Gaming Analysis among Different Participants in the Construction of Biomass Energy Forest Base

2012 ◽  
Vol 512-515 ◽  
pp. 416-420
Author(s):  
Feng Lian Sun ◽  
Wei Wei Wang ◽  
Zhong Ji Wang
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Construction Cost ◽  
Additional Benefit ◽  
Optimal Combination ◽  
Biomass Energy ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
The Government ◽  
Energy Forest

Through the analysis on the relations of the three main participants of the government, the enterprise and the farmers, the thesis has established the gaming model between the enterprise and the forest farmers and found that only when the additional benefit they each obtain is larger than the construction cost for the development they paid, optimal combination of Nash equilibrium can be accepted by enterprises and forest farmers and Pareto improvement will be possibly formed， the smooth development of energy forest construction can be ensured.

scholarly journals Corporate Profit Tax and Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility Under Foreign Acquisition

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lili Xu ◽  
Sang-Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Government Grants ◽  
Corporate Profit ◽  
Foreign Acquisition ◽  
Strategic Csr ◽  
The Government ◽  
Corporate Social

Abstract This study investigates government public policies facing competing firms’ strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and finds that the choice of CSR crucially depends on corporate profit tax. We demonstrate that strategic CSR decreases while social welfare increases with corporate tax. When the government grants uniform output subsidies, we show that bilateral CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under unilateral CSR but bilateral CSR is always beneficial to society. However, when the government grants discriminatory output subsidies which yield different levels of unilateral CSR, we show that domestic CSR leads to a lower CSR level than under foreign CSR. In an endogenous CSR choice game, domestic CSR (no CSR) is a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low (high) under the uniform subsidy, while foreign CSR could be a Nash equilibrium when corporate tax is low under the discriminatory subsidy.

scholarly journals POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION

2005 ◽  
Vol 07 (04) ◽  
pp. 407-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROD GARRATT ◽  
JAMES E. PARCO ◽  
CHENG-ZHONG QIN ◽  
AMNON RAPOPORT
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Data ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Data Support ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Minimal Winning Coalitions ◽  
Unique Potential

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strong/coalition-proof Nash equilibrium are also tested.

scholarly journals Construction Cost of Green Building Certified Residence: A Case Study in Taiwan

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen-Yi Sun ◽  
Yin-Guang Chen ◽  
Rong-Jing Wang ◽  
Shih-Chi Lo ◽  
Jyh-Tyng Yau ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Residential Buildings ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Residential Building ◽  
Green Building ◽  
Construction Cost ◽  
Construction Costs ◽  
Practical Strategy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship

The green building certification system of Taiwan, EEWH (Ecology, Energy Saving, Waste Reduction and Health), has been in operation for more than 20 years (since 1999). In order to understand the relationship between green building certification and the construction costs of residential buildings, this study obtained 37 green building-certified residential cases and 36 general residential cases available from public information and conducted a comparative analysis. The results of this study showed that the average construction cost of a green building certification residential building was only 1.58% higher than a general residential building, indicating that green building certification does not require a large increase in costs. However, for residential buildings, achieving a high-grade (gold-grade or diamond-grade) green building certification means an increase of 6.7% to 9.3% in construction costs. This shows that the pursuit of higher levels of green building certification does require higher construction costs. In addition, the results of this study can not only provide important references for the government in making green building policies, but also offer a practical strategy for developers for decision-making.

scholarly journals Tax amnesty and secondary tax evasion

2020 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-139
Author(s):  
Yu-Kun Wang ◽  
Li Zhang ◽  
We-Me Ho
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Initial Assessment ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Tax Amnesty ◽  
Policy Tool ◽  
Assessment Period ◽  
The Government ◽  
Behavioural Aspects

AbstractThough tax amnesties (TAs) are considered as a policy tool to increase revenue for governments, they have generated some puzzles. To solve the puzzles of TA we should not ignore the behavioural aspects of delinquent taxpayers. In this paper, we focus on a relatively neglected but important area of the TA literature. Considering that people who participate in tax amnesty policy (TAP) may not honestly report the whole amounts of evaded tax, thus they commit a secondary tax evasion. We indicate that even considering the risk of abstaining from TA and incurring possible uncertainty of tax evasion penalties, participating in a TA provides a higher level of utility for the delinquent taxpayers. Also, due to a secondary tax evasion usually accompanying with TA, we show that during the initial assessment period of a TAP the tax revenue drastically increases and when the assessment period is approaching the tax revenue stably declines and ultimately converges to a fixed value. Furthermore, we show that if delinquent taxpayers participate in the TAP and the penalties are larger than the expected tax revenue of the government, it increases the tax revenue without reducing the welfare of other taxpayers, so as to achieving Pareto improvement.

scholarly journals The Law Enforcement Of The Employees Social Security System In Indonesia: A Game Theory Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-174
Author(s):  
Randy Amsyari ◽  
Fajrin Satria Dwi Kesumah
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Social Security System ◽  
Security System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Subgame Perfection ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government

Insurance for the workers means a guarantee of safety for their works on the workplaces. It is necessarily crucial as workers need such a policy that can protect them from the loss. Indonesian government declare a policy that enact the act about National Social Security System (SJSN). The companies are the subject of this regulation, despite the fact at the initial implementation of this law enforcement brought to the pros and cons. Hence, the regulation also regulates for those who betray the policy will have to pay some certain amount of fine which in turn can harden them. The companies on the other side have a choice either to register or not their workers to SJSN as they still consider the premium they have to pay. This study aims to analyze the payoffs for both government and companies to be better off from the law enforcement. Game theory perspective is applied for the methodology of the study, particularly Subgame Perfection Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). The results present that in condition of an effective law enforcement at p, the firms will be beneficial from the SJSN policy by registering their workers and pay the premium, because if they do not pay the premium they have to pay additional amount of fine. On the other hand, if the policy is not effective with 1-p, the firms will have an advantage by not registering their employees to the SJSN as the law enforcement is not effective. Also, the government does not necessarily conduct an investigation as the cost is higher than the return that they will get.

scholarly journals Firms, technology, training and government fiscal policies: An evolutionary approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Elvio Accinelli ◽  
Filipe Martins ◽  
Humberto Muñiz ◽  
Bruno M. P. M. Oliveira ◽  
Alberto A. Pinto
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Poverty Trap ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
Training And Education ◽  
Dynamical Interaction ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Training

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In this paper we propose and analyze a game theoretical model regarding the dynamical interaction between government fiscal policy choices toward innovation and training (I&amp;T), firm's innovation, and worker's levels of training and education. We discuss four economic scenarios corresponding to strict pure Nash equilibria: the government and I&amp;T poverty trap, the I&amp;T poverty trap, the I&amp;T high premium niche, and the I&amp;T ideal growth. The main novelty of this model is to consider the government as one of the three interacting players in the game that also allow us to analyse the I&amp;T mixed economic scenarios with a unique strictly mixed Nash equilibrium and with I&amp;T evolutionary dynamical cycles.</p>

scholarly journals Current Status of Old Housing for Low-Income Elderly Households in Seoul and Green Remodeling Support Plan: Economic Analysis Considering the Social Cost of Green Remodeling

Buildings ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Jaemoon Kim ◽  
Seunghoon Nam ◽  
Duhwan Lee
Keyword(s):  
Low Income ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Net Present Value ◽  
Construction Cost ◽  
Economic Feasibility ◽  
Air Pollutant ◽  
Current Status ◽  
The Government ◽  
Elderly Households ◽  
Total Construction Cost

In this study, the economic feasibility of green remodeling (GR), which could improve the health, safety, and energy of elderly households considering social cost, was analyzed. As a result, the net present value of GR was ‘−10,267 USD (49.7%)’, which was found to be uneconomical compared to the total construction cost (20,981 USD, 100%) despite benefits of energy saving, carbon reduction, and air pollutant reduction. Based on this result, in order to expand GR for low-income elderly households, who cannot afford to perform GR, a GR support measure linked to the currently implemented energy conversion and old-age housing support policies was proposed. It allows the government to perform GR for low-income elderly households with 1/4 of the total construction cost. This result could revitalize GR to reduce greenhouse gas and contribute to housing stability for low-income elderly households who are vulnerable to COVID-19 and climate change.

scholarly journals Endogenous Stackelberg leadership within a team. The coalition effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-79
Author(s):  
E.M. Skarzhinskaya ◽  
◽  
V.I. Tsurikov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Investigation ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Stackelberg Strategy ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Leadership Formation ◽  
Stackelberg Leadership ◽  
Diminishing Returns ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Specific Individual

The article engages in a theoretical investigation of the possibility of implementing the Stackelberg strategy within a team. It is assumed that the team gene-rates aggregate income that increases as the efforts invested by each agent intensify, subject to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each agent in a team is to maximize his own individual gain. In order to achieve an outcome that is Paretopreferable over Nash equilibrium, two approaches may be used: identifying a leader or forming a smaller group (coalition) within the team whose members, in pursuance of increased individual gains, choose the route that maximizes coalition gains. It is shown that the advent of a coalition in a team results in Pareto-improvement in a simultaneous game. We analyse the possibility of endogenous leadership forming according to the Stackelberg model when using the mechanism of timing decisions. It is established that under autonomy of all team members, leadership formation can only be confidently predicted in specific individual cases. In a significantly more general case, all of the prerequisites for the formation of leadership are created by the presence of a single coalition interested in implementing the Stackelberg strategy.

scholarly journals The authentication and repatriation of a ceremonial tsantsa to its country of origin (Ecuador)

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig D. Byron ◽  
Adam M. Kiefer ◽  
Joanna Thomas ◽  
Sagar Patel ◽  
Amy Jenkins ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Imaging System ◽  
Ct Imaging ◽  
Additional Benefit ◽  
3D Images ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Natural History Collection ◽  
Unmet Demand ◽  
Data Files ◽  
Facial Anatomy ◽  
The Government

AbstractTsantsas, commonly referred to as “shrunken heads”, are unique and valuable antiquities that were produced by the Shuar, Achuar, Awajún/Aguaruna, Wampís/Huambisa, and Candoshi-Shampra (SAAWC) peoples until the mid twentieth century. Originally used with ceremonial purpose during important social group functions, tsantsas became monetarily valuable as keepsakes and curios during the nineteenth century as a result of Western/European cultural encroachment. Unmet demand resulted in the production of convincing forgeries that created confusion about the authenticity of existing collections. Ceremonial tsantsas are both human remains and valuable cultural items. Their production and purpose were negatively influenced by colonialism and the outside curio market; as such many institutions may choose to repatriate them to their places of origin. Herein, we report on the authentication and repatriation of a ceremonial tsantsa recently rediscovered in a university’s natural history collection. The personal memoirs of the original collector describe that it originated in the Ecuadorean Amazon. In consultation with the government of Ecuador, it was determined that authentication was required prior to repatriation. The tsantsa was compared to a list of thirty-three distinct characteristics shared by ceremonial tsantsas. These criteria were taken from those provided by Ecuador’s National Cultural Heritage Institute and those found in prior studies from the academic literature; they include notable skin and hair features, structure and facial anatomy, and evidence of traditional fabrication and modification. We were able to affirm 30 of the 33 authenticating indicators. As part of our protocol the tsantsa was scanned with a CT-imaging system. The resulting 3D images were invaluable in discerning subtle and difficult-to-visualize characteristics regarding the skin and patterns of modification, although there are limitations related to the small size of filamentous structures. The results of the authentication were accepted by the Ecuadorean government, and the tsantsa was repatriated in June 2019. An additional benefit of CT-imaging is that data files can be generated in order to create rapid prototypes via 3D printing. In fact, as our work demonstrates, artifacts of value can be repatriated while simultaneously preserved as a volumetric replica for the purposes of a collection.

scholarly journals Studi Pengaruh Temperatur Reaktor Gasifikasi Terhadap Fuel Conversion Rate Gasifikasi Dual Reactor Fluidized Bed

Jurnal METTEK ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
I Wayan Arya Darma ◽  
I Nyoman Suprapta Winaya ◽  
I Ketut Gede Wirawan
Keyword(s):  
Fluidized Bed ◽  
Conversion Rate ◽  
Alternative Fuels ◽  
Biomass Energy ◽  
Silica Sand ◽  
Renewable Energy Resources ◽  
Fuel Conversion ◽  
Carbon Efficiency ◽  
Gasification Process ◽  
The Government

Terjadinya krisis energi mendorong pemerintah untuk melakukan upaya pengembangan bahan bakar alternatif, yang berasal dari sumber daya energi terbarukan, salah satunya adalah biomassa. Pada penelitian ini proses konversi energi biomassa dilakukan menggunakan teknologi dual reactor fluidized bed. Bahan bakar biomassa yang digunakan adalah sekam padi dan pasir silika digunakan sebagai material bed nya. Temperatur pada reaktor gasifikasi diatur antara 600-7000C dan temperatur pada reaktor pembakaran konstan pada 7000C. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan peningkatan temperatur pada reaktor gasifikasi berpengaruh terhadap meningkatnya fuel conversion rate pada proses gasifikasi. The occurrence of an energy crisis encourages the government to make efforts to develop alternative fuels, which come from renewable energy resources, one of which is biomass. In this study the biomass energy conversion process was carried out using dual reactor fluidized bed technology. The biomass fuel used is rice husk and silica sand is used as a bed material. The temperature in the gasification reactor is set between 600-7000C and the temperature in the combustion reactor is constant at 7000C. The results showed that the increase in temperature in the gasification reactor had an effect on increasing carbon efficiency in the gasification process.  

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