scholarly journals Cyberspace as a domain of conflict: The case of the United States - Iran and North Korea

Vojno delo ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Dejan Vuletić ◽  
Miloš Milenković ◽  
Anđelija Đukić
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Information And Communications Technology ◽  
Communications Technology ◽  
Military Conflict ◽  
The Us

Modern society is critically dependent on information as a strategic resource and information and communications technology, which carries out its transmission, processing and exchange. Information and communications technology has created a new environment, cyberspace, in which tensions, disagreements and incidents are becoming more frequent. In recent years, the mentioned area has increasingly appeared as a domain of conflict between the leading world and regional powers. The paper gives a brief description of the concept of operations in several domains and elements of the new concept of joint warfare of the US Armed Forces. The importance of cyberspace for the US has been pointed out with a review of organizational changes and the adoption of certain strategic and doctrinal documents. The paper presents certain events and activities in cyberspace, in recent years, between the United States on the one hand, and Iran and North Korea on the other. The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was created in 2009. USCYBERCOM was elevated to the status of a full and independent unified command in May 2018. It indicates the importance of cyberspace for the Pentagon. In many ways, the separation of USCYBERCOM from Strategic Commands, which oversees strategic rejection, is a symbol of the change in the US attitude in cyberspace from "defensive" to "persistent engagement." The United States is still the strongest force in cyberspace and shows ambition to carry out cyber operations at all levels of command. It is unlikely that Iran will provoke the United States into a large-scale military conflict and wage a direct war in cyberspace. Iran has rapidly improved its ability to operate in cyberspace, and it is estimated that this trend will continue. The imbalance can prevent Iran from a direct military conflict with the United States and its allies. Greater action is expected with an asymmetric arsenal such as e.g. cyber attacks. Iranian and North Korean operations are similar in target selection, planning and exploitation of attacks. Both countries undertake different variants of phishing attacks in an attempt to deceive their victims into downloading malicious software by presenting it as a legitimate link or file. Whereas Iran usually had a motive only to cause disruption to the functioning of financial institutions, North Korean motive was both financial and political retaliation. Certain discovered incidents indicate that North Korea devotes much more time to conducting invasive surveillance before carrying out attacks. Numerous examples show that some activities have been prepared over the years and with the support of certain state bodies. Regardless of the fact that an investigation has been launched against certain groups, most often sponsored by states, it is unlikely that this will deter countries such as North Korea and Iran from giving up further activities and will pose an increasing threat to the US security.

EDUCATIONAL-TRAINING FACILITIES OF GROUND US FORCES

2019 ◽  
pp. 168-176
Author(s):  
D.B. Izyumov ◽  
E.L. Kondratyuk
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Educational Training ◽  
Us Army ◽  
The Us ◽  
Level Of Training ◽  
Army Personnel

The article discusses issues related to the development and use of training means and facilities in order to improve the level of training of US Army personnel. An overview of the main simulators used in the US Armed Forces at present is given, and the prospects for the development of the United States in this area are presented.

The Soviet Factor in the US-China Military-Technical Cooperation during the Cold War

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-47
Author(s):  
Yinan Li
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Active Role ◽  
The United States ◽  
Technical Cooperation ◽  
Arms Sales ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Military

The development of the PRC’s armed forces included three phases when their modernization was carried out through an active introduction of foreign weapons and technologies. The first and the last of these phases (from 1949 to 1961, and from 1992 till present) received wide attention in both Chinese and Western academic literature, whereas the second one — from 1978 to 1989 —when the PRC actively purchased weapons and technologies from the Western countries remains somewhat understudied. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap. The author examines the logic of the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States in the context of complex interactions within the United States — the USSR — China strategic triangle in the last years of the Cold War. The first section covers early contacts between the PRC and the United States in the security field — from the visit of R. Nixon to China till the inauguration of R. Reagan. The author shows that during this period Washington clearly subordinated the US-Chinese cooperation to the development of the US-Soviet relations out of fear to damage the fragile process of detente. The second section focuses on the evolution of the R. Reagan administration’s approaches regarding arms sales to China in the context of a new round of the Cold War. The Soviet factor significantly influenced the development of the US-Chinese military-technical cooperation during that period, which for both parties acquired not only practical, but, most importantly, political importance. It was their mutual desire to undermine strategic positions of the USSR that allowed these two countries to overcome successfully tensions over the US arms sales to Taiwan. However, this dependence of the US-China military-technical cooperation on the Soviet factor had its downside. As the third section shows, with the Soviet threat fading away, the main incentives for the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States also disappeared. As a result, after the Tiananmen Square protests, this cooperation completely ceased. Thus, the author concludes that the US arms sales to China from the very beginning were conditioned by the dynamics of the Soviet-American relations and Beijing’s willingness to play an active role in the policy of containment. In that regard, the very fact of the US arms sales to China was more important than its practical effect, i.e. this cooperation was of political nature, rather than military one.

What's new in the "new" US course towards the DPRK?

2021 ◽  
pp. 16
Author(s):  
Alexander Zhebin
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Republic Of Korea ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Problem ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Taiwan Straits

The article analyzes the prospects for US-North Korean and inter-Korean relations, taking into account the completed policy review of the new US administration towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the results of the President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in’s trip to Washington in May 2021 and his talks with US President Joe Biden. It is concluded that the “new" course proposed by the United States in relation to the DPRK will not lead to a solution to the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula and will interfere with the normalization of inter-Korean relations. During his visit to the US President Moon failed to obtain the US consent on ROK more “independent policy” toward North Korea. In spite of lavish investments into US economy and other concessions, Seoul was forced to promise to coordinate his approaches to the DPRK with US and Japan and support US position on Taiwan straits and South China Sea. The author argues that in the current conditions, the introduction of a regime of arms limitation and arms control in Korea should be a necessary stage on the way to complete denuclearization of the peninsula. The transition to a such method of the settlement of the nuclear problem could lead to the resumption of the negotiation process, mutual concessions, including reductions in the level of military-political confrontation, partial or large-scale lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for North Korea's restrictions of its nuclear weapon and missile systems.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Charlie Laderman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
World Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Eastern Question

This introductory chapter outlines why the American response to the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians offers such critical insights into the US rise to world power, its evolving relationship with Britain, and the development of ideas on humanitarian intervention and global order at the turn of the twentieth century. It introduces the Armenian question, setting it within the larger Eastern question, and explains why the Ottoman Empire became a target for outside intervention by the European great powers in the nineteenth century. It explains why the United States, which had traditionally avoided political entanglement in the Near East even while its missionaries established an exceptional role there, began to take a greater interest in the region as its emergence as a great power coincided with the first large-scale Armenian massacres.

scholarly journals Crisis Standards of Care Implementation at the State Level in the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 599-603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colton Margus ◽  
Ritu R. Sarin ◽  
Michael Molloy ◽  
Gregory R. Ciottone
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
State Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Pediatric Care ◽  
Standards Of Care ◽  
Institute Of Medicine ◽  
Full Spectrum ◽  
The Us

AbstractIntroduction:In 2009, the Institute of Medicine published guidelines for implementation of Crisis Standards of Care (CSC) at the state level in the United States (US). Based in part on the then concern for H1N1 pandemic, there was a recognized need for additional planning at the state level to maintain health system preparedness and conventional care standards when available resources become scarce. Despite the availability of this framework, in the years since and despite repeated large-scale domestic events, implementation remains mixed.Problem:Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) rejuvenates concern for how health systems can maintain quality care when faced with unrelenting burden. This study seeks to outline which states in the US have developed CSC and which areas of care have thus far been addressed.Methods:An online search was conducted for all 50 states in 2015 and again in 2020. For states without CSC plans online, state officials were contacted by email and phone. Public protocols were reviewed to assess for operational implementation capabilities, specifically highlighting guidance on ventilator use, burn management, sequential organ failure assessment (SOFA) score, pediatric standards, and reliance on influenza planning.Results:Thirty-six states in the US were actively developing (17) or had already developed (19) official CSC guidance. Fourteen states had no publicly acknowledged effort. Eleven of the 17 public plans had updated within five years, with a majority addressing ventilator usage (16/17), influenza planning (14/17), and pediatric care (15/17), but substantially fewer addressing care for burn patients (9/17).Conclusion:Many states lacked publicly available guidance on maintaining standards of care during disasters, and many states with specific care guidelines had not sufficiently addressed the full spectrum of hazard to which their health care systems remain vulnerable.

The 2,000 Mile Wall in Search of a Purpose: Since 2007 Visa Overstays have Outnumbered Undocumented Border Crossers by a Half Million

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Warren ◽  
Donald Kerwin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
Immigration Enforcement ◽  
Border Patrol ◽  
The Us ◽  
Mexico Border ◽  
Border Crossers ◽  
Us Mexico Border

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); Its inability to meet the administration’s goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one- third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.  

scholarly journals PRODUCTION OF RARE EARTH METALS IN THE INTERESTS OF DEFENSE AND THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES

2019 ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
D.B. Izyumov ◽  
E.L. Kondratyuk
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Rare Earth ◽  
Rare Earth Metals ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Global Market ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Impact

The article presents the results of the analysis of the global market of rare earth metals for the needs of the armed forces abroad. The Article also estimates the direction of development of the US legislative system in this area, as well as presents the results of comparing the levels of development of production of rare earth metals in the US and China.

scholarly journals European Defence: a puzzle with many unknowns

2020 ◽  
pp. 21-52
Author(s):  
Tatyana Arzamanova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Defence Budget ◽  
The Usa

Under the pressure of the growing turbulence of EuroAtlantic space due to the increasing isolationism of the United States and the fact that Global security is now determined by the confrontation between the two centers of power – the United States and China, as well as the shift of strategic decision-making into the USA-Russia-China triangle, Europe is forced to admit that the period of solidarity of the collective West is over. If earlier differences between the allies were exclusively tactical, now they affect already fundamental foundations. In the current situation, Europe will try to intensify the development of the European defence component and strengthen integration in the field of security policy in order to achieve full strategic sovereignty. This process is complicated by the low level of European defence capacity, the shortage of funds of the European defence budget, weak strategic planning, and the unresolved issue of limits of supranational competences of the command of the European Armed Forces. With the use of comparative, event and content analysis, it is concluded that the key problem is that EU member states have a different scale of assessment of risks and security threats, they find it difficult to reach a common understanding, without which the development of a strategic concept of European defence will be largely decorative. The author cosiders that it is first and foremost necessary to establish a Pan-European consensus on basic points, including a set of definitions. A serious challenge for the European defence project was coronavirus COVID-19. The pandemic revealed a global crisis of leadership, a lack of solidarity, and the world's lack of preparedness for a large-scale biological threat. In the near future, states will consider biological attacks among the priority security threats, and this seems to the author to be a promising field for cooperation within the framework of European defence. It is about the development of a Pan-European system of recognition, warning and opposition to the bacteriological threat using developments in the field of artificial intelligence.

scholarly journals The Development of the US National Missile Defense and its Impact on the International Security

2015 ◽  
pp. 43-48
Author(s):  
J. Yu. Parshkova
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Former Soviet Union ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
The Us ◽  
National Missile Defense

The article reflects the US officials' point of view on the development of its national missile defense. The major threat to international security is the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the former Soviet Union made huge efforts to reduce and limit offensive arms. However, presently the proliferation of ballistic missiles spreads all over the world, especially in the Middle East, because of the ballistic missile technology falling into the hands of hostile non-state groups. Missile defenses can provide a permanent presence in a region and discourage adversaries from believing they can use ballistic missiles to coerce or intimidate the U.S. or its allies. With the possible attack regional missile defense systems will be promptly mobilized to enhance an effective deterrent. The ultimate goal of such large-scale missile defense deployment is to convince the adversaries that the use of ballistic missiles is useless in military terms and that any attack on the United States and its allies is doomed to failure. The United States has missile defense cooperative programs with a number of allies, including United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Israel, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and many others. The Missile Defense Agency also actively participates in NATO activities to maximize opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability. The initiative of the development of US BMD naturally belongs to the United States. That country has enormous technological, financial, economic, military and institutional capabilities, exceeding by far those of the other NATO members combined.

Evaluating Distance Education and E-Learning

2011 ◽  
pp. 654-663
Author(s):  
Som Naidu
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
United States ◽  
Information Technology ◽  
Distance Education ◽  
National Survey ◽  
The United States ◽  
Information And Communications Technology ◽  
Communications Technology ◽  
Learning Programs ◽  
E Learning

The number of distance education and e-learning programs has been on the rise for some time now (Hannan & Silver, 2000). In the United States, the National Survey of Information Technology in Higher Education, as part of its Campus Computing Project, carries out regular surveys of the use of information and communications technology (ICT) in higher education (USA-DOE, 2000).

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