scholarly journals Misadventures of Sentience: Animals and the Basis of Equality

Animals ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Zuolo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Equal Status ◽  
The Troubles ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Equal Consideration ◽  
Lack Of Knowledge

This paper aims to put in question the all-purposes function that sentience has come to play in animal ethics. In particular, I criticize the idea that sentience can provide a sound basis of equality, as has been recently proposed by Alasdair Cochrane. Sentience seems to eschew the standard problems of egalitarian accounts that are based on range properties. By analysing the nature of range properties, I will show that sentience cannot provide such a solution because it is constructed as a sui generis range property. After criticizing the approaches seeking to ground animals’ equal status, I turn to Singer’s principle of equal consideration of interests. Despite its seeming non-controversiality, I argue that it cannot do without referring to the moral status of a being in order to determine the weight of a being’s interests. Moreover, it outlines a weak egalitarian basis because it relies on the presumption of equality of interests in virtue of our lack of knowledge of the weight of individuals’ interests. I conclude in a more positive tone by arguing that, irrespective of the troubles of range property egalitarianism, animal ethics can rely on other normative resources to defend the cause of animals.

scholarly journals David DeGrazia on Animal Rights: A Critical Analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Pełka
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Revolution ◽  
Animal Rights ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Animal Minds ◽  
Famous People ◽  
Social Philosopher ◽  
Equal Consideration

The article aims to critically discuss the theory of animal rights developed by American social philosopher David DeGrazia. It consists of two parts. The first one describes the main elements of DeGrazia’s approach, namely his views on animal minds, the principle of equal consideration, the idea of unequal moral status, the concept of border persons, and practical remarks concerning improving the treatment of animals by humans. The second part presents remarks about the points where DeGrazia’s proposals should be supplemented and corrected so as to make them more convincing and widely accepted. The conclusion of the essay is the proposal of a cultural revolution for the benefit of animals, which should be initiated by famous people, like actresses, actors, sportswomen and sportsmen, because of their influential position in contemporary societies.

Animals in Political Theory

2015 ◽  
pp. 42-64
Author(s):  
Sue Donaldson ◽  
Will Kymlicka
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Animal Rights ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
History Of ◽  
Human Animal ◽  
Animal Question ◽  
Blind Spots

Western political theorists have largely ignored the animal question, assuming that animals have no place in our theories of democracy, citizenship, membership, sovereignty, and the public good. Conversely, animal ethicists have largely ignored political theory, assuming that we can theorize the moral status and moral rights of animals without drawing on the categories and concepts of political theory. This chapter traces the history of this separation between animals and political theory, examines the resulting intellectual blind spots for animal ethics, and reviews recent attempts to bring the two together. Situating animal rights within political theory has the potential to identify new models of justice in human-animal relations, and to open up new areas of scholarship and research.

scholarly journals Animal Ethics and Behavioral Science: An Overdue Discussion

BioScience ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (10) ◽  
pp. 778-788 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine E Webb ◽  
Peter Woodford ◽  
Elise Huchard
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Animal Behavior ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Behavioral Science ◽  
Behavior Science ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals

Abstract Animal ethics—the field of philosophy concerned with the moral status of animals—is experiencing a momentum unprecedented in its history. Surprisingly, animal behavior science remains on the sidelines, despite producing critical evidence on which many arguments in animal ethics rest. In the present article, we explore the origins of the divide between animal behavior science and animal ethics before considering whether behavioral scientists should concern themselves with it. We finally envision tangible steps that could be taken to bridge the gap, encouraging scientists to be aware of, and to more actively engage with, an ethical revolution that is partly fueled by the evidence they generate.

Two-Tier Moral Codes

1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Code ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Individual Actions ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve a theoretical function, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve a practical function, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses.

The Theory and Politics of Recognition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Bird
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Social Discourse ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Politics Of Recognition ◽  
Equal Status ◽  
Status Recognition ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter investigates the relationship between the so-called ‘politics of recognition’ and the philosophical discussion of principles of distributive justice. It argues that the literature has failed to distinguish clearly between three forms of recognition potentially relevant to distributive justice: status-recognition, authenticity-recognition and worth-recognition. Each of these forms of recognition is explored, and their various possible links to arguments about the requirements of justice are distinguished and critically discussed. Against much conventional wisdom, the chapter suggests that models of recognition built around the recognition of ‘equal status’ need not be problematically ‘difference blind’; that claims about authenticity-recognition have a more tenuous relation to discussion of (distributive) justice than many suppose; and that disadvantaged individuals’ need for respectful recognition is not reducible either to claims about their moral status or to demands that identity be authentically expressed in social discourse.

scholarly journals ‘Utilitarianism for animals: deontology for people’ and the doing/allowing distinction

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona Woollard
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Wild Animals ◽  
The Core ◽  
Hybrid Approaches ◽  
Hybrid View

AbstractIt is tempting to think that zebras, goats, lions, and similar animals matter morally, but not in quite the same way people do. This might lead us to adopt a hybrid view of animal ethics such as ‘Utilitarianism for Animals; Deontology for People’. One of the core commitments of deontology is the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA): the view that doing harm is harder to justify than allowing harm. I explore how this core tenant of deontology applies to non-person, non-human animals and whether hybrid views of animal ethics can accept it. In doing so, I aim to do three things. First, to show that my defence of the DDA can solve a problem surrounding our duties to wild animals, while making only minimal claims about animal moral status. Second, to offer an argument that for many non-person, non-human animals, we should recognise deontological constraints on their treatment, but also see those constraints as importantly different from the constraints against doing harm to persons. Third, to get clearer on how we should understand Utilitarianism for Animals and Nozickian hybrid approaches to animal ethics.

scholarly journals The moral status of animals: Degrees of moral status and the interest-based approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-295
Author(s):  
Zorana Todorovic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals

This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia?s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan?s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics.

How to Count Animals, more or less

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelly Kagan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Moral Deliberation ◽  
Hierarchical Approach ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Do So

According to a prominent view in contemporary philosophical discussions of animal ethics—a view the author calls unitarianism—animals have the same moral status as people do, so that otherwise similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration in moral deliberation. In contrast, this book lays out and defends a hierarchical approach, according to which people count more than animals do, and some animals count more than others. Surprisingly, although this idea is close to being commonsense, for the most part moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of these crucial differences in status. Accordingly, the author both argues for a hierarchical account of morality and explores what suitably status sensitive moral principles might look like. Particular topics examined include the modification of distributive principles to take account of status, whether animals should be given deontological standing, and the moral complications that arise in cases that either involve defending animals or defending people from animals. The book also considers what the basis of moral status might be, and it responds to some of the potentially troubling implications of adopting a hierarchical approach to morality.

Dignity and Equality in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen
Keyword(s):  
Social Inequality ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

The chapter explores the ambiguity of the notion of dignity in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. On the one hand, dignity (dignatio) denotes the moral status of human beings in virtue of which they have to treat each other as equals. On the other hand, Pufendorf holds dignity and natural equality to be compatible with social inequality, notably with servitude and slavery. Moreover, when he deals with the comparative value and reputation (existimatio) of human beings, he admits that their moral status is conditioned by their readiness to behave as social beings. Human beings can thus lose their basic moral standing and are then considered as common enemies of all.

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