Public reason, legitimate state action, and justifiability to all

2020 ◽  
pp. 157-179
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
State Action ◽  
Legitimate State

When Public Reason Falls Silent

2021 ◽  
pp. 161-193
Author(s):  
Brian Kogelmann ◽  
Stephen G. W. Stich
Keyword(s):  
Social Organization ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Overwhelming Majority ◽  
Administrative State ◽  
State Action ◽  
Coercive State ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Ordinary Citizens

Public reason theorists argue that coercive state action must be justified to those subject to such action. Doing so requires citizens to give only those reasons that all can accept. These reasons, the chapter argues, include scientific and social scientific considerations. One ineliminable and arguably salutary property of the modern administrative state is that the coercive policies it produces can be justified only on the basis of extremely complex scientific and social scientific considerations. Many of these considerations are neither understood by most ordinary citizens nor agreed upon by experts. This means that the overwhelming majority of citizens do not accept the reasons justifying coercive administrative policies. As a result, public reason is inconsistent with the administrative state. There are deep implications to this result: if public reason is inconsistent with the administrative state, then it is also inconsistent with forms of social organization that presuppose it. This, the chapter argues, includes egalitarianism, which many proponents of public reason also endorse. Public reason theorists thus must choose: justification through public reason, or distributive equality?

scholarly journals When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? The Dilemmas of Freedom of Expression and Democratic Persuasion

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 1005-1019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The State ◽  
Hate Groups ◽  
Apparent Paradox ◽  
State Action ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Legitimate State ◽  
The One ◽  
Value Neutrality

Hate groups are often thought to reveal a paradox in liberal thinking. On the one hand, such groups challenge the very foundations of liberal thought, including core values of equality and freedom. On the other hand, these same values underlie the rights such as freedom of expression and association that protect hate groups. Thus a liberal democratic state that extends those protections to such groups in the name of value neutrality and freedom of expression may be thought to be undermining the values on which its legitimacy rests. In this paper, I suggest how this apparent paradox might be resolved. I argue that the state should protect the expression of illiberal beliefs, but that the state (along with its citizens) is also obligated to criticize publicly those beliefs. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—coercive and expressive—I contend that such criticism should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities in its roles as speaker, educator, and spender. Here I extend the familiar idea that law, to be legitimate, must be widely publicized; I contend that a proper theory of the freedom of expression obligates the legitimate state to publicize the reasons that underlie rights, in particular reasons that appeal to the entitlement of each citizen subject to coercion to be treated as free and equal. My theory of freedom of expression is thus “expressive” in two senses: it protects the entitlement of citizens to express any political viewpoint, and it emphasizes a role for the state in explaining these free-speech protections and persuading its citizens of the value of the entitlements that underlie them.

State civil disobedience: A republican perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danny Michelsen
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
State Action ◽  
The Status ◽  
Right To Participation ◽  
Legitimate State ◽  
The Right ◽  
International Trade Laws

The article deals with the question of whether or under which circumstances it is reasonable to interpret some forms of illegal state action as civil disobedience and whether republican political theory can make a difference to the justification of those actions. It is argued that the theory of freedom as non-domination and the interpretation of the right to participation as the “right of rights” in a legitimate state provide a better justificatory scheme for cases in which developing or emerging countries break international trade laws for the purpose of protecting constitutional rights than Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience, because it takes the problem of power asymmetries in international relations and the status of social rights more seriously. However, these republican standards do not offer different practical solutions for a specific type of state disobedience, humanitarian intervention, because transferring the standards of non-domination and the fundamental right to participation to international relations would lead to a “maximalist” interpretation of human rights, which would undermine the function of such interventions as an instrument of last resort against oppressive governments.

Public Reason and Illiberal Democracy

2020 ◽  
pp. 287-302
Author(s):  
Anna Śledzińska-Simon
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
State Action ◽  
Illiberal Democracy ◽  
Political Advantage ◽  
Rules Of The Game

Illiberal democracy is characterized by four features: pretending to play the democratic rules of the game; instrumental use of the law to gain political advantage; location of the source of political legitimacy in majority rule; and recourse to religiously driven morality as a basis for state action. Paradoxically, in this regime, both legislators and constitutional adjudicators continue to use rational justification to legitimize public policies and court decisions, but the reasons they provide do not indicate an overlapping political consensus on a given matter. This contribution aims to demonstrate that in illiberal democracy public reason ceases to fulfil its two main functions: to discipline those who dominate the political process and to protect the autonomy of those who are prevailed upon. Hence, it argues, public reason in illiberal democracy has a new meaning: it denotes a hierarchy of values that prevail over individual rights and interests.

Reasons for State Action

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-54
Author(s):  
Nicholas Hatzis
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
State Action ◽  
A Value ◽  
State Coercion ◽  
The Government ◽  
Offensive Speech

The claim that the government ought to prohibit offensive speech is a form of practical reasoning. It tells us what an agent has reason to do under certain circumstances. The first part of the chapter explores in more detail the structure of that claim and the underlying idea that respect for religious feelings is a value which is realized when insults are censored. The second part explores the types of reasons which can be legitimately invoked to justify the exercise of state coercion. We expect restrictions of liberty to be based on reasons which all citizens can be expected to accept, regardless of their own view about what kind of life is worth living (i.e. a public reason requirement). The fact that an act is incompatible with the teachings of a religion is never an adequate reason for its prohibition. After discussing different versions of public reason theory, I suggest that even those which allow for some reliance on religious justifications cannot support the use of coercion against speakers who hurt their listeners’ religious feelings.

China's “Major Country Diplomacy”: Legitimation and Foreign Policy Change

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen N Smith
Keyword(s):  
Social Constructivism ◽  
Global Politics ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
State Action ◽  
Political Concept ◽  
Chinese Characteristics ◽  
Regional Order ◽  
Foreign Policy Change ◽  
Global Affairs ◽  
Legitimate State

AbstractThis paper probes China's official political concept of “Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” to argue that the boundaries of legitimate state action have been dramatically expanded since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Building on Patrick Jackson's transactional social constructivism, I place the causal mechanism in China's new assertiveness in seminal changes to how Chinese elites legitimize their country's role in global politics. Drawing upon elite speeches, Party documents, and Chinese-language scholarship between 2013 and 2019, I show how new legitimation strategies are used to justify China's effort to proactively reform international order, engage in ideological competition with the West, and assume greater responsibility for global affairs in accordance with its elevated power and status. The boundaries of action sanctioned by this new discourse are likely to persist in the short to medium term, with implications for regional order in Asia and beyond.

scholarly journals The Deliberative City

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoi Kong
Keyword(s):  
Administrative Law ◽  
State Action ◽  
Normative Foundation ◽  
Legitimate State ◽  
Special Force ◽  
Rule Making

In this paper, I will argue that general administrative law concerns about thelegitimacy and effectiveness of rule-making have special force in the municipalzoning by-law context. In particular, I will argue that a particular, civicrepublican conception of legitimate state action offers the best justification formunicipal regulation and provides the best normative foundation fordevelopments in municipal consultation processes. In Part II, I will argue thatthe consultative processes in Quebec’s zoning laws reflect a commitment to civicrepublican ideals, but that because of specific features of municipal regulation,these ideals are incompletely realized. In Part III, I will argue that aparticular municipal institution – the ward council – enables the zoningprocess to better approximate civic republican ideals. I conclude this paper byarguing that ward councils not only strengthen the normative justifications formunicipal regulation, they contribute to its effectiveness.Dans cet article, je vais soutenir que les préoccupations du droit administratifgénéral au sujet de la légitimité et l’efficacité de l’élaboration de règles ont uneimportance particulière dans le contexte de la réglementation municipale sur lezonage. En particulier, je vais soutenir qu’une certaine conception civiquerépublicaine de l’action légitime de l’état offre la meilleure justification de laréglementation municipale et le meilleur fondement normatif pour lesdéveloppements des processus de consultation municipaux. Dans la partie II, jevais soutenir que les processus de consultation des lois sur le zonage du Québecreflètent un engagement envers les idéaux civiques républicains mais qu’à causede certains aspects précis de la réglementation municipale, ces idéaux ne sontpas complètement atteints. Dans la partie III, je vais soutenir qu’uneinstitution municipale particulière – le conseil de quartier – fait que leprocessus de zonage se rapproche mieux des idéaux civiques républicains. Jetermine l’article en soutenant que les conseils de quartier non seulementrenforcent les justifications normatives de la réglementation municipale, ilscontribuent à son efficacité.

The “Wisdom of the State”: Adam Smith on China and Tartary

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
RYAN PATRICK HANLEY
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
The State ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
State Action ◽  
The Social ◽  
Political Conditions ◽  
Material Conditions ◽  
Legitimate State ◽  
Civic Institutions ◽  
Insight Into

Adam Smith's engagement with China and Tartary is a central yet underappreciated element of his economic and political thought. This article reconstructs this engagement and demonstrates its broader significance, arguing that it focuses on three themes: the economic institutions that promote domestic growth in a manner that alleviates the material conditions of the poorest, the social and political conditions that minimize the dependence of the poor on the wealthy, and the ethical values and civic institutions that guarantee the existential survival of the state. This treatment is significant for three reasons: It offers useful insight into the contested issue of Smith's conception of legitimate state action; it clarifies Smith's vision of a commercial order that promotes human dignity; and it reveals the depth of his participation in a specific contextual debate.

scholarly journals Dimensions of Religious Harmony as Constitutional Practice: Beyond State Control

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 966-985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaclyn L. Neo
Keyword(s):  
Social Norm ◽  
State Control ◽  
Primary Case ◽  
State Action ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Complex Dimensions ◽  
State Obligations ◽  
Legitimate State

AbstractReligious harmony is an idea more commonly invoked in Asian countries, many of which are closely associated with non-individualistic or non-liberal approaches to law, ethics, and politics, than in Europe. As a constitutional norm, religious harmony not only directs state action involving the management of religious diversity but also has the potential to legitimate state action. As a result, harmony, including its subspecies of religious harmony, could be and has been criticized for imposing and legitimating an ideology of control over society, particularly over marginalized groups. While this is the case, I argue in this Article that religious harmony can mean many things and can be used in a myriad of ways that go beyond simply as a tool for state control. Religious harmony is not only a legal/constitutional principle, but has also become internalized as a social norm. Its regulating function extends to inter group relations and further grounds group demands on the state, thus imposing state obligations. To draw out the multiple and complex dimensions of religious harmony as a constitutional principle and social norm, I use Singapore, a self-avowed non-liberal communitarian state, as the primary case study in this Article.

scholarly journals The Pope’s Public Reason

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-148
Author(s):  
Aurélia Bardon
Keyword(s):  
Public Sphere ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Refugee Crisis ◽  
Pope Francis ◽  
State Action ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
Religious Reasons

Since the beginning of Europe’s “refugee crisis,” Pope Francis has repeatedly argued that we should welcome refugees. This, he said, is an obligation for Christians who have “a duty of justice, of civility, and of solidarity.” This religious justification is a problem for liberal political philosophers who are committed to the idea of public reason: state action, they argue, must be justified to all citizens based on public, generally accessible reasons. In this article, I argue that the claim that liberal public reason fully excludes religion from the public sphere is misguided; not all religious reasons are incompatible with the demands of Rawlsian public reason. Understanding how a religious reason can be public requires looking into both what makes a reason religious and what makes a reason public. I show that the pope’s reason supporting the claim that we should welcome refugees is both religious and public.

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