scholarly journals THE CASE ANALYSIS OF UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-149
Author(s):  
Mira Kabze
Keyword(s):  
Information Exchange ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Safety Measures ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Production Safety ◽  
Big Picture ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do The Right Thing

This article aims to analyze a catastrophic mining explosion which resulted in 29 deaths in West Virginia, U.S. The first reports upon the explosion suggested that the explosion happened due to lack of appropriate safety measures. However, further investigation revealed that the issue was deeper than merely the absence of appropriate safety measures. The negative organizational culture created by the leadership was considered as the root cause of this catastrophic incident. According to a case study published by The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2012, it appeared that the organization made systematic and aggressive efforts to prioritize production over the safety of its employees. The disaster could have been prevented if the leadership had taken appropriate safety measures. Leadership, who can see the big picture, understands that prioritizing safety results in overall performance improvement in the long term (Krause, 2005). It is possible to see the implications of such leadership mindset in the organization’s culture. Showing workers that the organization will always do the right thing to assure their safety is an important step toward building trust across the board. Otherwise, lack of trust and communication may eventually lead to tragic incidents as in the case of the Massey Energy. The despotic leadership, that constantly imposed fear on its employees to discourage them from voicing their opinions and questioning the existing conditions, eventually brought organizational deviance. Members of the organization neither had any meaningful communication nor appropriate information exchange. The absence of mutual trust and respect in the work environment was apparent. This paper offers further insights into the role of leadership in the prevention of future catastrophic incidence while promoting both safety and enhanced performance. KEYWORDS: Inclusive, leadership, organization, production, safety

scholarly journals Quality assurance program for Angra 1 licence renewal and long-term operation

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2B) ◽  
Author(s):  
YOUSSEF MORGHI ◽  
Amir Zacarias Mesquita ◽  
Ana Rosa BALIZA MAIA
Keyword(s):  
Quality Assurance ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Quality Assurance Program ◽  
Term Operation ◽  
Safety Requirements ◽  
Plant Safety ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
License Renewal

In Brazil, according to Cnen standard, a nuclear power plant has authorization to operate for 40 years. Angra 1 commercial operation started in 1985 and it has license to operate until 2024. Eletronuclear aims to extend the operation of the Angra 1 plant from 40 to 60 years. To obtain the license renewal by more than 20 years (long-term operation), Eletronuclear will need to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54, Cnen NT-CGRC-007/18 and NT-CGRC-008/18 (Cnen technical notes). To obtain a license renewal to a long-term operation it is necessary to demonstrate that the plants will operate according to safety requirements, through analysis, testing, aging management, system upgrades, as well as additional inspections. Plant operators and regulators must always ensure that plant safety is maintained and, when it is possible, strengthened during the long-term operation of the plant. One of the documents to obtain a license renewal to a long-term operation is the Quality Assurance Program (QAP). Angra 1 has a QAP according to 10CFR 50 App B and Cnen NN 1.16 for safety related items. However, according to 10 CFR50.34, Nureg-1800 Appendix A.2, Nureg-1801 Appendix A-1 of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and NT-CGRC-007/18 and NT-CGRC-008/18 of Cnen, the QAP needs to include the items that are not safety related but are included in the Aging Management. This article will discuss the Angra 1 QAP for the license renewal to a long-term operation according the standards approved by Cnen.

Long Term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants: Status in the U.S.

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garry G. Young
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Safe Operation ◽  
Term Operation ◽  
The Status ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
License Renewal ◽  
The U.S

As of January 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has renewed the operating licenses of 73 nuclear units out of a total of 104 licensed units, allowing for up to 60 years of safe operation. In addition, the NRC has license renewal applications under review for 15 units and more than 13 additional units have announced plans to submit applications over the next few years [1]. This brings the total of renewed licenses and plans for renewal to over 97% of the 104 operating nuclear units in the U.S. This paper presents the status of the U.S. license renewal process and issues being raised for possible applications for subsequent renewals for up to 80 years of operation. By the end of 2013 there will be 26 nuclear plants in the U.S. (or 25% of the 104 units) that will be eligible to seek a second license renewal and by the end of 2016 this number will increase to about 50% of the 104 licensed units. Although some nuclear plant owners have announced plans to shutdown before reaching 60 years, the majority are keeping the option open for long term operation beyond 60 years. The factors that impact decisions for both the first license renewals and subsequent renewals for 80 years of safe operation are presented and discussed in this paper.

The Impact of Geometric Discontinuities on Alloy 617 Creep-Rupture Behavior

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryann E. Rupp ◽  
Michael D. McMurtrey
Keyword(s):  
Rupture Life ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Creep Rupture ◽  
Multiaxial Stress ◽  
Alloy 617 ◽  
Multiaxial Creep ◽  
Term Creep ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact

Abstract The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is currently reviewing Section III, Division 5 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for potential endorsement. A prior NRC-sponsored review on the application of Section III, Division 5 design rules for elevated-temperature reactors have identified issues currently not in the code that need to be addressed. These include an insufficient knowledge of the effect of notches, structural discontinuities, and multiaxial stress. This work qualitatively evaluates Alloy 617 as notch strengthening or notch weakening and investigates the impact of multiaxial stress on Alloy 617 creep behavior. Multiaxial stress does not degrade Alloy 617’s short-term creep-rupture properties. This was concluded from the following observations: 1) multiaxial creep resided on or to the right of the Larson-Miller curve for uniaxial creep-rupture data, 2) Alloy 617 exhibited notch strengthening, and 3) creep-rupture life increased with a stronger multiaxial stress. Long-term and intermediate creep-rupture tests are in progress in order to determine whether notch behavior will cross from strengthening to weakening at lower stresses and longer rupture lifetimes. A nondestructive characterization methodology using X-ray computed tomography is explored as a means to identify the failure location on the specimen prior to rupture.

A Review Process and a Database for Waste-Package Documents

1990 ◽  
Vol 212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles G. Interrante ◽  
Carla A. Messina ◽  
Anna C. Fraker
Keyword(s):  
Information Needs ◽  
Review Process ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Waste Package ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
High Level Nuclear Waste ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
High Level ◽  
Term Storage

ABSTRACTThe work reported here is part of a program conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the efficacy of proposed plans for radionuclide containment for long-term storage of high-level nuclear waste (HLW). An important element of that program is the review and evaluation of available literature on components of a waste package. A review process and a database have been developed and tailored to provide information quickly to an individual who has a question about a particular material or component of a waste package. The database is uniquely suited to serve as a guide to indicate special areas where data and information needs exist on questions related to radionuclide containment. Additions to the database are made as information becomes available, and this source is as current as the published literature. A description of the review process and the database is given.

scholarly journals Radioactive Material Transportation Considerations With Respect to DOE 3013 Storage Containers

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. J. Hensel ◽  
T. T. Wu ◽  
B. R. Seward
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Storage Conditions ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Department Of Transportation ◽  
Type B ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Leak Tightness ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Regulatory Commission

This paper evaluates sealed hardware that meets the requirements of DOE-STD-3013, “Criteria for Preparing and packaging Plutonium Metals and Oxides for Long-Term Storage” [1] with respect to radioactive material (Type B quantity) transportation requirements. The Standard provides criteria for packaging of the plutonium materials for storage periods of at least 50 years. The standard requires the hardware to maintain integrity under both normal storage conditions and under anticipated handling conditions. To accomplish this, the standard requires that the plutonium be loaded in a minimum of two nested stainless steel sealed containers that are both tested for leak-tightness per ANSI N14.5. As such the 3013 hardware is robust. While the 3013 STD may provide appropriate storage criteria, it is not intended to provide criteria for transporting the material under the requirements of the Department of Transportation (DOT). In this evaluation, it is assumed that the activity of plutonium exceeds A1 and/or A2 curies as defined in DOT 49 CFR 173.431 and therefore must be shipped as a Type B package meeting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements of 10 CFR 71. The evaluation considers Type B shipment of plutonium in the 3013 hardware within a certified package for such contents.

Jon Kilik’s willfully independent producing ethos found its roots in the early 1980s American New Wave of lmmakers that included Jim Jarmusch and the Coen brothers. While Kilik worked on the more traditional New York sets of Martin Scorsese and Sidney Lumet, his indie spirit persisted. After gaining his rst full producer stripes on a low-budget feature (1988’s The Beat), Kilik began a long-term relationship with Spike Lee, starting with the director’s Do the Right Thing (1989), and his early 1990s lms Mo’ Better Blues, Jungle Fever, and Malcolm X, to his more recent lms, such as Inside Man (2006). Along the way, he’s produced a number of notable directorial debuts, including Robert De Niro’s A Bronx Tale (1993), Julian Schnabel’s Basquiat (1996), Gary Ross’ Pleasantville (1998), and Ed Harris’ Pollock (2000). Kilik has continued to collaborate with most of his directors, such as Schnabel, with whom he’s made four additional lms, including the Oscar-nominated The Diving Bell and the Buttery (2007). All were produced outside of the Hollywood system. He juggles smaller indies—Jarmusch’s Broken Flowers (2005)—and larger, ultimately studio-distributed lms—Oliver Stone’s Alexander (2004) and Alejandro González Iñárritu’s Babel (2006)—with aplomb. And even when he’s producing what, on the surface, looks like a studio project, such as The Hunger Games (2012), Kilik prefers to maintain his independent stance. Studio perks don’t lure him—he still proudly carries his own tattered Blackberry. Kilik has more indie productions in development, including another project with Schnabel and Sean Penn’s The Comedian, as well as The Hunger Games sequels.

2013 ◽  
pp. 95-96
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Malcolm X ◽  
New Wave ◽  
Spike Lee ◽  
Hunger Games ◽  
Martin Scorsese ◽  
The Hunger Games ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do The Right Thing

Results of the Loss of Offsite Power Events Analysis

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrija Volkanovski ◽  
Antonio Ballesteros Avila ◽  
Miguel Peinador Veira
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Diesel Generator ◽  
Human Errors ◽  
Electrical Grid ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Time Period ◽  
External Power ◽  
Inspection And Maintenance ◽  
Regulatory Commission

This paper presents the results of statistical and engineering analysis of Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) events registered in four reviewed databases. The paper includes events registered in IRSN (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire) SAPIDE and GRS (Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH) VERA database in time period 1992 to 2011. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Licensee Event Reports (LERs) database and the IAEA International Reporting System (IRS) database are screened for the relevant events registered in period 1990 to 2013. In total, 228 relevant events were identified in the IRSN database, 190 in GRS, 120 in LER and 52 in IRS. The data include events registered both during the critical (at power) and shutdown operation of the plants. The identified events were classified considering nine different categories. In the three databases (SAPIDE, VERA, IAEA-IRS) the largest numbers of events are registered for the plant centered category. The largest number of the events in the NRC-LER database is found for switchyard centered events. According to the mode of operation, most events were reported during critical power operation, in all four databases. The “Partial loss of external power” events are the most frequent type of event found in the IRSN and NRC databases while the “Physical loss of electrical busbars” is the main type in the GRS and IAEA databases. The largest number of events in all databases is identified for the switchyard failures followed by the interconnections failures (both lines and transformers). Mainly LOOP event are identified by the fault report in the control room. Electrical deficiency is detected as the main direct cause of events. Environment is registered as the main contributor for the electrical grid deficiency in the French and NRC databases. Electrical failures are dominant contributor to the electrical grid deficiency in the German and IAEA databases. The principal root cause for the LOOP events are human failures with the human errors during test, inspection and maintenance as the largest sub-group. The largest number of the LOOP events resulted in reactor trip followed by the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) start. The majority of the reported LOOP events lasted for more than 2 minutes. Main lessons learned from the analysed events and potential actions for decrease of the number of LOOP events are presented.

Root Cause Evaluation and Repair of Alloy 82/182 J-Groove Weld Cracking of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations at North Anna Unit 2

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. I. Bennetch ◽  
G. E. Modzelewski ◽  
L. L. Spain ◽  
G. V. Rao
Keyword(s):  
Ferritic Steel ◽  
Visual Inspection ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Reactor Vessel ◽  
Metallographic Analysis ◽  
Control Rod ◽  
Repair Strategy ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Technical Basis

In the fall of 2001, North Anna Unit 2 conducted a visual inspection of the outer surface of its reactor vessel head (RVH), looking for evidence of leakage. Three of 69 control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetrations were identified as suspect, based on the presence of boric acid crystals encircling the three penetrations. Supplemental inspections from underneath the ferritic steel RVH revealed crack-like indications in the vicinity of the J-groove weld/butter region of each of the three penetration attachment welds. To characterize the flaws, a representative portion of one of the welds was removed for metallographic analysis. The results of the analysis formed the technical basis for a root cause evaluation (RCE), conducted to determine the origin of cracking. This report summarizes the findings of that RCE. It also briefly discusses the inspection/repair strategy implemented by Dominion to comply with US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bulletin 2001–01.

scholarly journals Digitizing Native American Collections

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Nora Stewart
Keyword(s):  
Native American ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
State University ◽  
Technology Changes ◽  
Library School ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The Right

Note from the editor: DttP has been featuring student papers for a number of years at this point—I remember talking about it in my documents class in library school. (For the record, I did not get nominated, which was probably the right choice, even if I did find my paper about the Nuclear Regulatory Commission fascinating.) But as technology changes the work of libraries, so has it changed the products that our students are producing. What follows is an example of a libguide created by a Nora Stewart, student from Emporia State University. Although my presentation of this work is somewhat clumsy, I highly recommend that all of you visit the page (http://libguides.emporia.edu/c.php?g=531631&p=3637209) and look through the resources Nora has collected and placed into context.

scholarly journals New Reactors and New Engineering Programs for Motor-Operated Valves

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shawn Comstock ◽  
Mark Gowin
Keyword(s):  
Program Implementation ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Engineering Programs ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Under Construction ◽  
Consensus Standard ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The Right

Several new reactors are currently under construction in the USA. Based on current construction schedules, Watts Bar 2 will be the first new reactor to go online for commercial generation since Watts Bar 1 was issued its operating license in 1996. New engineering programs will be going online with new reactors like Watts Bar 2. The startup of these new engineering programs is not without its own set of challenges. One of the programs has undergone a significant transformation since the last nuclear power plant started commercial operation in terms of industry implementation methods and regulatory requirements. In 1996, the NRC issued Generic Letter 96-05 to communicate issues related to periodic verification (PV) of motor-operated valves (MOVs) and to request action by operating commercial power reactors to establish an MOV PV program. Subsequently, the regulations were revised to include a requirement to have an MOV PV program in Title 10, “Energy,” of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a(b)(3)(ii). Generic Letters 89-10 (on MOV surveillance and testing) and 96-05 have been closed and today stand as historical references. Their provisions do not directly apply to new reactors, but there are many lessons available from MOV PV programs at operating sites in terms of safety, implementation, and cost. There is only one consensus standard available to describe the requirements for an acceptable MOV PV program. This is contained in the ASME’s Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code) as Mandatory Appendix III. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) previously endorsed this approach as a Code Case and is preparing a proposed change to 10 CFR 50.55a to incorporate by reference the ASME OM Code edition that includes Appendix III. This paper conveys the technical complexities and financial concerns faced by plant staff in making the right technical decisions for new program implementation at a new reactor in the USA. Paper published with permission.

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