Checking Sets of Pure Evolving Association Rules

Extracting association rules from large datasets has been widely studied in many variants in the last two decades; they allow to extract relations between values that occur more “often” in a database. With temporal association rules the concept has been declined to temporal databases. In this context the “most frequent” patterns of evolution of one or more attribute values are extracted. In the temporal setting, especially where the interference betweeen temporal patterns cannot be neglected (e.g., in medical domains), there may be the case that we are looking for a set of temporal association rules for which a “significant” portion of the original database represents a consistent model for all of them. In this work, we introduce a simple and intuitive form for temporal association rules, called pure evolving association rules (PE-ARs for short), and we study the complexity of checking a set of PE-ARs over an instance of a temporal relation under approximation (i.e., a percentage of tuples that may be deleted from the original relation). As a by-product of our study we address the complexity class for a general problem on Directed Acyclic Graphs which is theoretically interesting per se.

‘Higher Laws’ and ‘Divine Madness’: Transnational and Translocal Configurations of Quixotic In/Sanity in the American Renaissance

The New England Transcendentalists deliberately chose a position which by definition did not belong to what was to them the common “prosaic mood” (Thoreau) of their time. Their choice was the result of representatively romantic discontent with their contemporary reality and, at the same time, through the vigorous drive of the Puritan spiritual leadership, it was essentially anachronistic. The sophisticated delight of identifying with such a doubly anomalous nonconformist ideal only intensified the need for counterbalancing the prosaic sanity of the real world with a wished-for poetic insanity, or “madness from the gods” (Emerson). Such “madness by romantic identification” whose “features have been fixed once and for all by Cervantes” (Foucault), naturally caused “Quixotic confusion” between reality and imagination and the substitution of the true with the fabulous. Though peculiarly intensified in the former Puritan context and in the context of ‘Americanness’ in which the nineteenth century New England intellectuals placed it, the problem was far from being merely a local, New England-centered, phenomenon. This paper argues that in their ‘in/sane’ Quixotic quest for perfection, which caused a series of personal failures, the New England Transcendentalists were remarkably faithful saunterers in a blessed place that, to them, was both America and, at the same time, the all-encompassing perennial—translocal and transnational—world, inviting them to establish what Emerson called “an original relation to the universe.”

Humanisme Bagi Sesama – Menyingkap Akar Kekerasan Dalam Relasi Antarmanusia Dan Etika Tanggung Jawab Menurut Emmanuel Levinas

This article contains the most fundamental text of Emmanuel Levinas. His unique contribution is his argument that the morality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy (TI 304). His starting point is the actual concrete encounter, with the “face” of the other, that underlies our sense of self and identity, and this, in turn is the beginning of Levinas’ understanding of what Philosophy is. Philosophy begins with the other and ethics is undertood as a relation of infinite responsibility to the other person. By this, he means that when we face someone, before we decide to respond others (to wish someone “great day”, to give or not to give money to a beggar), we are already put into a relationship with them. This is the reason why he calls that relationship ‘the original relation’. This unconditional responsibility is not something we take on or a rule by which we agree to be bound, it exists before us and we are ‘thrown’ into inexhaustible responsibility for them without any choice. Although his big idea is not adequate for the solution of all our ethical problems, we find the strength of Levinas’ position in reminding us to the nature of ethical demand, which must be presupposed at the basis of all moral theories.

Philosophy and Wisdom

Against the dominant trends of the scientification and naturalization of philosophy and the concurrent reduction of traditions of practical wisdom to private opinions, this article pleads for a revaluation of philosophy’s original relation with wisdom. It does so by shedding a philosophical light on several related aspects of wisdom through three different lenses. The first one, taken from Aristotle, explores the relation between theoretical and practical wisdom, leading to the conclusion that practical wisdom has to confront general moral principles with particular situations. The second lens, taken from Kant, argues that wisdom offers existential orientation, which requires the combination of an external and an internal moral principle. Yet, the external principle cannot be determined univocally because it is not empirically given. This lack of univocity raises the question of the fate of wisdom in our times, marked by a plurality of existential points of orientation. With the help of a third lens, stemming from Ricoeur, it will be argued that universal moral rules should be amendable to enrichment by ‘potential universals’ embedded in foreign cultures, thus creating a situation of reflexive equilibrium between theoretical and practical wisdom.

"Painting in Arabic": Etel Adnan and the Invention of a New Language

This article deals with Etel Adnan’s complex and original relation with the Arabic language, and with her concern for the situation of wars and destruction in the Arab world. It tries to analyze how, by “painting in Arabic,” Adnan not only finds a solution to her linguistic quest, but also gives word to her political commitment to the region. And finally, “painting in Arabic” makes her one of the main representatives of the Hurufiyya movement, a fundamental modernist pictorial trend in the Arab world.

Reading the First Epistle of John with the Method of Formal Indication

This presentation has two tasks. First, following Heidegger’s presentation of the method of formal indication in his 1920-21 lectures on the Pauline Epistles, I draw out two possible meanings for the method. On the one hand, formal indication could be a hermeneutic tool, a use of the how indicated in language to guide one in understanding the original relation in experience as original relation (enacted). On the other hand, formal indication could be the enacting of the original relation myself, in other words, appropriating the original relation in my own life as something to be enacted by me. The second task of the presentation is to read the First Epistle of John in the context of formal indication and these two possibilities, highlighting the affinities between the Epistle and the early Heidegger’s method and ultimately arguing that the dialogical imperative in John presents its necessary foil.

Habitar la finitud: El primer movimiento de la existencia humana como asentamiento residencial en el pensamiento fenomenológico de Jan Patocka

To dwell in finitude. The first movement of human existence as residential settlement in Jan Pato?ka’s phenomenological thought Resumen: El presente estudio se centra en la interpretación del primero de los tres movimientos de la existencia humana postulados por el fenomenólogo checo Jan Patocka, como un procedimiento orientado a ocultar la originaria alteridad del Ser y, consecuentemente, a favorecer el habitar humano en el mundo. La propia estructura de nuestra percepción y nuestra relación original con los otros formarían parte de ese mecanismo de inserción residencial que caracteriza al movimiento de “anclaje” o “enraizamiento”. Palabras clave: Patocka, habitar, movimiento de la existencia, enraizamiento. Abstract: The present work focuses on the interpretation of the first of the three movements of human existence postulated by the Czech phenomenologist Jan Patocka, as a procedure tending towards the concealing of the original alterity of Being and, in consequence, to favour human dwelling in the world. The structure of our perception itself and our original relation with the others would form part of that residential insertion that characterizes the movement of “anchorage” or “rooting”. Keywords: Patocka, dwelling, movement of existence, rooting.

Platonic Method

Using evidence from the Republic, the chapter shows how Plato thought that his iconic method could work. It focuses on some famous methodological remarks concerning the longer and shorter routes, and on Socrates’ diagram of the Divided Line which shows how one’s enquiries at each stage can use items from a level below to generate an understanding of the ones next above, in a continuous sequence of closer approximation to the truth (described as degrees of ‘clarity’). It argues that every level of enquiry is conducted by this method, which crucially involves the image–original relation. This allows the philosopher to investigate the forms by starting from particulars, and then at a later stage to consider the forms as shadows of higher, less accessible forms such as the Good itself.

The Form of the Good II

This chapter is concerned with the image of the Divided Line, in which dianoia illustrates the use of the image-original relation. Dianoia employs visible objects such as the diagrams used in geometry as images for the purpose of gaining insight into intelligible objects. In the process of making its inquiries, dianoia employs hypotheses as starting points. These hypotheses include but are not limited to the definitions that mathematicians set forth as they make their demonstrations. Philosophers are expected to make a further transition from dianoia to dialectic and thus to move to the highest section of the line. In making this transition, the hypotheses or definitions fashioned by dianoia are taken over by dialectic and used as images of the objects associated with dialectic, the forms.

Monstrous Desires and Disinterested Appreciation: Architecture, Technique and Nature

It seems that in the last decades architecture has finally become aware of the impact the demands of its construction and of its maintenance and operation have on the environment. The demands for architecture of being green or becoming ecological have been answered mostly through an enhanced use of technology, through a technical deployment of a multiplicity of systems and gadgets that try to achieve a better performance, or in other words, a better efficiency, but not by addressing the roots of the question. Henceforth, this increase in the use of technology is covering the fact that what architecture needs to do for being green is not to promote the use of technology, but to rethink its original relation with technique and nature. This paper will propose in the first place a brief survey of this original and tainted relation between architecture, technique and nature, to show how and why this relation was condemned since the beginning. Then, I will propose in the first place two strategies to fight this original misunderstanding: an architecture of visibility, which should be a critical one, and an architecture of gratuity, that should necessarily be a disinterested one. It will follow a review of some of the questions already mentioned with more detail, addressing the question of a necessary negotiation with nature, the issues posed by the rhetorical use of green technology, the demands of transparency and gratuity in architecture, the relations between physis and techne, and the important question of disinterest through the lens of Kantian aesthetics. In a final and short conclusion I will propose, instead of a technical substratum for the relations between architecture and nature, an aesthetical one, that can anticipate a relation between man and nature based in disinterest instead of extraction and domination.