scholarly journals Disinvestment of Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) and Fiscal Deficit Tackling in India

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-55
Author(s):  
K. A. Aneesh

Every year since 1991, the Central Government of India has been successfully disinvesting its PSEs from various sectors. The recent announcement to strategically disinvest some of the better performing PSEs like Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd., Air India and so on is indeed shocking. This seriously questions the intension of the government towards the declared objectives of the disinvestment strategy in 1991. There are severe apprehensions on selling-off the PSEs at a lower price and the utilization of disinvestment proceeds for filling the revenue deficits of the Central Government. This paper discusses the idea of disinvestment in India and the debates associated with it. The paper also critically analyses the disinvestment proceeds in India as a tool to tackle mounting fiscal deficits after the initiation of the New Economic Policies in 1991.

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-17
Author(s):  
K. A. Aneesh

Every year since 1991, the Central Government of India has been successfully disinvesting its PSEs from various sectors. The recent announcement to strategically disinvest some of the better performing PSEs like Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd., Air India and so on is indeed shocking. This seriously questions the intension of the government towards the declared objectives of the disinvestment strategy in 1991. There are severe apprehensions on selling-off the PSEs at a lower price and the utilization of disinvestment proceeds for filling the revenue deficits of the Central Government. This paper discusses the idea of disinvestment in India and the debates associated with it. The paper also critically analyses the disinvestment proceeds in India as a tool to tackle mounting fiscal deficits after the initiation of the New Economic Policies in 1991.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (S1) ◽  
pp. 13-19
Author(s):  
K. A. Aneesh

Fiscal deficit, one of the widely acclaimed and internationally accepted measures of fiscal imbalance, is faced with a lot of conceptual and accounting issues in India. The definition of deficit has been changing and therefore there is no consistency in the official series of deficits published by the government of India. Since 1991, budgets were being framed in the context of the New Economic Policies (NEP) consisting of the Stabilization Policies and the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP). While, the fiscal austerity in the form of expenditure reduction and revenue enhancement as a corollary to NEP has hardly worked out in India. However, the Central government has undertaken several measures to show a reduced fiscal deficit in India. One of the ways practiced was to implement some changes in the accounting practices over the years. This was by including some additional elements in the definition of deficit and excluding some other items. The second practice was to transfer the deficit of the Centre to other layers of the government. In a broad fiscal policy regime framework following Prof. Arun Kumar’s modified National Income Identity (1988), a total government or public sector comprising of the Centre, State/UTs and local-self-governments as well as the Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) at the Centre and State levels. The problem of deficit shifting can be automatically avoided by taking the whole public sector into the analysis, which makes the empirical results on interrelationship between fiscal deficit and various macroeconomic variables more realistic and convincing. Still, there is a paucity of white economy data, because of the existence of substantial black economy in India. Its non-inclusion in analysis results in a partial understanding of the economy and often incorrect policy pronouncements. The need to incorporate the black economy is not simply an empirical matter, but a theoretical necessity. This paper in general tries to bring the aforementioned issues on data reliability, accounting flaws and missing variables into the discussion and attempt to correct the fudges in the official deficit series published by the government and also tries construct a compiled series of deficit for the public sector in India. The empirical section of the paper explains the significance of black economy as a variable to be included in the analysis to get better understanding of the economy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-214
Author(s):  
Sumeet Gupta ◽  
Sharad Srivastava

Disinvestment of minority share of PSU have become one of the important medium of raising revenue for the government. The government wanted to reduce its fiscal deficit by doing disinvestment of public sector enterprise. It is believed that operating performance and efficiency of Public sector enterprise gets improved after the post disinvestment period. There are many public sector enterprise whose financial performance got improved after the disinvestment.The prime focus of the study is to examine:Why there is a need for disinvestment of public sector enterprise      such as ONGC and IOCL.The impact of disinvestment on the financial and operating      performance on pre disinvestment as well as on post disinvestment period. In this study financial performance will be measured e.g.  Profitability ratio, efficiency ratio, liquidity ratio, & leverage and ratio for perspective investor. The financial performance will be used to access whether there is any impact of disinvestment on company’s performance of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. & Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.  


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (223) ◽  
Author(s):  

Georgia’s public sector balance sheet (PSBS) is in relatively healthy shape, with assets exceeding liabilities, and is comparatively lean. Looking across all entities that the government controls, including the central government, local governments, the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector and the National Bank of Georgia (NBG), total assets are worth 149 percent of GDP, made up of cash, loans, infrastructure, land and productive SOE assets. Liabilities are worth 81 percent of GDP, primarily comprising loans and debt of the government and SOEs. This leaves positive net worth of 68 percent of GDP, putting it in the top third of countries in the IMF’s database.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 54
Author(s):  
Yu kun Wang ◽  
Li Zhang ◽  
We-me Ho

In the past 28 years, we find that except for the fiscal revenue of 5,132.1 billion yuan in 2007, which is greater than the fiscal expenditure of 4,978.1 billion yuan, presenting a fiscal surplus, the fiscal expenditure of the rest years is greater than the fiscal revenue, showing the situation of public sector net cash requirement (psncr), especially in 2011, the deficit( the gap between fiscal expenditure and fiscal revenue) is 537.3 billion yuan. Since then, the gap between expenditure and revenue has been increasing with each passing year. In 2015, the fiscal deficit is 2,368 billion yuan. In 2018, the fiscal deficit has been expanded to 3,754.4 billion yuan. In order to avoid the continuous increment of the deficit. This paper discusses the causal relationship between China's fiscal revenue and public expenditure from 1990 to 2018. If fiscal revenue has a positive impact on public expenditure, showing that the government shall reduce fiscal deficit through tax increment. On the contrary, it makes public expenditure continue to expand, leading to the continuous deterioration of fiscal deficit, so as to further decide whether China's future fiscal policy should adopt increasing fiscal revenue or deducting public expenditure policy to reduce the deficit.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 65-83
Author(s):  
Tashi Phuntsok

This paper investigates the different phases of reform state owned enterprises (SOEs) that India had been experience since the beginning of reform and analyses the policy objectives behind the policy of SOEs reforms introduced. Having evaluated the policy objectives based on various source the paper seeks to find the degree to which the objectives have been achieved and had an impact on the performance of SOEs. The paper finds three different phases of privatisation with different objectives and that the of performance of SOEs during these phases have been different. The analysis of performances of SOEs in different phases leads to questioning of the need for privatisation and speculation as to whether the actual objective behind the overall privatisation process is to generate revenue to cut the government fiscal deficit.


2000 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Corbridge

This paper reports on the economic and political consequences of reserving government and public-sector jobs for members of the Scheduled Tribes in the Indian State of Bihar. It also contributes to a more general debate on the system of compensatory discrimination that has existed in India since the 1940s, and which was made tangible for middle class Indians by the decision of the government of V. P. Singh (1989–90) to adopt some of the recommendations of the Second Backward Classes Commission (1979–80: chairman B. P. Mandal). The Mandal Commission report advised that a system of reserved jobs in central government could usefully be extended from the Scheduled Castes and Tribes of India (roughly 15 and 7.5 percent of the population, respectively) to embrace a broader collection of Socially and Economically Backward Classes.1 In August 1990 V. P. Singh found it expedient to act upon Mandal's suggestion that up to 49.5 percent of all jobs in central government services and public undertakings should be reserved for the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), and Other Backward Classes (OBCs).


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 220
Author(s):  
Gordon L. Brady

This paper uses Public Choice analysis to examine the case for and experience with Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). A PPP is a contractual platform which connects a governmental body and a private entity. The goal is to provide a public sector program, service, or asset that would normally be provided exclusively by a public sector entity. This paper focuses on PPPs in developed countries, but it also draws on studies of PPPs in developing countries. The economics literature generally defines PPPs as long-term contractual arrangements between a public authority (local or central government) and a private supplier for the delivery of services. The private sector supplier takes responsibility for building infrastructure components, securing financing of the investment, and then managing and maintaining this facility.However, in addition to those formed through contracts, PPPs may take other forms such as those developed in response to tax subvention or coercion, as in the case of regulatory mandates. A key element of PPP is that the private partner takes on a significant portion of the risk through a schedule of specified remuneration, contingency payments, and provision for dispute resolution. PPPs typically are long-term arrangements and involve large corporations on the private side, but may also be limited to specific phases of a project.The types of PPPs discussed in this paper exclude arrangements which may result from government mandates such as the statutory emission mandates imposed on automobile manufacturers and industrial facilities (e.g., power plants). It also excludes PPP-like organizations resulting from US section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides tax subsidies for certain public charities, scientific research organizations, and organizations whose goals are to prevent cruelty to animals or erect public monuments at no expense to the government. This paper concludes that an array of Public Choice tools are applicable to understanding the emergence, success, or failure of PPPs. Several short case studies are provided to illustrate the practicalities of PPPs. 


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-163
Author(s):  
Khoirul Aswar ◽  
Ermawati ◽  
Wisnu Julianto

Public sector accounting reforms have resulted in crucial changes in accounting reporting by the government, namely the adoption of accrual accounting in the public sector. This study looks into the social factors that led to the Indonesian central government implementing accrual accounting reform. This study adopted a quantitative approach using purposive sampling. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) with PLS version 3.0 was used to analyze the data. The information for this study was gathered using a Google Form, which was used to send 70 questionnaires to government finance officials, chief accountants and auditors, and heads of accounting and auditing divisions in the Ministry of Finance. Seeing these social factors is expected to increase the effectiveness of the administration of accrual accounting implementation. The results showed that pressure from donors, pressure from the National Board of Accountants and Auditors (NBAA), political will, and audit process had an impact on the effectiveness of accrual accounting application (AAA). However, management change, regulatory matters, and a culture of transparency have no effect. In addition, the effective administration of AAA affects managerial accountability. This study implies that the effective application of accrual accounting depends on human-related concerns and culture. It is important to note that accrual accounting is more of a management reform that entails changes to bigger areas of institutional and accountability systems than merely adopting a new accounting technology.


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSÉ ANTONIO CHEIBUB

This paper examines the impact of the form of government—presidential or parliamentary—on fiscal outcomes in democratic systems. Based on data for democracies in 98 countries between 1970 and 2002, it shows that the gross domestic product ratio of the central government budget balance is higher in presidential than in parliamentary democracies. It also shows that this impact is not due to the fact that presidential systems are not subject to the “costs of coalition” that allegedly afflict parliamentary democracies: the coalition and status of the government are of no consequence for budget balances in either presidential or parliamentary systems. Presidential systems matter for budget balances because they generate relatively high incentives for governments to keep budgets under control. They do so because in presidential systems, unlike in parliamentary systems, voters are by design able to identify and punish those responsible for economic policies. Presidents, however, vary in their capacity to affect budget policies. This paper demonstrates that presidential systems in which presidents are constitutionally able to dominate the budget process or to effectively veto legislation tend to have higher budget balances than those in which the budget process is dominated by the legislature or the president is unable to exercise existing veto powers.


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