scholarly journals The Impact of Guarantees on Peer-to-Peer Lending Platform: Evolutionary Game Analysis and Empirical Evidence from China

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 2708-2731
Author(s):  
Zhicheng Weng ◽  
Pinliang Luo
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Screening Effect ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Peer Lending ◽  
The Impact

The peer-to-peer lending market has developed rapidly over the past decade and reveals a severe problem of information asymmetry. This research constructed a four-party evolutionary game model to analyze the influence pathway of the guarantee mechanism on the users’ participation of the peer-to-peer lending platform and conducted an empirical study applying the mediating effect model and simultaneous equation model based on data of China’s peer-to-peer lending platform. The theoretical model shows that the guarantee mechanism reduced the participation of borrowers of the peer-to-peer lending platform through a screening effect, but increased the participation of investors through a signal effect. In the case of the platform self-guarantee, there existed a self-screening effect, whose influence on the participation of investors depended on the strength of external constraints imposed on the platform enterprises. Further, the empirical study shows that during the sample period, the platform self-guarantee mechanism reduced the scale of borrowers and investors of the peer-to-peer lending platform at the same time, thus reducing the transaction volume of the platform. Although the third-party guarantee mechanism reduced the scale of borrowers, it increased the scale of investors, and the comprehensive effect was to increase the transaction volume of the platform. On this basis, this research puts forward suggestions such as strengthening the qualification examination of the platform enterprises, transforming the platform self-guarantee mechanism into the third-party guarantee mechanism, and introducing more signal mechanisms.

scholarly journals A Critical Appraisal of Dismissals at the Behest of a Third Party: The Impact of the Constitutional Labour Rights

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-125
Author(s):  
Tumo Charles Maloka
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Critical Appraisal ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Disciplinary Power ◽  
Security Services ◽  
The Third ◽  
Statutory Protection ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Do So

The pivotal judgments on dismissals at the behest of a third party – East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd v UPUSA, Lebowa Platinum Mines v Hill, NUMSA v Hendor Mining Supplies a Division of Marschalk Beleggings (Pty) Ltd, TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA, NUPSAW obo Mani v National Lotteries Board and NUMSA v High Goal Investments t/a Chuma Security Services – deeply implicate discrimination in all its manifestations, accountability, gendered precariousness and social justice. This contribution explores the focal questions raised in recent times concerning the fairness of a dismissal at the instance of a third party. First, there are fundamental points relating to the constitutional and statutory protection of security of employment. Secondly, there are those familiar problems often associated with substantive and procedural fairness that surface here under the guise of questioning the disciplinary power of the employer. In this context, inroads into managerial prerogative and disciplinary procedure are amplified where there has been no fault on the part of the employee and no breakdown of the trust relationship, or where the employee has been disciplined, but not dismissed and the employer did not want to terminate the employee’s employment but was coerced by the third party to do so. Thirdly, there is the thorny issue of the reason behind the third-party demand and the related issue of intolerability caused by the targeted employee. And finally, there is the issue of striking in support of a demand for dismissal of a co-employee.

Study on Development Strategy of Third Party Logistics Based on Electronic Commercial Environment

2013 ◽  
Vol 584 ◽  
pp. 277-281
Author(s):  
Qiu Sheng Sheng
Keyword(s):  
Electronic Commerce ◽  
Evaluation System ◽  
Comprehensive Evaluation ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Third Party Logistics ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
The Third Party Logistics ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

Mid-20th century, with the scale of production and circulation of commodities have been expanding, the status and role of logistics has become more evident. At the same time the rise of e-commerce logistics and development of new demand, third-party logistics development as the development of the logistics industry has become an important form of specialized logistics, but also a prerequisite for development of electronic commerce. The objective of social and business requirements, the third-party logistics is increasingly becoming the mainstream of logistics development, known as the 21st century "gold industry." In this paper, the theory of third-party logistics and research-based, combine the first e-commerce development environment, described the development of electronic commerce on the impact of a third party logistics, and third-party logistics environment was the development of micro, meson and macro for analysis, followed by third-party logistics system, proposed comprehensive third party logistics capability evaluation system design principles, according to third-party logistics enterprise's comprehensive ability to evaluate the impact of factors, ability to set a comprehensive evaluation of the indicators, building the ability of third party logistics enterprise's comprehensive evaluation system, respectively, from service capabilities, relationship skills and the aspects of the internal capacity of the comprehensive capacity of third party logistics evaluation, then the use of AHP and fuzzy assessment method on simulated third-party logistics company comprehensive assessment, and evaluation results were analyzed. Finally, according to analysis of the results of the evaluation, and drawing on advanced domestic and international experience of the Third Party Logistics, e-commerce environment, third party logistics proposed the development of countermeasures and suggestions: to strengthen the construction of third-party logistics information, and promote third-party logistics and supply chain integration, and enhance internal capabilities.

System dynamics research of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain dominated by the third party

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shidi Miao ◽  
Tengfei Wang ◽  
Deyun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Waste Recycling ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

With the rapid development of the electronic information industry in recent years, electronic products are being updated faster and faster, and e-waste recycling has become a common problem around the world. Firstly, this article contrasts recycling at home and abroad using the predicament of Midea Corp. Based on a closed-loop supply chain with the system dynamics method, a model is constructed and simulated. In this model, the collection point coverage rate is introduced to adjust the e-waste recycling rate dynamically. Aiming at a recycling mode dominated by the third party of the closed-loop supply chain, the article mainly discusses the impact on the sales rate and market share of the recycling model by third-party enterprises and compares the total revenue of all supply chains. Simulation results show that the model is more effective and optimal than the traditional recycling model.

Agglomeration effect and the “dual-format” e-marketplace pricing scheme

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping Su ◽  
Shuguang Liu ◽  
Jun Lin
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Feasible Region ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
The Third ◽  
Agglomeration Effect ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Theoretical Evidence ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to study a dominant e-retailer operating its own e-marketplace (B2C) to host peer competitor as well as acting as a traditional retailer (“dual-format” retailing as in Mantin and Krishnan 2014). The dominant retailer offers a two-part tariff charging scheme to a third-party seller. The seller decides whether to join the e-marketplace. The present paper is interested in addressing the following questions: What is the pricing equilibrium before/after the formation of the e-marketplace? What will be the “optimal” charging scheme? What is the impact on the e-marketplace operator if the third-party seller has the option to become “featured”. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a stylized model to capture the competition between the two retailers and applies game theory to solve the pricing equilibrium. The authors model the dual-format retailing in a two-stage decision: Stage 1, the e-marketplace operator offers a two-part tariff; Stage 2, if the other retailer is participating, they engage in a pricing competition. They assume that the e-marketplace operator is a profit maximizer by choosing its charging scheme subject to the condition that the participating retailer is no worse off. Findings The authors find that the e-retailer and the third-party seller in the e-marketplace are not always hurt by intensified price competition. They identify conditions under which higher expected prices are charged as a result of agglomeration effect. The authors’ model also provides theoretical evidence on this popular charging scheme, and shows the feasible region in which the e-marketplace operator could allocate the surplus resulted from the formation of the e-marketplace between itself and the participating retailer. Finally, the authors demonstrate that if the third-party seller has the option to become a “featured” retailer (He and Chen, 2006), it can be detrimental to the e-marketplace operator. Originality/value This work is different in three ways: First, the authors model an e-marketplace adopting a “dual-format” retailing, facing the trade-off between its direct retailing revenue and the rents collected from the member store, while the literature mainly focuses on e-marketplaces playing the intermediary role. Second, they explicitly model the “market expansion effect” caused by the agglomeration after the formation of the e-marketplace. The present study complements this stream of research by investigating and providing theoretical evidence on the charging scheme popularly adopted by the e-marketplaces and proposes ways to share the surplus to the participating store.

scholarly journals Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game

2019 ◽  
Vol 475 (2227) ◽  
pp. 20190349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinhai Fang ◽  
Tina P. Benko ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Haiyan Xu ◽  
Qingmei Tan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Synergistic Effects ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
The Third ◽  
Individual Incentive ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.

scholarly journals Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou ◽  
Hualin Xie ◽  
Xinmin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

To promote third-party environmental pollution control in China, it is necessary to dissect the mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. This study first discusses the acting paths of fiscal policies on third-party environmental pollution control in theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise is established. The replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability strategies, and numerical simulation of the behavior of the three participants are analyzed to further study the acting mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. In addition, the influences of other parameters on the implementation of third-party environmental pollution control are evaluated. The results show that the behaviors of the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise influence each other. Furthermore, strengthening the relevant fiscal policy, reducing the risks of the polluting enterprise and third-party enterprise, and improving the benefit to the local government are conducive to promoting third-party environmental pollution control in China. Based on these results, this study proposes the following policy implications: formulating fiscal policies for third-party environmental pollution control, implementing fiscal policies in a dynamic and progressive manner, improving the market mechanism of third-party environmental pollution control, and strengthening the environmental performance assessment of the local government.

scholarly journals Impact of Trade-In Remanufacturing Policy and Consumer Behavior on Remanufacturer Decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (15) ◽  
pp. 5980
Author(s):  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Yongrui Duan ◽  
Jiazhen Huo
Keyword(s):  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Competitive Strategies ◽  
The Third ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Corporate Profits ◽  
Consumer Choice Behavior ◽  
The Impact

To develop more competitive strategies for different types of remanufacturing companies under the trade-in remanufacturing policy, this paper investigates the impact of the trade-in remanufacturing policy and consumer choice behavior on decisions of a traditional brand remanufacturer and a third-party brand remanufacturer by using a consumer utility model. The results suggest that the trade-in remanufacturing policy increases demand for the third-party brand, but does not increase demand for the traditional brand. Further, although trade-in remanufacturing policy increases both brand prices, it also increases consumer surplus and corporate profits. Neither the traditional brand remanufacturer nor the third-party brand remanufacturer can completely monopolize the remanufacturing market. In this situation, the traditional brand remanufacturer should strive to increase consumer loyalty, and the third-party brand remanufacturer should strive for consumer recognition of third-party remanufactured products.

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