Epilogue

Author(s):  
Richard Rogers ◽  
Sal Hagen

The publication of the study elicited reactions, especially on Twitter, where questions arose about the use of the notion of junk news, rather than ‘pulp news’, among other points. The analogy to junk food is emphasised. There was also the question of symmetry, and the treatment of both ends of the political spectrum. Why is the new populist right identified as the purveyors of extreme content? We found a polarised Dutch media landscape where hyperpartisan (and to a lesser extent conspiracy) content from new populist right (rather than the left or other orientations) circulates well on social media. Unlike in the US during the initial Trump insurgency, mainstream news in the Netherlands still outperforms what was hitherto known as ‘fake news’, across all platforms.

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Fin Bauer ◽  
Kimberly L. Wilson

Abstract China is accused of conducting disinformation campaigns on Taiwan's social media. Existing studies on foreign interventions in democratic societies predict that such disinformation campaigns should lead to increasing partisan polarization within Taiwan. We argue that a backlash effect, making Taiwan's citizens more united against China, is equally plausible. We conduct a survey experiment exposing participants to a real-life rumour and rebuttal to test these competing hypotheses. We find, at best, mixed evidence for polarization. Although neither rumour nor rebuttal mention China, there is consistent evidence of backlash against China. Most notably, participants across the political spectrum are more inclined to support Taiwanese independence after viewing the rumour rebuttal. These findings indicate that citizens may put aside partisanship when confronted with false news that is plausibly linked to an external actor. We conclude by discussing the broader applicability of our theory and implications for cross-Strait relations.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig A. Harper ◽  
Thom Baguley

The concept of ‘fake news’ has exploded into the public’s consciousness since the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency in late 2016. However, this concept has received surprisingly little attention within the social psychological literature. We present three studies (N = 2,275) exploring whether liberal and conservative partisans are motivated to believe fake news (Study 1; n = 722) or dismiss true news that contradicts their position as being fake (Study 2; n = 570). We found support for both of these hypotheses. These effects were asymmetrically moderated by collective narcissism, need for cognition, and faith in intuition (Study 3; n = 983). These findings suggest that partisans across the political spectrum engage with the ‘fake news’ label in a motivated manner, though these motivations appear to differ between-groups. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.


Stan Rzeczy ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 99-121
Author(s):  
Thari Jungen

In February 2016, the Institute for Falsification researched the production of fake news in Veles, North Macedonia. Focusing on a specific hoax distributed from Veles via social media, this article analyses the political and aesthetic effects of fake news. It argues that fakes and hoaxes (mis)use established references to renew pre-existing discourses, media techniques, and symbols. The present definition of fakes is therefore insufficient for these practices.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019685992097715
Author(s):  
James Morris

“Fake News” has been a frequent topic in the last couple of years. The phenomenon has particularly been cited with regards to the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States. The creation of “post truth” reports that are disseminated via the Web and social media has been treated as something new, a product of the digital age, and a reason to be concerned about the effects of online technology. However, this paper argues that fake news should be considered as part of a continuum with forms of media that went before in the 20th Century, and the general trend of postmodernity detailed by Baudrillard. The simulation of communications media and mass reproduction was already evident and has merely progressed in the digital age rather than the latter providing a wholly new context. The paper concludes by asking whether the political havoc caused by fake news has an antidote, when it appears to be a by-product of media simulacra’s inherent lack of connection to the real. In a communications landscape where the misrepresentations of the so-called “Mainstream Media” are decried using even more questionable “memes” on social media, is there any possibility for truth?


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 205630512096382
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Ferrari

This article investigates user-generated political satire, focusing in particular on one genre: fake political accounts. Such fakes, created as social media profiles, satirize politicians or political organizations by impersonating them. Through interviews with a sample of Italian fake accounts creators, I explore how the fakes navigate their fakeness vis-à-vis the affordances of social network sites and their publics. First, I map how the publics of the fake accounts react to the satire along two axes: one referring to the public’s understanding of the satire and the other to the uses that the public makes of the satire. Second, I show how fakeness is part of everyday interactions in networked publics. Third, I argue for fakeness as a playful, powerful, and sincere critique of the political and its pretense to authenticity. By focusing on fake political accounts, this article provides insights on the place of fakeness in online communication beyond the debate around “fake news.”


Subject The non-appearance of an expected EU anti-corruption report. Significance The European Commission’s cancellation of its second report on anti-corruption efforts across member-states and EU institutions removes a key benchmark against which to hold European governments to account at a time when several are attempting to roll back anti-corruption reforms and disable checks and balances. Given the political sensitivity of the first report, the move also feeds populist criticisms that the EU itself is prone to corruption and unwilling to expose itself to scrutiny. Impacts Populist governments appear to be learning from one another that they can remove limits on their power. This will allow interest groups to entrench their political and economic dominance, hindering economic growth in the long run. The US president’s attacks on parts of the media for ‘fake news’ may encourage use of anti-establishment rhetoric to discredit critics.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. e0246757
Author(s):  
Stephanie Preston ◽  
Anthony Anderson ◽  
David J. Robertson ◽  
Mark P. Shephard ◽  
Narisong Huhe

The proliferation of fake news on social media is now a matter of considerable public and governmental concern. In 2016, the UK EU referendum and the US Presidential election were both marked by social media misinformation campaigns, which have subsequently reduced trust in democratic processes. More recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the acceptance of fake news has been shown to pose a threat to public health. Research on how to combat the false acceptance of fake news is still in its infancy. However, recent studies have started to focus on the psychological factors which might make some individuals less likely to fall for fake news. Here, we adopt that approach to assess whether individuals who show high levels of ‘emotional intelligence’ (EQ) are less likely to fall for fake news items. That is, are individuals who are better able to disregard the emotionally charged content of such items, better equipped to assess the veracity of the information. Using a sample of UK participants, an established measure of EQ and a novel fake news detection task, we report a significant positive relationship between individual differences in emotional intelligence and fake news detection ability. We also report a similar effect for higher levels of educational attainment, and we report some exploratory qualitative fake news judgement data. Our findings are discussed in terms of their applicability to practical short term (i.e. current Facebook user data) and medium term (i.e. emotional intelligence training) interventions which could enhance fake news detection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-255
Author(s):  
Tara Marie Mortensen ◽  
Leigh Moscowitz ◽  
Anan Wan ◽  
Aimei Yang

In the wake of growing legalization efforts, both medicinal and recreational marijuana use in the US is becoming more prevalent and societally acceptable. However, racial, criminal and cultural stereotypes linger in mediated visual portrayals. This study examines the extent to which mediated visual portrayals in mainstream news have been impacted by these recent legalization efforts. Employing a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis of visual images used to represent marijuana use in mainstream news, this study draws upon the power of visual framing and the construction of social reality to examine how visual symbols and iconic signifiers are used to construct both stereotypical and ‘mainstreamed’ or ‘normative’ depictions of marijuana use. Analyzing 458 visuals across 10 different media outlets across the political spectrum, both before and after legalization of marijuana in Colorado, this study shows how news portrayals perpetuated stereotypes about marijuana users, particularly around criminality and pot-culture iconography. Relatively few depictions of marijuana users in the US are visuals of ordinary, ‘normal’ people or families. This study thus interrogates the relationship between representations of race, criminality and ‘pothead’ stereotypes associated with marijuana use, and how these visual representations differ amongst liberal and conservative news sites, finding that the political ideology of the news outlet largely influences the visual stereotyping of marijuana users. The study concludes by considering both the legal and cultural implications of how mainstream news visually represents marijuana use, considering how persistent decades-old representations were largely perpetuated rather than challenged in light of legalization efforts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antea Paviotti

While an incredible series of twists characterized the fight against COVID-19 in Burundi and its narration, references to God have never been missing in the narratives around the disease. Trust in God represented one of the pillars of the government’s narrative, next to an attitude of ‘denialism’, and the fight against ‘fake news’. This article analyses the evolution of the narration of COVID-19 on Twitter during the first three phases of the fight against the disease, focusing on the use of the religious narrative. Within Burundi’s contemporary sociopolitical context, analysis of these narratives on social media best demonstrates how the fight against COVID-19 in Burundi was a fight for the control of the narrative, and by extension for political legitimacy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
Salvatore Vilella ◽  
Mirko Lai ◽  
Daniela Paolotti ◽  
Giancarlo Ruffo

In this work, we apply network science to analyse almost 6 M tweets about the debate around immigration in Italy, collected between 2018 and 2019, when many related events captured media outlets’ attention. Our aim was to better understand the dynamics underlying the interactions on social media on such a delicate and divisive topic, which are the actors that are leading the discussion, and whose messages have the highest chance to reach out the majority of the accounts that are following the debate. The debate on Twitter is represented with networks; we provide a characterisation of the main clusters by looking at the highest in-degree nodes in each one and by analysing the text of the tweets of all the users. We find a strongly segregated network which shows an explicit interplay with the Italian political and social landscape, that however seems to be disconnected from the actual geographical distribution and relocation of migrants. In addition, quite surprisingly, the influencers and political leaders that apparently lead the debate, do not necessarily belong to the clusters that include the majority of nodes: we find evidence of the existence of a ‘silent majority’ that is more connected to accounts who expose a more positive stance toward migrants, while leaders whose stance is negative attract apparently more attention. Finally, we see that the community structure clearly affects the diffusion of content (URLs) by identifying the presence of both local and global trends of diffusion, and that communities tend to display segregation regardless of their political and cultural background. In particular, we observe that messages that spread widely in the two largest clusters, whose most popular members are also notoriously at the opposite sides of the political spectrum, have a very low chance to get visibility into other clusters.


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