Charles Peirce and Bertrand Russell on Euclid

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (37) ◽  
pp. 79-94
Author(s):  
Irving Anellis

Both Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) held that Euclid’s proofs in geometry were fundamentally flawed, and based largely on mathematical intuition rather than on sound deductive reasoning. They differed, however, as to the role which diagramming played in Euclid’s emonstrations. Specifically, whereas Russell attributed the failures on Euclid’s proofs to his reasoning from diagrams, Peirce held that diagrammatic reasoning could be rendered as logically rigorous and formal. In 1906, in his manuscript “Phaneroscopy” of 1906, he described his existential graphs, his highly iconic, graphical system of logic, as a moving picture of thought, “rendering literally visible before one’s very eyes the operation of thinking in actu”, and as a “generalized diagram of the Mind” (Peirce 1906; 1933, 4.582). More generally, Peirce personally found it more natural for him to reason diagrammatically, rather than algebraically. Rather, his concern with Euclid’s demonstrations was with its absence of explicit explanations, based upon the laws of logic, of how to proceed from one line of the “proof” to the next. This is the aspect of his criticism of Euclid that he shared with Russell; that Euclid’s demonstrations drew from mathematical intuition, rather than from strict formal deduction.

2014 ◽  
pp. 439-472
Author(s):  
John F. Sowa

Existential graphs (EGs) are a simple, readable, and expressive graphic notation for logic. Conceptual graphs (CGs) combine a logical foundation based on EGs with features of the semantic networks used in artificial intelligence and computational linguistics. CG design principles address logical, linguistic, and cognitive requirements: a formal semantics defined by the ISO standard for Common Logic; the flexibility to support the expressiveness, context dependencies, and metalevel commentary of natural language; and cognitively realistic operations for reasoning by induction, deduction, abduction, and analogy. To accommodate the vagueness and ambiguities of natural language, informal heuristics can supplement the formal semantics. With sufficient background knowledge and a clarifying dialog, informal graphs can be refined to any degree of precision. Peirce claimed that the rules for reasoning with EGs generate “a moving picture of the action of the mind in thought.” Some philosophers and psychologists agree: Peirce's diagrams and rules are a good candidate for a natural logic that reflects the neural processes that support thought and language. They are psychologically realistic and computationally efficient.


2005 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald A. Martin

Kurt Gödel is almost as famous—one might say “notorious”—for his extreme platonist views as he is famous for his mathematical theorems. Moreover his platonism is not a myth; it is well-documented in his writings. Here are two platonist declarations about set theory, the first from his paper about Bertrand Russell and the second from the revised version of his paper on the Continuum Hypotheses.Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived as real objects, namely classes as “pluralities of things” or as structures consisting of a plurality of things and concepts as the properties and relations of things existing independently of our definitions and constructions.It seems to me that the assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence.But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.The first statement is a platonist declaration of a fairly standard sort concerning set theory. What is unusual in it is the inclusion of concepts among the objects of mathematics. This I will explain below. The second statement expresses what looks like a rather wild thesis.


Author(s):  
Vincent G. Potter

This chapter provides an overview of the life of Charles Sander Peirce—philosopher, logician, scientist, and father of American pragmatism. This man, unappreciated in his lifetime, virtually ignored by the academic world of his day, is now recognized as perhaps America's most original philosopher and her greatest logician. Indeed, on the latter score, he is surely one of the logical giants of the nineteenth century, which produced such geniuses as Georg Cantor, Gottlob Frege, George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred North Whitehead. Today, more than eighty years after his death, another generation of scholars is beginning to pay him the attention he deserves. The chapter shows the brilliant and tragic career of Peirce. Though he never published a book on philosophy, his articles and drafts fill volumes.


Author(s):  
Howard Sankey

Abstract In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction.” Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use of induction, since induction is applied to the external world outside our minds. If the principle is interpreted in light of the objective interpretation of induction, it cannot be known to be true a priori, since it applies to frequencies that occur in the world outside the mind, and these cannot be known without recourse to experience. Russell’s principle of induction therefore fails to provide a satisfactory justification of induction.


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 191-206
Author(s):  
Torkild Thellefsen ◽  
Bent Sørensen

The American polyhistor Charles Sanders Peirce stated that association is the only active force in the mind; and since any meaning of a brand is created through countless associations among the brand users, branding seems to be a cognitive vis-à-vis semeiotic process. In literature on brands the concept of association is by no means new; however, if we take a look at some of the leading and dominant brand researchers, their definitions of associations seem to lack academic depth. We hope to contribute to this hitherto missing depth by applying Peirce’s understanding of associations.


Author(s):  
Joao Teixeira

I examine some recent controversies involving the possibility of mechanical simulation of mathematical intuition. The first part is concerned with a presentation of the Lucas-Penrose position and recapitulates some basic logical conceptual machinery (Gödel's proof, Hilbert's Tenth Problem and Turing's Halting Problem). The second part is devoted to a presentation of the main outlines of Complexity Theory as well as to the introduction of Bremermann's notion of transcomputability and fundamental limit. The third part attempts to draw a connection/relationship between Complexity Theory and undecidability focusing on a new revised version of the Lucas-Penrose position in light of physical a priori limitations of computing machines. Finally, the last part derives some epistemological/philosophical implications of the relationship between Gödel's incompleteness theorem and Complexity Theory for the mind/brain problem in Artificial Intelligence and discusses the compatibility of functionalism with a materialist theory of the mind.


2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-140
Author(s):  
Slobodan Perovic

Philosophers have substantially considered the key ideas of Neutral Monism, a philosophical view attempting to overcome the Mind/Body problem, as it was initially developed by Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell. Yet similar ideas are also found in some key considerations of a few prominent physicists who developed quantum mechanics, although philosophers have neglected them. We will show that Niels Bohr?s principle of complementarity (of the particle and wave aspects of microphysical phenomena) is a gradually developed and experimentally motivated account very close to Russell?s and Mach?s key ideas on Neutral Monism.


Author(s):  
Jessica Carter

This chapter presents aspects of the work of Charles Sanders Peirce showing that he adhered to a number of pre-structuralist themes. Further, it indicates that Peirce’s position is similar in spirit to the category theoretical structuralist view of Steve Awodey (2004). The first part documents Peirce’s extensive knowledge of, and contribution to, the mathematics of his time, illustrating that relations played a fundamental role. The second part addresses Peirce’s characterization of mathematical reasoning as diagrammatic reasoning, that is, as reasoning done by constructing and observing rational relations in diagrams.


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