scholarly journals The Problematics of Scientific Discovery

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Sudhakar Venukapalli

Historically, the problem of discovery or the problem of the genesis of scientific ideas has been taken seriously by the historians, psychologists, sociologists and philosophers who analyzed the creative thinking and formation of ideas and attempted to provide a meaningful account of them. In fact, the philosophical concern with scientific discovery is as old as science and philosophy of science themselves. However, almost throughout the first half of 20th century, philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of scientific discovery remained in a state of suspended animation. This is because the dominant trend in philosophy of science in this period outlawed it. The dominant view in philosophy of science maintained that the phenomenon of scientific discovery is philosophically irrelevant, and an adequate philosophical understanding of science should confine itself to the way in which scientific theories are justified; it was assumed that the process of justification is a neat, spick-and-span phenomenon eminently suited to be described in terms which are, logically speaking, cut and dry. The process of justification or evaluation according to this orthodox view constitutes the essence of science. Obviously, justification was demarcated from discovery. Justification, because of its supposed epistemic transparency, became the exclusive focus of philosophical attention to the detriment of discovery. The invidious distinction between discovery of scientific ideas and justification of finished ideas of science remained the catchword for a long time. This paper is an attempt to critically examine the nihilistic attitude of the dominant philosophies of science and to arrive at a philosophical theory of scientific discovery.

Author(s):  
Menachem Fisch

William Whewell’s two seminal works, History of the Inductive Science, from the Earliest to the Present Time (1837) and The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History (1840), began a new era in the philosophy of science. Equally critical of the British ‘sensationalist’ school, which founded all knowledge on experience, and the German Idealists, who based science on a priori ideas, Whewell undertook to survey the history of all known sciences in search of a better explanation of scientific discovery. His conclusions were as bold as his undertaking. All real knowledge, he argued, is ‘antithetical’, requiring mutually irreducible, ever-present, and yet inseparable empirical and conceptual components. Scientific progress is achieved not by induction, or reading-out theories from previously collected data, but by the imaginative ‘superinduction’ of novel hypotheses upon known but seemingly unrelated facts. He thus broke radically with traditional inductivism – and for nearly a century was all but ignored. In the Philosophy the antithetical structure of scientific theories and the hypothetico-deductive account of scientific discovery form the basis for novel analyses of scientific and mathematical truth and scientific methodology, critiques of rival philosophies of science, and an account of the emergence and refinement of scientific ideas.


Author(s):  
Christopher Lawrence

Abstract Robert Maxwell Young's first book Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century (1970), written from 1960 to 1965, still merits reading as a study of the naturalization of mind and its relation to social thought in Victorian Britain. I examine the book from two perspectives that give the volume its unique character: first, Young's interest in psychology, which he considered should be used to inform humane professional practices and be the basis of social reform; second, new approaches to the history of scientific ideas. I trace Young's intellectual interests to the Yale Philosophy Department, the Cambridge Department of Experimental Psychology and a new history and philosophy of science community. Although Young changed his political outlook and historiography radically after 1965, he always remained faithful to ideas about thought and practice described in Mind, Brain.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 107-111
Author(s):  
Boris I. Pruzhinin ◽  

The article discusses the prospects of philosophical understanding of the problem situations that have arisen in modern science due to its thorough involvement in the socio-economic dynamics of technogenic civilization. The natural sciences are under the powerful influence of social demands, which significantly affect the forms, directions, and intensity of the realization of the cognitive potential of natural science. The problems that arise in this case are thoroughly investigated today in specific socio-economic perspectives, as well as through various options for social epistemology. But, the author believes, a full understanding of the relevant problems also involves its discussion in the conceptual field of the philosophical, in its essence, issue of the cultural, and by no means only the socio-pragmatic sense of the phenomenon of scientific knowledge. Moreover, the need of scientists themselves for this kind of philosophical understanding of science is due, according to the author of the article, primarily to the widespread dissemination of scientific collaboration in interdisciplinary research programs. In the course of joint scientific research, acute problems of mutual understanding arise among collaborating scientists of various specialties. Their philosophical understanding and the search for ways to solve them effectively is becoming today the central task of the philosophy of natural sciences. However, to effectively solve these problems, the author insists, both philosophers and scientists need to disclose and analyze the specific sources of relevant philosophical topics that mature in the interdisciplinary practices of science itself. According to the author, first of all, the philosophy of the natural sciences is called upon to solve this problem today.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-170
Author(s):  
Alexander L. Urakov

The literature review shows that modern standards of treatment of diseases, as well as forms of statistical reporting of medical institutions do not include bruising as an independent disease and/or complication of drug therapy. Ancient and modern textbooks and reference books on drugs do not contain indications of the presence of drugs that cause bruising and/or vice versa, discoloring the skin in the area of bruises. Official medicine does not offer medications for urgent skin discoloration in the area of bruises. However, bruises have been known for a long time, and people have been fighting them for a long time, but without much success. It is shown that bruises are blood-stained areas of the skin that often occur when hitting hard objects in everyday life, injuries and wounds, as well as when injecting drugs and using drugs that thin the blood. Usually bruises disappear on their own after 5 to 8 days. The true bruising is most likely to occur when bites of snakes such as Gyurza and Viper, when injecting drugs such as heparin and its substitutes, as well as when injecting donor blood and when through-piercing veins with injection needles. Throughout the history of mankind, these facts have not been used sufficiently to analyze the causes of bruising, the possibilities of their diagnosis, prevention and elimination. This was done at the beginning of the 21st century in Russia. At the same time, the biological and clinical essence of the bruises was revealed. This scientific discovery made it possible to explain the absence of bruises in the list of diseases, offer a clinical classification of bruises, and discover drugs that can immediately discolor the skin in the area of bruises. This group of drugs has received names such as bruising bleachers, oxygen-alkaline bleachers, oxygen-alkaline bleach cleaners, blood bleachers and bleaching agents over the years. Their main ingredients are water, hydrogen peroxide, and sodium hydrocarbonate.


For one brief period, at all events, no one could speak of two cultures in England, and that period was the Restoration. The decades that surround the founding of the Royal Society in 1660 are full of the intellectual excitement that might ideally arise from the free interchange of ideas among scientists, poets, and philosophers. In no other age has it been so: no Elizabethan poet can be shown to have taken an active interest in scientific discovery, unless we call geography a science—though it is conceivable that Ben Jonson, lecturing in rhetoric at Gresham College in London in the very centre of the ferment that eventually produced the Royal Society, had access to new scientific ideas. Bacon’s Advancement of Learning (1605) was merely a manifesto for the public encouragement of knowledge, and for years after his death it remained unfulfilled. Milton wrote Paradise Lost indifferent, apparently, to the question whether the Ptolemaic or Copernican system were true, and probably preferred the discredited Ptolemaic system for no better reason than that, in its picturesque detail, it suited his epic purposes better. And the record of English poets and philosophers after the appearance of Newton’s Principia in 1687 is hardly better. His Opticks of 1704, it is true, had a perceptible influence on eighteenth-century poets which has already been studied; but what is much more remarkable is the general avoidance of scientific discovery by the literary world of Augustan London.


Dialogue ◽  
1965 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norwood Russell Hanson

Is there such a thing as a ‘Logic of Discovery’? Do we even have a consistent idea of such a thing? The approved answer to this seems to be “No.” Thus Popper argues (The Logic of Scientific Discovery) “The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it.” (p. 31.) Again, “… there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process.” (p. 32.) Reichenbach writes that philosophy of science “… cannot be concerned with [reasons for suggesting hypotheses], but only with [reasons for accepting hypotheses].” (Experience and Prediction, p. 382.) Braithwaite elaborates: “The solution of these historical problems involves the individual psychology of thinking and the sociology of thought. None of these questions are our business here.” (Scientific Explanation, pp. 20, 21.)


Author(s):  
Александр Александрович Писарев

В статье обсуждается репрезентация науки в музеях и центрах науки и техники и очерчивается возможная концепция музея технонауки, который бы восполнял ограничения и умолчания этой реперзентации. В отличие от этих институций музей технонауки посвящен не тому, что ученые знают о природе, а тому, как они получают это знание, как оно существует и применяется, то есть, метанаучным вопросам. Для решения этой задачи новый музей должен опираться на идеи и результаты исследований науки и техники (STS), а также истории и философии науки. Вполне возможно, что сегодня путь разума к совершеннолетию должен проходить не только через научное просвещение, но и через критическое метанаучное просвещение. В первой части статьи описывается общая логика и контекст репрезентации науки и техники в современных музеях и центрах науки и техники. Их основные задачи — способствовать повышению понимания науки обществом и привлекательности профессий научно-технической области. Обычно это достигается за счет акцента на чистой науке в ущерб прикладной: ядром музеев и центров являются экспозиции, представляющие результаты научного познания, систематизированные в научную картину мира. О технике говорится скорее как о непроблематичном «применении» знания или комплексе утилитарных функций: мало внимания уделяется сложному устройству инженерии и создаваемому техникой социальному порядку. Об устройстве самой науки говорится мало, в основном о научном методе. Этот подход подвергается критическому анализу. Помимо прочего критикуется акцент на чистой науке в ущерб прикладной, натурализация и идеализация знания за счет устранения контекстов его производства, существования и применения. В силу двойной невидимости авторства (науки — по отношению к знанию, музея — по отношению к экспозиции) и трансляции знания в режиме безальтернативности и полноты («парадигма Псафона», П. Бурдье) музеи науки функционируют как музеи-храмы (Д. Кэмерон). Приводятся доводы в пользу обращения к обсуждению устройства науки и техники с опорой на результаты исследований науки и техники. Оно предполагает создание музея или экспозиции, которые дополняли бы существующие музеи и центры. Его рабочее название — музей технонауки. Во второй части обсуждается его возможная концепция. Приводятся примеры тематики, раскрываются некоторые принципы организации: двойное видение, пересборка предмета, собственной позиции и аудитории, музей-бриколер, музей-форум. Эти принципы сближают музей технонауки с кунсткамерой в противовес модерным музеям науки. В качестве одного из возможных подходов построения экспозиции обсуждается историзация существующих форм науки и техники. Ориентирами из истории выставок могут служить Les Immatériaux (1985) под кураторством Ж.-Ф. Лиотара и Iconoclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion and Art (2002) под кураторством Б. Латура. В заключение концепция музея технонауки резюмируются в своде ценностей: продуктивное незнание, критика, разнообразие, дискуссионность. The article analyzes the representation of science in science and technology museums and centers, and outlines the possible concept of a museum of technoscience that would compensate their limitations and omissions. In contrast, the museum of technoscience is not dedicated to what scientists know about nature, but to how they get this knowledge, how it exists and is applied, that is, to metascientific issues. To meet this challenge, the new museum should be based on the ideas of Science and Technology Studies (STS), and of the History and Philosophy of Science. It is likely that today the path of reason to maturity should pass not only through scientific education, but also through metascientific education, that is, through STS and the History and Philosophy of Science. The first part of the article describes the general logic and context of the representation of science and technology in actual science and technology museums and centers. The main aims of such museums and centers are to contribute to increasing the public understanding of science and the attractiveness of professions in the STEM field. These aims are usually achieved by focusing on pure science at the expense of applied science and engineering. Technology is represented as an unproblematized “application” of knowledge. There is also little talk about the structure of scientific production of knowledge, mainly the scientific method is communicated. This approach is being critically analyzed. Among other issues, the naturalization and idealization of knowledge, double invisibility of authorship (science in relation to knowledge, museum in relation to the exhibition) are criticized. Arguments are given in favor of the desirability of addressing the discussion of the structure of science and technology based on the results of science and technology studies. It involves the creation of a museum or exhibition that would complement existing museums and science centers. Its working name is the museum of technoscience. The second part of the article describes the possible conception of the technoscience museum. Examples of topics are given, some principles of the organization are revealed: double vision, reassembling of the subject, museum position and audience, museum as a bricoleur, museum as a forum. These principles bring the museum of technoscience closer to the kunstkammer in contrast to modern museums of science. The historization of existing forms of science and technology is discussed as one of the possible approaches to the construction of the exposition. Les Immatériaux (1985) by J.-F. Lyotard and Iconoclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion and Art (2002) by B. Latour can serve as landmarks from the history of exhibitions. In conclusion, the conception of the museum of technoscience is summarized in a set of values: productive ignorance, criticism, diversity, controversiality.


2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-35
Author(s):  
Svetozar Sindjelic

The aim of this paper is to present the character and reason of the drastic change in the understanding of science that happened in the twentieth century. To do this, author describes the main points of the traditional philosophy of science: then, he argues that reason of the revolution in the philosophy of science used to be the careful philosophical analysis of the great scientific revolutions from 1905. Finally, he concludes that the consequence of mentioned analysis was a number of antagonistic views being the contemporary philosophy of science. To give a monolitic and integral presentment of this philosophy, author enumerated and explained the points shared by the majority of contemporary philosophers of science. In brief, he describes the traditional philosophy of science, the reasons of its fall, and the main tenets of the contemporary philosophy of science.


Literator ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 42-59
Author(s):  
M. E. Botha

Although there are important areas of overlap, the problem of realism differs in the contexts of philosophy, science and literature. What is common to all three realms is the fact that the empiricist notion of objectivity is not tenable any more. The recognition of the theory ladenness of scientific observation and the commentary ladenness of interpretation in literature is in fundamental contrast with the older views of objectivity which have dominated the scene for such a long time. The notion of realism inherent in this older view of objectivity in which science, philosophy or literature somehow “mirrors” the world, has fundamentally been affected by the overthrow of the objectivist tradition through developments in philosophy of science and developments in metaphor theory in which the emphasis on “literal” descriptions of reality have made way for the recognition of the relative distinction between the literal and the metaphorical. Both science and literature have acknowledged the possibility of a potential plurality of possible interpretations of “reality”. This means that as many “realities” exist as interpretations of reality and of texts are possible. This has confronted both science and literature with the need for a fundamentally revised notion of “realism” and of truth and has posed the very real problem of the (im-)possibility of convergence toward truth, reality or the one and only “correct” interpretation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 219-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANCESCO AMIGONI ◽  
VIOLA SCHIAFFONATI

Scientific practice has been rapidly evolving in the last years under the pressure of developments in computer science and technology. In this paper we present some of the results of our research activity at the boundary between computer science and philosophy of science started in 1997 under Marco Somalvico's impulse and guidance. In particular, we discuss two roles that multiagent systems can play in scientific discovery. From the one hand, they can support scientific practice; from the other hand, they can represent scientific results. The theoretical framework presented in this paper is exemplified in concrete by illustrating specific implemented systems, both taken from the literature and developed by ourselves.


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