scholarly journals CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juozas Augutis ◽  
Benas Jokšas ◽  
Ričardas Krikštolaitis ◽  
Inga Žutautaitė

After the last major accidents in the energy sector of the last decade (USA and Canada (2003), India (2012), Russian-Ukrainian (2009)), energy infrastructure criticality assessment has become one of the most important issues. It has become the topical subject of the economy and national security in all countries. There is no single measure unit for the assessment of critical infrastructure with respect to “interdependency” among critical infrastructure sectors. This paper proposes to use criticality of infrastructure element as a measure to assess the importance of considered element to the normal activity of all sectors of infrastructure. The pilot numerical simulation of heat and electricity infrastructure was performed to demonstrate the implementation of the application of developed method for the assessment of infrastructure functionality and criticality.

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 406-417
Author(s):  
Anca Dinicu ◽  
Romana Oancea ◽  
Ghiță Bârsan

Abstract The security environment is experiencing unprecedented dynamics, absorbing and counteracting elements that generate challenges and threats, favoring aspects (apparently) beneficial to development and responding to the most unique threats that manage to have an increased impact on new areas of public interest, thus weakening national security. This paper aims to highlight the variety of effects on the various areas of the global social system that can be generated by a vital infrastructure that has become dysfunctional as a result of a cyber attack. Also, the article discusses the way in which various cyber attacks on the energy sector were orchestrated against the background of alleged rivalries between states.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 1242-1248
Author(s):  
Józef Sadowski

The content outline: in accordance with law, the Polish critical infrastructure constitutes 11 sectors, vital for national security and public safety persistence. Two of the sectors (energy sector and transportation systems sector), are elements of the European Critical Infrastructure, and due to Poland’s EU and NATO membership, are subject to particular protection. The paper describes general principles of Polish critical infrastructure safety law acts and critical infrastructure sectors. Later in this paper, 4 alert states (THREATCON), and their impact on the critical infrastructure safety and protection were presented. The purpose and the program content of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan were described.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Burgherr ◽  
Jennifer Giroux ◽  
Matteo Spada

The risks of technological accidents in the energy sector and their potentially disastrous effects have been analyzed over the past decades, and are nowadays generally recognized to constitute a key factor in an encompassing assessment of energy security. In contrast, the issue of intentional attacks on energy infrastructures has received increased attentionmore recently, particularly due to growing dependence of energy imports fromand transit routes through regions considered less reliable and politically stable. Both types of risks, however, illuminate different vulnerabilities. Therefore, the focus of the present analysis was on these two risk categories: accidents and intentional attacks in the energy sector. Risk assessment resultswere based on quantitative data from the databases ENSAD (Energy-related Severe Accident Database) and EIAD (Energy Infrastructure Attack Database). Evaluations examined similarities and differences between technological accidents and intentional attacks in terms of frequencies and consequences, considering time-series trends and regional patterns. A key difference is that accidents are typically rare and independent events, whereas intentional attacks are often multiple events and concentrated both in time and space, resulting in distinct hotspots. Concerning consequences, the severity distribution for accidents generally stretches over a broad range, with low-probability high-consequence events being an important factor of both energy chain performance and as a measure of risk aversion. On the other hand, these types of consequences are usually less important for intentional attacks because targeted energy infrastructures are often of “linear” nature (e.g. pipelines and transmission lines) that are difficult to protect and usually lead through remote areas with low population density. However, when frequently attacked substantial business and supply disruptions can occur. In summary, the joint analysis of accidents and intentional attacks provides a comprehensive and complementary approach on two types of risks that have rather different properties, but are essential in an energy security perspective.


2021 ◽  
pp. 648-658
Author(s):  
Yoko Nitta

This chapter studies how the significant cyberattacks perpetrated against the Japan Pension Services (JPS) served to heighten awareness of the significance of cyber threats among political and corporate executives. According to the Japanese cybersecurity strategy, cyberattacks constitute a global risk and remain a prime concern for the development of appropriate countermeasures. As a result, Japan has regarded the strengthening of cybersecurity as a priority and outlined this to the National Security Council in 2014. At present, information security institutions in Japan are chaperoned by the cybersecurity strategy headquarters, which aims to promote constructive and efficient cybersecurity policies. In addition, Japan has implemented its third action plan on information security for critical infrastructure and revised its cybersecurity strategy in 2015. By working in partnership with countries around the world, Japan pursues its own national security as well as the peace and stability of the international community. International cooperation and partnerships also contribute to the international campaign against cyberattacks, especially those in which foreign state actors may be implicated.


Author(s):  
Ethèl Teljeur ◽  
Mayuree Chetty ◽  
Morné Hendriksz

Energy sector development is required to enable greater regional economic integration (harmonization of legal and regulatory frameworks for energy, coordination of energy infrastructure investments, etc.) in Africa. This can address problems associated with fractured energy infrastructure investment and allowing African nations to develop more shared facilities. In addition, regional integration facilitates trade of energy resources and services via sub-regional power pools. Despite the current attempts to integrate regional infrastructure via power pools, actual trade within these pools is low, and the opportunity to derive efficiencies from integrated regional resource planning is missed in favour of national plans. Different stages and design of energy market liberalization or (re-) regulation and the desire for energy self-sufficiency (“security of supply”) hinder the development of bilateral or multilateral projects. Investment in interconnection capacity is required to facilitate intra-power pool trade and achieve the efficiencies associated with the pooling of demand and integrated energy planning.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-52
Author(s):  
Miroslav Tuđman

The author gives an overview of the history of National Security and the Future (NSF). The first editorial board accepted a clear vision and mission of the NSF. That is why the NSF had to react to the political circumstances in which the journal has operated for 20 years. In the first period, international circumstances and the policy of detuđmanization directly influenced the choice of topics and papers published in the journal. For the past five years, the NSF has paid particular attention to the security of national and European critical infrastructure. A total of 257 texts were published on more than 8,000 pages and authored by 134 authors from 25 countries. The NSF has published studies on historical forgery, information operations, production of "fake news" and contributions to the theory and methodology of intelligence activities.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 11-26
Author(s):  
John S. Hurley ◽  
H. Mark McGibbon ◽  
Roxanne Everetts

Many of the systems that control the critical infrastructure were not originally designed with security in mind. This has left us vulnerable to unwanted attacks in many of the environments. It has become essential that the authors determine if their infrastructures are better prepared for existing and future threats. In this study, the authors will examine the impact of attacks, including terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures, in particular, the Energy sector. The results show that in spite of the warnings of the threats carried out in various sectors and organizations around the world, they have still remain extremely vulnerable because of a number of critical security issues that hamper their ability to better serve and protect our vital information assets. The authors examine some of the most prominent models being used today and how they may be modified to better serve the needs of their user communities and key stakeholders.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Warren ◽  
Shona Leitch

Australia has developed sophisticated national security policies and physical security agencies to protect against current and future security threats associated with critical infrastructure protection and cyber warfare protection. In this paper, the authors examine some common security risks that face Australia and how government policies and strategies have been developed and changed over time, for example, the proposed Australian Homeland Security department. This paper discusses the different steps that Australia has undertaken in relation to developing national policies to deal with critical infrastructure protection.


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