scholarly journals SOCIAL COLLECTIVES AND NETWORKED MOVEMENT: DIFFUSION DYNAMICS IN THE GERMAN-SPEAKING #FRIDAYSFORFUTURE NETWORK ON TWITTER

Author(s):  
Xixuan Zhang

Initiated by Greta Thunberg and carried by students who skip school every Friday to call for climate justice and the safeguarding of their future, FridaysForFuture emerged and proliferated along with both recognition and criticism. This study analyzes diffusion dynamics and connectivity formation in the German-speaking #FridaysForFuture network from its emergence to its expansion. Based on a diffusion network and cascade analysis (N = 238,458), it presents how different diffusion dynamics facilitated the emergence of #FridaysForFuture on Twitter. According to findings, FFF activists and organizations are the leading intermediaries and activators for movement diffusion. Most of the tweets in #FridaysForFuture are about activism, introducing the movement, and calling for action. During the development, news, liberal left, and right-wing actors joined, bringing discussions about the movement, the youth, and leading activists to the Twittersphere. While cascades by FFF clusters were more likely to gain attention and spread farther, faster, and deeper, cascades activated by right-wing actors were greater, but not broader, faster, or deeper. In contrast to the reciprocal reposting activities between left-wing and activist groups, right-wing actors are relatively isolated, expressing criticism of the movement. This study shows that the German-speaking #FridaysForFuture network serves as a facilitator of offline movements and features a public arena of political discourses. Through the mobilization endeavors of FFF clusters, engagement of left-wing hubs, and the counter-public of right-wing actors attacking the movement, it gained continuity and momentum to flourish.

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-185
Author(s):  
Sung Min Han ◽  
Mi Jeong Shin

AbstractIn this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H Costello ◽  
Shauna Bowes ◽  
Sean T. Stevens ◽  
Irwin Waldman ◽  
Scott O. Lilienfeld

Authoritarianism has been the subject of scientific inquiry for nearly a century, yet the vast majority of authoritarianism research has focused on right-wing authoritarianism. In the present studies, we investigate the nature, structure, and nomological network of left-wing authoritarianism (LWA), a construct famously known as “the Loch Ness Monster” of political psychology. We iteratively construct a measure and data-driven conceptualization of LWA across six samples (N = 7,258) and conduct quantitative tests of LWA’s relations with over 50 authoritarianism-related variables. We find that left- and right-wing authoritarianism reflect a shared constellation of personality traits, cognitive features, beliefs, and values that might be considered the “heart” of authoritarianism. Our results also indicate that LWA powerfully predicts several critical, real-world outcomes, including participation in political violence. We conclude that a movement away from exclusively right-wing conceptualizations of authoritarianism may be required to illuminate authoritarianism’s central features, conceptual breadth, and psychological appeal.


Author(s):  
Boris I. Kolonitskii

The article examines the cultural forms of legitimation / delegitimation of authority of the Provisional Government. Particular attention is paid to the personal authority of Alexander Kerensky, including rhetorical (persuasive) devices and visual images which underlay the tactics of praising or condemning him. As the main source, the article uses the newspapers of A.A. Suvorin, namely Malen'kaya gazeta [Little newspaper], Narodnaya gazeta [People’s newspaper], Rus' [Rus], Novaya Rus' [New Rus]. These newspapers are compared with resolutions, letters and diaries, and with publications in other periodicals. The study clarifies some aspects of political isolation of the Provisional Government in the fall of 1917. By this time, the propaganda attack on Kerensky was conducted not only by the Bolsheviks and other left-wing groups but also by the right-wing and conservative publications. The propaganda of the left- and right-wing opponents was significantly different but they had a point of contact: both of them created the image of the “traitor” who was unworthy to remain in power.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke March

This article represents one of the few systematic comparisons of left-wing populism with other populisms. Focussing on the manifestos of six British parties in 1999–2015, the findings confirm that left-wing populists are more socio-economically focussed, more inclusionary but less populist than right-wing populists. The article makes four main substantive contributions. First, empirically, it shows that the much-touted populist Zeitgeist in the United Kingdom barely exists. Second, methodologically, it provides a nuanced disaggregated populism scale that has advantages over existing methods because it can effectively distinguish populist from non-populist parties and analyse degrees of populism. Third, theoretically, it shows that host ideology is more important than populism per se in explaining differences between left and right populisms. Fourth is a broader theoretical point: what is often called ‘thin’ or ‘mainstream’ populism’ is not populism but demoticism (closeness to ordinary people). Therefore, analysts should not label parties ‘populist’ just because their rhetoric is demotic.


2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1407-1429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bernardi ◽  
James Adams

Issue ownership theory posits that when social welfare is electorally salient, left-wing parties gain public support by rhetorically emphasizing social welfare issues. There is less research, however, on whether left-wing governing parties benefit from increasing social welfare spending. That is, it is not known whether leftist governments gain from acting on the issues they rhetorically emphasize. This article presents arguments that voters will not react to governments’ social welfare rhetoric, and reviews the conflicting arguments about how government support responds to social welfare spending. It then reports time-series, cross-sectional analyses of data on government support, governments’ social welfare rhetoric and social welfare spending from Britain, Spain and the United States, that support the prediction that government rhetoric has no effects. The article estimates, however, that increased social welfare spending sharply depresses support for both left- and right-wing governments. These findings highlight a strategic dilemma for left-wing governments, which lose public support when they act on their social welfare rhetoric by increasing welfare spending.


2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Radkiewicz

Abstract The terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ cannot describe two extremes of a single ideological dimension. Instead, a bi-dimensional model including socio-cultural and socio-economic facets of leftism/rightism is postulated. Several studies conducted in the USA and Western Europe show a relative coherence of left-wing and right-wing orientation regarding both dimensions, whereas very diverse patterns can be found in the countries of Eastern Europe. In Poland cultural and economic leftism-rightism seem to be clearly negatively related. The general hypothesis in this paper claims that such ideological inconsistency is a product of coherence at the level of preferences for values, i.e. covariance within individualistic (Openness to change and Self-enhancement) as well as within collectivist values (Conservation and Self-transcendence). Based on a survey study (N = 750) conducted on a representative sample of Poles, it was shown that preferences for values made up two distinct dimensions: Openness to change vs Conservation, and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence. They are positively related but have fundamentally different relationships with political self-identification and ideology.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-221
Author(s):  
Malika Sh. Tovsultanova ◽  
Rustam A. Tovsultanov ◽  
Lilia N. Galimova

This is the first paper in Russian historiography dedicated to the struggle of left and right groups in the Turkish army on the eve of a military coup on March 12, 1971. By 1970, an alliance of leftist intellectuals and officers was formed, led by the editor of the Devrim newspaper, Dogan Avjioglu and one of the organizers of the 1960 coup, a retired lieutenant general Jemal Madanoglu, received the conditional name of the organization of national revolutionaries. The members of the organization sought to approve the socialist system of the bassist type in the country and outlined the number of military coups March 9, 1971. However, the death of one and the opportunist position of two other leaders of the military wing led to the failure of the attempt of a leftist coup. On the contrary, on March 12, 1971, a right-wing military coup took place in Turkey. In the course of subsequent repressions, a powerful blow was dealt to the left groups in the army and in Turkish society as a whole. In an effort to end the repression and achieve consensus in society, moderately leftist forces led by B. Ejevit entered into a coalition with their opponents religious conservatives led by N. Erbakan.


2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (8) ◽  
pp. 1661-1685 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey Crisman-Cox

I examine how the chief executive’s political party affects domestic terrorism within democracies. In particular, I contribute to the literature on terrorism within democracies by arguing that domestic terrorist groups prefer attacking when right-wing parties hold office. I find evidence for this claim as well as results indicating that left-wing executives are more likely to cut deals with domestic terrorist groups. These trends suggest that domestic terrorist groups attack during right-wing governance to build their reputation and reduce violence during left-wing governance to appear moderate and get a deal. These results contribute to literatures on differences between left and right parties, how political institutions affect terrorism, and differences between domestic and transnational terrorism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 146-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Huber ◽  
Christian H. Schimpf

This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy. The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minority rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that the association between populist parties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we expect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that, when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from its host ideology.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noa Katabi ◽  
Hadas Simon ◽  
Sharon Yakim ◽  
Inbal Ravreby ◽  
Yaara Yeshurun

Recent political polarization has highlighted the extent to which individuals with opposing views experience ongoing events in markedly different ways. In this study, we explored the neural mechanisms underpinning this phenomenon. We conducted functional magnetic resonance image (fMRI) scanning right- and left-wing participants watching political videos just before the 2019 elections in Israel. Behavioral results demonstrated significant differences between left- and right-wing participants in their interpretation of the videos' content. Neuroimaging results revealed partisanship-dependent differences in both high-order regions and early-motor and somato-sensory regions, although no such differences were found with regard to neutral content. Moreover, we found that most of the political content was more potent in synchronizing participants with right-wing views, and that this synchronization was observed already in early visual and auditory cortices. These results suggest that political polarization is not limited to higher-order processes as previously thought, but rather emerges already in motor and sensory regions.


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