LEGAL ESSENCE OF ANCIENT PROVERBS AND SAYS AND THEIR SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE

Author(s):  
Angela Dranishnikova ◽  
Ivan Semenov

The national legal system is determined by traditional elements characterizing the culture and customs that exist in the social environment in the form of moral standards and the law. However, the attitude of the population to the letter of the law, as a rule, initially contains negative properties in order to preserve personal freedom, status, position. Therefore, to solve pressing problems of rooting in the minds of society of the elementary foundations of the initial order, and then the rule of law in the public sphere, proverbs and sayings were developed that in essence contained legal educational criteria.

Author(s):  
Zainal Arifin Hoesein

<p>Materi muatan hukum selayaknya mampu menangkap aspirasi masyarakat yang tumbuh dan berkembang bukan hanya yang bersifat kekinian, melainkan sebagai acuan dalam mengan Ɵ sipasi perkembangan sosial, ekonomi, budaya dan poli Ɵ k di masa depan. Norma hukum pada dasarnya inheren dengan nilai-nilai yang diyakini oleh masyarakat, tetapi daya kekuatan keberlakuan hukum, Ɵ dak dapat melepaskan diri dari kelembagaan kekuasaan, sehingga hukum, masyarakat dan kekuasaan merupakan unsur dari suatu tatanan masyarakat. Oleh karena itu, Hukum Ɵ dak sekedar dipahami sebagai norma yang menjamin kepasa Ɵ an dan keadilan tetapi juga harus dilihat dari perspek Ɵ f kemanfaatan. Oleh karena itu, maka pembentukan hukum dalam perspek Ɵ f pembaruan hukum harus difokuskan pada dua hal yaitu, sistem hukum dan budaya hukum. Tulisan ini akan membahas bagaimana idealisasi peraturan perundang-undangan; bagaimana fungsi peraturan perundang-undangan dalam pembangunan hukum; dan bagaimana pendekatan metodologis terhadap pembentukan hukum. Dari berbagai pembahasan tersebut disimpulkan bahwa pembentukan hukum dalam perspek Ɵ f pembaharuan hukum, di samping harus memperha Ɵ kan aspek metodologis, juga harus merujuk dan meletakkan norma hukum dalam kesatuan harmoni ver Ɵ kal dengan aspek teologis, ontologis, posi Ɵ vis Ɵ k dan aspek fungsional dari suatu norma hukum.</p><p>The substance of the law should be able to capture the aspira Ɵ ons of the people who grow and develop not only be present, but as a reference in an Ɵ cipa Ɵ on of the social, economic, cultural and poli Ɵ cal future. The rule of law is essen Ɵ ally inherent to the values that are believed by the public, but the validity of the power of the law, not to break away from the ins Ɵ tu Ɵ onal power, so the law, society and power is an element of a society. Therefore, the law does not merely understood as a norm that ensures certainty and jus Ɵ ce but also to be seen from the perspec Ɵ ve of expediency. Therefore, the legal establishment in the perspec Ɵ ve of legal reform should be focused on two things, namely, the legal system and legal culture. This paper will discuss how the idealiza Ɵ on of laws, how the laws func Ɵ on in the development of the law, and how the methodological approach to the legal establishment. It was concluded that the forma Ɵ on of the law in the perspec Ɵ ve of legal reform, in addi Ɵ on must pay a Ʃ en Ɵ on to methodological aspects, should also refer to and put the rule of law in the unity of ver Ɵ cal harmony with aspects of the theological, ontological, posi Ɵ vist and func Ɵ onal aspects of the rule of law.</p>


2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 103-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Horn

In the modern age, the political secret has acquired a bad reputation. With modern democracy’s ideal of transparency, political secrecy is identified with political crime or corruption. The article argues that this repression of secrecy in modern democracies falls short of a substantial understanding of the structure and workings of political secrecy. By outlining a genealogy of political secrecy, it elucidates the logic as well as the blind spots of a current culture of secrecy. It focuses on two fundamental logics of secrecy, deduced from the Latin terms ‘ arcanum’ and ‘ secretum’. Whereas the logic of arcanum regards secrecy as a legitimate dimension of government, a modern logic of secretum is marked by an inextricable dialectics between the withdrawal and communication of knowledge, between secrecy and publicity. Here, the secret is not so much a piece of withheld knowledge as a ‘secrecy effect’ that binds the realm of secrecy to the public sphere by a dialectics of permanent suspicion and scandal. Instead of falling into the trap of this ‘secrecy effect’ it is worth taking a closer look at the tradition of thought on the arcana imperii, from Tacitus to early modern doctrines of raison d’état to Carl Schmitt. What this tradition deals with is the functionality of secrecy and its complicated relation to the law. The arcana tradition elaborates the crucial point of secrecy: its potential, but also its profound ambivalence. Secrecy opens up a discretionary space of action exempt from the rule of law, and, according to Carl Schmitt, ignores the law so as to allow it to become effective. Secrecy serves to protect and stabilize the state, but at the same time it opens a space of exception from the rule of law that breeds violence, corruption and oppression. Instead of seeing secrecy as the opposite of a political culture of transparency, it is more productive to regard secrecy as transparency's complement – a counterpart, however, that is marked by the profound paradox of being both a consolidation of and a threat to democracy.


Author(s):  
Margit Cohn

Concerned with the role of the judiciary as a constraining agent of fuzzy law, the chapter is laid out in two layers. First, in light of the special problems attached to reliance on fuzzy law, it advances arguments that call for enhanced review in this context. Secondly, the chapter joins the ongoing general debate over the role of the judiciary in the shaping of the public sphere. The argument for active review is based both on the principles reflected in the rule of law ideal, and on an argument from governance. Setting judicial review in a framework that seeks to enhance participation, the judiciary, stripped of accusations of supremacy over all other forms of decision-making, operates as an intermediator by offering members of society, especially those who do not have direct access to government corridors, an additional forum for voicing their concerns and thereby contributing to public deliberation over all contested aspects of social and political life.


Author(s):  
Raden Muhammad Mihradi ◽  
Dinalara Dermawati Butarbutar ◽  
Nazaruddin Lathif ◽  
Tiofanny Marselina

The decisions of the Constitutional Court are always interesting to observe. First, the Constitutional Court's decision has a broad impact in maintaining and ensuring the guarantee of the principles of the rule of law, human rights and institutionalized democracy. Second, the decisions of the Constitutional Court are always dynamic. Not always conservative. As in the decision of the Constitutional Court, which is positive legislation, it provides a breakthrough that the Constitutional Court is no longer just a norm canceler. However, it can test or create norms on a limited basis with constitutional or conditionally unconstitutional terms. Third, it is certain that the model of the Constitutional Court's decision is positive legislation and risks causing tension with the parliament as the legislator. It is important to study and relate it to the institutionalization of substantial democracy, a democracy that brings justice and equality in the public sphere.


Author(s):  
Adam Szot

Abstract The article concerns the actual impact of courts controlling the activity of public administration on the direction of its activities and the content of issued decisions. In particular, it concerns sovereign individual decisions that affect the sphere of civil rights and freedoms. The aim of the article is to seek an answer to the question of whether independent judges actually participate in the process of management in the public sphere, which is characterised by elements of politics and (regardless of the answer to this question) whether such participation is allowed or (even) necessary in modern rule of law states. The main argument is that regardless of whether the courts controlling the administration have reformatory or exclusive cassation powers, they influence the decision-making process in the public sphere. At the same time, such influence not only does not violate the fundamental values of the rule of law, but is even sometimes necessary. This does not mean that courts should interfere in the management processes in the public sphere in every case.


2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Calhoun

In this article I ask (1) whether the ways in which the early bourgeois public sphere was structured—precisely by exclusion—are instructive for considering its later development, (2) how a consideration of the social foundations of public life calls into question abstract formulations of it as an escape from social determination into a realm of discursive reason, (3) to what extent “counterpublics” may offer useful accommodations to failures of larger public spheres without necessarily becoming completely attractive alternatives, and (4) to what extent considering the organization of the public sphere as a field might prove helpful in analyzing differentiated publics, rather than thinking of them simply as parallel but each based on discrete conditions. These considerations are informed by an account of the way that the public sphere developed as a concrete ideal and an object of struggle in late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Britain.


October ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 159 ◽  
pp. 3-6
Author(s):  
Hal Foster

In the face of Trumpism and its peculiar mix of the buffoonish and the lethal, Foster suggests that we “pump up” past theoretical concepts by raising them to a higher degree. Social media, for example, could thereby be considered the “fifth estate,” a force that outdoes the “fourth estate” of journalistic media and thereby evacuates the last residues of the public sphere that, over fifty years ago, Jürgen Habermas associated with the advent of print culture. Peter Sloterdijk's notion of cynical reason, too, must be raised to a higher power in order to comprehend the Trumpist mentality; perhaps in this post-truth era, we should speak instead of “noncynical unreason”? And while the concept of the “primal father” is so outrageous that it cannot be inflated, Foster argues, it is one that we must grapple with in the face of a figure who, like Freud's figure, embodies the law and simultaneously performs its transgression.


Author(s):  
N. W. Barber

The rule of law requires that law make the differences it purports to make; linking the formal demands of law and the reality of the rules that structure power within a community. The chapter begins by outlining the rule of law. There are two aspects to the principle: first, the rule of law requires that laws be expressed in a way that enable people to obey the law; secondly, the rule of law requires that the social context is such that people are led to obey these rules. The second part of the chapter examines the connection between the rule of law and the state. First, it will be contended that states need to comply—to a degree—with the rule of law in order to exist. Secondly, in societies such as ours, non-state legal orders require the existence of the state, and state legal orders, for their successful operation.


2019 ◽  
pp. 146-172
Author(s):  
Paul Mutsaers

This concluding chapter synergizes the previous chapters and adds something new. Both functions are captured by the title, Reclaiming the Public in Policing. First, it argues that the empirical and conceptual work in this book points at the corrosion of the public character of policing, which results in law enforcement agencies that find it increasingly difficult to exclude politics, particularism, and populism from their operations. This part of the chapter concludes that it is imperative that we ‘unthink’ bureaucracy as the social evil of our time and revalue the public contours of policing. A second way to reclaim the ‘public’ in policing, now defined not as a quality of the police but an engaged citizenry that is involved in public debates on the police, concerns the role of police scholars in the public sphere. The chapter advocates a public anthropology of police and reflects on the author's efforts to ‘go public’.


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