scholarly journals The Green-Innovation-Inducing Effect of a Unit Progressive Carbon Tax

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (21) ◽  
pp. 11708
Author(s):  
Xiao Yu ◽  
Yingdong Xu ◽  
Meng Sun ◽  
Yanzhe Zhang

The major global economies are facing increasing pressure to reduce their carbon emissions. Introducing environmental policy instruments to stimulate green innovation is key to mitigating global warming. We propose a carbon tax design with a typical green innovation orientation that links carbon taxes with the low-carbon technology (LCT) of enterprises and imposes a progressive tax on heterogeneous enterprises with LCT stock to encourage green innovation. This study used a dynamic evolution game model based on the Stackelberg model of heterogeneous enterprises with LCT stock to analyze the green-innovation-inducing effect of unit progressive carbon taxes. A unit progressive carbon tax could encourage enterprises to participate in green innovation, regardless of their initial green innovation willingness. The progressive tax rate was more effective than a fixed rate for stimulating green innovation by all enterprises. There was a marginal diminishing effect of increases in the tax rate. An increase in the innovation cost coefficient of enterprises reduced the green-innovation-inducing effect of the unit progressive carbon tax. Increasing the tax rate was effective only under normal circumstances. A decline in the carbon reduction in enterprises also reduced the green-innovation-inducing effect of the unit progressive carbon tax. Furthermore, increasing the tax rate when the carbon reduction amount was extremely low caused enterprises to abandon green innovation.

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 8185-8191

Global warming has been described as “the biggest externality the world has ever seen”. With international policymaking gradually taking into account initiatives to tackle climate change, the idea of putting a price on carbon has also received much acclaim. Pricing carbon, in the form of a carbon tax, was put forward as a policy initiative with the commencement of the Paris Climate Summit of 2015, as such a policy, could address emissions at the sources while being the least intrusive with the lowest burden on taxpayers. India is the third largest emitter of greenhouse gases globally but has also been a pioneer in acknowledging carbon taxes. The government has claimed its high excise duties on petrol and diesel, along with the Clean Environment Cess on coal consumption, to be implicit carbon taxes. Interestingly, while a carbon tax should be linked to carbon emissions, current indirect taxes by the government are not at all linked to them while are mostly used as revenue generating measures or compensating the States as part of GST revenue losses. This paper envisages to examine the case for introducing a carbon tax regime in India vis-à-vis fossil fuel consumption in the economy, with a subsequent determination of a unique carbon tax rate for India. To achieve India’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets of Paris Summit, it is imperative that India introduces an explicit carbon tax that links fuel prices to emissions, which can have a cascading effect of reducing their consumption while switching to cleaner fuels as substitutes. Findings from the study indicate that coal faces a minimal tax burden while being the most polluting whereas natural gas faces a high tax burden even though it is cleanest among all. As part of the study, a tax rate has been derived that is expected to act as a policy benchmark and can nudge tax policies in the right way, as switching to a low-carbon economy forms a primary agenda of India, in this era of a hothouse Earth.


1994 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongxiang Zhang

Increasing concern in scientific and policy making circles about the possibility of global warming induced by the accumulation of CO2 and other GHGs in the atmosphere has advanced for consideration of policies to limit emissions of these GHGs. This paper gives an overview of policy instruments that might be used to control CO2 emissions, including command-and-control approach, energy taxes, carbon taxes, and tradeable carbon permits, with special attention paid to the economic instruments. It highlights the differences between energy taxes and carbon taxes in terms of target achievement. It presents some main findings arising from those studies on carbon taxes, with the emphasis placed on some aspects of domestic carbon tax design and incidence. The allocations of emission permits (or reimbursement of carbon tax revenues) are also discussed. Moreover, a comparison of carbon taxes with tradeable carbon permits is briefly made. This paper ends with some conclusions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongwei Cheng ◽  
Dong Mu ◽  
Yi Zhang

This paper established cooperation decision model for a mixed carbon policy of carbon trading-carbon tax (environmental tax) in a two-stageS-Msupply chain. For three different cooperative abatement situations, we considered the supplier driven model, the manufacturer driven model, and the equilibrium game model. We investigated the influence of mixed carbon policy with constraint of reduction targets on supply chain price, productivity, profits, carbon emissions reduction rate, and so on. The results showed that (1) high-strength carbon policies do not necessarily encourage enterprises to effectively reduce emissions, and increasing market acceptance of low carbon products or raising the price of carbon quota can promote the benign reduction; (2) perfect competitive carbon market has a higher carbon reduction efficiency than oligarch carbon market, but their optimal level of cooperation is the same and the realized reduction rate is in line with the intensity of carbon policy; (3) the policy sensitivity of the carbon trading mechanism is stronger than the carbon tax; “paid quota mechanism” can subsidize the cost of abatement and improve reduction initiative. Finally, we use a numerical example to solve the optimal decisions under different market situations, validating the effectiveness of model and the conclusions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengzhong Zhang ◽  
Yingmin Yu ◽  
Qihong Zhu ◽  
Chun Martin Qiu ◽  
Aixuan Tian

Previous literature has shown that manufacturers’ choices between radical and incremental green innovation modes can greatly impact the tradeoff between industry growth and carbon emission reduction. Yet, how the government can motivate manufacturers to implement radical green innovations to reduce carbon emission is unclear. In this paper, the researchers construct an evolutionary game model to analyze the joint impacts of carbon tax and innovation subsidy on manufacturers’ choices of green innovation mode. We derive the conditions for manufacturers’ stable strategies. Based on those results, we find that four factors—carbon tax, innovation subsidy, consumer green preference, and manufacturers’ capabilities of absorbing and adopting new technologies—may facilitate the choice of radical innovation. Furthermore, we conduct numerical simulations to verify the theoretical results, and further illustrate how the synergy of carbon tax rate and subsidy level affects the evolution of the green innovation mode choices. Specifically, we demonstrate the superiority of portfolio policy in the early stage of green innovation over single policy. In contrast, in the later stage, it is carbon tax but not innovation subsidy that remains effective. We discuss the insights for the government to formulate appropriate environmental policies to effectively promote the adoption of green innovation and reduce carbon emission.


Author(s):  
Gilbert E. Metcalf

As of 2020, carbon taxes were in effect in 30 jurisdictions around the world. This article provides a theoretical overview of carbon taxes along with some empirical evidence on the macroeconomic impacts of existing taxes, including emission reductions. It compares and contrasts carbon taxes with other policy instruments to reduce emissions. It also highlights issues that have recently attracted the attention of researchers on which additional research would be beneficial. Those include ( a) the role of border adjustments in a unilaterally imposed carbon tax, ( b) hybrid carbon tax systems that increase the likelihood of hitting desired emission reduction targets, ( c) the optimal price path for a carbon tax, and ( d) the growing empirical literature on the economic impact of carbon taxes. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Resource Economics, Volume 13 is October 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3597
Author(s):  
Fei Zou ◽  
Yanju Zhou ◽  
Caihua Yuan

In the current low-carbon economy, the government has adopted carbon taxes and carbon trading policies to control the carbon emissions of manufacturers. As consumers become increasingly aware of low-carbon, some retailers have also started investing in low-carbon to shape their public image and increase their competitiveness to attract more customers. In this paper, the Stackelberg game method is utilized to solve the model, and the graphs are used to analyze the benefits of retailers' low-carbon investment on the supply chain through numerical analysis. It is found that when the emission reduction cost coefficient of manufacturers is relatively low, manufacturers are willing to reduce carbon emissions. At this time, increasing carbon tax and the carbon emission permits price can effectively promote the emission reduction behavior of manufacturers, because it increases demand for products and the profit of manufacturers and retailers. However, when the emission reduction cost coefficient of the manufacturers is quite high, increasing carbon tax and carbon emission permits price cannot effectively promote the emission reduction behavior, because this situation of the emission reduction reduces the profit of manufacturers. The main contribution of this paper discovers that the green cost coefficient of retailers' low-carbon investment will adjust the impact of the carbon tax and the carbon trading price on the profits of retailers and manufacturers which proves that retailers’ low-carbon investment is beneficial to the supply chain. When the emission reduction cost coefficient is high and the green cost coefficient is low, increasing the carbon tax or carbon emission permits price can increase the profit of manufacturers and retailers. Finally, we design a supply chain coordination of comprehensive sharing contact for retailers and manufacturers. The result shows that this contract has economic and environmental benefits, and that it is beneficial for the environment and economy of sustainable development.


Author(s):  
Qiang Du ◽  
Yunqing Yan ◽  
Youdan Huang ◽  
Chanchan Hao ◽  
Jiao Wu

The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the government’s implementation of the carbon tax will change their choices of LCBs. Evolutionary game models between developers and consumers are established under static and dynamic carbon taxes. Their evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are deduced in different situations. According to the real scenarios in China, numerical simulations are further conducted to show that carbon tax influences the low-carbon behaviors of stakeholders in the construction industry. Under a static carbon tax, the two players cannot reach an equilibrium state, while the game system is stable under a dynamic tax. The probability of the developers constructing LCBs is positively related to the carbon tax, while its degree is gradually weakened as the tax rate increases. Therefore, an appropriate tax should be set to promote the development of LCBs effectively. Finally, policy implications are put forwarded to guide the participants’ low-carbon behaviors and reduce the carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry.


2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (5) ◽  
pp. 563-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald B. Marron ◽  
Eric J. Toder

A carbon tax is a promising tool for discouraging the greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change. In principle, a well-designed tax could reduce the risk of climate change, minimize the cost of emissions reductions, encourage innovation in low-carbon technologies, and raise new public revenue. But designing a real-world carbon tax poses significant challenges. We analyze those challenges from a public finance perspective, emphasizing three tax policy design issues: setting the tax rate, collecting the tax, and using the resulting revenue. The benefits of a carbon tax will depend on how policymakers address those issues.


2018 ◽  
Vol 06 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850016
Author(s):  
Dan SHI ◽  
Cheng ZHANG ◽  
Bo ZHOU ◽  
Lu YANG

As an emissions abatement mechanism focusing on property rights theory and market trading methods, carbon emissions rights trading plays an important role in achieving low-carbon economic development, which has already garnered broad worldwide recognition. In the aftermath of the implementation of an initial, seven-province/city, carbon emissions rights trading pilot project, in 2017 China launched a carbon emissions trading rights market on a national basis. The authors of this paper provide a theoretical basis for research into this trading market’s impacts on energy conservation, reduction of emissions, and on economically sustaining, healthy development, from the following four perspectives: the history of the market’s development, a comparison of carbon reduction mechanisms associated with differing carbon tax levies, the effects of carbon emissions rights trading’s implementation, and the influencing factors on such trading. They systematically summarize, sort out, and evaluate the most recent, related carbon emissions rights trading literature, and then based on this analysis offer up insights regarding possible developments and refinements of future carbon emissions rights trading research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Wu ◽  
Peng Liu ◽  
Qi Wei

In view of the problem of high carbon emissions of logistics enterprises, the government’s carbon tax policy, consumers’ willingness to purchase low-carbon services, and the carbon emission reduction behavior of logistics enterprises, the evolutionary game model between the government, consumers, and logistics enterprises is established by using the theory and method of evolutionary game, and the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the three parties under different parameters are analyzed. The research results show the following. (1) When setting the carbon tax rate, the government can ignore the impact on consumers and give more consideration to the influencing factors of logistics enterprises, which is conducive to the formulation of carbon emission reduction policies for logistics enterprises. (2) When the government sets a lower carbon tax rate, it can not only promote the carbon emission reduction of logistics enterprises but also be conducive to government supervision. (3) The evolution direction of the government’s final decision will not change due to the size of Y and Z. The government’s final decision is to adopt a regulatory strategy. The study provides theoretical guidance for the government to formulate carbon tax policies, guides consumers to purchase low-carbon services, and promotes carbon emission reduction in logistics enterprises.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document