scholarly journals Mente, consciencia y cuerpo en la obra de Friedrich Nietzsche / Mind, Consciousness and the Body in Friedrich Nietzsche’s Opus

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-82
Author(s):  
Mario Colon
Keyword(s):  
Friedrich Nietzsche ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Body ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
German Philosopher ◽  
The Mind

ABSTRACTThe study of consciousness possess considerable relevance in contemporary philosophy of mind. However, the “scientistic” approach that dominates the aforementioned discipline, although of undisputed usefulness, contributes to the rejection of other approaches whose explanatory value has proven to be illuminating in the study of mind, consciousness and the body. One of these approaches can be found in the philosophical works of Friedrich Nietzsche. The causal determinism of the mind-body relation proposed by the german philosopher has been posited through similar proposals for renowned neuroscientists and philosophers. Nevertheless, the historical and theoretical importance of Nietzsche’s contributions hasn’t been recognized as such. The purpose of this article is to show the subtleties of the causal determination in the mind-body relation and its implications in the actual discussions about the nature of consciousness.RESUMENEl estudio de la conciencia es de considerable relevancia en la filosofía de la mente contemporánea. Sin embargo, el enfoque “cientificista” imperante en esta disciplina, aunque de indiscutible utilidad, ha contribuido al rechazo de perspectivas cuyo valor explicativo resulta revelador en la investigación sobre la mente, la consciencia y el cuerpo. Una de estas perspectivas la podemos encontrar en la obra filosófica de Friedrich Nietzsche. El determinismo causal de la relación mente-cuerpo que propuso el filósofo alemán ha sido defendido por medio de propuestas similares de neurocientíficos y filósofos de probada pericia. No obstante, la relevancia de la aportación nietzscheana no ha sido reconocida en su importancia histórica y teórica. El propósito de este artículo es señalar las particularidades sobre la determinación causal de la relación mente/cuerpo y sus implicaciones en los debates actuales sobre la naturaleza de la consciencia.

scholarly journals Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness: The Relevance of a Classical Indian Debate to Cognitive Science

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
The Body ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Advaita Vedānta ◽  
Advaita Vedanta ◽  
Classical Indian Philosophy ◽  
Mind Training ◽  
Dreamless Sleep

One of the major debates in classical Indian philosophy concerned whether consciousness is present or absent in dreamless sleep. The philosophical schools of Advaita Vedānta and Yoga maintained that consciousness is present in dreamless sleep, whereas the Nyāya school maintained that it is absent. Consideration of this debate, especially the reasoning used by Advaita Vedānta to rebut the Nyāya view, calls into question the standard neuroscientific way of operationally defining consciousness as “that which disappears in dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up or dream.” The Indian debate also offers new resources for contemporary philosophy of mind. At the same time, findings from cognitive neuroscience have important implications for Indian debates about cognition during sleep, as well as for Indian and Western philosophical discussions of the self and its relationship to the body. Finally, considerations about sleep drawn from the Indianmaterials suggest that we need a more refined taxonomy of sleep states than that which sleep science currently employs, and that contemplative methods of mind training are relevant for advancing the neurophenomenology of sleep and consciousness.

scholarly journals What's in a Concept? Conceptualizing the Nonconceptual in Buddhist Philosophy and Cognitive Science

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Concept Formation ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Buddhist Philosophy ◽  
Comprehensive Treatment ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
The Mind

A recurrent problem in the philosophical debates over whether there is or can be nonconceptual experience or whether all experience is conceptually structured or mediated is the lack of a generally accepted account of what concepts are. Without a precise specification of what a concept is, the notion of nonconceptuality is equally ill defined. This problem cuts across contemporary philosophy and cognitive science as well as classical Indian philosophy, and it affects how we go about philosophically engaging Buddhism. Buddhist philosophers generally argue that our everyday experience of the world is conceptually constructed, whereas “nonconceptual cognition” (nirvikalpa jñāna) marks the limits of conceptuality. But what precisely do “conceptual” and “nonconceptual” mean? Consider that “concept” is routinely used to translate the Sanskrit term vikalpa; nirvikalpa is accordingly rendered as “nonconceptual.” But vikalpa has also been rendered as “imagination,” “discriminative construction,” “discursive thought,” and “discrimination.” Related terms, such as kalpanā (conceptualization/mental construction) and kalpanāpoḍha (devoid of conceptualization/mental construction), have also been rendered in various ways. Besides the question of how to translate these terms in any given Buddhist philosophical text, how should we relate them to current philosophical or cognitive scientific uses of the term “concept”? More generally, given that the relationship between the conceptual and the nonconceptual has been one of the central and recurring issues for the Buddhist philosophical tradition altogether, can Buddhist philosophy bring fresh insights to our contemporary debates about whether experience has nonconceptual content? And can contemporary philosophy and cognitive science help to illuminate or even resolve some older Buddhist philosophical controversies? A comprehensive treatment of these questions across the full range of Buddhist philosophy and contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science would be impossible. I restrict my focus to certain core ideas from Abhidharma, Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory, and Yogācāra, as refracted through current philosophical and cognitive science views of concepts. I argue for the following five general theses. First, cognitive science can help us to clarify Abhidharma issues about the relation between nonconceptual sense perception and conceptual cognition. Second, we can resolve these Abhidharma issues using a model of concept formation based on reading Dharmakīrti through cognitive science glasses. Third, this model of concept formation offers a new perspective on the contemporary conceptualist versus nonconceptualist debate. Fourth, Yogācāra offers a conception of nonconceptual experience absent from this debate. In many Yogācāra texts, awareness that is said to be free from the duality of “grasper” (grāhaka) and “grasped” (grāhya) is nonconceptual. None of the contemporary philosophical arguments for nonconceptualism is adequate or suitable for explicating this unique kind of nonconceptuality. Thus, Yogācāra is relevant to what has been called the problem of the “scope of the conceptual,” that is, how the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction should be drawn. For this reason, among others, Yogācāra has something to offer philosophy of mind. Moreover, using cognitive science, we may be able to render some of the Yogācāra ideas in a new way, while in turn recasting ideas from cognitive science. Fifth, in pursuing these aims, I hope to show the value of thinking about the mind from a cross-cultural philosophical perspective. Sixth, from an enactive cognitive science perspective informed by Buddhist philosophy, a concept is not a mental entity by which an independent subject grasps or represents independent objects, but rather one aspect of a complex dynamic process in which the mind and the world are interdependent and co-emergent poles.

Body schema and pain

2021 ◽  
pp. 301-315
Author(s):  
Katsunori Miyahara
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Pathological Condition ◽  
Body Schema ◽  
The Body ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Enactive Approach ◽  
The Third ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Conceptual Distinction

This chapter aims to situate Merleau-Ponty’s notion of body schema within the context of contemporary philosophy of pain. In the first section, the chapter starts by introducing his notion of body schema and its role in his account of the experience of pain. It then briefly reviews current theoretical treatments of pain in the analytic philosophy of mind. It outlines representational and imperative theories of pain by mapping them onto the conceptual distinction between body image and body schema. In the second section, the chapter further argues that they are both deeply entrenched in a Cartesian dualistic picture of mind and body. To be fair, imperativism partly overcomes the Cartesian conception of the body by acknowledging the significance of the body schema. To see how theories of pain can escape the dualistic picture, thus, it will be helpful to examine imperativist explanations. The chapter undertakes this task by closely examining Colin Klein’s imperativist account of a rare pathological condition called pain asymbolia. This account, it suggests in the third section, leads to an unacceptably over-intellectual view of the body because of hidden Cartesian assumptions. It concludes by contrasting this with an enactive approach to pain, deeply inspired by Merleau-Ponty. In the last section, the chapter turns to phenomenological grounds to clarify and support this alternative approach.

Descartes' thesis about the separation of mind and body is usually quite severely criticized in the modern cognitive science in general and philosophy of mind in particular. This thesis serves as an important starting point for the development of the conception of embodied and enacted cognition, which has gained extraordinary popularity to date. This article substantiates that the solution to the mind - body problem proposed by Descartes is not at all so unequivocal and categorical, his position is much more subtle and sophisticated than it often seems to us. The article discusses the Descartes’ arguments both in favor of the «great separation between mind and body», and against it. It is shown that Descartes’ thoughts about the mutual influence of the states of the body and phenomena of mind, about the close coupling of mind and body and their unity, about the connection of mind with bodily action are in line with the modern conception of embodied and enactive cognition and may well be considered as a forerunner for its development. Descartes' deep analytical mind, which allowed him to create a method and which gave scientists an attitude to doubt everything in search of scientific truths, allowed him to carefully evaluate his own theses, carrying out various, including opposing, argumentative lines of thought. The understanding the real contribution of Descartes is essential for the further development of the conception of embodied and enactive cognition, which has considerable methodological strength in various fields of social and humanitarian research.

METOD ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 179-195
Author(s):  
Elena Knyazeva
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mutual Influence ◽  
The Body ◽  
Close Coupling ◽  
Enactive Cognition ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Further Development ◽  
Methodological Strength

Descartes' thesis about the separation of mind and body is usually quite severely criticized in the modern cognitive science in general and philosophy of mind in particular. This thesis serves as an important starting point for the development of the conception of embodied and enacted cognition, which has gained extraordinary popularity to date. This article substantiates that the solution to the mind - body problem proposed by Descartes is not at all so unequivocal and categorical, his position is much more subtle and sophisticated than it often seems to us. The article discusses the Descartes’ arguments both in favor of the «great separation between mind and body», and against it. It is shown that Descartes’ thoughts about the mutual influence of the states of the body and phenomena of mind, about the close coupling of mind and body and their unity, about the connection of mind with bodily action are in line with the modern conception of embodied and enactive cognition and may well be considered as a forerunner for its development. Descartes' deep analytical mind, which allowed him to create a method and which gave scientists an attitude to doubt everything in search of scientific truths, allowed him to carefully evaluate his own theses, carrying out various, including opposing, argumentative lines of thought. The understanding the real contribution of Descartes is essential for the further development of the conception of embodied and enactive cognition, which has considerable methodological strength in various fields of social and humanitarian research.

Inserting the Presence of Mind into a Philosophy of Presence: A Response to Sheridan and Mantovani and Riva

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 546-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Biocca
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
The Body ◽  
Divine Presence ◽  
Perceptual Presence ◽  
Common Goals ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Fuzzy Boundary

This article considers the following question: What is the best foundation for a theory of presence? After establishing criteria for a philosophy of presence, the article applies these criteria to a set of articles on the philosophy of presence by Sheridan (1999), Mantovani and Riva (1999), and others. Although we share common goals, it is suggested that these articles advance a philosophy of presence that may be ill suited to support theory and research on presence. Several arguments are advanced to support this judgment. J. J. Gibson's work may be misinterpreted to accommodate relativistic models of physical reality. By directly referencing Gibson's writings, especially his concepts of ecological invariants, the article details how Gibson's work could not be used to support cultural, relativistic, or “engineering” arguments about “different realities”, perceptual or otherwise, without significant modification of Gibson's work and violation of his apparent intent. Another source of problems for a philosophy of presence is traced. There appears to be a terminological and theoretical confusion about the difference between epistemology and ontology. This article proposes that ontological debates about divine presence represented by these authors may be inappropriate or sterile for three reasons: (1) although perceptual presence (that is, phenomenal states of distal attribution) and “divine presence” (that is, immanence of God) share the term presence, they are fundamentally different philosophical problems; (2) the concept of divine presence and Sheridan's associated “estimation paradigm” is framed at such a level of generality to be incapable of supporting specific, actionable, and researchable theories about perceptual presence; and (3) any theory about “virtual reality”, a technology with a misleading oxymoronic term, provides no more ontological insight into reality than does theory and research on any other communication medium such as photography, film, or sound recording. Finally, the article proposes a remedy. The philosophy of presence might be most fruitfully approached via the philosophy of mind. Specifically, it is suggested that presence opens the door to related problems in the science of human consciousness, notably the mind-body problem. The article also suggests that the problem of presence bridges the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of technology on the issue of mediated embodiment, that is, the fuzzy boundary between the body and technological extensions of the body.

scholarly journals DEKARTIŠKAS DUALIZMO ĮRODYMAS ŠIUOLAIKINĖJE SĄMONĖS FILOSOFIJOJE

Problemos ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Semantic Analysis ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Dimensional Theory ◽  
Conceptual Content ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Modal Semantic

Straipsnyje analitinės filosofijos požiūriu analizuojamas Descartes’o sąmonės ir kūno skirtingumo įrodymas, siekiant atskleisti jo panašumus su šiuolaikinėje sąmonės filosofijoje populiariu Davido Chalmerso pateiktu „zombio“ mintiniu eksperimentu ir juo grindžiamu dualizmo įrodymu. Siekiama parodyti, kad šiuolaikinis modaline semantikos analize grindžiamas įrodymo variantas yra techniškai sudėtingesnis ir atsparesnis fizikalistinei kritikai, tačiau jis paremtas nutylėta ir nepagrįsta episteminio sąvokų skaidrumo prielaida, kuri išskirstina kaip viena originalaus dekartiško įrodymo silpnybių. Tai leidžia tvirtinti, kad Antoine’o Arnauld kritika, pateikta Descartes’o įrodymui, lygiai taip pat sėkmingai taikytina ir Chalmerso antifizikalistiniams samprotavimams.Reikšminiai žodžiai: sąmonės filosofija, dualizmo įrodymai, „zombio“ mintinis eksperimentas, fizikalizmas. DESCARTES’ ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MINDJonas Dagys Summary The paper analizes Descartes’ argument for the mind–body dualism from the perspective of contemporary analytical philosophy of mind. It attempts to show that the popular zombie argument, mostly due to David Chalmers, is reminescent of this Cartesian proof of dualism. The intended conclusion is that although the contemporary argument invokes modal semantic analysis and two-dimensional theory of conceptual content and so is technically more difficult and resistant to certain physicalist criticism, it neverhteless rests on an unstated and unjustified assumption. This assumption is that of epistemic transparency and completeness of at least some of our concepts. It was the same assumption that had been identified as one of the weaknesses of the original Cartesian argument for dualism. Therefore, one could argue that Arnauld’s objections to Descartes are well applicable to Chalmers’ antiphysicalist arguments without substantial modification.Keywords: philosophy of mind, arguments for dualism, zombie argument, physicalism.

scholarly journals Comment on: Bente Klarlund Peddersen, Physical activity and muscle-brain crosstalk

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 172
Author(s):  
Leandro Paim da Cruz Carvalho ◽  
Jorge Luiz De Brito Gomes
Keyword(s):  
Physical Activity ◽  
Skeletal Muscle ◽  
Friedrich Nietzsche ◽  
Muscle Cell ◽  
Cell Biology ◽  
Recent Article ◽  
Skeletal Muscle Cell ◽  
The Past ◽  
German Philosopher ◽  
The Mind

In the recent article published in Nature Reviews Endocrinology – “Physical activity and muscle-brain crosstalk” [1], the author - Bente Klaurlund Peddersen, a great reference in the study of skeletal muscle cell biology, contextualizes the theme by citing great philosophers of the past and their perceptions about the link between physical activity and the mind. Emphasizing the phrase of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche: “All great thoughts are conceived by walking”....

scholarly journals VI—Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism

2020 ◽  
Vol 120 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-144
Author(s):  
Philip Goff
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Macro Level ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Liberal Naturalism ◽  
The Mind

Abstract There has been a resurgence of interest in panpsychism in contemporary philosophy of mind. According to its supporters, panpsychism offers an attractive solution to the mind–body problem, avoiding the deep difficulties associated with the more conventional options of dualism and materialism. There has been little focus, however, on whether panpsychism can help with philosophical problems pertaining to free will. In this paper I will argue (a) that it is coherent and consistent with observation to postulate a kind of libertarian agent causation at the micro-level, and (b) that if one if believes in libertarian agent causation at the macro-level, there are significant advantages in also postulating its existence at the micro-level.

Wilhelm Diltheys Philosophie der Verkörperung

2015 ◽  
Vol 63 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Madzia ◽  
Matthias Jung
Keyword(s):  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
External World ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Wilhelm Dilthey ◽  
The Mind

AbstractThe philosophical tradition reaching from antiquity up till the contemporary philosophy of mind had tended to conceive of the mind as something which is ‘contained’ in the head. In recent decades such cognitive internalism has been called into question by the ‘embodied cognition’ movement in the philosophy of mind. The interactionist critique of cognitive and epistemological internalism, however, is not new. As the authors demonstrate, Wilhelm Dilthey, especially in his texts from the 1880s, came up with a profound critique of internalism and was able to clearly recognise its solipsistic ramifications. Dilthey took a strong interactionist stance with regard to internalism and presented an interesting argument in favor of the objective reality of the external world. The authors reconstruct these arguments and demonstrate the closeness of Dilthey’s work to the philosophy of the American pragmatists as well as Dilthey’s possible influence on some of them.

scholarly journals Solutions to the Problems Concerning Descartes’ Interactionism

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Md. Ezazul Karim
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Rene Descartes ◽  
The Body ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
The Mind

Philosophy of mind in its essence philosophizes about the mind. And among many questions that it raises, the question regarding the relation between the body and the mind is of paramount importance. Among various theories considering the relation between the body and the mind, interactionism shines brightly. Advocated by the philosopher Rene Descartes it is one of the oldest and the most talked about theories. The aim of this paper is to propose some solutions to the problems concerning Rene Descartes’ interactionism. In order to do that at first interactionism is going to be discussed. Then the main points concerning Descartes’ interactionism along with the initial problems will be discussed. And finally, the solution to these problems will be proposed.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document