scholarly journals Taking the Relationship Between Populism and Healthcare Seriously: A Call for Empirical Analysis Rather Than Moral Condemnation Comment on "A Scoping Review of Populist Radical Right Parties’ Influence on Welfare Policy and its Implications for Population Health in Europe"

Author(s):  
Martijn Felder ◽  
Iris Wallenburg ◽  
Syb Kuijper ◽  
Roland Bal

In this commentary, we reflect on Rinaldi and Bekker’s scoping review of the literature on populist radical right (PRR) parties and welfare policies. We argue that their review provides political scientists and healthcare scholars with a firm basis to further explore the relationships between populism and welfare policies in different political systems. In line with the authors, we furthermore (re)emphasize the need for additional empirical inquiries into the relationship between populism and healthcare. But instead of expanding the research agenda suggested – for instance by adding categories or niches in which this relationship can be observed – we would like to challenge some of the premises of the studies conducted and reviewed thus far. We do so by identifying two concerns and by illustrating these concerns with two examples from the Netherlands.

Author(s):  
Jasper Muis

To what extent has the rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe affected welfare policies? Based on a scoping review of studies that address the relationship between PRR parties and welfare policy, Chiara Rinaldi and Marleen Bekker conclude that, due to their welfare chauvinistic positions, the participation of PRR parties in government coalitions is likely to have negative effects on the access to welfare provisions and health of vulnerable population groups. This short commentary reflects on this review article and critically examines its conclusion. It suggests some conceptual clarifications, raises some reservations about the review’s main claim, and provides some follow-up questions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 112-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Moffitt

Populism, particularly in its radical right-wing variants, is often posited as antithetical to the principles of liberalism. Yet a number of contemporary cases of populist radical right parties from Northern Europe complicate this characterisation of populism: rather than being directly opposed to liberalism, these parties selectively reconfigure traditionally liberal defences of discriminated-against groups—such as homosexuals or women—in their own image, positing these groups as part of ‘the people’ who must be protected, and presenting themselves as defenders of liberty, free speech and ‘Enlightenment values’. This article examines this situation, and argues that that while populist radical right parties in Northern Europe may only invoke such liberal values to opportunistically attack their enemies—in many of these cases, Muslims and ‘the elite’ who allegedly are abetting the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe’—this discursive shift represents a move towards a ‘liberal illiberalism’. Drawing on party manifestoes and press materials, it outlines the ways in which these actors articulate liberal illiberalism, the reasons they do so, and the ramifications of this shift.


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-144
Author(s):  
Erik R. Tillman

This chapter examines the relationship between authoritarianism and the likelihood of voting for populist radical right parties in Western Europe. Radical right parties share an ideology based around nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. This ideology appeals to high authoritarians because it promises tough measures to preserve social cohesion, so high authoritarians are more likely to vote for radical right parties. This prediction is tested using national election study data from a range of West European countries. The results show that high authoritarians are more likely to vote for radical right parties, but even more so if they have weaker attachments to the political mainstream. The final set of analyses examines whether economic anxieties or anti-immigration attitudes moderate this relationship. While economic anxieties matter little to radical right party support, high authoritarians who oppose immigration are more likely to vote for a radical right party. These findings build on existing research by providing a stronger explanation of previous findings linking anti-immigration attitudes or cultural anxieties to radical right party support.


2021 ◽  
pp. 167-188
Author(s):  
Erik R. Tillman

This chapter examines the relationship between authoritarianism, age, and radical right party support. This book’s worldview evolution proposes that the relationship between authoritarianism and radical right party support should be stronger among younger voters. However, a rival cultural backlash argument suggests that the relationship should be strongest among older voters, who were socialized in an era of traditional values and less diversity. The analysis finds evidence consistent with the worldview evolution argument while leading to a rejection of the cultural backlash hypothesis. Neither older voters nor older high authoritarians are more likely to support radical right parties. However, the relationship between authoritarianism and radical right party support is stronger among younger voters in each country besides the United Kingdom. This finding suggests that the worldview evolution is driven more by younger voters with fewer prior party attachments, and it also should lead to a rejection of the claim that populist radical right party support comes mostly from ageing demographic groups who will soon be replaced in the electorate.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147892992110291
Author(s):  
Guillermo Cordero ◽  
Piotr Zagórski ◽  
José Rama

This article deepens the analysis of the effects of immigration on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, focusing on education levels of both natives and immigrants. By analysing the immigrant population in 101 regions from 11 European countries, we show that in contexts with a large immigrant presence, the low-educated voters tend to support Populist Radical Right Parties to a greater degree than those who are more educated. However, when the ratio of skilled immigrants is high, also the more educated population tends to support these parties. Hence, our analysis adds insight into the relationship between immigration, education and Populist Radical Right Parties voting, highlighting the need of focusing at lower levels of aggregation and combining the characteristics of both foreign-born and host populations.


Author(s):  
Ronald Labonté ◽  
Fran Baum

Our paper responds to a narrative review on the influence of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) on welfare policy and its implications for population health in Europe. Five aspects of their review are striking: (i) welfare chauvinism is higher in tax-funded healthcare systems; (ii) PRRPs in coalition with liberal or social democratic parties are able to shift welfare reform in a more chauvinistic direction; (iii) coalitions involving PRRPs can buffer somewhat the drift to welfare chauvinism, but not by much; (iv) the European Union (EU) and its healthcare policies has served somewhat as a check on PRRPs’ direct influence on healthcare welfare chauvinism; (v) PRRPs perform a balancing act between supporting their base and protecting elected power. We note that PRRPs are not confined to Europe and examine the example of Trump’s USA, arguing that the Republican Party he dominates now comes close to the authors’ definition of a PRRP. We applaud the authors’ scoping review for adding to the literature on political determinants of health but note the narrow frame on welfare policy could be usefully expanded to other areas of public policy. We examine three of such areas: the extent to which policy protects those who are different from mainstream society in terms of race, ethnicity, gender or sexuality; the debate between free trade and protectionism; and the rejection of climate change science by many PRRPs. Our analysis concludes that PRRPs promote agendas which are antithetical to eco-socially just population health, and conclude for a call for more research on the political determinants of health.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402199716
Author(s):  
Winston Chou ◽  
Rafaela Dancygier ◽  
Naoki Egami ◽  
Amaney A. Jamal

As populist radical right parties muster increasing support in many democracies, an important question is how mainstream parties can recapture their voters. Focusing on Germany, we present original panel evidence that voters supporting the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)—the country’s largest populist radical right party—resemble partisan loyalists with entrenched anti-establishment views, seemingly beyond recapture by mainstream parties. Yet this loyalty does not only reflect anti-establishment voting, but also gridlocked party-issue positioning. Despite descriptive evidence of strong party loyalty, experimental evidence reveals that many AfD voters change allegiances when mainstream parties accommodate their preferences. However, for most parties this repositioning is extremely costly. While mainstream parties can attract populist radical right voters via restrictive immigration policies, they alienate their own voters in doing so. Examining position shifts across issue dimensions, parties, and voter groups, our research demonstrates that, absent significant changes in issue preferences or salience, the status quo is an equilibrium.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110243
Author(s):  
Sirus H. Dehdari

This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that one layoff notice among low-skilled native-born workers increases, on average, support for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats by 0.17–0.45 votes. The relationship between layoff notices and support for the Sweden Democrats is stronger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that economically distressed voters oppose immigration as they fear increased labor market competition. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.


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