Understanding Evolution of China’s Peacekeeping Policy in the 21st Century

Author(s):  
Fahad Nabeel

In recent years, China has enhanced its personnel and financial contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). According to UN statistics, China is the largest personnel contributor among the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and 11th largest contributor among UN member states. In terms of financial contribution, China is the 2nd largest contributor, next to the USA, to the UNPKOs in 2018 (Gebrehiwot & Demissie, 2018).

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 458-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingvild Bode ◽  
John Karlsrud

Since the failures of the United Nations of the early 1990s, the protection of civilians has evolved as a new norm for United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, a 2014 United Nations report found that while peacekeeping mandates often include the use of force to protect civilians, this has routinely been avoided by member states. What can account for this gap between the apparently solid normative foundations of the protection of civilians and the wide variation in implementation? This article approaches the question by highlighting normative ambiguity as a fundamental feature of international norms. Thereby, we consider implementation as a political, dynamic process where the diverging understandings that member states hold with regard to the protection of civilians norm manifest and emerge. We visualize this process in combining a critical-constructivist approach to norms with practice theories. Focusing on the practices of member states’ military advisers at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and their positions on how the protection of civilians should be implemented on the ground, we draw attention to their agency in norm implementation at an international site. Military advisers provide links between national ministries and contingents in the field, while also competing for being recognized as competent performers of appropriate implementation practices. Drawing on an interpretivist analysis of data generated through an online survey, a half-day workshop and interviews with selected delegations, the article adds to the understanding of norms in international relations while also providing empirical insights into peacekeeping effectiveness.


Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 223-251
Author(s):  
Blanca Montejo ◽  
Bojan Stefanovic

Abstract With the launching of the Action for Peacekeeping and its culmination with the Declaration of Shared Commitments in 2018, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres aimed to mobilize all partners and stakeholders to support United Nations peacekeeping, marking its seventieth anniversary and revitalizing a long process of reform which had started with previous Secretaries-General, and in its last phase by Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. The purpose of this article is to look at the implementation of Commitment 5 of the Declaration of Shared Commitments to realize the objective of sequenced, prioritized and achievable mandates. To do so, this article looks at the process of endorsement and progressive implementation of the Declaration of Shared Commitments by the Security Council, starting with the examination of the conclusions of the High Level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (hippo report), the subsequent Secretary-General’s report under Secretary-General Ban’s tenure and the passing of the baton to Secretary-General Guterres who continued the process through the launching of the Action for Peacekeeping. The article looks at the definitions available to guide the implementation of sequenced and prioritized mandates and describes and assesses the mandate renewal process in the context of three specific field missions concentrating some of the most recent efforts of the Security Council to apply the principles of the Declaration of Shared Commitments.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul D. Williams

Abstract The United Nations (UN) Security Council is stuck in a peacekeeping trilemma. This is a situation where the Council's three strategic goals for peacekeeping operations—implementing broad mandates, minimizing peacekeeper casualties and maximizing cost-effectiveness—cannot be achieved simultaneously. This trilemma stems from longstanding competing pressures on how the Council designs UN peacekeeping operations as well as political divisions between peacekeeping's three key groups of stakeholders: the states that authorize peacekeeping mandates, those that provide most of the personnel and field capabilities, and those that pay the majority of the bill. Fortunately, the most negative consequences of the trilemma can be mitigated and perhaps even transcended altogether. Mitigation would require the Council to champion and implement four main reforms: improving peacekeeper performance, holding peacekeepers accountable for misdeeds, adopting prioritized and sequenced mandates, and strengthening the financial basis for UN peacekeeping. Transcending the trilemma would require a more fundamental reconfiguration of the key stakeholder groups in order to create much greater unity of effort behind a re-envisaged peacekeeping enterprise. This is highly unlikely in the current international political context.


Author(s):  
Олена Скрипник

Ключові слова: ООН, Рада Безпеки, військовий конфлікт, операція з підтримки миру, війська ООН. Анотація У статті проаналізовано діяльність Ради Безпеки ООН, визначено її роль у врегулюванні військових конфліктів. Проаналізовано історичний аспект діяльності Ради Безпеки ООН у даному питанні. Висвітлено процес прийняття рішення щодо започаткування операції з підтримання миру під егідою ООН. З’ясовано які методи Рада Безпеки ООН застосовує для припинення військового конфлікту. Охарактеризовано з якими проблемами змушена боротись РБ ООН під час прийняття рішень щодо врегулювання військового конфлікту. Зроблено висновок про те, що у руслі подій які відбуваються в Україні, а саме військового конфлікту на Сході нашої держави, де прямим учасником якого виступає постійний член Ради Безпеки ООН (Російська Федерація), особливо потрібне реформування РБ. Посилання Akulov, 2005 – Akulov S. Mizhnarodni myrotvorchi operatsiyi yak politychnyy instrument vrehulyuvannya voyenno-politychnykh konfliktiv [International peacekeeping operations as a political tool for resolving military-political conflicts] // Politychnyy menedzhment. 2005. № 2. S. 165–172. [in Ukrainian] Bani-Naser Fadi, 2015 – Bani-Naser Fadi Myrotvorchi operatsiyi OON: teoriya i praktyka [UN peacekeeping operations: theory and practice] // Problems of international relations. 2015. № 10-11. S. 24–36. [in Ukrainian] Barhamon, 2017 – Barhamon N. I. Yurydychnyy analiz kompetentsiyi rady bezpeky OON shchodo pidtrymannya mizhnarodnoho myru ta bezpeky [Legal analysis of the competence of the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security] // International law in the service of the state, society, man: materials of scientific practice. conf. (Kyiv, December 8, 2016). 2017. S. 6–11. [in Ukrainian] Hodovanyk, 2010 – Hodovanyk YE. V. Orhanizatsiyno-pravovi aspekty reformuvannya rady bezpeky OON na suchasnomu etapi [Organizational and legal aspects of reforming the UN Security Council at the present stage] // State and law. 2010. № 49. S. 648–655. [in Ukrainian] Doklad General'nogo sekretarya, predstavlyayemyy vo ispolneniye Rezolyutsii 53/53 General'noy Asamblei. Padeniye Srebrentsy [Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/53. The fall of Srebrenza]. А/54/549. 1999. URL: https://undocs.org/ru/A/54/549 [in Russian] Doklad General'nogo sekretarya o situatsii v Somali, predstavlennyy vo ispolneniye punkta 13 Rezolyutsii 954 (1994) Soveta Bezopasnosti [Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 954 (1994)]. S/1995/231. URL: https://undocs.org/ru/S/1995/231 [in Russian] Leha, 2011 – Leha A. YU. Pravovi osnovy vrehulyuvannya viysʹkovykh konfliktiv [Legal bases of settlement of military conflicts] // Istorychnyy arkhiv. 2011. № 6. S. 80–83. [in Ukrainian] Malysheva, 2016 – Malysheva YU. V. Tsilespryamovani sanktsiyi ta yikh zastosuvannya Radoyu Bezpeky OON [Targeted sanctions and their application by the UN Security Council]: dys. … kand. yuryd. nauk : 12.00.11. Kyyiv, 2016. 253 s. [in Ukrainian] Operatsii OOH po podderzhaniyu mira [UN Peacekeeping Operations] // Ofitsiynyy sayt OON. URL: https://peacekeeping.un.org/ru/role-of-security-council [in Russian] Ostapenko, 2019 – Ostapenko N. V. Reforma Rady Bezpeky OON yak zasib podolannya kryzy efektyvnosti Orhanizatsiyi [Reform of the UN Security Council as a means of overcoming the crisis of the Organization's effectiveness] // Zovnishni spravy. 2019. № 1. S. 53–55. [in Ukrainian] Rezolyutsii Soveta Bezopasnosti OON 1960 [Resolutions of the UN Security Council 1960] S/4426 (1960). URL: https://undocs.org/ru/S/RES/146(1960) [in Russian] Statut OON [United Nations Statute]. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_010#Text. [in Ukrainian]. Fedorenko, 2011 – Fedorenko A. I. Shlyakhy ta napryamy transformatsiyi Rady Bezpeky OON [Ways and directions of transformation of the UN Security Council] // Aktualʹni problemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn. 2011. №. 96(2). S. 97–99 Security Council. United Nations. S/1999/1257/ 12 December 1999. URL: https://undocs.org/S/1999/1257 [in English]


China Report ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-56
Author(s):  
Christopher B. Primiano

When China joined the United Nations in 1971, it viewed UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) as an instrument for powerful countries to exploit weaker countries. Today, under Xi Jinping, China contributes the largest number of UN peacekeeping personnel among the five permanent (P5) members of the UN Security Council. This article presents findings from a pilot study based on a survey conducted at two international universities in China in the fall of 2016, regarding how Chinese students perceive China’s UNPKO involvement. A total of 297 Chinese university students participated in this survey. Given that there has been little scholarship on how Chinese citizens view China’s UNPKO spending or involvement, this article aims to contribute to our understanding of this subject.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 388-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musifiky Mwanasali

AbstractThis essay considers the R2P principle as expressed by the African Union's (AU) Constitutive Act of 2000, the United Nations (UN) World Summit's outcome document of 2005, and recent civilian protection mandates issued for peacekeeping operations by the UN Security Council. Examining how these three international mechanisms have sought to establish and operationalise the norm, the author argues that the AU should make greater efforts to bring R2P implementation into line with the UN Charter in order to secure the legitimacy of regional interventions in Africa. Reflecting on the experience of the AU Mission in Sudan between 2004 and 2007, the importance of clear mandates and sufficient capacity to the success of R2P interventions is emphasised. The use of force by peacekeepers—its feasibility and potential extent—is analysed and placed within the context of peacebuilding in the R2P continuum. The essay also argues for better coordination between the UN Security Council and the world body's Economic and Social Council, as well as with the AU's Peace and Security Council, to ensure a reliable supply of adequate peacebuilding resources to Africa and proper consideration of security and reconstruction matters.


2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (891-892) ◽  
pp. 645-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katarina Grenfell

The applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to United Nations (UN) forces has long generated discussion. When peacekeepers have become engaged in hostilities of such a nature as to trigger the application of IHL (either via acts in self-defence, or in the course of carrying out a mandate as authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations), questions have arisen as to whether they should be equally subject to the rules of IHL. Such questions arise as UN peacekeeping forces act on behalf of the international community and thus have a ‘just cause’, so to speak, to use force. Despite these questions, however, it now appears well settled that the distinction between jus ad bellum (the right to use force under public international law) and jus in bello (the law governing the conduct of hostilities) should be maintained, and that IHL applies in respect of UN peacekeeping operations whenever the conditions for its application are met. That said, questions regarding the conditions for the application of IHL, as well as its scope of application, continue to be relevant, particularly at a time when the Security Council is tasking UN operations with increasingly robust mandates.


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