On Analysis

2019 ◽  
pp. 175-218
Author(s):  
Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke
Keyword(s):  
Intelligence Analysis ◽  
Problem Of Induction ◽  
Theory Of Intelligence ◽  
Failure Theory ◽  
Circular Problem ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
New Knowledge ◽  
Intelligence Studies ◽  
Human Tendency ◽  
Intelligence Theory

The understanding and acknowledgement of the problem of induction and its negative force on discourse failure bring intelligence studies towards a new theory of intelligence. The understanding of discourse failure opens a window to intelligence failure as a circular problem that intensifies itself by the human tendency to displace and redirect new knowledge that threatens orthodoxies, political assumptions and a uniform belief in nature. The result is that threats appearing in new variations will not easily be acknowledged or accepted, since they exist outside the normative threat paradigms and outside the existing language available to communicate threats that exist outside the possibilities of induction. The acknowledgement of this phenomenon discloses the problems that arise because intelligence has lacked a proper intelligence theory. It illustrates that if intelligence institutions want to reduce the damaging effect of the problem of induction and discourse fail- ure, and produce qualitative intelligence, they must probe beyond the limits of induction. A deep acknowledgement of the discourse failure theory therefore explains the reciprocal nature of intelli- gence, as well as capturing and identifying the circular dynamic between threats, threat perception and intelligence failure. This chapter examines how this phenomenon shapes intelligence analysis.

United States Intelligence Cultures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamilton Bean
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Culture ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Intelligence Analysis ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
The Us ◽  
Intelligence Studies ◽  
Intelligence Theory ◽  
Four Levels ◽  
Integrated Or ◽  
Reflective Discourse

Organizational culture refers to the constellation of values, beliefs, identities, and artifacts that both shape and emerge from the interactions among the formal members of the US intelligence community. It is useful for understanding interagency cooperation and information sharing, institutional reform, leadership, intelligence failure, intelligence analysis, decision making, and intelligence theory. Organizational culture is also important in understanding the dynamics of US intelligence. There are four “levels” of, or “perspectives” on, organizational culture: vernacular and mundane organizational communication; strategic and reflective discourse; theoretical discourse; and metatheoretical discourse. Meanwhile, four overarching claims can be made about the intelligence studies literature in relation to organizational culture. First, explicit references to organizational culture within the literature do not appear until the 1970s. Second, studies of organizational culture usually critique “differentiation” among the subcultures of a single agency—most often the CIA or the FBI. Third, few intelligence scholars have provided audiences with opportunities to hear the voices of the men and women working inside these agencies. Finally, the majority of this literature views organizational culture from the dominant, managerial perspective. Ultimately, this literature evidences four themes that map to traditionally functionalist assumptions about organizational culture: (1) a differentiated or fragmented culture diminishes organizational effectiveness, while (2) an integrated or unified culture promotes effectiveness; (3) senior officials can and should determine organizational culture; and (4) the US intelligence community should model its culture after those found in private sector corporations or institutions such as law or medicine.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Willingness To Accept ◽  
Iron Curtain ◽  
Problem Of Induction ◽  
Intellectual Courage ◽  
Theory Of Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Theory ◽  
Adequate Definition ◽  
Ultimate Objective ◽  
Share Information

The iron curtain and cold war that used to divide Europe have been replaced by transnational threats, nonlinear war, digideceptionalisation, and state-sponsored digital subversion. The threats reach beyond and transcend the boundaries given by history, and thus challenge traditional methods of intelligence. The ultimate objective of modern intelligence is thus the cleverness and ability to divide truth from falsehood, the willingness to accept the inconceivable and the courage to share information beyond the boundaries of experience and tradition. Intelligence must therefore be built on intellectual courage, solid theory, commonly understood definitions and scientific doubt. However, this book argues that there exists neither a proper conceptual or descriptive theory of intelligence, nor any adequate definition than can shape a cohesive appreciation of what intelligence is. The lack of a rigorous understanding of intelligence has arguably increased the problem of induction and discourse failure. The book will thus explore and illustrate how the lack of a descriptive intelligence theory has increased the problem of induction and discourse failure, and how an appreciation of intelligence as art can diminish this problem.

scholarly journals Defining the term "intelligence" - insight into existing intelligence knowledge

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 194-205
Author(s):  
Tomislav Dokman
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Qualitative Content Analysis ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Scientific Discipline ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Broad Concept ◽  
Intelligence Studies ◽  
Uniform Definition ◽  
Intelligence Theory ◽  
Definition Of

For more than half a century of Intelligence Studies, this field has been characterized by the problem of lack of uniform definition of the term intelligence, a contentious place in the corpus of existing knowledge. The determinant of this is the existence of different types of intelligence, that is, the term is related to the intelligence product or information, the process/cycle in which information is collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated, and to the intelligence producing organization. Furthermore, it is a broad concept that initially developed and presented itself throughout history as exclusive state property, only later to become an equally represented term in other fields, more specifically business, science, sports, etc. Defining the term "intelligence" is important not only for the sake of development of intelligence theory and scientific discipline, but also because of the practical part of "intelligence" which is an essential feature of every state as it provides support for state decision-making process and defining policies in the national security spectrum. The paper analyzes 35 scientific, expert and institutional definitions of the term intelligence using quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Qualitative content analysis identified 15 key elements. The quantitative analysis found that the most represented element was "information", followed by "end user/decision maker", followed by "actionable character", "foreign countries" and "knowledge". Based on the elements extracted, a new definition is presented. Intelligence is characterized by actionable knowledge of foreign/other countries that is disseminated towards end users, i.e. decision makers, in the form of information.

Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War

1976 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avi Shlaim
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Systematic Research ◽  
Accurate Information ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Yom Kippur War ◽  
Theory Of Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
Yom Kippur ◽  
Intelligence Failures

The principal question which this article seeks to answer is: Why was the intention of the Arabs to launch the Yom Kippur War misperceived despite the fact that Israeli Intelligence had ample and accurate information on enemy moves and dispositions? In this anatomy of the Israeli intelligence failure, extensive use is made of the report of the official commission of inquiry that investigated the events leading up to the war. The article is equally concerned with the phenomenon of strategic surprise in general, and this case study is used to explore the psychological and organizational roots of intelligence failures. Some safeguards and institutional reforms for reducing the frequency of failure are examined. However, there is no suggestion that surprise can ever be eliminated altogether. In conclusion a case is made for developing a theory of intelligence through case studies and systematic research.

Intelligence Failure Theory

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Copeland
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Failure Theory ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Intelligence Failures

Intelligence failures are commonly understood as the failures to anticipate important information and events, such as terrorist attacks. Explanations for intelligence failure generally include one or more of the following causal factors: organizational obstacles, psychological and analytical challenges, problems with warning information, and failures of political leadership. The earliest literature on intelligence failures is found in the 1960s, having developed in the context of the Cold War. At the time, the stable bipolar system was threatened by periodic surprises that promised to alter the balance of power. With tens of thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other, the United States and the Soviet Union spent a great deal of time and energy assessing each other’s intentions and capabilities and trying to avoid a catastrophic surprise. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, scholarship on intelligence failure decreased substantially. In the meantime, this scholarship diversified to include topics such as the environment, human rights, drug trafficking, and crime, among other things. Surprises in these areas were perhaps more frequent, but were less consequential. However, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003, interest in both scholarly and journalistic analyses of intelligence failures has once again increased.

The politics of hard knowledge: uncertainty, intelligence failures, and the ‘last minute genocide’ of Srebrenica

2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 2221-2235 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERNA RIJSDIJK
Keyword(s):  
War Crimes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
Intelligence Studies ◽  
Criminal Intent ◽  
The Hague ◽  
Knowledge Uncertainty ◽  
Intelligence Failures

AbstractQuestions of uncertainty and responsibility have been central to the political and legal investigations of the failed UN/Dutch peacekeeping mission in Srebrenica. The official Dutch NIOD report on the peacekeeping mission has reconstructed the fall of Srebrenica as a surprise attack and as an ‘intelligence failure’. The report and its understanding of tactical uncertainty has led to a call for more intelligence in UN operations. I argue that the report builds its claims on a problematic epistemology of intelligence studies drawing upon a politics of ‘hard knowledge’. A similar epistemology can be identified in the proceedings of the war crimes tribunal in The Hague (ICTY) in the legal approach of criminal intent for the violence in Srebrenica. Although it is recognised that the political responsibility to prevent genocide and the juridical responsibility to punish those who have committed crimes have different implications for what can be called relevant foreknowledge or criminal intent, both the juridical and the political approaches close off paths for the mobilisation of histories that are more sensitive to the productive workings of language and images and thus to their bearing on possible futures.

Thelma Gwinn Thurstone: Career Strategies and Contributions to Measurement

1988 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. L. Bashaw ◽  
Carolyn Terry Bashaw
Keyword(s):  
Common Factor ◽  
Psychological Testing ◽  
Instructional Materials ◽  
Professional Activity ◽  
American Council ◽  
Theory Of Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Theory ◽  
Career Strategies ◽  
Mental Abilities ◽  
The Common

This paper examines the life and career of Thelma Gwinn Thurstoneher career strategies and her contributions to psychological testing, intelligence theory, and instruction—based on her publications and a series of personal interviews with her and her colleagues. Thurstone's contributions, with her husband, L. L. Thurstone, included the development of the American Council on Education's Psychological Examinations and the Primary Mental Abilities test batteries. Her own work included the development of instructional materials using the common factor theory of intelligence. Thurstone, wife of a preeminent scholar and mother of three sons, pursued career strategies that facilitated her continued professional activity for six decades. Further research on measurement history and also on women's career strategies are suggested.

British Strategic Intelligence and the Cold War

2010 ◽  
pp. 137-154
Author(s):  
Len Scott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Active Involvement ◽  
Strategic Intelligence ◽  
Intelligence Studies ◽  
Intelligence Theory ◽  
The Cold War

Strategic intelligence was a term developed by the early pioneers of “classical intelligence theory” in the United States who combined their academic perspectives with active involvement in the development of the American intelligence community. The term entered the lexicon of intelligence studies in the United States while in Britain, the pioneering academic studies of intelligence made only fleeting reference to them. While there is an informed debate and a degree of openness on the issues of intelligence in the United States, Britain tackled the lessons of intelligence within the narrow walls of Whitehall. This article is a survey of the themes and issues in the study of British strategic intelligence. It discusses the evolution of the British strategic intelligence and intelligence historiography during the Cold War. It also discusses how British strategic intelligence coped with the war within the context of Whitehall and the Joint Intelligence Committee.

The Problem of Secret Intelligence

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke
Keyword(s):  
Threat Perception ◽  
Shared Experience ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Theory Of Intelligence ◽  
Adequate Theory ◽  
Intelligence Failure ◽  
The Future ◽  
Automatic Inference ◽  
Tests Of Hypotheses

Why is intelligence so hard to define? Why is there no systematic or adequate theory of intelligence? This book argues that classic intelligence production has been premised on an ill-founded belief in an automatic inference between history and the future, and that the lack of a working theory has exacerbated this problem. The book uses classic cases of intelligence failure to demonstrate how this problem creates a restricted language in intelligence communities that undermines threat perception. From these cases it concludes that intelligence needs to be re-thought, and argues that good intelligence is the art of threat perception beyond the limits of our habitual thinking and shared experience. This book therefore argues that intelligence can never be truths, only uncertain theories about the future. Qualified intelligence work is, accordingly, ideas that lead to theories about the future. These theories should always seek to explain a comprehension of the wholeness of threats. The hypothesis derived from these theories must thereafter be tested, as tests that make the theories less uncertain. This implies that intelligence never can be anything but uncertain theories about the future that are made less uncertain through scientific, critical tests of hypotheses derived from these theories. High quality intelligence institutions conduct these tests in what is known as the intelligence cycle. This cycle works well if it mirrors good thinking.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document