Moral Emotions for Autonomous Agents

2012 ◽  
pp. 1753-1766
Author(s):  
Antoni Gomila ◽  
Alberto Amengual

In this chapter we raise some of the moral issues involved in the current development of robotic autonomous agents. Starting from the connection between autonomy and responsibility, we distinguish two sorts of problems: those having to do with guaranteeing that the behavior of the artificial cognitive system is going to fall within the area of the permissible, and those having to do with endowing such systems with whatever abilities are required for engaging in moral interaction. Only in the second case can we speak of full blown autonomy, or moral autonomy. We illustrate the first type of case with Arkin’s proposal of a hybrid architecture for control of military robots. As for the second kind of case, that of full-blown autonomy, we argue that a motivational component is needed, to ground the self-orientation and the pattern of appraisal required, and outline how such motivational component might give rise to interaction in terms of moral emotions. We end suggesting limits to a straightforward analogy between natural and artificial cognitive systems from this standpoint.

Author(s):  
Antoni Gomila ◽  
Alberto Amengual

In this chapter we raise some of the moral issues involved in the current development of robotic autonomous agents. Starting from the connection between autonomy and responsibility, we distinguish two sorts of problems: those having to do with guaranteeing that the behavior of the artificial cognitive system is going to fall within the area of the permissible, and those having to do with endowing such systems with whatever abilities are required for engaging in moral interaction. Only in the second case can we speak of full blown autonomy, or moral autonomy. We illustrate the first type of case with Arkin’s proposal of a hybrid architecture for control of military robots. As for the second kind of case, that of full-blown autonomy, we argue that a motivational component is needed, to ground the self-orientation and the pattern of appraisal required, and outline how such motivational component might give rise to interaction in terms of moral emotions. We end suggesting limits to a straightforward analogy between natural and artificial cognitive systems from this standpoint.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-43
Author(s):  
Surjo Soekadar ◽  
Jennifer Chandler ◽  
Marcello Ienca ◽  
Christoph Bublitz

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.


Duty to Self ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 19-41
Author(s):  
Paul Schofield

This chapter distinguishes between mere self-regarding reasons to treat oneself in particular ways, and more robust moral duties owed to oneself. While the former are a philosophical commonplace, the latter are absent from most contemporary accounts and their addition to our practical philosophy would be significant. Duties owed to the self are second-personal, in the sense of being directed at a specific person. When a person has a duty to herself, her reasons are particularly strict, they pre-empt other reasons, they require a special sort of acknowledgment of their moral quality, and they engage special moral emotions. As such, if a person accepts that she owes duties to herself, it will impact the way in which she treats herself, and the way she relates to herself, beyond the mere acknowledgment that she has self-regarding reasons.


Author(s):  
Jason Kautz ◽  
M. Audrey Korsgaard ◽  
Sophia So Young Jeong

Organizations and their agents regularly face ethical challenges as the interests of various constituents compete and conflict. The theory of other-orientation provides a useful framework for understanding how other concerns and modes of reasoning combined to produce different mindsets for approaching ethical challenges. To optimize outcomes across parties, individuals can engage in complex rational reasoning that addresses the interests of the self as well as others, a mindset referred to as collective rationality. But collective rationality is as difficult to sustain as it is cognitively taxing. Thus, individuals are apt to simplify their approach to complex conflicts of interest. One simplifying strategy is to reduce the relevant outcome set by focusing on self-interests to the neglect of other-interest. This approach, referred to as a rational self-interest mindset, is self-serving and can lead to actions that are deemed unethical. At the other extreme, individuals can abandon rational judgment in favor of choices based on heuristics, such as moral values that specify a given mode of prosocial behavior. Because this mindset, referred to as other-oriented, obviates consideration of outcome for the self and other, it can result in choices that harm the self as well as other possible organizational stakeholders. This raises the question: how does one maintain an other-interested focus while engaging in rational reasoning? The resolution of this question rests in the arousal of moral emotions. Moral emotions signal to the individual the opportunity to express, or the need to uphold, moral values. Given that moral values direct behavior that benefits others or society, they offset the tendency to focus on self-interest. At extreme levels of arousal, however, moral emotions may overwhelm cognitive resources and thus influence individuals to engage in heuristic rather than rational reasoning. The effect of moral emotions is bounded by attendant emotions, as individuals are likely to experience multiple hedonic and moral emotions in the same situation. Deontic justice predicts that the arousal of moral emotions will lead individuals to retaliate in response to injustice, regardless of whether they experience personal benefit. However, evidence suggests that individuals may instead engage in self-protecting behavior, such as withdrawal, or self-serving behaviors, such as the contagion of unjust behavior. These alternative responses may be due to strong hedonic emotions, such as fear or schadenfreude, the pleasure derived from others’ misfortunes, overpowering one’s moral emotions. Future research regarding the arousal levels of moral emotions and the complex interplay of emotions in the decision-making process may provide beneficial insight into managing the competing interests of organizational stakeholders.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Buck

Self-organizing dynamic systems (DS) modeling is appropriate to conceptualizing the relationship between emotion and cognition-appraisal. Indeed, DS modeling can be applied to encompass and integrate additional phenomena at levels lower than emotional interpretations (genes), at the same level (motives), and at higher levels (social, cognitive, and moral emotions). Also, communication is a phenomenon involved in dynamic system interactions at all levels.


Author(s):  
Alberto Sánchez-Rojo ◽  
Ángel García del Dujo ◽  
José Manuel Muñoz-Rodríguez ◽  
Arsenio Dacosta

AbstractIdentity has been widely understood in Western societies as a specular construction that operates simultaneously both from within and from outside oneself. However, this process is fiercely changing in a world in which almost every human action is mediated by information and communication technologies. This paper, from a theoretical perspective, aims to discover the main educational implications of this change. For that purpose, we first consider the traditional meaning and process of forming the self in Western culture. Afterwards, we identify and describe the mechanisms for the construction of the self in our current context, highlighting the fact that technologies, in themselves and regardless of the use we make of them, hide implications. Taking this into account, we show to what extent the current development of the self presents shades, conflicts and tangible risks from an educational perspective. We finally conclude that it is essential to promote an education on technology that goes beyond the use regulation in which, up to now, it has been solely focused on.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-175
Author(s):  
Mochamad Abdul ◽  
S.B. Waluya ◽  
Dwijanto Dwijanto ◽  
Isnarto Isnarto

<p style="text-align: justify;">Algebraic reasoning involves representation, generalization, formalization of patterns and order in all aspects of mathematics. Hence, the focus of algebraic reasoning is on patterns, functions, and the ability to analyze situations with the help of symbols. The purpose of this study was to develop a test instrument to measure students' algebraic reasoning abilities based on cognitive systems in Marzano's taxonomy. The cognitive system in Marzano's taxonomy consists of four levels, including retrieval, comprehension, analysis, and knowledge utilization. According to the stage of cognitive development, students are at the level of knowledge utilization. At this level, students can make decisions, solve problems, generates and test hypotheses, as well as carry out investigations that are in line with indicators of algebraic reasoning abilities. The stages in developing the test instrument were based on three phases: preliminary investigation phase, prototyping phase, and assessment phase. The study obtains a set of valid and reliable algebraic reasoning test instruments for students based on the cognitive system in Marzano's taxonomy. Through the development of an algebraic reasoning test instrument based on Marzano's taxonomy, students can build' thinking habits so that active learning exercises occurs.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. p1
Author(s):  
Olivier GUY ◽  
Rémy Potier

In this text we answer at the same time to two recent interesting works of Giancarlo Minati and Luca Possati in which they both called to work on the development, one from the part of the computer side, and the other of the humanities one of an IA unconscious in complex cognitive systems as an experiment to come to more anthropomorphic machines, performance added by the unconscious will not be addressed in this paper. We gathered many sources in psychoanalysis to help us understand what could be the barriers dressed against us. In the light of Lacan, Anzieu, Leclaire and Winnicott amongst others we tried to explain how having a body, in the biological sense, makes a difference with recreating—this is a typical human preoccupation—an unconscious in IA. Of course, from a French psychoanalytic standpoint there are many conservative objections, while some can be easily overcome, the matter of innate desire and body seems an understandable concern. It is also important to consider the interesting conjecture of Possati (i.e., a computer can be a projective identification object); while we only may say that it is a transitional object in the sense of Winnicott. Also, we can study further within psychotherapy the behaviour of the patient and therapist, with an algorithm we developed. In the end we address the objection of French postructruralist psychology objections to the creation of a human-like unconscious and advise the experimenting of Possati’s theory with our device.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-200
Author(s):  
Robert D. Rupert

A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy’s Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper’s first section explores aspects of Talmy’s view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer – the conditional probability of co-contribution account (cpc) – a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms of intelligent behavior. Central to this approach is the idea of an integrated system. A formal characterization of integration is laid out in the form of a conditional-probability based measure of the clustering of causal contributors to the production of intelligent behavior. I relate the view to the debate over extended and embodied cognition and respond to objections that have been raised in print by Andy Clark, Colin Klein, and Felipe de Brigard.


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