Whewell, William (1794–1886)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menachem Fisch
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Discovery ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
Mathematical Truth ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
New Era ◽  
History Of ◽  
Scientific Ideas

William Whewell’s two seminal works, History of the Inductive Science, from the Earliest to the Present Time (1837) and The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History (1840), began a new era in the philosophy of science. Equally critical of the British ‘sensationalist’ school, which founded all knowledge on experience, and the German Idealists, who based science on a priori ideas, Whewell undertook to survey the history of all known sciences in search of a better explanation of scientific discovery. His conclusions were as bold as his undertaking. All real knowledge, he argued, is ‘antithetical’, requiring mutually irreducible, ever-present, and yet inseparable empirical and conceptual components. Scientific progress is achieved not by induction, or reading-out theories from previously collected data, but by the imaginative ‘superinduction’ of novel hypotheses upon known but seemingly unrelated facts. He thus broke radically with traditional inductivism – and for nearly a century was all but ignored. In the Philosophy the antithetical structure of scientific theories and the hypothetico-deductive account of scientific discovery form the basis for novel analyses of scientific and mathematical truth and scientific methodology, critiques of rival philosophies of science, and an account of the emergence and refinement of scientific ideas.

Robert M. Young's Mind, Brain and Adaptation revisited

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Christopher Lawrence
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Social Reform ◽  
Victorian Britain ◽  
Unique Character ◽  
Philosophy Department ◽  
History Of ◽  
Science Community ◽  
Scientific Ideas

Abstract Robert Maxwell Young's first book Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century (1970), written from 1960 to 1965, still merits reading as a study of the naturalization of mind and its relation to social thought in Victorian Britain. I examine the book from two perspectives that give the volume its unique character: first, Young's interest in psychology, which he considered should be used to inform humane professional practices and be the basis of social reform; second, new approaches to the history of scientific ideas. I trace Young's intellectual interests to the Yale Philosophy Department, the Cambridge Department of Experimental Psychology and a new history and philosophy of science community. Although Young changed his political outlook and historiography radically after 1965, he always remained faithful to ideas about thought and practice described in Mind, Brain.

scholarly journals When Does HARKing Hurt? Identifying When Different Types of Undisclosed Post Hoc Hypothesizing Harm Scientific Progress

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 308-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Literature Search ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Research Report ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Replication Crisis ◽  
Post Hoc

Hypothesizing after the results are known, or HARKing, occurs when researchers check their research results and then add or remove hypotheses on the basis of those results without acknowledging this process in their research report ( Kerr, 1998 ). In the present article, I discuss 3 forms of HARKing: (a) using current results to construct post hoc hypotheses that are then reported as if they were a priori hypotheses; (b) retrieving hypotheses from a post hoc literature search and reporting them as a priori hypotheses; and (c) failing to report a priori hypotheses that are unsupported by the current results. These 3 types of HARKing are often characterized as being bad for science and a potential cause of the current replication crisis. In the present article, I use insights from the philosophy of science to present a more nuanced view. Specifically, I identify the conditions under which each of these 3 types of HARKing is most and least likely to be bad for science. I conclude with a brief discussion about the ethics of each type of HARKing.

Scientific Change

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anouk Barberousse
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
General Question ◽  
Scientific Enterprise ◽  
History Of ◽  
Dynamics Of Science

How should we think of the dynamics of science? What are the relationships between an earlier theory and the theory that has superseded it? This chapter introduces the heated debates on the nature of scientific change, at the intersection of philosophy of science and history of science, and their bearing on the more general question of the rationality of the scientific enterprise. It focuses on the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of scientific change and the various versions of the incommensurability thesis one may uphold. Historicist views are balanced against nagging questions regarding scientific progress (Is there such a thing? If so, how should it be defined?), the causes of scientific change (Are they to be found within scientific method itself?), and its necessity (Is the history of scientific developments an argument in favor of realism, or could we have had entirely different sciences?).

scholarly journals The Problematics of Scientific Discovery

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Sudhakar Venukapalli
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Creative Thinking ◽  
Scientific Discovery ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Understanding Of Science ◽  
Scientific Ideas ◽  
Orthodox View ◽  
Exclusive Focus ◽  
Philosophical Understanding

Historically, the problem of discovery or the problem of the genesis of scientific ideas has been taken seriously by the historians, psychologists, sociologists and philosophers who analyzed the creative thinking and formation of ideas and attempted to provide a meaningful account of them. In fact, the philosophical concern with scientific discovery is as old as science and philosophy of science themselves. However, almost throughout the first half of 20th century, philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of scientific discovery remained in a state of suspended animation. This is because the dominant trend in philosophy of science in this period outlawed it. The dominant view in philosophy of science maintained that the phenomenon of scientific discovery is philosophically irrelevant, and an adequate philosophical understanding of science should confine itself to the way in which scientific theories are justified; it was assumed that the process of justification is a neat, spick-and-span phenomenon eminently suited to be described in terms which are, logically speaking, cut and dry. The process of justification or evaluation according to this orthodox view constitutes the essence of science. Obviously, justification was demarcated from discovery. Justification, because of its supposed epistemic transparency, became the exclusive focus of philosophical attention to the detriment of discovery. The invidious distinction between discovery of scientific ideas and justification of finished ideas of science remained the catchword for a long time. This paper is an attempt to critically examine the nihilistic attitude of the dominant philosophies of science and to arrive at a philosophical theory of scientific discovery.

scholarly journals When Does HARKing Hurt? Identifying When Different Types of Undisclosed Post Hoc Hypothesizing Harm Scientific Progress

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Literature Search ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Research Report ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Replication Crisis ◽  
Post Hoc

Hypothesizing after the results are known, or HARKing, occurs when researchers check their research results and then add or remove hypotheses on the basis of those results without acknowledging this process in their research report (Kerr, 1998). In the present article, I discuss three forms of HARKing: (1) using current results to construct post hoc hypotheses that are then reported as if they were a priori hypotheses; (2) retrieving hypotheses from a post hoc literature search and reporting them as a priori hypotheses; and (3) failing to report a priori hypotheses that are unsupported by the current results. These three types of HARKing are often characterized as being bad for science and a potential cause of the current replication crisis. In the present article, I use insights from the philosophy of science to present a more nuanced view. Specifically, I identify the conditions under which each of these three types of HARKing is most and least likely to be bad for science. I conclude with a brief discussion about the ethics of each type of HARKing.

scholarly journals The Scholar’s study in Painting and the History of Collection in Dutch XVII century

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-94
Author(s):  
Liu Sijia
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Still Life ◽  
New Era ◽  
Xvii Century ◽  
Foreign Products ◽  
The Social ◽  
Symbolic Meanings ◽  
History Of ◽  
Great Development

his article is devoted to analysis the theme of the “scholar’s study” in Netherland XVII century painting. The reason for the rise of this theme is closely related to the great development of science and navigation in the XVII century in Netherland. Under the economic development, the tradition of collecting prevails among scholars. People admire knowledge and work on scientific inquiry. The author analyzes Gerrit Dou’s self-portrait The Artist’s studio and the symbolic meanings of objects in the painting. The author states that his self-portrait portrays himself as a scholar, reflecting the social ethos of worshiping knowledge. The specificity of his work, the themes of the scholar’s study, the influence of science, religion, philosophy on the painting of Gerrit Dou, the symbolic meanings of objects surrounding the scientist are considered. Jan van der Hayden’s paintings Still Life with a Globe, Books, Sculpture and Other Objects reflect the wide-ranging style of the collection at that time, reflecting both the worship of religion and the abundance of Netherland foreign products under the background of the great geographical discovery in the XVII century. During this period, establishment of Netherland universities and advent of the maritime age encouraged a thriving cartography producing. A large number of globes and scientific tools appeared in the paintings. They not only have religious meaning, but also show the progress of the new era. Audience can get a glimpse of the characteristics of a typical Netherland scholar’s collection from his paintings. The purpose of this article is to analyze the scientific progress, social development of the Netherlands. This allows you to take a fresh look at the assessment of creativity on the theme of the scholar’s study. To fulfill that purpose, need to complete following tasks: to characterize the specifics of paintings in the themes of the scholar’s study, to reveal the symbolism in the paintings The Artist’s studio by Gerrit Dou, Still Life with a Globe, Books, Sculpture and Other Objects and A Corner of a Room with Curiosities by Jan van der Hayden, to show the close connection between the development of science in the 17th century and the topic of the scientist’s office. The author concludes that the theme of the “scholar’s study” in Netherland XVII century paintings reflect the collection characteristics and aesthetics in the XVII century.

The Modern Synthesis: Einstein and Kant

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-216
Author(s):  
Friedel Weinert
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Theory ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Modern Synthesis ◽  
Scientific Theories

The paper discusses the Kantian legacy in modern views about scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to show how Einstein's philosophy of science, which was inspired by his physics, offers a specialized version of the Kantian synthesis of Empiricism and Rationalism. In modern physical theories (relativity and quantum theory) Kant's a priori conditions become “constraints,” as shown in Einstein's use of principle theories. Einstein's use of principle theories shows how constraints are used to steer the mapping of the rational onto the empirical elements of scientific theories.

A Priori in the Philosophy of Science

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 60-74
Author(s):  
Tatiana D. Sokolova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Technical Difficulty ◽  
Scientific Thought ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Model Approach

The article is devoted to the analysis of research approaches and attitudes to the study of the a priori in the philosophy of science. In the first part, I outline the basic premises of this study: (a) scientific knowledge as the highest manifestation of rationality; (b) the normative nature of scientific knowledge. In the second part, I turn to the difference in the subject of philosophical research on the history of science – the history of science as a “history of facts” vs the history of science as a history of scientific thought. The third part discusses the main theoretical and technical difficulty associated with changing the subject of research – the possibility of a transition from historical fact to “scientific thought at the time of its birth” (in Helene Metzger terminology). The forth part is devoted to the analysis of the “model approach” (Arianna Betti, Hein van den Berg) in philosophy as a possible way to overcome this difficulty and includes both theoretical and technical aspects of the future direction of research. In conclusion, consequences are drawn about the possibility of using the “model approach” for reconstruction a priori in the history of science as “constitutive elements of scientific knowledge” (David Stump).

scholarly journals Sobre el realismo convergente

1984 ◽  
Vol 16 (48) ◽  
pp. 53-78
Author(s):  
León Olivé
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Central Component ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Theory Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
History Of ◽  
Empirical Hypothesis

This paper discusses Laudan´s claims (1981) that neither reference nor approximate truth explain the success of science as some realists have maintained; that the main realists theses about conceptual change and scientific progress are wanting, and that the history of science decisively confutes naturalistic scientific realist theses. Laudan´s arguments are examined in detail and it is shown that there are possible realist answers to his objections, provided a different view of scientific theories than the syntactic one normally accepted by naturalistic realists is assumed. This alternative view must include the notion of model as a central component of scientific theories, as developed e.g. by Harré (1970). It is also argued that Laudan´s arguments are based upon too narrow a conception of reference. It is shown that a more elaborated notion, e.g. that suggested by Kitcher (1978), can fruitfully be used by realists to explain convergence and also to rebut Laudan´s claim that there are theories, e.g. flogisto or ether theories, whose central terms did not refer but were nonetheless successful. The alternative view of reference sketched here according to Kitcher shows that some tokens of terms like ‘flogisto’ and ‘eter’ as used by the original flogisto and ether theorists did have genuine reference. The paper goes on to argue against the naturalistic idea that reference and approximate truth alone can explain why theories are accepted by scientists and why them follow, as a matter of fact, a retentionist methodology. Laudan shares the naturalistic idea that this is an empirical hypothesis, and so he tries to refute it on the basis of historical examples. The paper argues that this naturalistic view will not do. A broader theory of science is required which, besides realist theses, should develope adequate concepts to deal with the social factors of science; e.g. experimental practices, communication processes, exercises of power through them, etc. It is advocated that a theory of science of this type should be developed in order to defend realism. But then, most of the naturalistic premisses shared by realists and antirealists should be abandoned. An important consequence is that history of science, although not irrelevant for the realism-antirrealism debate, cannot be taken as a basis of neutral, hard facts, against which theories of science can founder. On the contrary, historical studies of science will necessary presuppose a theory of science. Therefore scientific realism must be seen as a philosophical doctrine to be disputed via philosophical arguments, and the idea that it is an empirical hypothesis should be abandoned. [L.O.]

scholarly journals A meta-analysis on uterine transplantation: Redefining the limits of reproductive surgery

2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 474-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Flávia Garcia Silva ◽  
Luiz Fernando Pina Carvalho
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Solid Organ Transplantation ◽  
Reproductive Potential ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Human Reproduction ◽  
Solid Organ ◽  
New Era ◽  
Uterus Transplantation ◽  
Uterine Transplantation ◽  
History Of

SUMMARY In September 2014, the first baby grown in a transplanted uterus was born, which represented an astonishing scientific progress that will mark the history of human reproduction. The recipient was a 32-year-old woman with Rokytanski syndrome who became pregnant after a successful embryo transfer and had an uneventful pregnancy, giving birth to a healthy newborn and marking the beginning of a new era. Patients who do not have a uterus or have a dysfunctional uterus now have the chance of dreaming with pregnancy and motherhood. Combining principles of solid organ transplantation and techniques of human reproduction, uterus transplantation is the first ephemeral transplant performed in order to promote reproductive potential of women and may be removed after successful pregnancy. Worldwide, 11 uterine transplantations were performed in patients. Of these, seven maintained their reproductive potential, with viable transplanted uteri and regular menstrual cycles.

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