scholarly journals Embodiment: The Ecology of Mind

Philosophies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Paul Dumouchel
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Central Component ◽  
Abstract Object ◽  
The Third ◽  
Heterogeneous Objects ◽  
Ecology Of Mind ◽  
Circular Causality ◽  
Individual Body ◽  
Ontological Uncertainty

Following a suggestion from G. Bateson, this article enquires into the consequence of the idea of embodiment in philosophy of mind, taking seriously the notion of an ecology of mind. In the first half of this article, after distinguishing between the biological and the systemic approaches to ecology, I focus on three characteristics of the systemic approach. First, that a system is an abstract object that is multiply embodied in a collection of physically distinct heterogeneous objects. Second, that there is a form of circular causality between the level of the elements and that of the system as a whole, as some characteristics of the elements partake in the explanation of how the system functions, while the requirement of the system explains why the elements have the characteristics that they do. The third is the ontological uncertainty that we sometimes find in ecology, where the same term is used to designate both a central component of the ecological system and the system as a whole. In the second half, beginning with a critique of the theory of mind approach, I look into the consequences of conceiving that mind is embodied in a collection of physically distinct heterogeneous objects that interact as elements of a system, rather than enclosed in an individual body.

Materialism in the philosophy of mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Main Difficulty ◽  
Ordinary Sense ◽  
Causal Dependence ◽  
Physical Relation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Almost All ◽  
The Mind

Materialism – which, for almost all purposes, is the same as physicalism – is the theory that everything that exists is material. Natural science shows that most things are intelligible in material terms, but mind presents problems in at least two ways. The first is consciousness, as found in the ‘raw feel’ of subjective experience. The second is the intentionality of thought, which is the property of being about something beyond itself; ‘aboutness’ seems not to be a physical relation in the ordinary sense. There have been three ways of approaching these problems. The hardest is eliminativism, according to which there are no ‘raw feels’, no intentionality and, in general, no mental states: the mind and all its furniture are part of an outdated science that we now see to be false. Next is reductionism, which seeks to give an account of our experience and of intentionality in terms which are acceptable to a physical science: this means, in practice, analysing the mind in terms of its role in producing behaviour. Finally, the materialist may accept the reality and irreducibility of mind, but claim that it depends on matter in such an intimate way – more intimate than mere causal dependence – that materialism is not threatened by the irreducibility of mind. The first two approaches can be called ‘hard materialism’, the third ‘soft materialism’. The problem for eliminativism is that we find it difficult to credit that any belief that we think and feel is a theoretical speculation. Reductionism’s main difficulty is that there seems to be more to consciousness than its contribution to behaviour: a robotic machine could behave as we do without thinking or feeling. The soft materialist has to explain supervenience in a way that makes the mind not epiphenomenal without falling into the problems of interactionism.

Central site for pressor action of blood-borne angiotensin in rat

1980 ◽  
Vol 239 (3) ◽  
pp. R358-R361 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. D. Fink ◽  
J. R. Haywood ◽  
W. J. Bryan ◽  
W. Packwood ◽  
M. J. Brody
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Angiotensin Ii ◽  
Pressor Response ◽  
Third Ventricle ◽  
Central Component ◽  
The Third ◽  
Electrolytic Lesions ◽  
The Central Nervous System ◽  
The Difference

A previous study demonstrated that the threshold dose of intra-arterial angiotensin II required to induce a pressor response in the rat was significantly lower when the drug was administered into the carotid artery than when administered into the abdominal aorta. This result was interpreted to indicate that part of the increase in arterial pressure produced by low concentrations of blood-borne angiotensin in this species was the result of an effect on structures in the central nervous system selectively accessible via the carotid vascular bed. The purpose of the present study was to establish more precisely the site of the pressor action of angiotensin within the central nervous system. The central component of the pressor effect of angiotensin was quantified as the difference in pressor responses to intracarotid and intra-aortic infusions of angiotensin II (delta c-a). In conscious rats, delta c-a was attenuated by administration of the angiotensin antagonist, saralasin, into the third cerebral ventricle. In rats with chronic electrolytic lesions of the anteroventral third ventricle (AV3V), delta c-a was abolished. Periventricular structures surrounding the third ventricle appear to mediate the central component of the pressor action of blood-borne angiotensin in the rat.

Philosophical Analysis; Referents of Names

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Philosophical Methodology ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Public Language ◽  
Arbitrary Collection

Replacing empirical concepts with unicepts has implications both for philosophical methodology and for some central matters in philosophy of science, plilosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. This chapter gives illustrations that concern the fixing of referents of naming words in a public language, the method of philosophical analysis, referential constancy of names for theoretical objects over theory change, the distinction between so-called “observational concepts” and “theoretical concepts,” and last, so-called “theory of mind.” This is a somewhat arbitrary collection of apparent implications of embracing unicepts, but the discussions of the “observation-theory” distinction and of “theory of mind” will be needed when discussing both perception and the semantics-pragmatics distinction.

Searle Rediscovers What Was Not Lost

Dialogue ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-130
Author(s):  
Tim Kenyon
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Common Sense View ◽  
The Mind

John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind comprises two related projects. The first is to show that philosophy of mind since Descartes has been not merely false, but obviously false. The materialist tradition—as Searle encapsulates behaviourism, type and token identity theories, functionalism, Artificial Intelligence, and eliminativism—consists of more or less crazy positions, with a crucial shared trait: they “leave out” the mind, the very thing they were to explain. Searle's second concern is to sketch his own theory of mind, a “common-sense” view that is, he claims, obviously true, and thus is a sharp departure from the madness of the various received views of this century.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind Development in Adolescence and Early Adulthood: The Growing Complexity of Recursive Thinking Ability

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Valle ◽  
Davide Massaro ◽  
Ilaria Castelli ◽  
Antonella Marchetti
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Early Adulthood ◽  
Memory Task ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Third Order ◽  
The Third ◽  
Thinking Ability ◽  
Recursive Thinking

This study explores the development of theory of mind, operationalized as recursive thinking ability, from adolescence to early adulthood (N= 110; young adolescents = 47; adolescents = 43; young adults = 20). The construct of theory of mind has been operationalized in two different ways: as the ability to recognize the correct mental state of a character, and as the ability to attribute the correct mental state in order to predict the character’s behaviour. The Imposing Memory Task, with five recursive thinking levels, and a third-order false-belief task with three recursive thinking levels (devised for this study) have been used. The relationship among working memory, executive functions, and linguistic skills are also analysed. Results show that subjects exhibit less understanding of elevated recursive thinking levels (third, fourth, and fifth) compared to the first and second levels. Working memory is correlated with total recursive thinking, whereas performance on the linguistic comprehension task is related to third level recursive thinking in both theory of mind tasks. An effect of age on third-order false-belief task performance was also found. A key finding of the present study is that the third-order false-belief task shows significant age differences in the application of recursive thinking that involves the prediction of others’ behaviour. In contrast, such an age effect is not observed in the Imposing Memory Task. These results may support the extension of the investigation of the third order false belief after childhood.

Illusions of Consciousness

Dialogue ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 769-776
Author(s):  
Stewart Nicolson
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
The Third ◽  
To Come ◽  
Intentional Systems

Daniel Dennett's theory of mind divides into two parts: a theory of mental content, which is provided by his intentional systems theory, and a theory of consciousness, the latest presentation of which is brought together in an exciting recent work, Consciousness Explained. This book, combined with his 1987 The Intentional Stance, constitutes the third execution of Dennett's overall program, the first two being Content and Consciousness (1969) and Brainstorms (1978). Consciousness Explained is a veritable treasure of fascinating ideas, fresh perspectives and striking illustrations, many of which are sure to be much discussed by philosophers in years to come.

scholarly journals A central component of the N1 event-related brain potential could index the early and automatic inhibition of the actions systematically activated by objects

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Molly Touzel ◽  
Christine Snidal ◽  
Julia Segal ◽  
Louis Renoult ◽  
J. Bruno Debruille
Keyword(s):  
Strong Support ◽  
Reaction Times ◽  
Real Space ◽  
Central Component ◽  
Brain Potentials ◽  
Brain Potential ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Press ◽  
Initial Activation ◽  
Early Inhibition

AbstractStimuli of the environment, like objects, systematically activate the actions they are associated to. These activations occur extremely fast. Nevertheless, behavioural data reveal that, in most cases, these activations are then automatically inhibited, around 100 ms after the occurrence of the stimulus. We thus tested whether this early inhibition could be indexed by a central component of the N1 event-related brain potential (ERP). To achieve that goal, we looked at whether this ERP component is greater in tasks that could increase the inhibition and in trials where reaction times happen to be long. The illumination of a real space bar of a keyboard out of the dark was used as a stimulus. To maximize the modulation of the inhibition, the task participants had to performed was manipulated across blocks. A look-only task and a count task were used to increase inhibition and an immediate press task was used to decrease it. ERPs of the two block-conditions where presses had to be prevented and where the largest central N1s were predicted were compared to those elicited in the press task, differentiating the ERPs to the third of the trials where presses were the slowest from the ERPs to the third of the trials with the fastest presses. Despite larger negativities due to motor potentials and despite greater attention likely in immediate press-trials, central N1s were found to be minimal for the fastest presses, intermediate for the slowest ones and maximal for the two no-press conditions. These results thus provide a strong support for the idea that the central N1 indexes an early and short lasting automatic inhibition of the actions systematically activated by objects. They also confirm that the strength of this automatic inhibition spontaneously fluctuates across trials and tasks. On the other hand, just before N1s, parietal P1s were found greater for fastest presses. They might thus index the initial activation of these actions. Finally, consistent with the idea that N300s index late inhibition processes, that occur preferentially when the task requires them, these ERPs were quasi absent for fast presses trials and much larger in the three other conditions.HighlightsEvent-related brain potentials (ERPs) elicited by a real objectSmaller parietal P1s and greater central N1s for slowest than for fastest motor responsesEven greater central N1s for tasks without such responsesCentral N1s may index early inhibition of stimulus-activated actionsN300s could index late inhibition of stimulus-activated actions

Body schema and pain

2021 ◽  
pp. 301-315
Author(s):  
Katsunori Miyahara
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Pathological Condition ◽  
Body Schema ◽  
The Body ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Enactive Approach ◽  
The Third ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Conceptual Distinction

This chapter aims to situate Merleau-Ponty’s notion of body schema within the context of contemporary philosophy of pain. In the first section, the chapter starts by introducing his notion of body schema and its role in his account of the experience of pain. It then briefly reviews current theoretical treatments of pain in the analytic philosophy of mind. It outlines representational and imperative theories of pain by mapping them onto the conceptual distinction between body image and body schema. In the second section, the chapter further argues that they are both deeply entrenched in a Cartesian dualistic picture of mind and body. To be fair, imperativism partly overcomes the Cartesian conception of the body by acknowledging the significance of the body schema. To see how theories of pain can escape the dualistic picture, thus, it will be helpful to examine imperativist explanations. The chapter undertakes this task by closely examining Colin Klein’s imperativist account of a rare pathological condition called pain asymbolia. This account, it suggests in the third section, leads to an unacceptably over-intellectual view of the body because of hidden Cartesian assumptions. It concludes by contrasting this with an enactive approach to pain, deeply inspired by Merleau-Ponty. In the last section, the chapter turns to phenomenological grounds to clarify and support this alternative approach.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Temporal Structure ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Standard Theory ◽  
Basic Action ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Social

I outline the motivation for thinking about the connections between action and interaction. I then provide a preview of the remaining chapters. The first part of this book focuses on the nature of action, starting with questions about action individuation, context, the notion of “basic action,” and the temporal structure of action. These topics lead to questions about intention and the sense of agency and ultimately to the idea that we need to consider action in the social contexts of interaction. The second part looks at the role of interaction in discussions of social cognition, building a contrast between standard theory of mind, and embodied and enactive accounts. In the third part I explore possible implications of these considerations for some critical social-political questions concerning autonomy, recognition, justice, and the effects of norms and social institutions on our actions and interactions.

The Mind's Body: The Body's Self-Awareness

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 619-634
Author(s):  
Frank S. Lucash
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Body ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
True False

In order to find out how successful or unsuccessful Spinoza's philosophy of mind is, I will examine what Spinoza says about (1) the nature of mind, (2) its relation to the body, (3) its adequate/inadequate and true/false ideas. In doing so I will see what problems critics say he runs into and then find out if what they say about these difficulties can be resolved. If these difficulties can be resolved within Spinoza's own framework then his theory of mind is a success. If not, then it is a failure. I shall argue that his theory of mind is a success because the problems that his critics say he has are not really problems at all or if there are problems they can be resolved within his own system.

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