Normativity

Author(s):  
Stephen Darwall

Something is said by philosophers to have ‘normativity’ when it entails that some action, attitude or mental state of some other kind is justified, an action one ought to do or a state one ought to be in. The philosophical area most distinctively concerned with normativity, almost by definition, is ethics. Arguably, every ethical concept or category involves normativity of some kind. One area of lively debate within ethics concerns the precise kind of normativity that is possessed by different ethical concepts: moral wrongness, virtue, well-being and so on. For example, if an action is wrong, does that entail that there is reason not to do it or just that there is reason to take a certain attitude (blame) towards those who do act in that way? A second way in which ethics is concerned with normativity is in investigating how an ethical proposition’s normative claim might be vindicated and considering whether it actually is vindicated. For example, if an action is morally wrong only if there is reason not to do it, can we then satisfactorily establish that any actions actually are wrong? Yet a third kind of engagement with normativity concerns the very sources of normativity itself. An attempt to vindicate or debunk the implicit normativity of some specific ethical claim will ultimately face the question of what could support claims to normativity in general. Here we find a fertile debate between Humeans, who seek to ground practical normativity in instrumental rationality, and Kantians, who argue that practical reason necessarily includes formal constraints that extend beyond means/end coherence. Philosophical discussion of normativity is by no means restricted to ethics, however. Epistemology has an irreducibly normative aspect, in so far as it is concerned with norms for belief. And the idea that meaning is implicitly normative has sparked some of the most exciting discussions in recent philosophy of language.

Author(s):  
Daniel M. Haybron

This chapter discusses the role of mental states in well-being, focusing on three types of state: pleasure, emotional well-being, and life satisfaction. Some philosophical theories, notably hedonism, take mental states to constitute the entirety of well-being, an approach that has significant attractions but also faces weighty objections. But even those who reject mental state theories of well-being should recognize that the psychological dimensions of well-being are centrally important in human life—though not always in the ways one might expect, particularly in the case of life satisfaction. A second aim of the chapter is to examine the implications of the philosophical discussion for measures of well-being, as well as the contrast between so-called hedonic and eudaimonic approaches. A brief consideration of the upshot of these reflections for policy concludes the chapter.


Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood

Rationality is a central concept for epistemology, ethics, and the study of practical reason. But what sort of concept is it? It is argued here that—contrary to objections that have recently been raised—rationality is a normative concept. In general, normative concepts cannot be explained in terms of the concepts expressed by ‘reasons’ or ‘ought’. Instead, normative concepts are best understood in terms of values. Thus, for a mental state or a process of reasoning to be rational is for it to be in a certain way good. Specifically, rationality is a virtue, while irrationality is a vice. What rationality requires of you at a time is whatever is necessary for your thinking at that time to be as rational as possible; this makes ‘rationally required’ equivalent to a kind of ‘ought’. Moreover, rationality is an “internalist” normative concept: what it is rational for you to think at a time depends purely on what is in your mind at that time. Nonetheless, rationality has an external goal—namely, getting things right in your thinking, or thinking correctly. The connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic: if your thinking is irrational, that is bad news about your thinking’s degree of correctness; and the more irrational your thinking is, the worse the news is about your thinking’s degree of correctness. This account of the concept of rationality indicates how we should set about giving a substantive theory of what it is for beliefs and choices to be rational.


2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Sergius Koku ◽  
Hannah Emma Acquaye

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the mental state and the disposition of those who have fallen on hard times during the recent financial crisis and have had their homes foreclosed on or their automobiles repossessed. It also proposes an alternative process for dispossessing individuals that preserves the mental health of such individuals and the banks’ reputation. Design/methodology/approach This study uses the hermeneutics approach to analyze the predicament of those whose homes have been foreclosed on or whose properties have been repossessed by financial institutions to better understand their predicament. Findings Those whose homes have been foreclosed on or whose properties have been repossessed by financial institutions are traumatized. They feel victimized, bitter, helpless and hopeless and have poor mental state. The study draws on theories in counseling psychology to propose an alternative approach to making loans that take long time to be repaid (long-term loans), and for repossessing personal properties such as automobiles and for foreclosing on real property (homes). Research limitations/implications As a qualitative study based on a small sample, the findings of the study are limited to only those who have been studied. A further study that leads to a generalized result will be useful. Practical implications The study develops a practical framework that could be useful to financial institutions in making long-term loans and to foreclose on delinquent loans (i.e. to dispossess individuals). Social implications The proposed strategy, if implemented, could have a significant positive impact on the mental well-being of those who have fallen on financial hard times. Originality/value To the best of the knowledge, this is the first marketing paper that has explored the mental health of those who have defaulted on loans, and has proposed an alternative approach to making long-term loans that not only preserves the mental health of banks’ customers, but also protects the reputation and market share of banks.


Politologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 73-94
Author(s):  
Aistė Noreikaitė

Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant’s influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O’Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Andrea Rucska ◽  
Csilla Lakatos

Emergency caused by the SARS-CoV-2 has provoked several difficulties in daily life. On the other hand, it provided an opportunity to produce new attitudes toward our life and community, but also forced us to face our vulnerabilities. Outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 highlighted that despite our vulnerability, we can manage this crisis, by being able to influence our stress reaction as well as our fears and emotions about the pandemic. Faculty of Healthcare of the University of Miskolc is training such professionals, whose priority task is to preserve the mental health of individuals and communities, reduce stress reactions, increase the available information on the subject, and help the community to adapt adequately to unexpected difficulties, like a pandemic situation. In the present study, we examined the mental state of the population of Northeastern Hungary in the second wave to adapt the above-described education to the ongoing changes caused by the pandemic. During the research, we applied an online questionnaire, that included the Hungarian version of the 10-item Perceived Stress Scale-, the Adult Hope Scale-, the WHO Well-Being, and the Buss Perry aggression questionnaire. Most participants (n=528) live in small towns or villages and their average age is 39.4±13.1. The aggression level of responders did not reach the threshold, but the level of verbal aggression exceeded it. The participants were more stressed, but they thought they could handle their problems. Consequently, the pandemic harms the mental state and health of the population, therefore the presence of health professionals is needed.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1574-1592
Author(s):  
Gönül Kaya Özbağ

This chapter aims to contribute to the debate about corporate social responsibility (CSR), sustainable development (SD) and global corporate citizenship (GCC) that is becoming increasingly an important issue for the human well being as well as that of ecological systems. It contains three sections. The first section looks at the concept of CSR with a historical perspective. The dimensions of CSR and its relationship with ethical theories is investigated in the second section since CSR is an ethical concept. Throughout this chapter three main groups of ethical theories classified by Garriga and Mele (2004) will be presented such as normative stakeholder theory, universal rights, the common good approach. Based on the relationship between common good approach and sustainable development, the author will discuss a requirement for global corporate citizenship approach in the third section.


Author(s):  
Mona Lena Krook

Chapter 13 provides an overview of psychological forms of violence against women in politics. Psychological violence inflicts trauma on individuals’ mental state or emotional well-being. It seeks to disempower targets by degrading, demoralizing, or shaming them—often through efforts to instill fear, cause stress, or harm their credibility. These acts may occur inside and outside official political settings and be carried out in person, by telephone, or via digital means like email and social media. Experiencing it firsthand, targets (and their allies) have taken the lead in devising and sharing coping strategies, empowering individuals and mobilizing groups to call out psychological violence and counteract its pernicious effects.


Utilitas ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sobel

Shelly Kagan and Leonard Katz have offered versions of hedonism that aspire to occupy a middle position between the view that pleasure is a unitary sensation and the view that pleasure is, as Sidgwick put it, desirable consciousness. Thus they hope to offer a hedonistic account of well-being that does not mistakenly suppose that pleasure is a special kind of tingle, yet to offer a sharp alternative to desire-based accounts. I argue that they have not identified a coherent middle position.


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