scholarly journals Selection of Recycling Channels and Product Eco-Design with Take-Back Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 8961
Author(s):  
Shiqi Xu ◽  
Hui Liu ◽  
Guangye Xu
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Take Back ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Selection Of

The influence of government policies on the selection of recycling channels has been widely discussed, but there are few studies from the perspective of product Eco-design. This paper examines the recycling channel options for a manufacturer applying Eco-design under government environmental regulation. We consider a system that includes a retailer, a manufacturer, and a government, and develop a three-stage Stackelberg game model. The government firstly decides whether to impose environmental regulations. Next, the manufacturer decides whether to recycle by himself or delegate the recycling task to the retailer, deciding both the wholesale price of the product and the collected price (recycled by the manufacturer) or the recycling compensation to the retailer (recycled by the retailer), and the retailer decides the retail price of new products and the collection price (recycled by the retailer). Our study finds that for the regulator, the optimal policy is not to implement environmental regulation because the manufacturer has implemented the product Eco-design. For the manufacturer, the choice of recycling channel depends on the recycling cost of the manufacturer and the retailer. When the manufacturer’s recycling cost is below a certain threshold, he will prefer to recycle the waste products by himself, and when the cost increases beyond this threshold, the manufacturer will transfer the recycling task to the retailer.

Updating Belief in Concept Selection of a Public Project Using a Mathematical Model

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Takai
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Decision Analysis ◽  
National Laboratory ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Project Proposal ◽  
Concept System ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Selection Of

Acquiring information about uncertainty and updating belief before making the final decision are important steps in decision analysis. In this paper, a national laboratory (lab hereafter) uses decision analysis to choose the optimal project proposal for a public project submitted to the government. A project proposal consists of a system concept (system technology and specifications) and a budget. When choosing a project proposal, the lab may not know what might happen when the cost of the project exceeds the budget. If the cost only exceeds the budget for a small amount, the government may allow the project to continue. On the other hand, if the cost substantially exceeds the budget, the project may be cancelled. To assess this uncertainty, experts’ opinions are useful source of information. However, experts’ opinions may not always be available. This paper proposes a mathematical model to simulate the government’s actions and to update the lab’s belief about this uncertainty when experts’ opinions cannot be obtained. Information obtained from analyzing a mathematical model should help the lab update its belief and make better decisions.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Approach for Eco-Design and Remanufacturing Considering Take-Back Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 7174
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiao Chang ◽  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Qian Wang ◽  
Yongguang Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Monetary Value ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Take Back ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This paper mainly aims at investigating the governments’ take-back policy of penalty or subsidy that motivates eco-design or remanufacturing. For this purpose, we consider a two-stage Stackelberg game between a government and a manufacturer. The government first decides to impose a take-back penalty or offer a take-back subsidy, and then the manufacturer selects to remanufacture or invest in eco-design as a response to the take-back policy. Upon analyzing and comparing game equilibrium, we find that the government prefers to offer a subsidy policy for eco-design and to impose a penalty policy for remanufacturing. The manufacturer will decide on investing in eco-design when the monetary value of the environmental impact of landfill and eco-design coefficient is medium. However, if the eco-design coefficient is high, the manufacturer practices remanufacturing instead of eco-design whether penalized and subsidized. The present study provides a set of guidelines in practical managerial recommendations for governments and manufacturers.

Decision Models of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information with Demand Disruption

2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 773-781
Author(s):  
Xin Rong Jiang ◽  
Yong Chao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Production Quantity

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.

scholarly journals Equilibrium decisions on pricing and innovation that impact reference price dynamics

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Shaokun Tao ◽  
Xianjin Du ◽  
Suresh P. Sethi ◽  
Xiuli He ◽  
Yu Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Steady State ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Interactive Effect ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Price Ratio ◽  
Reference Prices ◽  
Consumer Memory

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Previous studies have confirmed that reference prices play an essential role in consumer purchasing decisions, and some researchers have suggested that reference prices are positively influenced by innovation. Therefore, we construct an interactive effect of innovation and reference price to study their combined impact on supply chain decisions. We model a supply chain, where a manufacturer determines the innovation level and the wholesale price while the retailer controls the retail price, as a dynamic Stackelberg game. We show that the interactive effect causes the steady-state wholesale and retail prices to increase, thus motivating the manufacturer to increase innovation investment. We see that the retail price and the level of innovation increase in reference price effect whereas they decrease in consumer memory. The centralized firm has a higher steady-state innovation level and innovation/price ratio and lower steady-state retail price compared to the decentralized supply chain. Consumers also benefit from the interactive effect as well as from centralization. Finally, we use numerical analysis to demonstrate our results and offer some managerial implications.</p>

scholarly journals CSR Remanufacturing Supply Chains under WTP Differentiation

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2197
Author(s):  
Lili Dai ◽  
Tong Shu ◽  
Shou Chen ◽  
Shouyang Wang ◽  
Kin Keung Lai
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Corporate Social

With the shortage of global resources and the call for sustainable development, the remanufacturing supply chain and the corporate social responsibility of enterprises have attracted extensive attention from scholars. This paper studies a manufacturer-retailer corporate social responsibility (CSR) remanufacturing supply chain in which the manufacturer collects the used products grounded in the willingness to pay (WTP) differentiation. Different from previous literature, this paper first adds WTP differences to the CSR remanufacturing supply chain. Next, we analyze the manufacturer exhibiting CSR activity by Stackelberg game theory in both centralized and decentralized models with a consideration of prices, recycling, consumer surplus, and profits for the chain players in the two models with different CSR ratios. Through calculation and analyses of the models, we note that the chain members have the best status when the consumers’ WTP for new and remanufactured products is within a threshold. Subsequently, we compare the optimal price decisions and the expected profits in the decentralized and centralized systems, and we find that the retail price, wholesale price, and recycling rate decrease with a rising CSR under WTP differentiation. The centralized retail price is lower than the decentralized one. Conversely, the profit is higher when the increment of demand is higher. On top of that, in common cases, the pure and total profits of manufacturing are ascending while the retailer’s profit is descending. We also find that the consumer surplus is increasing in two cases. Finally, to motivate the players in the supply chain to engage in CSR activity, we consider the revenue sharing contract. From the perspective of WTP differences, this paper studies CSR remanufacturing, which has certain influences on the sustainable development of the economy.

PENDIDIKAN BERBASIS KESETARAAN GENDER: Studi Kebijakan Pemerintah dan Aplikasinya dalam Pendidikan

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Inayatul Ulya
Keyword(s):  
Gender Equality ◽  
Gender Inequality ◽  
Formal Education ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Gender Analysis ◽  
Normative Approach ◽  
Library Research ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract Gender equality-based education is education that accommodate gender differences. This study aims to reveal the gender sensitivity insocial and educational as well as identify government policies in building gender equ ality and its applications in formal education. This study is qualitative with an inventory of government policies in building gender equality, and then analyze it with the reality of education in Indonesia. The approach used in this study is referring to the normative approach to the study of government policies in enforcing gender equality and its applications in formal education. The research data was collected using the techniques of literary study (library research). Materials that have been acquired and processed is described and analyzed by using descriptive interpretative paradigm and gender analysis. Although many efforts have been taken by the government for the realization of gender equality, but in the education sector still  show gender inequality. The indication can be seen from three aspects, they are not unequal participation in education for women, unequal educational material as well as the selection of majors unequal proportions of men and women. The phenomenon is not yet reflect the totality of gender equality education. Keywords:pendidikan, kesetaraan gender, kebijakan pemerintah

Competition and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain With Asymmetric Retailers

2020 ◽  
pp. 1311-1328
Author(s):  
YuHang Zhang ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Different Characteristics ◽  
Linear Quantity

This article studies competition and coordination in a dual-channel supply chain where one supplier supplies homogeneous products to multiple asymmetric retailers, meanwhile, selling products to the end consumers acting as retailers, through a two-level Stackelberg game. This article first studies the asymmetry among the retailers in terms of the different characteristics of the cost, price, quantity. This article finds that a supplier's profits increase when the number of retailers are high enough in the retail market, even though the retail price of the retailers is lower than that of the supplier, or the wholesale price is cut down when there are many retailers competing in the retail market. On the other hand, under certain conditions, the efficiency of supply chain goes to 1. In this article, the authors show that some traditional contracts that can perfectly coordinate the single-channel supply chain, while failing to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. Therefore, this article puts forth a linear quantity discount contract and first proves it can be applicable to the dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric retailers under a certain special condition where the lead retailer exits the retail market. The authors examine contracts which can reduce the loss of the efficiency, though they cannot completely coordinate a dual-channel supply chain.

scholarly journals The Impact of Government Subsidies on the Low-Carbon Supply Chain Based on Carbon Emission Reduction Level

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (14) ◽  
pp. 7603
Author(s):  
Biao Li ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Xiqiang Xia ◽  
Dan Qiao
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

To improve low-carbon technology, the government has shifted its strategy from subsidizing low-carbon products (LCP) to low-carbon technology. To analyze the impact of government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction levels on different entities in the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), game theory is used to model the provision of government subsidies to low-carbon enterprises and retailers. The main findings of the paper are that a government subsidy strategy based on carbon emission reduction levels can effectively drive low-carbon enterprises to further reduce the carbon emissions. The government’s choice of subsidy has the same effect on the LCP retail price per unit, the sales volume, and the revenue of low-carbon products per unit. When the government subsidizes the retailer, the low-carbon product wholesale price per unit is the highest. That is, low-carbon enterprises use up part of the government subsidies by increasing the wholesale price of low-carbon products. The retail price of low-carbon products per unit is lower than the retail price of low-carbon products in the context of decentralized decision making, but the sales volume and revenue of low-carbon products are greater in the centralized decision-making. The cost–benefit-sharing contract could enable the decentralized decision model to achieve the same level of profit as the centralized decision model.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Su ◽  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
The Government

This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

scholarly journals Analisis Hukum Administrasi Terhadap Kebijakan Pemerintah Mengenai Pembebasan Biaya Sertifikasi Tanah Wakaf

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Islamiyati Islamiyati
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Library Research ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Research Type

Abstrack The study analyzed Article 22 of Government Regulation Number 13 of 2010 concerning government policies for the exemption of waqf land certification fees according to state administrative law. The analyze focus on the reasons for the government to issue such policies in the perspective of the state administrative law. The research type of library research requires secondary data, which consists of primary, secondary and tertiary legal materials, normative juridical approaches, and qualitative data analysis. The results of the study explained that the government issued a policy of freeing the cost of waqf land certificates aimed at empowering waqf land so that its designation could be felt by the community, accelerating the legality of waqf land, protecting and securing and optimizing the benefits of waqf assets. This policy is an effort to understand waqf deeds which means worship and legal certainty. Government policy is the implementation of the function of the  state administrative law in creating a government that is clean and in accordance with the principles of good general governance, namely; the principles of legality, equality, justice, legal protection, wisdom, implementation of public interest, and acting meticulously. Key Words: State Administrative Law, Free of Cost, Endowments Land Certification Abstrak Penelitian menganalisis Pasal 22 Peraturan Peemrintah Nomor 13 Tahun 2010 tentang kebijakan pemerintah pembebasan biaya sertifikasi tanah wakaf menurut hukum administrasi negara. Menganalisis alasan pemerintah mengeluarkan kebijakan demikian dalam perspektif HAN. Jenis penelitian library research, memerlukan data sekunder, yang terdiri dari bahan hukum primer, sekunder dan tersier, pendekatannya yuridis normatif, dan analisis datanya kualitatif. Hasil penelitian menjelaskan bahwa pemerintah mengeluarkan kebijakan  membebaskan biaya sertifikat tanah wakaf bertujuan untuk memberdayakan tanah wakaf supaya peruntukannya dapat dirasakan masyarakat, percepatan legalitas tanah wakaf, melindungi dan mengamankan serta mengoptimalkan manfaat aset wakaf. Kebijakan ini adalah salah satu upaya memahami perbuatan wakaf yang bermakna ibadah dan berkepastian hukum. Kebijakan pemerintah merupakan implementasi fungsi HAN dalam menciptakan pemerintahan yang bersih dan sesuai asas pemerintahan umum yang baik, yakni; asas legalitas, kesamaan, keadilan, perlindungan hukum, kebijaksanaan, penyelenggaraan kepentingan umum, dan bertindak cermat. Kata Kunci: Hukum Administrasi Negara, Bebas Biaya, Sertifikasi Tanah Wakaf

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