scholarly journals Neutral monism in modern philosophy and physics

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-140
Author(s):  
Slobodan Perovic

Philosophers have substantially considered the key ideas of Neutral Monism, a philosophical view attempting to overcome the Mind/Body problem, as it was initially developed by Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell. Yet similar ideas are also found in some key considerations of a few prominent physicists who developed quantum mechanics, although philosophers have neglected them. We will show that Niels Bohr?s principle of complementarity (of the particle and wave aspects of microphysical phenomena) is a gradually developed and experimentally motivated account very close to Russell?s and Mach?s key ideas on Neutral Monism.

Author(s):  
Andrii Leonov

Головним фокусом статтi є психофiзична проблема на прикладi доктрини ‘нейтрального монiзму’, а також, прояснення питання, хто може вважатися її пропонентами. Згiдно з Бертраном Расселом, такими є Ернст Мах, Вiльям Джеймс та Джон Дьюї (серед iнших). Стаття намагається прояснити, чи сам Рассел був правий у своїх висновках чи нi. Спершу я прояснюю вiдношення мiж ‘нейтральним монiзмом’ та ‘двох-аспектною теорiєю’. По друге, я аналiзую ‘велику трiйку’ нейтрального монiзму: Мах, Джеймс, Рассел. Моєю стартовою позицiєю є саме розумiння Расселом по-зицiй Маха та Джеймса. Наостанок, виявляється, що анi Мах, Джеймс чи Дьюї не можуть розглядатися як нейтральнi монiсти. Радше, нерозумiння Расселом як радикального емпiризму Джеймса, так i аналiзу вiдчуттiв Маха спонукало його до створення власної оригiнальної версiї ‘нейтрального монiзму’ (чи ‘монiзму Рассела’).


Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 551
Author(s):  
Michael Silberstein ◽  
William Stuckey

Herein we are not interested in merely using dynamical systems theory, graph theory, information theory, etc., to model the relationship between brain dynamics and networks, and various states and degrees of conscious processes. We are interested in the question of how phenomenal conscious experience and fundamental physics are most deeply related. Any attempt to mathematically and formally model conscious experience and its relationship to physics must begin with some metaphysical assumption in mind about the nature of conscious experience, the nature of matter and the nature of the relationship between them. These days the most prominent metaphysical fixed points are strong emergence or some variant of panpsychism. In this paper we will detail another distinct metaphysical starting point known as neutral monism. In particular, we will focus on a variant of the neutral monism of William James and Bertrand Russell. Rather than starting with physics as fundamental, as both strong emergence and panpsychism do in their own way, our goal is to suggest how one might derive fundamental physics from neutral monism. Thus, starting with two axioms grounded in our characterization of neutral monism, we will sketch out a derivation of and explanation for some key features of relativity and quantum mechanics that suggest a unity between those two theories that is generally unappreciated. Our mode of explanation throughout will be of the principle as opposed to constructive variety in something like Einstein’s sense of those terms. We will argue throughout that a bias towards property dualism and a bias toward reductive dynamical and constructive explanation lead to the hard problem and the explanatory gap in consciousness studies, and lead to serious unresolved problems in fundamental physics, such as the measurement problem and the mystery of entanglement in quantum mechanics and lack of progress in producing an empirically well-grounded theory of quantum gravity. We hope to show that given our take on neutral monism and all that follows from it, the aforementioned problems can be satisfactorily resolved leaving us with a far more intuitive and commonsense model of the relationship between conscious experience and physics.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxim Chistyakov

<p> This report considers the differences between the medical psychiatric and the psychotherapeutic (in particular, the psychodynamic) approaches to the diagnostics and treatment of mental disorders, and it describes a generalized model of the psychotherapeutic process. It traces the development of the relationship between the medical psychiatric and the psychotherapeutic approaches, which has resulted in different models of the interrelatedness of these paradigms in different countries (a unified model encompassing both the psychiatric and the psychotherapeutic approaches, and a model of two relatively independent approaches). Examples are provided of the difficulties and inconsistencies which have arisen from attempts to employ different variants of the unified model that purports to unify the two different approaches into a single whole. It is proposed that the medical psychiatric and the psychotherapeutic approaches should each be considered to have their own internal logic, independent from and simultaneously complementary to that of the other, in accordance with the principle of complementarity formulated by the physicist Niels Bohr in quantum mechanics for the systematization of irreconcilable data obtained by observers with differing perspectives. The author proposes that each patient with a mental disorder should be examined simultaneously and independently from the point of view of each of these systems of coordinates (the medical psychiatric paradigm and the psychotherapeutic paradigm).<br></p><p></p>


KronoScope ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Rémy Lestienne

Abstract In 1911, Alfred North Whitehead has a brainstorm: if we deny the reality of the instant, many problems of the philosophy of nature seem solved. His metaphysics, however, will wait until his moving to Harvard, in 1924, to mature. Besides his denial of the instants of time and the replacement of the concept of time by that of “process,” Whitehead articulates new concepts (concrescence, prehension) to account for the crystallization of successive empirical realities, the solidarity between events, the permanence of objects, and their deterministic behavior altogether. His views of nature fit well with both quantum mechanics and relativity theories, although not in the details of the latter. But one of his largely unnoticed merits, in my view, is to reopen the question of free will in the mind-body problem.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxim Chistyakov

<p> This report considers the differences between the medical psychiatric and the psychotherapeutic (in particular, the psychodynamic) approaches to the diagnostics and treatment of mental disorders, and it describes a generalized model of the psychotherapeutic process. It traces the development of the relationship between the medical psychiatric and the psychotherapeutic approaches, which has resulted in different models of the interrelatedness of these paradigms in different countries (a unified model encompassing both the psychiatric and the psychotherapeutic approaches, and a model of two relatively independent approaches). Examples are provided of the difficulties and inconsistencies which have arisen from attempts to employ different variants of the unified model that purports to unify the two different approaches into a single whole. It is proposed that the medical psychiatric and the psychotherapeutic approaches should each be considered to have their own internal logic, independent from and simultaneously complementary to that of the other, in accordance with the principle of complementarity formulated by the physicist Niels Bohr in quantum mechanics for the systematization of irreconcilable data obtained by observers with differing perspectives. The author proposes that each patient with a mental disorder should be examined simultaneously and independently from the point of view of each of these systems of coordinates (the medical psychiatric paradigm and the psychotherapeutic paradigm).<br></p><p></p>


1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 660-660
Author(s):  
MADGE SCHEIBEL ◽  
ARNOLD SCHEIBEL

Author(s):  
Leemon B. McHenry

What kinds of things are events? Battles, explosions, accidents, crashes, rock concerts would be typical examples of events and these would be reinforced in the way we speak about the world. Events or actions function linguistically as verbs and adverbs. Philosophers following Aristotle have claimed that events are dependent on substances such as physical objects and persons. But with the advances of modern physics, some philosophers and physicists have argued that events are the basic entities of reality and what we perceive as physical bodies are just very long events spread out in space-time. In other words, everything turns out to be events. This view, no doubt, radically revises our ordinary common sense view of reality, but as our event theorists argue common sense is out of touch with advancing science. In The Event Universe: The Revisionary Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead, Leemon McHenry argues that Whitehead's metaphysics provides a more adequate basis for achieving a unification of physical theory than a traditional substance metaphysics. He investigates the influence of Maxwell's electromagnetic field, Einstein's theory of relativity and quantum mechanics on the development of the ontology of events and compares Whitehead’s theory to his contemporaries, C. D. Broad and Bertrand Russell, as well as another key proponent of this theory, W. V. Quine. In this manner, McHenry defends the naturalized and speculative approach to metaphysics as opposed to analytical and linguistic methods that arose in the 20th century.


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