scholarly journals Longino's Concept of Values in Science

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Miroslav Vacura
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Values In Science ◽  
A Value ◽  
Helen Longino ◽  
External Consistency ◽  
Controversial Aspect

While classical neo-positivists reject any role for traditionally understood values in science, Kuhn identifies five specific values as criteria for assessing a scientific theory; this approach has been further developed by several other authors. This paper focuses on Helen Longino, who presents a significant contemporary critique of Kuhn’s concept. The most controversial aspect of Longino’s position is arguably her claim that the criterion of empirical adequacy is the least defensible basis for assessing theories. The de-emphasizing of the importance of external consistency as a value and the introduction of socio-political considerations into the processes of an assessment of scientific theories are also considered problematic issues. I provide arguments against Longino’s conception, identify some of its problems, and argue for refusal of her approach.

scholarly journals Scientific Realism versus Antirealism in Science Education

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park
Keyword(s):  
Science Education ◽  
Science Teachers ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Science Classrooms ◽  
Moore's Paradox ◽  
Scientific Antirealism

Scientific realists believe both what a scientific theory says about observables and unobservables. In contrast, scientific antirealists believe what a scientific theory says about observables, but not about unobservables. I argue that scientific realism is a more useful doctrine than scientific antirealism in science classrooms. If science teachers are antirealists, they are caught in Moore’s paradox when they help their students grasp the content of a scientific theory, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Teachers ask questions to their students to check whether they have grasped the content of a scientific theory. If the students are antirealists, they are also caught in Moore’s paradox when they respond positively to their teachers’ questions, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Finally, neither teachers nor students can understand phenomena in terms of scientific theories, if they are antirealists.

Scientific realism and antirealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Fine
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Dual Character ◽  
Objects Of Knowledge ◽  
The One ◽  
Independent Existence

Traditionally, scientific realism asserts that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or acts of scientists and that scientific theories are true of that objective (mind-independent) world. The reference to knowledge points to the dual character of scientific realism. On the one hand it is a metaphysical (specifically, an ontological) doctrine, claiming the independent existence of certain entities. On the other hand it is an epistemological doctrine asserting that we can know what individuals exist and that we can find out the truth of the theories or laws that govern them. Opposed to scientific realism (hereafter just ‘realism’) are a variety of antirealisms, including phenomenalism and empiricism. Recently two others, instrumentalism and constructivism, have posed special challenges to realism. Instrumentalism regards the objects of knowledge pragmatically, as tools for various human purposes, and so takes reliability (or empirical adequacy) rather than truth as scientifically central. A version of this, fictionalism, contests the existence of many of the objects favoured by the realist and regards them as merely expedient means to useful ends. Constructivism maintains that scientific knowledge is socially constituted, that ‘facts’ are made by us. Thus it challenges the objectivity of knowledge, as the realist understands objectivity, and the independent existence that realism is after. Conventionalism, holding that the truths of science ultimately rest on man-made conventions, is allied to constructivism. Realism and antirealism propose competing interpretations of science as a whole. They even differ over what requires explanation, with realism demanding that more be explained and antirealism less.

scholarly journals The No Alternatives Argument

2019 ◽  
pp. 67-80
Author(s):  
Jan Sprenger ◽  
Stephan Hartmann
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Particle Physics ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Empirical Theory ◽  
Degree Of Belief ◽  
Feasible Alternative ◽  
Theory Confirmation ◽  
Degree Of Confirmation

Convincing scientific theories are often hard to find, especially when empirical evidence is scarce (e.g., in particle physics). Once scientists have found a theory, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to it. Is this belief justified? We model how the failure to find a feasible alternative can increase the degree of belief in a scientific theory—in other words, we establish the validity of the No Alternatives Argument and the possibility of non-empirical theory confirmation from a Bayesian point of view. Then we evaluate scope and limits of this argument (e.g., by calculating the degree of confirmation it provides) and relate it to other argument forms such as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) or “There is No Alternative” (TINA).

What would it take for us to abandon construction Grammar?

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hoffmann
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Confirmation Bias ◽  
Construction Grammar ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Scientific Theories

Abstract One of the hallmarks of scientific theories is their falsifiability, i.e. the fact that they make predictions that can objectively be proven wrong. Thus, it is paramount that researchers, including linguists, are able to state what kind of evidence would lead them to abandon their scientific theory. Yet, researchers just like all other human beings are susceptible to confirmation bias, i.e. the fact that they only seek evidence that support their existing views. In this squib, I will raise the question whether Construction Grammar can become a falsifiable theory.

Scientific Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 251-253
Author(s):  
Heikki Patomäki
Keyword(s):  
Interwar Period ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
True Story ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
The Status

This chapter addresses scientific realism. After the heyday of empiricism in the interwar period and its immediate aftermath, many critical reactions to empiricism seemed to suggest scientific realism. It was widely agreed that scientific theories make references to things that cannot be directly observed (or at least seen), and thus emerged the issue of the status of non-observables. As scientific realism became increasingly dominant, new philosophical stances such as Bas C. van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism were often defined in opposition to it. Van Fraassen understands scientific realism as a claim that science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. More in line with established forms of scientific realism, Ilkka Niiniluoto talks about verisimilitude, or truth-likeness. This concept is supposed to avoid the consequences of claiming to have access to the truth itself. The chapter then considers how the social sciences seem to pose difficulties for scientific realism.

Science

2020 ◽  
pp. 112-123
Author(s):  
Subrena E. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Values In Science ◽  
Scientific Communities ◽  
Scientific Objectivity ◽  
Helen Longino

Anna Morandi was the foremost anatomist in eighteenth-century Bologna. Although her work was widely recognized as exceptional by the scientists of her day, she was not granted the standing of a scientist. In this chapter, the author uses Morandi as a case study to illuminate aspects of the philosophy of science. In particular, the chapter addresses conceptions of scientific objectivity and the role of social values in science, drawing on the work of Helen Longino. In addition to the phenomena described by Longino, the author argues that social values enter into science and impact scientific research by determining how individuals are positioned in scientific communities, or excluded from them.

Axiology of socio-humanitarian cognitive and sociocultural types being of man

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 34-42
Author(s):  
Bauyrzhan Moldagaliyev ◽  
Reza Sabbaghpoor
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Scientific Work ◽  
Value Orientations ◽  
Investment Policy ◽  
Values In Science ◽  
A Value ◽  
Cultural Conditioning ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Determining Factor

The goal of the following article is to show that the system of values (ideals and worldview attitudes) affects the nature and results of scientific work of a researcher. It is showed, that socio-cultural and historical conditionality of scientific knowledge is implemented not only by the impact of social institutions, investment policy and state support for science, but also through the system of value orientations of scientists themselves. It was analyzed the axiological views in the application of scientific knowledge to such prominent outstanding thinkers such as I. Kant, H. Rickert, M. Weber, W. Dilthey. We prove that an approach which recognizes that the values in science express socio-cultural conditioning of science, and becomes the determining factor in philosophy of social and humanitarian knowledge. Keywords: axiology, value, cognition, meaning, social and humanitarian cognition, truth as a value

scholarly journals METHOD OF GENERAL SCIENTIFIC ONTOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-11
Author(s):  
Sergey Lebedev
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Logical Contradiction ◽  
The World ◽  
General Scientific

The article describes the method of General scientific ontological justification of scientific theories. Its essence consists in the following: 1) proof of the absence of logical contradiction between a particular scientific theory and a scientific picture of the world; 2) the interpretation of specific scientific theories in terms of relevant General scientific picture of the world; 3) the withdrawal of the main provisions will describe a scientific theory as a consequence of the General scientific picture of the world. The General scientific ontological justification of the scientific theory is only one of the factors of legitimization of the new theory as true along with three other forms of its legitimization: paradigmatic, epistemological and philosophical justification.

“Laws” and “Theories” in Chemistry Do Not Obey the Rules

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maureen Christie ◽  
John R. Christie
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
External World ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Classical Physics ◽  
Small Branch ◽  
The World ◽  
Newton’S Laws ◽  
Ontological Sense ◽  
The Way

Most philosophers’ discussions of issues relating to “laws of nature” and “scientific theories” have concentrated heavily on examples from classical physics. Newton’s laws of motion and of gravitation and the various conservation laws are often discussed. This area of science provides very clear examples of the type of universal generalization that constitutes the widely accepted view of what a law of nature or a scientific theory “ought to be.” But classical physics is just one very small branch of science. Many other areas of science do not seem to throw up generalizations of nearly the same breadth or clarity. The question of whether there are any laws of nature in biology, or of why there are not, has often been raised (e.g., Ghiselin, 1989; Ruse, 1989). In the grand scheme of science, chemistry stands next to physics in any supposed reductive hierarchy, and chemistry does produce many alleged laws of nature and scientific theories. An examination of the characters of these laws and theories, and a comparison with those that arise in classical physics, might provide a broader and more balanced view of the nature of laws and theories and of their role in science. From the outset, we should very carefully define the terms of our discourse. The notion of laws of nature has medieval origin as the edicts of an all-powerful deity to his angelic servants about how the functioning of the world should be arranged and directed. It may be helpful to distinguish three quite different senses in which laws of nature are considered in modern discussions. On occasion, the discussion has become sidetracked and obscure because of conflation and confusion of two or more of these senses. In the first, or ontological, sense, laws of nature may be considered as a simply expressed generalization about the way an external world does operate. Laws of nature are often seen as principles of the way the world works. They are an objective part of the external world, waiting to be discovered. The laws that we have and use may be only approximations of the deeper, true laws of nature.

On the Aim of Scientific Theories in Relating to the World: A Defence of the Semantic Account

Dialogue ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Baur
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Bernard Lonergan ◽  
Semantic View ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Theoretical Terms ◽  
Linguistic Structure ◽  
Semantic Account ◽  
The World ◽  
Correspondence Rules

According to the received view of scientific theories, a scientific theory is an axiomatic-deductive linguistic structure which must include some set of guidelines (“correspondence rules”) for interpreting its theoretical terms with reference to the world of observable phenomena. According to the semantic view, a scientific theory need not be formulated as an axiomatic-deductive structure with correspondence rules, but need only specify models which are said to be “isomorphic” with actual phenomenal systems. In this paper, I consider both the received and semantic views as they bear on the issue of how a theory relates to the world (Section 1). Then I offer a critique of some arguments frequently put forth in support of the semantic view (Section 2). Finally, I suggest a more convincing “meta-methodological” argument (based on the thought of Bernard Lonergan) in favour of the semantic view (Section 3).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document