scholarly journals Hapusnya Wewenang Executive Review Pemerintah terhadap Peraturan Daerah: Studi Pasca-adanya Putusan MK Nomor 137/PUU-XIII/2015 dan Nomor 56/PUU XIV/2016

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lusy Liany

The Constitutional Court, on April 4, 2017, through the Decision No.137/PUU-XIII/2015 has invalidated the enactment of the rules that enabled a Governor to annul Regency/City Laws. On June 14, 2017, with the Decision No.56/PUU-XIV/2016, the Court also invalidated the authority of Ministry of Internal Affair to void Provincial Laws. These decisions brought about a question on whether the government still has the authority to revise those regional laws or it can only be taken through the material review to the judiciary. Based on the background, the authors formulated two problems. Firstly, what is the mechanism of government control of the Regional Regulation after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 137 / PUU-XIII / 2015 and the Court's Decision Number 56/PUU-XIV/2016? Secondly, what are the obstacles to judicial review of regional regulations in the Supreme Court? The research method applied in this paper is a normative method in which qualitative data are gathered and the statute and conceptual approaches are employed. First result, the government, both the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Governor, can oversee the regional law-making process through the executive preview mechanism and the annulation of both Province and Regency/City Laws is in the domain of the Supreme Court's authority. Second, the judicial review process in the Supreme Court has not fully met the legal principles of judicial review process, as it is not open to public, there is no deadline to finish the trial, and the Supreme Court’s decision is not supported by sufficient details of judges’ legal opinion.

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Firdaus Firdaus

Peraturan Daerah (Perda) sebagai produk hukum pemerintahan daerah untuk mengatur dan memerintah sendiri sebagai manifestasi otonomi, tetapi dalam praktiknya sering kali dihadapkan dengan penundaan atau pembatalan akibat fungsi pengawasan preventif atau represif oleh Pemerintah. Melalui Putusan Nomor 137/PUU-XIII/2015, Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) meneguhkan fungsi pengawasan preventif dan membatalkan fungsi pengawasan represif dengan harapan: pertama mengakhiri dilema konstitusional fungsi Pengawasan Pemerintah terhadap Perda; kedua, memperkuat otonomi daerah; dan ketiga, meneguhkan pengujian perda sebagai kompetensi Mahkamah Agung (MA). Namun hal tersebut justru menciptakan dikotomi baru, baik terkait hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dengan pemerintahan daerah maupun dalam memaknai fungsi pengawasan represif dihubungkan dengan kompetensi MA menguji peraturan perundang-undangan di bawah undang-undang terhadap undang-undang. Bentuk dikotomi baru yang dimaksud; pertama, merevitalisasi instrumen sentralisme; dan kedua mereduksi otonomi dan fungsi kekuasaan Pemerintah dengan karakteristik yang bersifat aktif, sepihak (bersegi satu) dalam mengawasi dan memastikan pelaksanaan undangundang. Dimensi konstitusional yang harus dipastikan, bahwa pelaksanaan fungsi pengawasan represif terhadap Perda memberi kedudukan hukum bagi Pemerintah Daerah otonom untuk dapat mengajukan permohonan pengujian kepada MA.Local Regulation (Perda) as a legal product of local government is to regulate and govern itself as a manifestation of autonomy. Yet, in practice it is often confronted with delays or cancellations due to the Government's preventive or repressive supervision functions. Through Decision Number 137 / PUU-XIII / 2015, the Constitutional Court (MK) affirmed the function of preventive supervision and canceled the repressive supervision function in the hope of: first, ending the constitutional dilemma of the Government Oversight function on Local Regulations; second, strengthening local autonomy; and third, confirm the perda review as Supreme Court (MA) competency. However, this actually creates a new dichotomy, both in relation to the relationship between the Central Government and the local government and in interpreting the repressive monitoring function associated with the MA competency in examining the legislation under the regulations toward the statute. The form of the new dichotomy in intended; firstly, revitalize the instrument of centralism; and secondly reducing the autonomy and function of the Government's power with active, unilateral (onesided) characteristics in supervising and ensuring the implementation of the statute. The constitutional dimension that must be ensured is that the implementation of the repressive oversight function of the Local Regulation gives a legal standing for the autonomous local Government to be able to submit an application for judicial review to the Supreme Court.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 01003
Author(s):  
Suparto ◽  
Rahdiansyah

Boundary dispute is a new phenomenon that occurred in the era of regional autonomy followed by the expansion of the region. One of them occurred between Kepulauan Riau and Jambi Provinces related to Berhala Island ownership. Settlement of disputes between these two provinces took quite a long time and also caused tensions between two provinces. Actually, the government through the Ministry of Home Affairs has issued a regulation to solve the boundary problem of this area namely the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No.1 in 2006 and No. 76 in 2012 on Guidelines for Confirmation of the Boundaries, however, is still less effective because although it has been done in such a way the party who feels aggrieved still take another way that is by testing the legislation to the Supreme Court or Mahkamah Konstitusional (Constitutional Court). An example is the boundary dispute between Kepulauan Riau and Jambi Province which was resolved through the examination of legislation to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. In the case, there were 3 decisions, namely Supreme Court Decision No.49P/HUM/2011, Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 32/PUU-X/2012 and the decision of the Constitutional Court No. 62/PUU-X/2012. Based on the research results obtained as follows 1). Implementation of the principle or legal principle of lex posterior derogat lex priori by the Supreme Court 2). The decision of the Supreme Court was taken into consideration in the decision of the Constitutional Court 3). The cause of the territorial boundary disputes between Kepulauan Riau Province and Jambi Province was the synchronization of 3 related laws namely Indonesian Law no. 31 in 2003, Law no. 25 in 2002 and Law no. 54 of 1999.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 247
Author(s):  
Sholahuddin Al-Fatih

Post-reform of the role of judicial institution is run by two institutions namely the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The duties and authorities of the two institutions are regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 and the act that addresses the three institutions more specifically. Several powers possessed by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, one of them is the authority to judicial review. The Constitutional Court is authorized to review the act on the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945, while the Supreme Court is authorized to review under the Act on the above legislation.The unfairness of the regulatory testing function is feared to trigger bureaucratic inefficiency. Based on data released by the Supreme Court Clerk, it was recorded during 2016 that the Supreme Court received 18,514 cases, including the Hak Uji Materi (HUM) subject to legislation under the Act. While the number of cases of judicial review of the Constitutional Court in 2016-2017 amounted to only 332 cases. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a bureaucratic reform and provide new ideas related to the model of one court of judicial review in Indonesia. So that in this paper will be discussed deeply about problematic of judicial review in Indonesia and the authority of the Constitutional Court to review the act under one roof with SIJURI mechanism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Muhammad Yusrizal Adi Syaputra

Rule lower against the rules of higher then lower regulation it can test the material (judicial review) to be canceled entirely or partially canceled. The assertion of hierarchy intended to prevent overlap between legislation that could give rise to legal uncertainty. Position regulations set by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) House of Representatives (DPR), the Regional Representatives Council (DPD), the Supreme Court (MA), the Constitutional Court (MK), the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), Commission Judicial (KY) , Bank Indonesia (BI), the Minister, the Agency, Organization, or commissions, in the Indonesian legal system recognized by Act No. 12 of 2011 either were born because of higher regulatory mandate and within the scope and authority of the minister. Thus, no doubt that the regulations set by state institutions, have binding force that must be obeyed by the parties set forth therein. While the Regulations issued policy also recognized as an Freies Ermessen in the execution of its duties and functions.<br /><br />


Jurnal Hukum ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 612
Author(s):  
Widayati

Indonesia is a sovereign country folk. One implementation of the sovereignty of the people is the election that followed by political parties for members of Parliament and members of parliament and individuals for DPD.Political parties are the main pillars of democracy. Establishment of political parties must meet the requirements in accordance with legislation. Terms of founding a political party regulated under Article 2 of Law No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties.As the main pillar of democracy, political parties should be able to carry out its functions properly. There are some restrictions on political parties, among others, are prohibited from engaging in activities contrary to the Constitution of 1945 NRI and legislation; engage in activities that endanger the integrity and safety Homeland. If the ban is violated, then the government may ask the parties to the freezing of the District Court. If the parties do not accept the decision of freezing the District Court, it can be appealed to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the PN, then the Government may propose the dissolution of the parties to the Court.The procedure by which parties to the Court daitur dissolution under Article 68 paragraph (1) and (2) of Law No 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court's decision regarding the request for the dissolution of political parties must be decided upon within a period of 60 (sixty) days after pemoohonan recorded in the Register of Case Constitution.Keywords: Parati dissolution of political, constitutional systemIndonesia


2010 ◽  
pp. 1017
Author(s):  
Alice Woolley ◽  
Shaun Fluker

In Dunsmuir the Supreme Court of Canada reassessed the “troubling question” of how courts should review decisions of administrative tribunals. The majority judgment of Bastarache and LeBel JJ. (writing also for McLachlin, Abella, and Fish JJ.), sought to simplify the judicial review process by reducing the standards of review from three to two, increasing reliance on precedent to determine which standard is appropriate, making explicit the significance of the nature of the question to the determination of the standard in every case, and re-labelling the “pragmatic and functional” test the “standard of review analysis.” In its recent judgment in Khosa the Supreme Court emphasized the simplifying intention of Dunsmuir, suggesting that “Dunsmuir teaches that judicial review should be less concerned with the formulation of different standards of review and more focused on substance, particularly on the nature of the issue that was before the administrative tribunal under review.”


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Asep Syarifuddin Hidayat

Abstract.Article 13 paragraph 1 of Act Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power states that all court hearings are open to the public, unless the Act says otherwise. Therefore, a judicial review trial must be open to the public. If the trial process of the judicial review is carried out in a closed manner, it can be considered a legal defect, because it is contrary to Article 13 paragraph (3) of the Law. The Law of the Supreme Court is not regulated that the judicial review is closed, because in the judicial review there is a need for openness or principle of audiences of parties or litigants must be given the opportunity to provide information and express their opinions, including the defendant as the maker of Legislation invitation under the law, so that the impact of the decision will need to be involved.Keywords: Judicial Review, Audi Alteram Et Partem Principle, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court Abstrak.Pasal 13 ayat 1 Undang-Undang Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman menyebutkan semua sidang pemeriksaan pengadilan terbuka untuk umum, kecuali Undang-Undang berkata lain. Oleh karena itu,  judicial review persidangan harus dilakukan terbuka untuk umum. Apabila proses persidangan judicial review ini dilakukan secara tertutup, maka dapat dinilai cacat hukum karena bertentangan dengan Pasal 13 ayat (3) Undang-Undang tersebut. Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung pun tidak diatur bahwa persidangan judicial review bersifat tertutup, karena dalam judicial review perlu adanya keterbukaan atau asas audi alteram et partem atau pihak-pihak yang berperkara harus diberi kesempatan untuk memberikan keterangan dan menyampaikan pendapatnya termasuk pihak termohon sebagai  pembuat Peraturan Perundang-Undangan di bawah Undang-Undang sehingga akan terkena dampak putusan perlu dilibatkan.Kata Kunci: Judicial Review, Asas Audi Alteram Et Partem, Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Tim Lindsey

The Indonesian constitutional system contains a serious flaw that means that the constitutionality of a large number of laws cannot be determined by any court. Although the jurisdiction for the judicial review of laws is split between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, neither can review the constitutionality of subordinate regulations. This is problematic because in Indonesia the real substance of statutes is often found in implementing regulations, of which there are very many. This paper argues that that is open to the Constitutional Court to reconsider its position on review of regulations in order to remedy this problem. It could do so by interpreting its power of judicial review of statutes to extend to laws below the level of statutes. The paper begins with a brief account of how Indonesia came to have a system of judicial constitutional review that is restricted to statutes. It then examines the experience of South Korea’s Constitutional Court, a court in an Asian civil law country with a split jurisdiction for judicial review of laws like Indonesia’s. Despite controversy, this court has been able to interpret its powers to constitutionally invalidate statutes in such a way as to extend them to subordinate regulations as well. This paper argues that Indonesia’s Constitutional Court should follow South Korea’s example, in order to prevent the possibility of constitutionalism being subverted by unconstitutional subordinate regulations.


Author(s):  
Yusri Yusri ◽  
Yaswirman Yaswirman ◽  
Neneng Oktarina

Indonesia as a legal state, the presence of law in a country aims to guarantee life to protect the interests of citizens. In the Indonesian government system there are several branches of power, namely the legislative, executive and judiciary branches, the judicial power branches are the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court's authority is contained in Article 24 C paragraph (1) and (2) adjudicating at the first and last level whose decision is final to review the Law on the Constitution. Marriage agreement is a form of agreement that regulates assets in marriage and others. A marriage agreement is also an agreement which can affect other regulations. So with the regulation of the marriage agreement in Article 29 paragraph (1) prior to the lawsuit for judicial review to the Constitutional Court stating that the marriage agreement was made at the time, and before the marriage took place, this is what prevents many married couples from different citizens who previously were not have a marriage agreement while their interests require a marriage agreement. The decision analysis can be concluded that the Urgency of the marriage agreement in its decision No.69 / PUU-XIII / 2015 states that the importance of the marriage agreement is related to the position of shared property so that there is a separation of husband's assets with the wife's assets both regarding their respective belongings and the assets that belong to each other obtained during the marriage known as joint property. Whereas the assets obtained before their marriage period together are known as inheritance or personal property obtained after the marriage period which is usually referred to as acquisition assets. Due to the legal marriage agreement before MK Decision Number 69 / PUU-XIII / 2015, Indonesian citizens who carry out marriages mixed and does not make a marriage agreement, the Indonesian citizen may not have immovable property in the form of ownership or building rights.


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