An empirical examination of moral hazard in the vehicle inspection market

2018 ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
Thomas N. Hubbard
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Vehicle Inspection

scholarly journals An empirical examination of moral hazards and adverse selection on PPP projects

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 910-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
De-Graft Owusu-Manu ◽  
David John Edwards ◽  
A.S. Kukah ◽  
Erika Anneli Parn ◽  
Hatem El-Gohary ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Accurate Information ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Relative Significance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Moral Hazards ◽  
Selection Problems ◽  
Research Findings

Purpose Failures of public–private partnership (PPP) projects are often ascribed to the agency problem, which arise under conditions of inadequate and asymmetric information when a principal (the client) hires an agent (the contractor). This paper aims to identify the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on PPP construction projects using a synthesis of extant literature (to determine key variables) and analysis of survey questionnaire data collected. Design/methodology/approach Mean score ranking was used to rank the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. One sample t-test was conducted to establish the relative significance of these variables. Findings Effort dimensions (which are not verifiable), low transfer of risk, lack of accurate information about project conditions, wrong party chosen to execute project and renegotiation of contracts were the most significant causes of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. In addition, reduction of competition, high transaction costs, consequences on profitability of project, siphoning of funds and negative implications on enforceability of contract were the most significant effects of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. Practical implications Application of these findings will help mitigating moral hazard and adverse selection problems occurring when undertaking PPP construction projects. Originality/value Research findings provide guidance to construction stakeholders in the PPP sector on the different causes and effects of adverse selection and moral hazard. This pioneering study is the first to conduct an empirical assessment of the causes and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects in a developing country.

Moral hazard and risk-taking incentives in Islamic banks, does franchise value matter!

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Mili ◽  
Sami Abid
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Bank Risk ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Total Risk ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Franchise Value ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to examine risk-taking in Islamic banks by exploring moral hazard and owner/manager agency problems simultaneously. Design/methodology/approach The authors propose to estimate a model of bank risk-taking that includes both franchise value and ownership structure as explanatory factors of bank risk. Findings The results show that franchise value is an important determinant of Islamic bank risk-taking. Banks with high franchise values are less likely to take risks than banks with low franchise value. In contrast, outside block holders have, at best, limited influences on bank risk-taking. Originality/value This paper conducts the first empirical examination of the relationship between managerial risk preferences and Islamic banks ownership. The authors examine simultaneously the effect of franchise value and owner/manager problem on Islamic bank risk taking behavior. They consider separately the impact on total risk, systematic risk and bank specific risk.

Psychometric Definition of Rorschach Determinant Component Structure

1998 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond M. Costello
Keyword(s):  
Lower Order ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Comprehensive System ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Component Structure ◽  
Exner's Comprehensive System ◽  
Factor Analytic ◽  
Confirmatory Factor ◽  
Components Analysis ◽  
Definition Of

This is an empirical examination of Experienced Stimulation (es) and Experience Actual (EA) from Exner's Comprehensive System (CS) for Rorschach's Test, spurred by Kleiger's theoretical critique. Principal components analysis, Cronbach's α, and inter-item correlational analyses were used to test whether 13 determinants used to code Rorschach responses (M, FM, m, CF+C, YF+Y, C'F+C', TF+T, VF+V, FC, FC', FV, FY, FT) are best represented as a one, two, or more-dimensional construct. The 13 determinants appear to reflect three dimensions, a “lower order” sensori-motor dimension (m + CF+C + YF+Y + C'F+C' + TF+T + VF+V) with a suggested label of Modified Experienced Stimulation (MES), a “higher order” sensori-motor dimension (FM + FV + FY + FT) with a suggested label of Modified Experience Potential (MEP), and a third sensori-motor dimension (M+FC+FC') for which the label of Modified Experience Actual (MEA) is suggested. These findings are consistent with Kleiger's arguments and could lead to a refinement of CS constructs by aggregating determinants along lines more theoretically congruous and more internally consistent. A RAMONA model with parameters specified was presented for replication attempts which use confirmatory factor analytic techniques.

An empirical examination of a model of authentic leadership

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiafang Chen ◽  
Juliet Aiken ◽  
Paul J. Hanges
Keyword(s):  
Authentic Leadership ◽  
Empirical Examination

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

ASPEK ETIK DAN SISTEMIK DALAM EKONOMI DAN BISNIS ISLAM

ALQALAM ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Budi Harsanto
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Academic Journals ◽  
Lehman Brothers ◽  
The World ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The fall of Enron, Lehman Brothers and other major financial institution in the world make researchers conduct various studies about crisis. The research question in this study is, from Islamic economics and business standpoint, why the global financial crisis can happen repeatedly. The purpose is to contribute ideas regarding Islamic viewpoint linked with the global financial crisis. The methodology used is a theoretical-reflective to various article published in academic journals and other intellectual resources with relevant themes. There are lots of analyses on the causes of the crisis. For discussion purposes, the causes divide into two big parts namely ethics and systemic. Ethics contributed to the crisis by greed and moral hazard as a theme that almost always arises in the study of the global financial crisis. Systemic means that the crisis can only be overcome with a major restructuring of the system. Islamic perspective on these two aspect is diametrically different. At ethics side, there is exist direction to obtain blessing in economics and business activities. At systemic side, there is rule of halal and haram and a set of mechanism of economics system such as the concept of ownership that will early prevent the seeds of crisis. Keywords: Islamic economics and business, business ethics, financial crisis 

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