scholarly journals Philosophy and Wisdom

2020 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-277
Author(s):  
Peter Jonkers

Abstract Against the dominant trends of the scientification and naturalization of philosophy and the concurrent reduction of traditions of practical wisdom to private opinions, this article pleads for a revaluation of philosophy’s original relation with wisdom. It does so by shedding a philosophical light on several related aspects of wisdom through three different lenses. The first one, taken from Aristotle, explores the relation between theoretical and practical wisdom, leading to the conclusion that practical wisdom has to confront general moral principles with particular situations. The second lens, taken from Kant, argues that wisdom offers existential orientation, which requires the combination of an external and an internal moral principle. Yet, the external principle cannot be determined univocally because it is not empirically given. This lack of univocity raises the question of the fate of wisdom in our times, marked by a plurality of existential points of orientation. With the help of a third lens, stemming from Ricoeur, it will be argued that universal moral rules should be amendable to enrichment by ‘potential universals’ embedded in foreign cultures, thus creating a situation of reflexive equilibrium between theoretical and practical wisdom.

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.


2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (S1) ◽  
pp. 133-134
Author(s):  
Michal Stanak

INTRODUCTION:Nudging is the application of behavioural sciences aimed at influencing behaviour in a non-prescriptive way. It is a tool of public health decision makers to produce health gain. Just like decisions in the field of Health Technology Assessment (HTA), nudging decisions are inevitably value laden. The current European Network for HTA (EUnetHTA) approach to evaluate ethical aspects encompasses mainly utilitarian and principlistic approaches. The aim of this project is to incorporate the virtue ethics approach in public health decision-making processes based on the example of nudging.METHODS:The narrative analysis of nudging is based on a systematic literature search conducted from 28 October to 13 November 2015 in the following databases: Medline via Ovid, Embase, and TRIP Database. A total of sixty-two articles were listed as relevant as a result of searches and, in addition, twenty-five more articles were found through hand searching.RESULTS:Regardless of the potential issues related to nudging (manipulation or coercion), nudging is considered cost-effective and inevitable because of the malleability of human psychology for example, alcoholic drinks served in smaller glasses nudge people to drink less alcohol.No policy intervention, nudging or HTA, is value neutral and hence it requires an ethical evaluation. It takes traits of character, virtues, to discern which principle to apply in what circumstances and phronesis, practical wisdom, is the key virtue of a decision maker. Phronesis is not a moral judgement deduced from principles, but it is context specific, bottom-up, action orientated, and framed through dialogues. It focuses on the agent, the decision maker, who, via the use public scrutiny, should be held accountable for phronetic decisions made.CONCLUSIONS:Nudging is a cost-effective tool that can improve the populations health in a non-prescriptive way. Transparent reporting open to public scrutiny is necessary for the sake of evaluating whether the decisions made were phronetic for it takes traits of character, virtues, to decide between competing moral principles.


1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve a theoretical function, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve a practical function, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses.


2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (10) ◽  
pp. 1577-1585
Author(s):  
A. L. EFROS ◽  
P. DÉSESQUELLES

We introduce a new model that mimics the strong and sudden effects induced by conformity in tightly interacting human societies. Such effects range from mere crowd phenomena to dramatic political turmoil. The model is a modified version of the Ising Hamiltonian. We have studied the properties of this Hamiltonian using both a Metropolis simulation and analytical derivations. Our study shows that increasing the value of the conformity parameter, results in a first order phase transition. As a result a majority of people begin to honestly support the idea that may contradict the moral principles of a normal human beings though each individual would support the moral principle without tight interaction with the society. Thus, above some critical level of conformity our society destabilizes with respect to ideas that might be doubtful. Our model includes, in a simplified way, human diversity with respect to loyalty to the moral principles.


Teosofia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Umi Daris Salamah

<em><span>Postmodern society has related to the terms of relativism, it is kind of the rejection of certain universal forms (grand narrative). In this case, the uncertainty of ethic is being one of the problems of humanity that exist in postmodern society. It implies that there is no true moral principle. The accuracy of all moral principles are relatively accommodated to the concerned or selected individual environment. The difficulty is how to marry such values to respect for diversity. Some agreements on the principles of social justice are desirable. Human has to position themselves between ‘absolutism’ and ‘anything goes’. Ki Ageng Suryomentaram, one of the Javanese Philosophers, formulated a set of philosophical views called to deal with human life. It is not an absolute concept to follow. Neither is it a form of totalitarianism reconstruction. Yet, it can be included as one of what so called by Lyotard as a small narrative. So in postmodernism view, the concept of Ki Ageng Suryomentaram, be it about harmony or manungsa tanpa tenger (human without signs), mawas diri (self-cautiousness), and mulur mungkret (state of being developed and shrunk) can be regarded as knowledge that qualifies to be publicized. It fits to some degree into a postmodern society for creating a harmonious life. </span></em>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bramka Arga Jafino ◽  
Jan Kwakkel

&lt;p&gt;The importance of considering equity in climate change adaptation planning is increasingly being acknowledged. A preferred adaptation strategy is one that not only yields robust outcomes under multiple futures, but also has a fair distribution of benefits and harms across affected actors. In this study we propose two complementary approaches for assessing the equity of impacts of adaptation strategies. First, in the explorative approach, we explore what different multi-actor inequality patterns might emerge under different policy and uncertainty scenarios. Put differently, we identify who benefits and who loses under which kind of circumstances. Second, in the normative approach, we attempt to rank alternative strategies based on their performance across uncertain futures. Identifying which strategy is more preferable requires us to define what kind of distribution is considered to be &amp;#8216;good&amp;#8217;. We thus employ six alternative distributive moral principles that each has its own maxim in justifying the moral righteousness of a distribution: utilitarianism, prioritarianism, sufficientarianism, envy measures, weighted utilitarianism, and the Rawlsian difference principle.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We apply both approaches to a case study on agricultural adaptation planning in An Giang and Dong Thap, two provinces in the upper Vietnam Mekong Delta. We develop an integrated assessment metamodel to assess the equity implications of six alternative adaptation strategies, including dikes (de)construction policies, fertilizer subsidy, and seeds upgrading. We evaluate the distributional impacts of the alternative strategies to 23 districts in the two provinces under a large number of strategic scenarios, i.e., combinations of policy scenarios and uncertain futures. From the explorative approach, we discover six distinctive inequality patterns and identify the strategic scenarios that give rise to each inequality pattern. We find a trade-off between districts located along the Mekong river and those located further away. In some strategic scenarios the former group of districts are substantially better-off than the latter, and vice versa.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;From the normative approach, we find a mixed result of preferred strategies depending on what moral principle is being adopted. The dikes deconstruction policy in Dong Thap, which performs best from a utilitarian point of view, ranks fifth from a prioritarian perspective. Upgrading seed is the most preferred strategy from the prioritarian view, but it performs the worst when looked at from a sufficientarian point of view. We further find that the results from each principle are strongly affected by uncertainties. For example, the fertilizer subsidy policy ranks last in approximately 70% of the uncertain futures according to the sufficientarian principle, but it becomes the most preferable in the other 20% of the uncertain futures. Our findings further emphasize the simultaneous consideration of both uncertainties and alternative distributive principles in adaptation planning. By using multiple moral principles, we expand the information base upon which adaptation decisions are made, and thus minimizing potential surprises and unintended consequences from our choice.&lt;/p&gt;


1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. B. Thomas

John Rawls’ use of a contractarian strategy for justifying basic principles of justice has raised the hope that a similar strategy might work for a theory of right and moral principles generally. I want to show that this hope cannot be fulfilled.In what follows I interpret contractarianism in a Rawlsian way on the grounds that his is the most plausible version of the doctrine we are likely to get. I am not however concerned with the details of Rawls’ argument for justice but instead with an idea that appears to underlie the contractarian strategy. In order to avoid the complications of Rawlsian exegesis, I choose to discuss the doctrine as it might be used to justify a moral principle of mutual assistance and not as Rawls in fact uses it to justify principles of justice.


Author(s):  
Robin Attfield

Environmental ethics cannot escape from considering what ought or ought not to be done, and how this is to be decided or discovered. ‘Principles for right action’ reflects on how to understand moral principles. It considers different contract theories of ethics, concluding that they continue to fail to ensure equity between generations and between species. Virtue ethics may be a more promising approach, but well-chosen, justifiable moral rules are essential. Rules and duties, and beneficial practices, traits, and actions are also discussed. The approach that is the more consistent, most fruitful, and best serves the needs of future generations seems to be consequentialism, allied to a broad theory of value.


SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Nykänen

AbstractThe aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually assumed in moral philosophy. Instead, moral reasoning is one aspect of repressing conscience. The formal dimensions of moral reasoning function as a repressive depersonalisation of our sense of being an I who stands in a relationship to a you. For instance, “moral principle” invokes a formal and hence impersonal understanding of a moral problem. The thinking person loses her sense of being a particular person related to another particular person and focuses instead on the moral principles with their inherent, systematic implications. However, and as I will show in connection to so-called moral dilemmas, the thinking person does not actually act in the rational manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prince Saprai

The rule against penalty clauses in contract law sits uneasily with the promise theory of contract. According to the rule, if contracting parties agree a monetary remedy for breach which is substantially in excess of what would be required to compensate the claimant then that remedy is not enforceable. If contracts enforce promises however one would expect to see these clauses enforced. The rule appears therefore to be an example of a contract doctrine that diverges from promise. Promise theorists tend to respond to divergent doctrines in one of three ways, they either: seek to accommodate these doctrines within the promise principle, or they repudiate them, or finally they justify these doctrines on the basis of the specific legal context within which they operate.I argue that in the case of the penalties rule all of these standard responses would fall short. These responses are inadequate because they are premised on the claim that the promise principle is the only general moral principle relevant to evaluating contract law, or that it has overriding justificatory priority when it conflicts with other moral concerns. I argue that a richer conception of the moral principles that bear on contract and how they interact offers a way forward for justifying the rule.


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