Corporate Governance Role of the Board Committees in India

Author(s):  
Shinu Vig ◽  
Manipadma Datta

The establishment of board sub-committees has been strongly recommended as a suitable mechanism for improving corporate governance by delegating specific tasks from the main board to a smaller group and harnessing the contribution of non-executive directors. This chapter discusses the constitution of board committees in Indian context, their composition, processes, and their role in promoting good corporate governance. India has constantly made efforts to update its corporate governance regulations in line with the international best practices. This chapter will help the readers to understand the corporate governance scenario in India with special reference to the board committees and will have implications for the regulators, policymakers, corporate governance practitioners, researchers, and academicians in the developing countries.

Author(s):  
I Gusti Ayu Made Asri Dwija Putri ◽  
I.G.K.A Ulupui ◽  
Ni Gusti Putu Wirawati

The purpose of this study, namely to obtain empirical evidence that the implementation of corporate governance affect the performance of “Bank Perkreditan Rakyat” ( rural banks), and the role of local culture “Tri Hita Karana “to the BPR’s performance. The population is all BPR located in Badung and Denpasar. The samples using purposive sampling method. The data in this study were collected using a questionnaire are distributed directly to the object of research. “BPR” number into the sample in this study was 65 Banks. Data analyzed by model Multiple Regression Analysis. The research result show that the principles of corporate governance and the local cultural effect on the performance of BPR in Badung and Denpasar. “Bank Perkreditan Rakyat”. The implication of the study is important for the government to solve the economic problem using Corporate Governance and Tri Hita Karana concept.  


1975 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 268-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
W P Feistritzer

In this short article the author indicates the present stages of development of variety evaluation, testing, certification, production and marketing of quality seed—of cereals, industrial crops, pasture plants and vegetables—in major geographical regions of the world and draws attention to some of the underlying problems which must be faced in the future if further progress is to be made.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-90
Author(s):  
Dedi Rusdi ◽  
Indri Kartika ◽  
Maya Indriastuti

Abstract: This study examined the role of good corporate governance and investment opportunity set in maintaining firm performance. This study's sample population comprised 240 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2019. The research sample was selected using a purposive sampling method. The data were analyzed by using structural equation modeling analysis (SEM). The results showed that good corporate governance in terms of board size had a negative effect on firm performance. Meanwhile, good corporate governance in terms of board independence and investment opportunity set had a positive effect on firm performance.Keywords: good corporate governance, investment opportunity set, firm performance Menuju Kinerja Perusahaan di Indonesia: Peran Good Corporate Governance dan Investment Opportunity Set Abstrak: Studi ini menguji peran good corporate governance dan investment opportunity set dalam menjaga kinerja perusahaan. Populasi sampel penelitian terdiri dari 240 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia dari tahun 2016 hingga 2019. Sampel penelitian dipilih dengan menggunakan metode purposive sampling. Analisis data menggunakan analisis structural equation modeling (SEM). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa good corporate governance ditinjau dari ukuran dewan komisaris berpengaruh negatif terhadap kinerja perusahaan. Sedangkan good corporate governance ditinjau dari independensi dewan komisaris dan investment opportunity set berpengaruh positif terhadap kinerja perusahaan.Kata kunci: good corporate governance, investment opportunity set, kinerja perusahaan


The research investigate the impact of foreign shareholding originated from developed and developing countries on the efficiency of acquired local banks in Indonesia during 2007-2017 by including Corporate Governance as a moderating variable. Methodology: Using the secondary aggregate data of 29 commercial banks acquired by foreign shareholders, a panel regression model using econometrics methods of GLS, and DEA were applied to examine the effects of percentage of foreign shareholdings on efficiency of the acquired local banks. The main findings; First, percentage of foreign shareholdings positively affecting efficiency of acquired local banks only if the foreign shareholders is originated from developed countries. Second, the level of economic advancement of the country of origin of foreign shareholders has significant effects on the efficiency of the acquired local banks. Third, the increase in the size of the Board of Directors tends to decrease the efficiency of the acquired local banks and fourth, the presence of Foreign Director has a positive moderating effect on strengthening the effect of percentage of foreign shareholdings on the efficiency of the acquired local banks. Overall, the originality of this studies is that the percentage of foreign shareholdings and its country of origin are two combined factors that cannot be separated in affecting the level of efficiency of its acquired local bank and the fact of significant positive moderating effect of Foreign Director. As policy consideration, monetary authority need to perform strict due diligence on prospective foreign shareholders specifically originated from developing countries, advise banks to maintain the existence of Foreign Director and to encourage small local banks to be merged prior to the acquisition by foreign shareholders.


AKUNTABILITAS ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-82
Author(s):  
Erma Setiawati ◽  
Mujiyati Mujiyati ◽  
Erma Marga Rosit

This research aimed to examine the effect of free cash flow and leverage to earnings management.This study also examines the role of good corporate governance as measured by the index Government in moderating influence of free cash flow and leverage on earnings management. This research was conducted in the company are listed in the JakartaIslamicIndex(JII)from2015-2017 and unlisted in the Bursa Efek Indonesia(BEI).The sample is determined by purposive sampling with 45 samples. This analysis uses regression analysis moderation (MRA). The results of the research indicate where (1) free cash flow significant effect on earnings management, (2) no leverage effect on earnings management, (3) good corporate governance as measured by the index of corporate governance is not able to moderate the influence of free cash flow and earnings management


Author(s):  
Sebastien Deschenes ◽  
Hamadou Boubacar ◽  
Miguel Rojas ◽  
Tania Morris

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to examine if certain board characteristics have an impact on the total remuneration of top management and the ratio of stock-based remuneration to total top-management remuneration. Design/methodology/approach – The study draws on data from the largest public Canadian companies, the constituents of the TSX/60 index. The study controls for firm size and profitability. Findings – The authors concludes that total remuneration of top management is directly linked to board-member total remuneration and the board average number of director-tenure years. The study also shows that the ratio of stock-based to total top-management remuneration is positively affected by the percentage of independent directors, total remuneration of board directors, the ratio of stock-based remuneration of directors to their total remuneration and the average number of tenure years of the board of directors. Practical implications – If regulators are determined to curb the excesses in top-management remuneration by means of promoting boards with certain characteristics, they should implement measures facilitating the control of directors’ remuneration and tenure, to discourage cronyistic behavior. Good corporate governance requires that the board act as a counterbalance to top management, ensuring that a substantial percentage of top-executive total compensation is variable, and not fixed. According to our findings, the boards that are the most likely to hold managerial avoidance of variable pay in check are those favoring director independence, variable director remuneration and longer director tenures. Social implications – The present article examines specifically the latter aspect, namely, the role of board characteristics (independence, size, compensation, board director ownership and tenure, etc.) in the determination of top-management compensation. This relationship is important because it allows us to further the analysis of corporate governance. If the above-mentioned traits of boards have a meaningful relationship with the compensation of the top management, one might conclude that certain practices in the composition of boards could influence good corporate governance practices. This is relevant for regulatory agencies, for investors and for corporations. Originality/value – The article adds to the extant literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it considers the role of the traits of the board in the determination of the compensation of the top-management teams, and not only of the chief executive officer, as is the focus of previous literature. Secondly, the article focuses on the power interplay between boards and managers, and, more particularly, on the ability of boards to be an effective mechanism of corporate governance. Finally, the article examines the potential impact of board traits in the determination of top-management compensation in the context of Canadian firms, a subject that has received less attention from academic research, which has mostly concentrated on analyzing the issue in the US context.


Author(s):  
Brenda Hannigan

This chapter discusses corporate governance in publicly traded companies with widely dispersed shareholdings. Most shareholders are not involved in the management and control of a company's affairs. Thus, a separation usually develops between those who collectively own the company through their combined shareholdings (the shareholders) and those who manage it (the directors). Problems can arise from this separation of ownership and control as distance from the day-to-day running of the business makes it difficult for shareholders to restrain any managerial excesses. The starting point of good corporate governance is internal mechanisms (such as shareholders' rights and board structures). The discussions cover the UK corporate governance code, corporate governance requirement, board committees, and shareholder engagement.


Author(s):  
Imogen Moore

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter explores important issues in company management and corporate governance, starting by examining the role of directors and shareholders (and the relationship between them) and the separation of ‘ownership and control’. Since the early 1990s, the governance of listed companies has been dominated by self-regulatory codes (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code). This chapter examines how these codes operate and considers key themes in corporate governance, including the role of non-executive directors and auditors; the position of institutional investors; and executive remuneration.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-14
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs), other than the control role prescribed by agency theory and reformatory documents such as the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative research design, consisting of face-to-face interviews with 27 company directors of Malaysian-owned PLCs, was instigated. Findings The interviews revealed that INEDs do more than just monitor their executive counterparts. Apart from the control role, INEDs of Malaysian companies provide a conduit for mitigating uncertainties in the environment and perform invaluable services to the host companies. Research limitations/implications This research utilized interviews. Generalizations may be an issue when interviews are used as the method of inquiry. Also, the sample is not random as access to many of the interviewed directors depended on recommendations. In addition, respondents were consciously selected in order to obtain various board positions that include independent and non-independent directors. Originality/value There are limited studies using qualitative research design in investigating INEDs’ performing other roles apart from the control role of the board in developing countries. Many of previous studies and literature in this area of corporate governance were predominantly based upon experiences of western economies.


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