Reasons for State Action
The claim that the government ought to prohibit offensive speech is a form of practical reasoning. It tells us what an agent has reason to do under certain circumstances. The first part of the chapter explores in more detail the structure of that claim and the underlying idea that respect for religious feelings is a value which is realized when insults are censored. The second part explores the types of reasons which can be legitimately invoked to justify the exercise of state coercion. We expect restrictions of liberty to be based on reasons which all citizens can be expected to accept, regardless of their own view about what kind of life is worth living (i.e. a public reason requirement). The fact that an act is incompatible with the teachings of a religion is never an adequate reason for its prohibition. After discussing different versions of public reason theory, I suggest that even those which allow for some reliance on religious justifications cannot support the use of coercion against speakers who hurt their listeners’ religious feelings.