Plan Alfa

Author(s):  
James Lockhart

This chapter assesses the Viaux movement's Plan Alfa, more commonly known by its White House name, Track II, which led to the murder of Gen. René Schneider in October 1970. It reviews the developments in Chilean politics that led to this while clarifying the United States and CIA's influence in it, particularly its limitations.

2020 ◽  
pp. 216747952095077
Author(s):  
Evan L. Frederick ◽  
Ann Pegoraro ◽  
Samuel Schmidt

When asked if she would go to the White House if invited, Megan Rapinoe stated, “I’m not going to the fucking White House.” The next morning, President Donald Trump posted a series of tweets in which he criticized Rapinoe’s statements. In his tweets, Trump introduced issues around race in the United States and brought forth his own notion of nationalism. The purpose of this study was to conduct an analysis of users’ tweets to determine how individuals employed Twitter to craft a narrative and discuss the ongoing Rapinoe and Trump feud within and outside the bounds of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and nationalism. An inductive analysis of 16,137 users’ tweets revealed three primary themes: a) Refuse, Refute, & Redirect Racist Rhetoric b) Stand Up vs. Know your Rights, and c) #ShutUpAndBeALeader. Based on the findings of this study, it appears that the dialogue regarding racism in the United States is quickly evolving. Instead of reciting the same refrain (i.e., racism no longer exists and systematic racism is constructed by Black people) seen in previous works, individuals in the current dataset refuted those talking points and clearly labeled the President as a racist. Additionally, though discussions of nationalism were evident in this dataset, the Stand Up vs. Know Your Rights theme was on the periphery in comparison to discussions of race. Perhaps, this indicates that some have grown tired of Trump utilizing nationalism as a means to stoke racism.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-191
Author(s):  
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Abstract:While Africans are generally satisfied that a person of African descent was reelected to the White House following a campaign in which vicious and racist attacks were made against him, the U.S. Africa policy under President Barack Obama will continue to be guided by the strategic interests of the United States, which are not necessarily compatible with the popular aspirations for democracy, peace, and prosperity in Africa. Obama’s policy in the Great Lakes region provides an excellent illustration of this point. Since Rwanda and Uganda are Washington’s allies in the “war against terror” in Darfur and Somalia, respectively, the Obama administration has done little to stop Kigali and Kampala from destabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and looting its natural resources, either directly or through proxies. Rwanda and Uganda have even been included in an international oversight mechanism that is supposed to guide governance and security sector reforms in the DRC, but whose real objective is to facilitate Western access to the enormous natural wealth of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.


Significance The Vietnam analogy implies that President Joe Biden’s decision to leave Afghanistan will have deeply negative consequences for the United States. However, Afghanistan is not Vietnam and the Biden withdrawal needs to be considered within the wider context of his administration’s review of US commitments abroad. Impacts The White House will be pressured to clarify the future of other US military commitments, particularly in Iraq. Biden will seek to reassure allies, particularly those in NATO, that his commitment to multilateralism will not diminish. Biden may seek an opportunity for a military show of force, possibly in the Middle East, to refute accusations of weakness.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-795
Author(s):  
Claude Cadart

« From the Sino-Soviet strategic project to the Sino-American strategic project » is a purposely schematic interpretative essay on the evolution of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1979 with emphasis on, the latter phase of that evolution, that of the 1969—1979 period, and more particularly on the last year of that decade, 1979. The project, both defensive and offensive, of American and Chinese co-leadership of the planet that Mao had undertaken to carry out in 1971-1972 with the encouragement of Nixon had to be more or less put aside from 1973 to 1978 because of the seriousness of the domestic crises that were successively shaking both China and the United States during those years. In 1978—79, it was able to be reactivated by Deng Xiaoping who sought, with the benediction of the White House, to add an economic and a cultural dimension to Us diplomatic and strategic dimension. It is unlikely however in the near future that the United States will consider China as other than an auxiliary aspect of the fundamental game of their relations with the most powerful of their adversary-partners, the U.S.S.R. As in the case of the Sino-Soviet strategic project that China promoted from 1949 to 1959, the Sino-American strategic project that China has sought to « sell » the United States since 1969 has not, therefore, much chance of success.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (7) ◽  
pp. 149-150
Author(s):  
Attila J. Hertelendy, PhD ◽  
William L. Waugh, Jr., PhD

The change in presidential administrations in the United States promises new approaches to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. The first year of the pandemic response in the United States has been characterized by a lack of national leadership. Moreover, the message from the White House Coronavirus Task Force has been muddled at best. There have been great inconsistencies in how the States have chosen to address spreading infections and increased stress on individual Americans who are trying to protect themselves and their families. The same pattern can be found with the distribution of vaccines and management of vaccinations. Politics has often conflicted with public health concerns. The States have been left to provide personal protective equipment (PPE) to medical personnel and first responders and to formulate their own guidance for protective measures.


2021 ◽  
Vol VI (III) ◽  
pp. 59-71
Author(s):  
Muhammad Nadeem Mirza ◽  
Lubna Abid Ali ◽  
Irfan Hasnain Qaisrani

This study intends to explore the rise of Donald Trump to the White House. Why was Donald Trump considered a populist leader, and how did his populist rhetoric and actions impact the contours of American domestic and foreign policies? The study adopted qualitative exploratory and explanatory research techniques. Specific methods utilised to conduct the study remained political personality profiling. It finds that the populist leaders construct the binaries in the society by dividing the nation into two groups: �us� the people, against �them� the corrupt elite or other groups presented as a threat to the lives and livelihood of the nation. Though populism as a unique brand of politics remained active through most of the US history, yet these were only two occasions that populists were successful in winning the American presidential elections � Andrew Jackson in 1828 and Donald Trump in 2016. Structural and historical reasons became the biggest cause behind the election of Donald Trump, who successfully brought a revolution in American domestic and foreign policies. And if structural issues in the United States are not addressed, there is a clear chance that Trump � who is not withering away � will come back to contest and challenge any competitors in the 2024 presidential elections.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1027-1035

In June 2017, President Donald Trump announced a plan to roll back various steps taken by his predecessor toward normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. A senior official for the administration announced the plan in a White House press briefing:The President vowed to reverse the Obama administration policies toward Cuba that have enriched the Cuban military regime and increased the repression on the island. It is a promise that President Trump made, and it's a promise that President Trump is keeping.With this is a readjustment of the United States policy towards Cuba. And you will see that, going forward, the new policy under the Trump administration, will empower the Cuban people. To reiterate, the new policy going forward does not target the Cuban people, but it does target the repressive members of the Cuban military government.


Author(s):  
Tatiana A. Karasova

Israeli-U.S. relations are an important factor in U.S. policy in the Middle East. USA maintain Israel as a strategic ally and Israel was granted American “major non-NATO ally” status. United States actively influenced the Israeli regional policy. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict settlement was always America’ the most priority area. Israelis and Americans share the view that the United States has a predominant role and responsibility in the Palestinians - Israeli dispute peace-making. The two-state outcome and critical issue over Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem was a topic of American concerns for a long time relied on bipartisanship support of Democrats and Republicans. During Osama’s  presidency D. Biden held post of deputy president and supported no new ideas for restarting negotiations between the sides of the conflict but its policies have failed, from Israel’s refusal to freeze settlement. The next Trump administration however was the “most pro-Israel ever”. Trump’s White House led a radical departure from the U.S.’s traditional role as the honest broker between Israelis and Palestinians. Biden’s victory in 2021 signals restructure Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts, rehabilitating a durable two-state formula that establishes political, territorial, and demographic separation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). But uunlike the Obama and Trump administrations, the Biden administration doesn't see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a foreign policy priority. The question is: what really a Biden presidency might mean for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?


Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (11 (109)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
German Gigolaev

The USA, as well as the USSR, initiated the convocation of the III UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973—1982). However, after the Ronald Reagan administration came to the White House, American diplomacy significantly changed its policy toward the Conference, which eventually resulted in US refusal to support the draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was worked out during the Conference. This behavior was in line with policy course of the Reagan administration — more aggressive than that of their predecessors. The article considers the American policy regarding Law of the Sea negotiations in the first months of Reagan's presidency, during the Tenth Session of the III UNCLOS.


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