Reactions to China-linked Fake News: Experimental Evidence from Taiwan

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Fin Bauer ◽  
Kimberly L. Wilson

Abstract China is accused of conducting disinformation campaigns on Taiwan's social media. Existing studies on foreign interventions in democratic societies predict that such disinformation campaigns should lead to increasing partisan polarization within Taiwan. We argue that a backlash effect, making Taiwan's citizens more united against China, is equally plausible. We conduct a survey experiment exposing participants to a real-life rumour and rebuttal to test these competing hypotheses. We find, at best, mixed evidence for polarization. Although neither rumour nor rebuttal mention China, there is consistent evidence of backlash against China. Most notably, participants across the political spectrum are more inclined to support Taiwanese independence after viewing the rumour rebuttal. These findings indicate that citizens may put aside partisanship when confronted with false news that is plausibly linked to an external actor. We conclude by discussing the broader applicability of our theory and implications for cross-Strait relations.

Author(s):  
Richard Rogers ◽  
Sal Hagen

The publication of the study elicited reactions, especially on Twitter, where questions arose about the use of the notion of junk news, rather than ‘pulp news’, among other points. The analogy to junk food is emphasised. There was also the question of symmetry, and the treatment of both ends of the political spectrum. Why is the new populist right identified as the purveyors of extreme content? We found a polarised Dutch media landscape where hyperpartisan (and to a lesser extent conspiracy) content from new populist right (rather than the left or other orientations) circulates well on social media. Unlike in the US during the initial Trump insurgency, mainstream news in the Netherlands still outperforms what was hitherto known as ‘fake news’, across all platforms.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022110300
Author(s):  
Andrea Pereira ◽  
Elizabeth Harris ◽  
Jay J. Van Bavel

We test three competing theoretical accounts invoked to explain the rise and spread of political (mis)information. We compare the ideological values hypothesis (people prefer news that bolster their values and worldviews); the confirmation bias hypothesis (people prefer news that fit their preexisting stereotypical knowledge); and the political identity hypothesis (people prefer news that allow them to believe positive things about political ingroup members and negative things about political outgroup members). In three experiments ( N = 1,420), participants from the United States read news describing actions perpetrated by their political ingroup or outgroup. Consistent with the political identity hypothesis, Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their ingroup or the value-undermining behavior of their outgroup. Belief was positively correlated with willingness to share on social media in all conditions, but Republicans were more likely to believe and want to share apolitical fake news.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Pereira ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel ◽  
Elizabeth Ann Harris

Political misinformation, often called “fake news”, represents a threat to our democracies because it impedes citizens from being appropriately informed. Evidence suggests that fake news spreads more rapidly than real news—especially when it contains political content. The present article tests three competing theoretical accounts that have been proposed to explain the rise and spread of political (fake) news: (1) the ideology hypothesis— people prefer news that bolsters their values and worldviews; (2) the confirmation bias hypothesis—people prefer news that fits their pre-existing stereotypical knowledge; and (3) the political identity hypothesis—people prefer news that allows their political in-group to fulfill certain social goals. We conducted three experiments in which American participants read news that concerned behaviors perpetrated by their political in-group or out-group and measured the extent to which they believed the news (Exp. 1, Exp. 2, Exp. 3), and were willing to share the news on social media (Exp. 2 and 3). Results revealed that Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group, supporting a political identity hypothesis. However, although belief was positively correlated with willingness to share on social media in all conditions, we also found that Republicans were more likely to believe and want to share apolitical fake new. We discuss the implications for theoretical explanations of political beliefs and application of these concepts in in polarized political system.


Stan Rzeczy ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 99-121
Author(s):  
Thari Jungen

In February 2016, the Institute for Falsification researched the production of fake news in Veles, North Macedonia. Focusing on a specific hoax distributed from Veles via social media, this article analyses the political and aesthetic effects of fake news. It argues that fakes and hoaxes (mis)use established references to renew pre-existing discourses, media techniques, and symbols. The present definition of fakes is therefore insufficient for these practices.


Author(s):  
Kristy A. Hesketh

This chapter explores the Spiritualist movement and its rapid growth due to the formation of mass media and compares these events with the current rise of fake news in the mass media. The technology of cheaper publications created a media platform that featured stories about Spiritualist mediums and communications with the spirit world. These articles were published in newspapers next to regular news creating a blurred line between real and hoax news stories. Laws were later created to address instances of fraud that occurred in the medium industry. Today, social media platforms provide a similar vessel for the spread of fake news. Online fake news is published alongside legitimate news reports leaving readers unable to differentiate between real and fake articles. Around the world countries are actioning initiatives to address the proliferation of false news to prevent the spread of misinformation. This chapter compares the parallels between these events, how hoaxes and fake news begin and spread, and examines the measures governments are taking to curb the growth of misinformation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019685992097715
Author(s):  
James Morris

“Fake News” has been a frequent topic in the last couple of years. The phenomenon has particularly been cited with regards to the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States. The creation of “post truth” reports that are disseminated via the Web and social media has been treated as something new, a product of the digital age, and a reason to be concerned about the effects of online technology. However, this paper argues that fake news should be considered as part of a continuum with forms of media that went before in the 20th Century, and the general trend of postmodernity detailed by Baudrillard. The simulation of communications media and mass reproduction was already evident and has merely progressed in the digital age rather than the latter providing a wholly new context. The paper concludes by asking whether the political havoc caused by fake news has an antidote, when it appears to be a by-product of media simulacra’s inherent lack of connection to the real. In a communications landscape where the misrepresentations of the so-called “Mainstream Media” are decried using even more questionable “memes” on social media, is there any possibility for truth?


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 205630512096382
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Ferrari

This article investigates user-generated political satire, focusing in particular on one genre: fake political accounts. Such fakes, created as social media profiles, satirize politicians or political organizations by impersonating them. Through interviews with a sample of Italian fake accounts creators, I explore how the fakes navigate their fakeness vis-à-vis the affordances of social network sites and their publics. First, I map how the publics of the fake accounts react to the satire along two axes: one referring to the public’s understanding of the satire and the other to the uses that the public makes of the satire. Second, I show how fakeness is part of everyday interactions in networked publics. Third, I argue for fakeness as a playful, powerful, and sincere critique of the political and its pretense to authenticity. By focusing on fake political accounts, this article provides insights on the place of fakeness in online communication beyond the debate around “fake news.”


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-306
Author(s):  
Supriyadi Ahmad ◽  
Husnul Hotimah

Abstract:Hoaks originating from "focus pocus" originally from Latin "hoc est corpus", means false news. Hoaks also comes from English, namely Hoax, which means fake news. Terminologically, hoax is a false message in an attempt to deceive or influence readers or dealers to believe something, even though the source of the news delivered is completely baseless. Ahead of the Legislative and Presidential Elections in Indonesia 2019, hoaks have entered the political sphere which can threaten the nation's unity and unity. In the perspective of Islamic thought, hoax is a public lie or dissemination of information that is misleading and even defame the other party. The hoax maker is classified as a party that harms others and the hoaxes made are categorized as ifki hadith or false news. Therefore, the perpetrators were threatened with very severe torture. In a positive legal perspective, hoax is a charge of false and misleading news, a content that creates hatred or hostility of certain individuals and/or groups based on ethnicity, religion, race, and between groups (SARA). The culprit can be punished with a maximum of ten years in prison.Keywords: Hoax, Islamic Studies, Positive Law. Abstrak:Hoaks yang berasal dari “hocus pocus” aslinya dari bahasa Latin “hoc est corpus”, berarti berita bohong. Hoaks juga berasal dari Bahasa Inggris Hoax, yang berarti berita palsu. Secara terminologis, hoaks merupakan sebuah pemberitaan palsu dalam usaha untuk menipu atau mempengaruhi pembaca atau pengedar untuk mempercayai sesuatu, padahal sumber berita yang disampaikan adalah palsu tidak berdasar sama sekali. Menjelang Pemilu Legislatif dan Pemilu Presiden di Indonesia tahun 2019, hoaks telah memasuki ranah politik yang dapat mengancam persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa. Dalam perspektif pemikiran Islam, hoaks adalah pembohongan publik atau penyebaran informasi yang menyesatkan dan bahkan menistakan pihak lain. Pembuat hoaks digolongkan sebagai pihak yang merugikan orang lain dan hoaks yang dibuatnya dikategorikan sebagai haditsul ifki atau berita bohong. Oleh karena itu, penyebarnya diancam dengan siksa yang sangat berat. Dalam perspektif hukum Positif, hoaks merupakan muatan berita bohong dan menyesatkan, muatan yang menimbulkan rasa kebencian atau permusuhan individu dan/atau kelompok masyarakat tertentu berdasarkan atas suku, agama, ras, dan antar golongan (SARA). Pelakunya dapat dihukum dengan penjara setinggi-tingginya sepuluh tahun.Kata Kunci: Hoaks, Kajian Islam, Hukum Positif


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mateusz Szczepański ◽  
Marek Pawlicki ◽  
Rafał Kozik ◽  
Michał Choraś

AbstractThe ubiquity of social media and their deep integration in the contemporary society has granted new ways to interact, exchange information, form groups, or earn money—all on a scale never seen before. Those possibilities paired with the widespread popularity contribute to the level of impact that social media display. Unfortunately, the benefits brought by them come at a cost. Social Media can be employed by various entities to spread disinformation—so called ‘Fake News’, either to make a profit or influence the behaviour of the society. To reduce the impact and spread of Fake News, a diverse array of countermeasures were devised. These include linguistic-based approaches, which often utilise Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Deep Learning (DL). However, as the latest advancements in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) domain show, the model’s high performance is no longer enough. The explainability of the system’s decision is equally crucial in real-life scenarios. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to present a novel explainability approach in BERT-based fake news detectors. This approach does not require extensive changes to the system and can be attached as an extension for operating detectors. For this purposes, two Explainable Artificial Intelligence (xAI) techniques, Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME) and Anchors, will be used and evaluated on fake news data, i.e., short pieces of text forming tweets or headlines. This focus of this paper is on the explainability approach for fake news detectors, as the detectors themselves were part of previous works of the authors.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Sirlin ◽  
Ziv Epstein ◽  
Antonio Alonso Arechar ◽  
David Gertler Rand

It has been widely argued that social media users with low digital literacy – who lack fluency with basic technological concepts related to the internet – are more likely to fall for online misinformation, but surprisingly little research has examined this association empirically. In a large survey experiment involving true and false news posts about politics and COVID-19, we find that digital literacy is indeed an important predictor of the ability to tell truth from falsehood when judging headline accuracy. However, digital literacy is not a significant predictor of users’ intentions to share true versus false headlines. This observation reinforces the disconnect between accuracy judgments and sharing intentions, and suggests that interventions beyond merely improving digital literacy are likely needed to reduce the spread of misinformation online.


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