often seem motivated by self-interest are actually ultimately driven by a concern to do what’s right.


Author(s):  
Florien M. Cramwinckel ◽  
Kees van den Bos ◽  
Eric van Dijk

AbstractActing on one’s moral principles is not always easy. Upholding one’s moral beliefs may run counter to one’s social environment or situational demands. It may often cause people to remain silent on their convictions, while at the same time some may show the moral courage to speak out. How do people evaluate those who do stand up, and how does it affect their self-evaluations? In two experimental studies (Ns = 207 and 204), we investigated both types of evaluations. The studies demonstrate that people who failed to uphold their moral beliefs still had positive evaluations of others who showed moral courage. More specifically, pro-gay participants who went along with writing an anti-gay essay denouncing equal rights for sexual minorities had positive evaluations of another person who spoke up and refused this task. The failure to display moral courage had negative consequences for participants’ self-concepts. In Experiment 1, we show that pro-gay participants’ positive self-concepts were lowered after writing an anti-gay essay (vs. a pro-gay essay). In Experiment 2, we reveal that participants' positive self-concepts were lowered only when they were confronted with morally courageous behavior and their own failure to uphold their moral beliefs was visible to the experimenter.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-144
Author(s):  
Brad E. Kelle

Moral injury emerged within clinical psychology and related fields to refer to a non-physical wound (psychological and emotional pain and its effects) that results from the violation (by oneself or others) of a person’s deepest moral beliefs (about oneself, others, or the world). Originally conceived in the context of warfare, the notion has now expanded to include the morally damaging impact of various non-war-related experiences and circumstances. Since its inception, moral injury has been an intersectional and cross-disciplinary term and significant work has appeared in psychology, philosophy, medicine, spiritual/pastoral care, chaplaincy, and theology. Since 2015, biblical scholarship has engaged moral injury along two primary trajectories: 1) creative re-readings of biblical stories and characters informed by insights from moral injury; and 2) explorations of the postwar rituals and symbolic practices found in biblical texts and how they might connect to the felt needs of morally injured persons. These trajectories suggest that the engagement between the Bible and moral injury generates a two-way conversation in which moral injury can serve as a heuristic that brings new meanings out of biblical texts, and the critical study of biblical texts can contribute to the attempts to understand, identify, and heal moral injury.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (194) ◽  
pp. 195-199
Author(s):  
Nataliia Huzenko ◽  

The problem of moral behavior experience for adolescents is quite sharp. The difficulty of moral behavior experience for older adolescents involves the separation in the pedagogical reality the phenomenon ‘moral behavior experience’ and its component clarification. Some issues of adolescents’ moral behavior allowed us to define our own concept ‘moral behavior experience’ as a system of conscious actions and deeds, formed in the process of acquiring knowledge about morality, moral norms, acquiring skills for their practice usage and skills of moral actions by emotional and volitional efforts. The article clarifies the component structure in the organization of moral behavior experience for older adolescents. Its clarification is necessary for understanding the process of moral behavior experience development. The paper identifies the components of moral behavior experience for older adolescents: motivational and valuable, cognitive and interesting, practical and active, personal and reflexive ones. The article describes each component separately in details. In the work the structure of moral behavior experience for older adolescents are characterized with the following components. The motivational and valuable component is represented by motivation, interest, values, moral feelings and attitudes, moral beliefs. The cognitive and interesting component is represented by knowledge of moral norms and behavior rules. The practical and active component is represented by personal ability to communicate, leadership, behavioral self-regulation. The personal and reflexive component is represented by personal traits, reflection, personal moral qualities, self-esteem and self-analysis in moral behavior. In the article the prospects of determining pedagogical conditions for moral behavior experience for older adolescents are clarified to prevent and avoid bullying. Undoubtedly, the elucidation of the component composition in the structure of the experience of moral behavior is necessary to understand the process of its formation. In the work in the structure of the experience of moral behavior of older adolescents, the following components were identified: motivational-value component (motivation, interest, values, moral feelings, relationships, moral beliefs); cognitive component (knowledge of moral norms and rules of conduct); practical-activity component (personality's ability to communicate, leadership, self-regulation of behavior), personality-reflexive component (personality traits, reflection, moral qualities of personality, self-esteem and self-analysis of moral behavior).


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A Vitriol

We investigated how moral and religious convictions relate to voting on a same-sex marriage constitutional amendment. Using data collected before and after people voted on a state constitutional amendment, we examined the psychological conditions under which moral beliefs influence political choice. Voters high in purity-based moral concerns were more likely to vote to ban same-sex marriage, and voters high in fairness-based moral concerns were more likely to vote against banning same-sex marriage. These concerns were particularly important for voters with a moral or religious conviction regarding same-sex marriage. Furthermore, moral and religious convictions moderated the effect of the vote outcome on procedural and outcome fairness perceptions. These results build on prior theory and research in political and moral psychology by highlighting the importance of convictions when understanding the link between moral beliefs and political choice.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoe Fowler ◽  
Kyle Fiore Law ◽  
Brendan Gaesser

Empathy has long been considered central in living a moral life. However, mounting evidence has shown that empathy is often biased towards (i.e., felt more strongly for) close and similar others, igniting a debate over whether empathy is inherently morally flawed and should be abandoned in efforts to strive towards greater equity. This debate has focused on whether empathy limits the scope of our morality, with little consideration of whether it may be our moral beliefs limiting our empathy. Across two studies conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N= 604), we investigate moral judgments of biased and equitable feelings of empathy. We observed a moral preference for empathy towards socially close over distant others. However, feeling equal empathy for all is seen as the most morally and socially valuable. These findings provide new theoretical insight into the relationship between empathy and morality with implications for navigating towards a more egalitarian future.


1994 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Menard ◽  
Delbert S. Elliott

2000 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 245-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Stingl

The error theory of moral judgment says that moral judgments, though often believed to be objectively true, never are. The tendency to believe in the objectivity of our moral beliefs, like the beliefs themselves, is rooted in objective features of human psychology, and not in objective features of the natural world that might exist apart from human psychology. In naturalized epistemology, it is tempting to take this view as the default hypothesis. It appears to make the fewest assumptions in accounting for the fact that humans not only make moral judgments, but believe them to be, at least some of the time, objectively true. In this paper I argue that from an evolutionary perspective, the error theory is not the most parsimonious alternative. It is simpler to suppose that mental representations with moral content arose as direct cognitive and motivational responses to independent moral facts.


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