Arctic Regional Security

Author(s):  
Alexander Sergunin

This chapter examines an emerging regional security system in the Arctic. There was a significant shift in the Arctic powers' threat perceptions and security policies in the High North. In contrast with the Cold War era when the Arctic was a zone for the global confrontation between the USSR and the U.S./NATO, now this region is seen by international players as a platform for international cooperation. The Arctic countries now believe that there are no serious hard security threats to them and that the soft security agenda is much more important. The military power now has new functions, such as ascertaining coastal states' sovereignty over their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in the region; protecting the Arctic countries' economic interests in the North, and performing some symbolic functions. The Arctic states believe that the regional cooperative agenda could include climate change mitigation, environmental protection, maritime safety, Arctic research, indigenous peoples, cross- and trans-border cooperative projects, culture, etc.

1990 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Oneal

Mancur Olson's theory of collective action could account for much of the variance in the defense burdens of the allied nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early years of the Cold War, but the association between economic size (gross domestic product, or GDP) and defense burden (the ratio of military expenditures to GDP) has declined to insignificant levels. Two influences are shown to be important in producing this change: the increased pursuit of private goods by Greece, Turkey, and Portugal and the growing cooperation among the other European allies. Since cooperation in the military realm has not provided the Europeans with credible means of self-defense, it appears to be a consequence of the general growth of interdependence in Europe during the postwar period. NATO is still essentially a uniquely privileged group producing a relatively pure public good. Accordingly, the theory of collective action continues to provide valuable insights into the operation of the alliance.


Author(s):  
Edward Jones-Imhotep

Natures and technologies have long been central to the making of modern nations. Only recently, however, have scholars seen nations as sites where the very understandings of the “natural” and the “technological” were articulated, contested, and remade in the interests of the nation. This book examines the role of technological failure in crafting both national identities and the distinctive natures that support them. Focusing on the mid-twentieth-century attempt to extend reliable radio communications to the Canadian North, it explores how a group of Canadian defense scientists sought to visualize, map, and catalog the connections between a distinctive natural order of ionospheric storms, auroral displays, and magnetic disturbances on one side, and the particularly severe communication failures that cut the North off from the rest of the nation on the other. Through that project and its related efforts, they gradually transformed machine failures in hostile environments, from the Arctic to outer space, into a defining characteristic of Canadian identity at a time of national redefinition. Tracking those efforts through continental defense strategies, engineering practices, clandestine maps, and material cultures, the book argues that the real and potential failures of machines came to define the nation, its Northern nature, its cultural anxieties, and its geo-political vulnerabilities during the Cold War. More broadly, it argues for technological failures as key sites for linking historical technologies and historical natures, and for writing the histories of “other” nations during the Cold War.


Polar Record ◽  
1947 ◽  
Vol 5 (33-34) ◽  
pp. 14-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. T. Wilson

Exercise Musk-ox was no isolated adventure, but the culminating test of several years of wartime work. In it, vehicles, equipment, and techniques of training and of air-supply, secretly developed during the war, were given an open test to ascertain their usefulness in northern Canada. Because the public had not been aware of this secret work by the services, Exercise Musk-ox was hailed by them as a new idea, but it would not have been possible had not the equipment and methods all been ready and proven before tbe close of the war.So great had been these wartime improvements that none of those men best acquainted with the north country and with older methods of transportation believed that the ground party had any chance of driving 2600 miles without roads across the Arctic and sub-Arctic in less than 2½ months. Neither was it generally realised that the military purposes had already been served and that this was no tactical exercise but a demonstration of the soundness of military development and an experiment in applying it to peaceful pursuits in the Canadian Arctic.


Significance Delivery of relief to 8.5 million people in north-eastern Nigeria is complicated by persistent insecurity due to the Boko Haram insurgency, the dependency of the aid community on military cooperation for access, alleged corruption and mismanagement by government agents and contractors, an uncertain domestic political situation and ambiguity about mid-term funding from international sources. These challenges have led to an enduring humanitarian disaster and the possibility of reversals on the regional security front. Impacts Political uncertainty due to President Muhammadu Buhari’s poor health will hamper national efforts on the humanitarian front. An unimproved humanitarian situation will complicate the military’s counter-insurgency campaign, and harm long-term security efforts. Ongoing corruption revelations, particularly within the military, could undermine security sector and federal executive relations. Renewed Niger Delta militancy and pro-Biafra separatism could distract the federal government's attention from the north-east.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gunn

Coups d’état were a relatively common means of regime change during the Cold War. From 1945 through 1985, 357 attempted coups d’état occurred in the Third World, and 183 succeeded. The high frequency of coups during this period is unsurprising, especially considering the advantageous position of the military during the rapid and destabilizing pace of modernization and decolonization in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Coups d’état were not exclusive to the Third World, however. They also occurred in members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Surprisingly, however, few scholars have explored why these extra-constitutional regime changes were tolerated, or how they were even possible, within NATO. This article attempts to answer these questions within the context of the 1960 coup in Turkey by closely evaluating the notion that the United States had no knowledge or warning that a coup was about to unfold.


2012 ◽  
Vol 149 (5) ◽  
pp. 875-891 ◽  
Author(s):  
HENNING LORENZ ◽  
DAVID G. GEE ◽  
ALEXANDER N. LARIONOV ◽  
JAROSLAW MAJKA

AbstractThroughout the high Arctic, from northern Canada (Pearya) to eastern Greenland, Svalbard, Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya, Taimyr and Severnaya Zemlya and, at lower Arctic latitudes, in the Urals and the Scandinavian Caledonides, there is evidence of the Grenville–Sveconorwegian Orogen. The latest orogenic phase (c. 950 Ma) is well exposed in the Arctic, but only minor Mesoproterozoic fragments of this orogen occur on land. However, detrital zircons in Neoproterozoic and Palaeozoic successions provide unambiguous Mesoproterozoic to earliest Neoproterozoic (c. 950 Ma) signatures. This evidence strongly suggests that the Grenville–Sveconorwegian Orogen continues northwards from type areas in southeastern Canada and southwestern Scandinavia, via the North Atlantic margins to the high Arctic continental shelves. The widespread distribution of late Mesoproterozoic detrital zircons far to the north of the Grenville–Sveconorwegian type areas is usually explained in terms of long-distance transport (thousands of kilometres) of either sediments by river systems from source to sink, or of slices of lithosphere (terranes) moved on major transcurrent faults. Both of these interpretations involve much greater complexity than the hypothesis favoured here, the former involving recycling of the zircons from the strata of initial deposition into those of their final residence and the latter requiring a diversity of microcontinents. Neither explains either the fragmentary evidence for the presence of Grenville–Sveconorwegian terranes in the high Arctic, or the composition of the basement of the continental shelves. The presence of the Grenville–Sveconorwegian Orogen in the Arctic, mainly within the hinterland and margins of the Caledonides and Timanides, has profound implications not only for the reconstructions of the Rodinia supercontinent in early Neoproterozoic time, but also the origin of these Neoproterozoic and Palaeozoic mountain belts.


2021 ◽  
pp. 79-102
Author(s):  
Andrey V. ZAGORSKIY ◽  
◽  
Andrey A. TODOROV ◽  

The article describes the politico-military situation in the Arctic, including the development of military capabilities of states in the region, the coastal infrastructure, the scales and the manner of military exercises, as well as the dynamics of the military landscape in the Arctic. The authors argue that the mili-tary capabilities in most parts of the Arctic remain moderate, primarily due to harsh climate restraints. However, military activity both of NATO member-states and Russia has increased considerably recently in the Euro-Arctic area adjacent to the North Atlantic, in particular in the waters of the Barents and the Nor-wegian seas. Mutual military deterrence in this area represents a "new old" normal that will shape the security situation in the Arctic in the long term. The article concludes by considering possible options for preventing escalation and minimizing the concerns of the sides by restoring a full, regular and institutionalized military dialogue between Russia and the rest of the Arctic states.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 79-85
Author(s):  
Adam Tereszowski

As demonstrated by this summer’s OP Nanook, the Arctic continues to be of strategic importance to Canada due to its wealth of natural resources and the importance of its position to the defence of the country. This policy brief contends that Canada should strengthen its patrol capacity in the Arctic and its exclusive economic zones by using Arctic/offshore patrol ships that belong to an armed Canadian Coast Guard. If Canada is serious about defending its North, the Canadian Forces will need to enhance its search and rescue capabilities in the region. Furthermore to counter illegal activity in the North, the Canadian Forces should share responsibility with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and an armed Canadian Coast Guard. Lastly, unmanned aerial vehicles may be of strategic importance to Canada, as they can monitor remote areas while Canadian Rangers provide support on the ground to better protect the region. A Canadian policy that places importance on the Arctic will need to contain elements that develop the capabilities of the Canadian Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 515-545
Author(s):  
ANDREW D. SMITH ◽  
LAURENCE B. MUSSIO

In their 2013 bookReimagining Business History, Philip Scranton and Patrick Fridenson called on business historians to reassess militarization and the “two-way exchanges” between the military and the private sector. The call is timely. The extensive business-historical scholarship on the relationship between companies and war sensibly focuses on companies that profited from their involvement in the military-industrial complex.1The business-historical literature is virtually silent, however, on the role of business in preventing wars from starting in the first place. In other words, business historians have missed a productive opportunity to engage with capitalist peace theory (CPT), an increasingly important theory in the discipline of international relations (IR). Many IR scholars now argue that the mutual economic interdependence characteristic of global capitalism reduces the likelihood of war. Their research suggests that while extensive cross-border economic linkages do not preclude the possibility of war, the creation of a transnational community of economic interests tends,ceteris paribus, to reduce the frequency, duration, and intensity of warfare.2


1992 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 819-855 ◽  
Author(s):  
John S. Duffield

With the end of the cold war, the military posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has entered a period of profound change. Prior to the recent dramatic political events in Europe, however, NATO conventional force levels in the Central Region had been remarkably stable for some three decades. This article seeks to explain this record of stability in terms of three widely used theories of international relations. It argues that balance-of-power theory and public goods theory cannot alone provide a satisfactory account. Rather, these traditional approaches for understanding alliance behavior must be supplemented by regime theory, which emphasizes the constraining effects of enduring institutional factors even in the face of structural change. Specifically, it shows how an international regime has influenced the provision of conventional forces in the Central Region by alliance members. More generally, this analysis seeks to contribute to the literature on international regimes in three ways. First, it demonstrates that regimesdomatter by providing an example of their importance for explaining state behavior and international outcomes. Second, it extends regime theory to relations among military allies. Third, it elaborates a comprehensive model for understanding why states actually comply with regime injunctions. The model stresses both the ways in which regimes effectively modify the international environment within which states operate, altering the costs and benefits associated with different courses of action, and the ways in which participating states may internalize regime norms and rules, thereby making compliance increasingly automatic.


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