scholarly journals Ownership Patterns and Control of Top 100 Turkish Listed Companies

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 192
Author(s):  
Aree Saeed Mustafa ◽  
Ayoib Che-Ahmad ◽  
Sitraselvi a/p Chandren
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Common Control ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
And Control

This study aims to highlight the importance of protecting investors’ rights, and particularly those of minority shareholders. This study addresses the predominant control-ownership structure of the top 100 firms listed in Bursa Istanbul (BI) using the data for 2015. It shows the most common control-ownership structure within business groups, in which shareholders exercise control over a group of firms and maintain a small stake of firms’ equities. Turkish firms are categorised with highly concentrated ownership and families’ being the dominant shareholders owning more than 80% of all publically listed firms in BI. The study results indicate that the divergence between cash rights and control rights (wedge)in the top 100 Turkish firms is mainly achieved through pyramidal-ownership structure, dual class shares, and cross-ownership at about 41%, 40% and 11%, respectively, while approximately 8% of firms do not use wedge. Hence, wedge exacerbates Type II Agency Problems. This paper calls for future research to study the environment of wedge for Turkish firms listed in BI.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and implications for minority shareholders in Turkey

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Burcin Yurtoglu
Keyword(s):  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Holding Companies ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
And Control

This paper reports on the ownership and control structures of publicly listed firms in Turkey using data from 2001. While holding companies and non-financial firms are the most frequent owners at the direct level, families ultimately own more than 80 percent of all publicly listed firms in Turkey. Pyramids and dual class shares are common devices that families use to separate their cash-flow rights from control rights. We also show that such deviations result in significantly lower market to book ratios suggesting large agency costs because of the conflict of interests between controlling families and minority shareholders

scholarly journals Estrutura Piramidal de Controle, Emissão de Duas Classes de Ações e Desempenho Financeiro das Empresas Brasileiras

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lelis Pedro Andrade ◽  
Aureliano Angel Bressan ◽  
Robert Aldo Iquiapaza
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Pyramidal Structure ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class

This study aims to identify whether there is a relationship between dual class shares issuance, pyramidal ownership structure and firms’ financial performance in the Brazilian market. To this end, univariate tests and panel data analysis were applied in a sample for the 2000 to 2012 period. The results indicate that there is a significant and negative relationship between dual class shares issuance and firm’s financial performance, regardless of whether there is a pyramidal ownership structure in firm. In other hand, we find positive effects from pyramidal structure on the firm’s financial performance, conditioned that there is no dual class shares issuance, and also on the absence of an excessive number of levels until the ultimate controlling shareholder in the pyramidal structure. These evidences suggest that the voting power matters to improve firms’ financial performance; and that there are benefits and costs from pyramidal ownership structure in Brazilian firms.

Ownership structure and analysts’ forecast properties: a study of Chinese listed firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sun Liu
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between ownership structure and the properties of analysts’ forecasts in China’s unique corporate setting. Design/methodology/approach Multiple regression models were used to examine the influence of ownership structure mechanisms on analysts’ forecast properties for listed Chinese firms during the period 2008-2012. Findings The paper finds that analysts’ forecast accuracy is higher for listed firms with high levels of foreign ownership and managerial ownership. However, the complex pyramidal ownership structure could make corporate information less transparent and then increase the complexity of forecasting; hence, it results in less precise analysts’ forecasts. Interestingly, the relationship between state ownership and analysts’ forecast properties appears to be non-linear (an inverted U-shape), and the inflection point at which the relationship becomes negative occurs at state ownership over 45 per cent. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the influence of ownership structure mechanisms on the properties of analysts’ forecasts in an emerging market, and the findings provide some insight on how the properties of analysts’ forecast might be shaped by certain ownership and control features in the context of concentrated state ownership and complex pyramidal ownership structure.

The impact of corporate governance and ownership structure reforms on earnings quality in China

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu_Dong Ji ◽  
Kamran Ahmed ◽  
Wei Lu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005. Design/methodology/approach – This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression. Findings – This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality. Research limitations/implications – Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country. Practical implications – The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China. Originality/value – This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.

scholarly journals Dividend policy and ownership structure: A study of Russian dual-class stock companies.

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irina Berezinets ◽  
Yulia Ilina ◽  
Liudmila Alekseeva
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Dividend Payments ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explores the relationship between ownership structure and dividend policy in Russian public companies with dual-class shares. The sample includes all companies issuing both ordinary (voting) and preferred (non-voting) shares traded on the Russian Trading System (RTS) in the period of 2003-2009. Using panel data and employing both linear and nonlinear regression modeling approach, we tested the relationship between ownership structure and dividend payout. One of the major conclusions is the existence of a negative relationship between the dividend payout on ordinary shares and institutional ownership, as well as between dividend payout on ordinary shares and offshore ownership. Unlike for ordinary shares, ownership structure is not related to dividend payments on preferred shares. Dividend policy on preferred shares is, instead, essentially related to a company’s performance.

scholarly journals Corporate Disclosure, Ownership Structure And Earnings Management: The Case Of French-Listed Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 1493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Lakhal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Management Measures ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance devices on earnings management for French-listed firms. Particularly, it examines the relationship between corporate disclosure practices, ownership structure features and earnings management by French managers. Results show that the relationship between earnings management measures and disclosure scores is negative suggesting that less transparent firms are likely to engage in earnings management practices. The findings also show that families, institutional investors and multiple large shareholders negatively influence earnings management, and hence, act as good corporate governance devices to limit managerial discretion. This paper shed light on the monitoring role of corporate disclosures and ownership structure in the French context where minority shareholders interests are less protected than in common law countries.

scholarly journals Pyramidal Ownership and Company Value: Evidence from Polish Listed Companies

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-498
Author(s):  
Maria Aluchna ◽  
Tomasz Kuszewski
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Company Value ◽  
Warsaw Stock Exchange ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
Majority Shareholder

This paper examines the effects of pyramidal ownership. Using the sample of 162 non-financial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange during the period 2010-2014, we verify the relation between the adoption of a pyramidal structure and company value. Specifically, we show that the link between pyramidal ownership and company value is more complex than previously thought addressing the aspect of ownership concentration and dual class shares. Our results indicate that the use of pyramids is associated with a higher value measured by Tobin’s Q, supporting the efficient monitoring hypothesis. Contrary to our expectations the combination of pyramidal ownership and dual class shares is correlated with lower Q. Finally, while the adoption of a pyramid by a majority shareholder does not impact firm value, the combination of a pyramid, ownership concentration and dual class shares is associated with higher Q. This finding suggests that the blockholder ownership outweighs the possible cost of excessive disproportionate ownership and that pyramids and dual class shares have different effects on company value.

scholarly journals The effect of ownership structure on dividend policy: evidence from Turkey

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Basil Al-Najjar ◽  
Erhan Kilincarslan
Keyword(s):  
Family Involvement ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Dividend Yield ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy of listed firms in Turkey. Particularly, it attempts to uncover the effects of family involvement (through ownership and board representation), non-family blockholders (foreign investors, domestic financial institutions and the state) and minority shareholders on dividend decisions in the post-2003 period as it witnesses the major economic and structural reforms. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses alternative dividend policy measures (the probability of paying dividends, dividend payout ratio and dividend yield) and uses appropriate regression techniques (logit and tobit models) to test the research hypotheses, by focusing on a recent large panel dataset of 264 Istanbul Stock Exchange-listed firms (non-financial and non-utility) over a 10-year period 2003-2012. Findings The empirical results show that foreign and state ownership are associated with a less likelihood of paying dividends, while other ownership variables (family involvement, domestic financial institutions and minority shareholders) are insignificant in affecting the probability of paying dividends. However, all the ownership variables have a significantly negative impact on dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. Hence, the paper presents consistent evidence that increasing ownership of foreign investors and the state in general reduces the need for paying dividends in the Turkish market. Research limitations/implications Because of the absence of empirical research on how ownership structure may affect dividend policy and the data unavailability for earlier periods in Turkey, the paper cannot make comparison between the pre-and post-2003 periods. Nevertheless, this paper can be a valuable benchmark for further research. Practical implications The paper reveals that cash dividends are not used as a monitoring mechanism by investors in Turkey and the expropriation argument through dividends for Turkish families is relatively weak. Accordingly, the findings of this paper may benefit policymakers, investors and fellow researchers, who seek useful guidance from relevant literature. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the link between ownership structure and dividend policy in Turkey after the implementation of major reforms in 2003.

Dual-Class Shares and Audit Pricing: Evidence from the Canadian Markets

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samer Khalil ◽  
Michel L. Magnan ◽  
Jeffrey R. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Dual Class ◽  
And Control

SUMMARY: This paper investigates whether audit fees vary with the wedge between cash flow rights and control rights arising from the presence of dual-class share structures. Dual-class shares exist in firms having two or more classes of shares with disproportionate voting rights. They affect audit fees through their effect on the supply for audit services. External auditors conduct wider (narrower) scope audits depending on whether dual-class shares increase (decrease) audit risk and/or auditor business risk. Wider (narrower) scope audits are more (less) costly for the auditors and for their clients. This paper documents a positive association between audit fees and the wedge between cash flow rights and control rights in a sample of Canadian firms during 2004. It extends current research by investigating whether dominant shareholdings affect audit pricing, and by examining audit pricing in Canada over a time period that witnessed significant changes in corporate governance.

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