scholarly journals PEMBENTUKAN HUKUM DALAM PERSPEKTIF PEMBARUAN HUKUM

Author(s):  
Zainal Arifin Hoesein

<p>Materi muatan hukum selayaknya mampu menangkap aspirasi masyarakat yang tumbuh dan berkembang bukan hanya yang bersifat kekinian, melainkan sebagai acuan dalam mengan Ɵ sipasi perkembangan sosial, ekonomi, budaya dan poli Ɵ k di masa depan. Norma hukum pada dasarnya inheren dengan nilai-nilai yang diyakini oleh masyarakat, tetapi daya kekuatan keberlakuan hukum, Ɵ dak dapat melepaskan diri dari kelembagaan kekuasaan, sehingga hukum, masyarakat dan kekuasaan merupakan unsur dari suatu tatanan masyarakat. Oleh karena itu, Hukum Ɵ dak sekedar dipahami sebagai norma yang menjamin kepasa Ɵ an dan keadilan tetapi juga harus dilihat dari perspek Ɵ f kemanfaatan. Oleh karena itu, maka pembentukan hukum dalam perspek Ɵ f pembaruan hukum harus difokuskan pada dua hal yaitu, sistem hukum dan budaya hukum. Tulisan ini akan membahas bagaimana idealisasi peraturan perundang-undangan; bagaimana fungsi peraturan perundang-undangan dalam pembangunan hukum; dan bagaimana pendekatan metodologis terhadap pembentukan hukum. Dari berbagai pembahasan tersebut disimpulkan bahwa pembentukan hukum dalam perspek Ɵ f pembaharuan hukum, di samping harus memperha Ɵ kan aspek metodologis, juga harus merujuk dan meletakkan norma hukum dalam kesatuan harmoni ver Ɵ kal dengan aspek teologis, ontologis, posi Ɵ vis Ɵ k dan aspek fungsional dari suatu norma hukum.</p><p>The substance of the law should be able to capture the aspira Ɵ ons of the people who grow and develop not only be present, but as a reference in an Ɵ cipa Ɵ on of the social, economic, cultural and poli Ɵ cal future. The rule of law is essen Ɵ ally inherent to the values that are believed by the public, but the validity of the power of the law, not to break away from the ins Ɵ tu Ɵ onal power, so the law, society and power is an element of a society. Therefore, the law does not merely understood as a norm that ensures certainty and jus Ɵ ce but also to be seen from the perspec Ɵ ve of expediency. Therefore, the legal establishment in the perspec Ɵ ve of legal reform should be focused on two things, namely, the legal system and legal culture. This paper will discuss how the idealiza Ɵ on of laws, how the laws func Ɵ on in the development of the law, and how the methodological approach to the legal establishment. It was concluded that the forma Ɵ on of the law in the perspec Ɵ ve of legal reform, in addi Ɵ on must pay a Ʃ en Ɵ on to methodological aspects, should also refer to and put the rule of law in the unity of ver Ɵ cal harmony with aspects of the theological, ontological, posi Ɵ vist and func Ɵ onal aspects of the rule of law.</p>

Author(s):  
Angela Dranishnikova ◽  
Ivan Semenov

The national legal system is determined by traditional elements characterizing the culture and customs that exist in the social environment in the form of moral standards and the law. However, the attitude of the population to the letter of the law, as a rule, initially contains negative properties in order to preserve personal freedom, status, position. Therefore, to solve pressing problems of rooting in the minds of society of the elementary foundations of the initial order, and then the rule of law in the public sphere, proverbs and sayings were developed that in essence contained legal educational criteria.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alani Golanski

AbstractThe prevalent approach to the concept of the rule of law among legal theorists puts attributes first, assigning certain features of laws and sometimes legal systems as rule-of-law virtues. Inquiring at a more basic level, this paper advances a novel, structuralist view of the rule of law. While honoring theoretical constraints that guard against diluting the rule-of-law concept too thinly as a remedy for myriad societal ills, this approach shows that the concept implicates inequalities sustained by a society’s social, economic, and political structures. This is accomplished by demonstrating that the rule-of-law project holds a structural position in the collective normative discourse as a vehicle by which people morally evaluate the interplay between the actual capabilities of individuals and groups to participate in law, and the legal system’s treatment of those individuals and groups.Law’s procedural outputs may formally provide the public with access to the legal system, but the rule-of-law project goes to the actual capabilities of the people to access the system in reality, to have a fair opportunity to participate in the inputs into the system, and to have that participation impartially adjudicated. Conditions impacting a diversity of stakeholders – and particularly the most disadvantaged within the population – perturb the virtues typically associated with the rule-of-law ideal when those conditions, and the power exercised to maintain them, impair capabilities for fair, dignified, and equal access to legal processes.Understanding the rule of law in structuralist terms, as an informal moral operator, (1) makes sense of the schism we normally accept between the concepts of law and the rule of law, (2) reorients the source of rule-of-law thinking from theorists bent on fixing a conceptual definition to communities engaged in first-order interactions with the legal system, (3) helps explain why citizens come not only to expect law to constrain official coercive powers but also to demand that law promote their actual capabilities to participate in the legal system on an egalitarian and dignitarian footing, and hence (4) implicates a critique of conditions of political and material inequalities that cannot but impair the healthy functioning of the rule-of-law project.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 408-419
Author(s):  
Ikhsan Fatah Yasin

Abstract: This article discusses the analysis of the prohibition of analogy in the Draft Bill. The majority of the experts of jurisprudence against analogy. The author does not agree with the ban on using the analogy in the Draft Bill, but justifies the analogy with the record, the judge must be competent and with integrity. If the judge is unable to make analogy, then he could use self-interpretation to find a legal decition. The argument of usage of analogy is to seek substantial justice for the people without setting aside the individual’s rights, because by using the analogy, the rule of law will remain unfulfilled. It is because the crime, in its various forms, is still contrary to morality even though it is not written, and even if the crime has an impact to the public. In Islamic law, the method of qiyâs compiled by Imam Shafi’i in may be used as a good analogy, because qiyâs method has been tested by producing many laws.Keywords: Analogy, draft bill, the criminal code. Abstrak: Artikel ini membahas tentang analisis terhadap larangan analogi dalam RUU KUHP. Mayoritas para ahli ilmu hukum menentang analogi. Penulis tidak sepakat dengan larangan menggunakan analogi dalam RUU KUHP, tetapi membenarkan analogi dengan catatan, hakimnya harus kompeten dan berintegritas. Jika hakimnya memang tidak mampu untuk beranalogi, maka ia masih bisa menggunakan interpretasi untuk menemukan hukumnya.   Argumen diperbolehkannya analogi adalah untuk mencari keadilan substansial bagi masyarakat tanpa menyampingkan perlindungan individu, sebab dengan menggunakan analogi kepastian hukum akan tetap terpenuhi. Karena kejahatan, dalam berbagai bentuknya, tetap saja bertentangan dengan kesusilaan meskipun ia tidak tertulis, apalagi jika kejahatan tersebut membawa pengaruh kepada masyarakat luas. Dalam hukum Islam, metode qiyâs yang disusun oleh Imam Syafi’i dalam berijtihad mungkin dapat digunakan sebagai proses analogi yang baik, sebab metode qiyâs ini sudah teruji dengan memproduksi banyak hukum. Kata Kunci: Analogi, Rancangan Perundang-undangan, KUHP.


Author(s):  
N. W. Barber

The rule of law requires that law make the differences it purports to make; linking the formal demands of law and the reality of the rules that structure power within a community. The chapter begins by outlining the rule of law. There are two aspects to the principle: first, the rule of law requires that laws be expressed in a way that enable people to obey the law; secondly, the rule of law requires that the social context is such that people are led to obey these rules. The second part of the chapter examines the connection between the rule of law and the state. First, it will be contended that states need to comply—to a degree—with the rule of law in order to exist. Secondly, in societies such as ours, non-state legal orders require the existence of the state, and state legal orders, for their successful operation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-217
Author(s):  
Dewi Ratnasari Rustam

Dissenting opinion is the difference of opinion between the Tribunal judges who handle certain a matter with other judges of the Tribunal dealing with certain cases. Dissenting opinion does not have the force of law because it cannot be the Foundation for the inception of the award. Dissenting opinion itself is an aspect of the law that need to be examined in order to prevent the formation of false opinion among the public. So, nowadays have started to formed the perception that dissenting opinion was an engineering law, instead of enforcing the rule of law but rather media that gave the opportunity for the defendant in corruption regardless of criminal trapping; but on the other hand is a form of difference of opinion and the independence of the judges as the metre is guaranteed by the provisions of the law; that the importance of dissenting opinion in the Court ruling was the judge's opinion be weighted, in an attempt of law appeal or cassation; as an indicator to determine the career judge, as an attempt to avoid the practice of corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN) and the judicial mafia; as a real step towards the transparency of judicial democratization; the judiciary; and kemandiarian the judge require the freedom of speech.


2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 103-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Horn

In the modern age, the political secret has acquired a bad reputation. With modern democracy’s ideal of transparency, political secrecy is identified with political crime or corruption. The article argues that this repression of secrecy in modern democracies falls short of a substantial understanding of the structure and workings of political secrecy. By outlining a genealogy of political secrecy, it elucidates the logic as well as the blind spots of a current culture of secrecy. It focuses on two fundamental logics of secrecy, deduced from the Latin terms ‘ arcanum’ and ‘ secretum’. Whereas the logic of arcanum regards secrecy as a legitimate dimension of government, a modern logic of secretum is marked by an inextricable dialectics between the withdrawal and communication of knowledge, between secrecy and publicity. Here, the secret is not so much a piece of withheld knowledge as a ‘secrecy effect’ that binds the realm of secrecy to the public sphere by a dialectics of permanent suspicion and scandal. Instead of falling into the trap of this ‘secrecy effect’ it is worth taking a closer look at the tradition of thought on the arcana imperii, from Tacitus to early modern doctrines of raison d’état to Carl Schmitt. What this tradition deals with is the functionality of secrecy and its complicated relation to the law. The arcana tradition elaborates the crucial point of secrecy: its potential, but also its profound ambivalence. Secrecy opens up a discretionary space of action exempt from the rule of law, and, according to Carl Schmitt, ignores the law so as to allow it to become effective. Secrecy serves to protect and stabilize the state, but at the same time it opens a space of exception from the rule of law that breeds violence, corruption and oppression. Instead of seeing secrecy as the opposite of a political culture of transparency, it is more productive to regard secrecy as transparency's complement – a counterpart, however, that is marked by the profound paradox of being both a consolidation of and a threat to democracy.


2006 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Wexler ◽  
Andrew Irvine

In Politics III.10 and IV.4, Aristotle discusses the difference between governments that are regulated by the rule of law and those that are not. Although he concludes that the rule of law helps guard against arbitrary and injudicious government action, Aristotle is also sensitive to the fact that in a democracy it is essential for the people to remain sovereign over the law. His discussion is helpful for understanding, not only the tension between the ‘rule of law’ and the ‘rule of men’, but also the complex role the rule of law plays in any modern democracy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-40
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Imuetinyan Obarisiagbon Barr

All over Southern Nigeria, incidents of people taking the law into their hands and meting out instant justice on suspected criminals without recourse to the rule of law and the position of Section 33 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria abound. This motivation for participation in jungle justice was therefore explored. A combination of both qualitative and quantitative techniques was employed to collect data from six hundred and fifteen respondents. A descriptive analysis of the quantitative data collected was undertaken, using frequency distribution while the qualitative data were content analysed. Findings from this study reveal that motivation for jungle justice was multifaceted. Illiteracy, lack of trust on the police, flaccid court system, chronic anger due to economic situation and disregard for the rule of law and human right were some of the motivation for the alarming incidence of the social phenomenon. Based on the findings of this study, there is the need to overhaul the criminal justice processes with a view to boosting the confidence of the public in its activities and also embark on a teaching on no violence and the ills of jungle justice.Keywords: Jungle justice, court, police, human rights


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 149-156
Author(s):  
Laura-Roxana Popoviciu

This study aims to examine the offence as the only ground for criminal liability. Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Criminal code provides that: “offences are the only grounds for criminal liability”, which implies the existence of an act, which is detected by the bodies empowered under the law in the form required by law, and also this principle comes as a guarantee of the person’s freedom because, without committing an act provided for by the law as an offense, the criminal liability cannot exist.The criminal liability is one of the fundamental institutions of the criminal law, together with the institution of the offence and of the sanction, set in the various provisions of the Criminal code.As shown in the Criminal code, in Title II regarding the offence, there is a close interdependence among the three fundamental institutions. The offence, as a dangerous act prohibited by the criminal rule, attracts, by committing it, the criminal liability, and the criminal liability without a sanction would lack the object. It obliges the person who committed an offence to be held accountable for it in front of the judicial bodies, to bide the sanctions provided for by the law, and to execute the sanction that was applied.The correlation is also vice-versa, meaning that the sanction, its implementation, cannot be justified only by the existence of the perpetrator’s criminal liability, and the criminal liability may not be based only on committing an offence.The criminal liability is a form of the judicial liability and it represents the consequence of non-complying with the provision of the criminal rule. Indeed, the achievement of the rule of law, in general, and also the rule of the criminal law implies, from all the law’s recipients, a conduct according to the provisions of the law, for the normal evolution of the social relations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
Enjang Sudarman

This research is motivated by the existence of a standard contract which is a written agreement made or provided by one party, by including various contract clauses that have been standardized by one party without giving the other party the opportunity to negotiate them. The existence of a standard contract in the sharia business world is a pros and cons among the public, especially among legal experts, because in addition to making it easier and saving time, it is also considered to be against the principles of sharia, namely persecuting other parties. The theory used in this research is that the grand theory uses the rule of law theory; Middle Rangge Theory uses the Shahadah Theory from al-Syafi'i then the Social Juctice Theory; and the application theory uses a legal system supported by the theory of legal change. This study uses descriptive qualitative research, in collecting data, the authors use the method of observation, interviews and documentation using descriptive analysis to describe and describe the data obtained by using words or sentences that are separated according to the research data category in order to obtain a conclusion. The result of the research shows that the standard contract is legally valid because it has fulfilled the terms and conditions of contract in Islam which are marked by the signing of the standard contract by both parties as proof that both parties are equally pleased.


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