Performance Efficiency Measurement of Airports

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anil Kumar ◽  
Manoj Kumar Dash ◽  
Rajendra Sahu

This article describes how to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the aviation sector and also to source extra funding, the Government of India has paved the way for private investors through to a Public Private Partnership (PPP) model since the 1980s. This liberalization step in the Indian aviation market has minimized the institutional barriers which have hindered the freedom and flexibility of air transport operations among private investors. Now, competition within the aviation sector has become fiercer; the Airports Authority of India (AAI) and Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Indian airports are not only providing varied services, but also attracting consumers with new infrastructure and full modern facilities. The importance of this article is because after privatization, no studies have been conducted to examine the efficiency of Indian airports by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). An output-oriented DEA model is employed to determine the efficiency score of airports by taking a sample of 15 airports, including airports run by PPP, for comparison. Output-oriented DEA calculates the efficiency by maximizing the outputs for a given level of inputs. Therefore, this article contributes to the existing literature on Indian airports. Based on available data, three variables - length of runways, terminal size and number of check-in counters, are used as inputs and two variables - passenger movement and aircraft movement, are used as outputs.

Author(s):  
Anil Kumar ◽  
Manoj Kumar Dash ◽  
Rajendra Sahu

This article describes how to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the aviation sector and also to source extra funding, the Government of India has paved the way for private investors through to a Public Private Partnership (PPP) model since the 1980s. This liberalization step in the Indian aviation market has minimized the institutional barriers which have hindered the freedom and flexibility of air transport operations among private investors. Now, competition within the aviation sector has become fiercer; the Airports Authority of India (AAI) and Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Indian airports are not only providing varied services, but also attracting consumers with new infrastructure and full modern facilities. The importance of this article is because after privatization, no studies have been conducted to examine the efficiency of Indian airports by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). An output-oriented DEA model is employed to determine the efficiency score of airports by taking a sample of 15 airports, including airports run by PPP, for comparison. Output-oriented DEA calculates the efficiency by maximizing the outputs for a given level of inputs. Therefore, this article contributes to the existing literature on Indian airports. Based on available data, three variables - length of runways, terminal size and number of check-in counters, are used as inputs and two variables - passenger movement and aircraft movement, are used as outputs.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Md. Mahmudul Alam ◽  
Abu Rashed

Like other social services, education is one of the essential services that government is obliged to arrange for its country people, but to meet such increasing demand of educational infrastructures, government alone faces hues difficulties in capital investment especially in the developing countries. So, for developing the education infrastructure and providing quality education programmes, Public Private Partnership (PPP) has been proven an advanced tool for government in many of the countries. However, private investors may not have much interest for a typical PPP deal in education sector, because government provides the education services for free at the primary and secondary level. Therefore to make the PPP deal attractive to private investors, this paper suggests two approaches of PPP funding under the Built Operate and Transfer (BOT) models. Both the Viability Gap Funding (VGF) and Annuity Payment provide the investors the required subsidy from the government through payment in the construction or operation phase to make the project viable. This allows private investors to make revenue at expected level and government to save of hues up-front investments. Moreover, among different types of PPP models, the suggested types – BOT - also ensures the quality of education programmes.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongyu Jin ◽  
Shijing Liu ◽  
Jun Li ◽  
Chunlu Liu

PurposeConsidering there is a lack of research in determining the optimal levels of government guarantee and revenue cap, the objective of this research is to determine their optimal levels to achieve a reasonable financial risk allocation between governments and private investors while avoiding overly lucrative conditions for private investors.Design/methodology/approachExpanded net present value (NPV) analysis and bargaining game theory are employed to construct the core of the determination process. The risk gap between governments and private investors is assessed via an expanded NPV analysis to see if the financial risk has been shared reasonably, based on which the range of the government guarantee is decided. A bargaining model is then created to help locate the optimal level of the government guarantee. Finally, a revenue cap, often combined with the government guarantee in public–private partnership (PPP) agreements, will be determined if overly lucrative conditions for private investors are observed or governments suffer a risk spillover.FindingsReferring to a real PPP project in Australia, Project BA is created to validate the applicability of the proposed determination process. The outcome shows that the proposed determination process in this paper is capable of determining the optimal levels of government guarantee and revenue cap. The government preferences towards risk allocation will influence the values of the optimal levels. Governments may also consider to alleviate the control over investors' net profits to mobilise private investors into PPP projects.Research limitations/implicationsThere is a potential possibility that the revenue cap fails to control the financial risk for governments or the overly lucrative condition for private investors. In other words, even though the revenue cap is set at the minimal level, the financial risk for governments still beyond their tolerance range or the overly lucrative condition for private investors still occurs. Future research may focus on other financial protective schemes which help to better control the financial risks for governments and profits for private investors.Originality/valueGovernment guarantees are frequently used as an investment incentive to reduce the probabilities of suffering loss for private investors. Nevertheless, the financial risks for governments may increase after providing guarantees and, as a result, revenue cap is required by governments to avoid placing themselves in an unprotected situation. By recognising the importance of the two contractual parameters, many scholars dig into their option values. However, there are very rare research works focussing on the method of determining the specific levels of government guarantee and revenue cap. To overcome the limitations of existing models and enrich the methodology for government guarantee and revenue cap determination, this paper contributes to the body of knowledge by developing a government guarantee and revenue cap determination process which contributes to a reasonable allocation of financial risks between governments and private investors.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanaa Mohamed Aly Helal ◽  
Haga Abdelrahman Elimam

The study aimed to assess the efficiency of health services provided by the government hospitals in various districts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The number of beds at hospitals, doctors, nursing staff and paramedical categories were used as inputs for the model. The average productivity efficiency of government hospitals in the districts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2014 was 92.3%; whereas, the average internal production efficiency of these districts in the provision of health services through their respective hospitals was 94.7%; and the average external productivity efficiency in the different cities of the districts in Kingdom of the Saudi Arabia was 97.5%. It has been found that the average overall productivity efficiency was 90.2%, concerning the relative efficiency indicators of government hospitals, which were based on the hospitals’ distribution of Saudi Arabian districts in 2006. An analysis of the indicator showed that the average production efficiency of the services provided (internally) by the districts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was 94.7%, and that the average of the external production efficiency for such services was 95.4%. The Data Envelopment Analysis is a successful technique in measuring the performance efficiency of hospitals and it also assists to identify possible improvement and reduction in cost.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
Mahirah Rafie

Public Private Partnership (PPP) is not a new method of development in a country. In Malaysia, concept of PPP had been used almost four decades after Malaysian Incorporated Policy had been introduced by the government. The objectives of this present study is to scrutinize defining the concept of PPP, the evolution of implementation PPP, and also characteristic and criteria of PPP based on Public Private Partnership Guidelines. This paper also examines the potential benefits of PPP implementation in Malaysia based on the previous study. Last but not least, issues and recommendation for future study has been suggested to enhance PPP implementation project.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Osei-Kyei ◽  
Albert P.C. Chan ◽  
Ayirebi Dansoh ◽  
Joseph Kwame Ofori-Kuragu ◽  
Emmanuel Kingsford Owusu

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the motivations of governments for adopting unsolicited proposals for public–private partnership (PPP) project implementation. Design/methodology/approach A comprehensive review of literature was conducted to derive a list of motivations for adopting unsolicited PPPs. Subsequently, an empirical questionnaire survey was conducted with international PPP experts. Inter-rater agreement analysis, mean significance index and independent two-sample t-test were used for data analysis. Findings Results reveal four very critical motivations for governments’ interest in unsolicited PPPs; these include: “enhanced private sector innovation and creativity in PPPs”; “lack of public sector capacity to identify, prioritise and procure projects”; “lack of private investors’/developers’ interest in projects at remote areas”; and “rapid implementation of PPP projects”. Further analysis shows that developing and developed countries view the significance of three motivations differently. Research limitations/implications The major limitation lies in the fact that this study only focused on the general motivations/rationale for using unsolicited PPP proposals and did not thoroughly examine and consider the inherent property of motivations (i.e. push and pull theories). Therefore, future studies should explore the “pull and push” motivations for adopting unsolicited PPPs within a specific country or region. Originality/value The research outputs inform international private developers of the key expectations of governments/public departments when submitting unsolicited PPP proposals for consideration by the public sector. Furthermore, the outputs will enable governments/public departments and private proponents to derive performance objectives and standards for unsolicited PPP projects.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110403
Author(s):  
Noemí Peña-Miguel ◽  
Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros

This article analyses the effect of political factors on the use of Public Private Partnerships in developing countries. According to a sample of 80 low- and middle-income countries over the period 1995–2017, our findings suggest that Public Private Partnership projects are affected by political ideology, the strength of the government and electoral cycles. Concretely, they tend to be used by left-wing governments to a greater extent than governments with other ideologies. Public Private Partnerships also tend to be more frequently used by fragmented governments and when there is greater political competition. There is also some evidence (although slight) on the relevance of the proximity of elections in explaining Public Private Partnerships in developing countries.


Author(s):  
James E. Shaw

The guilds were essential allies in the operation of the regulatory system, which can be considered an early-modern example of a public/private partnership. Not only were the guilds the chief ‘customers’ of the court, providing much of the funding for public officials, they also had the authority to enforce market rules in their own sector. The price paid for their cooperation was the confirmation of their privileges and the division of the economy into separate sectors. This chapter emphasizes the functional role of guild litigation as opposed to the rhetoric that has surrounded it. From the point of view of a ‘command economy’, guild litigation served no useful purpose. The government considered it to be a waste of money, ‘petty disputes’ of no real significance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yingjun Zhu ◽  
Zhitong Gao ◽  
Ruihai Li

To control the “uniqueness” risk in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects of transportation infrastructure, we design a simplified “uniqueness” contract model by incorporating the impact of the initial investment which is based on the Bertrand model. The nonlinear programming method is adopted to derive the optimal “uniqueness” contracts for incumbent private capital, the public, and the social welfare, respectively. The simulation results show that the achievement of the optimal “uniqueness” contract is essentially the result of a compromise between the private capital, the public, and social welfare. The extent to which such a contract reduces the probability of “uniqueness” risk mainly depends on the equilibrium relation between the interests of private capital and the public. The initial investment is not related to the government default when the contract does not take into account the interests of the private capital. Furthermore, the “uniqueness” contracts between private capital and the government are mainly for anticompetitive purpose in the PPP market of transportation infrastructure. Unless the contract terms focus on the improvement of social welfare, entering a “uniqueness” contract will cause social welfare losses.


Transfers ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Waldemar Kuligowski

The article surveys a giant infrastructural construction project in Poland: the A2 motorway, connecting Poznan´ and Warsaw with the Polish-German border. It was the first private motorway in Poland, and the biggest European infrastructural project, and was realized in a public-private partnership system. The last section of A2 was opened on 1 December 2011, which can be seen as a key moment in Polish socioeconomic transformation. I examine it on two levels: (1) a discourse between government and private investors in which the motorway was the medium of economic and social development and infrastructural “the end” modernization of Poland; (2) practices and opinions of local communities, living along the new motorway. On the first level, the construction of A2 was seen as an impetus for the economic and social development of the regions where the motorway was built. But on the second level, I observe almost universal disappointment and a deep crisis experienced by local economies.


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