The Map and the Territory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Munro

“I didn’t even know that was a question I could ask.” That remark from a student in an introductory philosophy course points to the primary body of knowledge philosophy produces: a detailed record of what we do not know. When we come to view a philosophical question as well-formed and worthwhile, it is a way of providing as specific a description as we can of something we do not know. The creation or discovery of such questions is like noting a landmark in a territory we’re exploring. When we identify reasonable, if conflicting, answers to this question, we are noting routes to and away from that landmark. And since proposed answers to philosophical questions often contain implied answers to other philosophical questions, those routes connect different landmarks. The result is a kind of map: a map of the unknown. Yet when it comes to the unknown, and all the more so to its cartography, might it not make sense to take our orientation from Borges: What’s in question here, with respect to philosophical questions, is an incipient, unlocalizable threshold—a terrain neither subjective, nor entirely objective, one neither of representation, nor finally of simple immediacy—there where the map perceptibly fails to diverge from the territory. Amid Inclemencies of weather and fringed, as per Borges, with ruin and singular figures—with Animals and Beggars—what’s enclosed is an attempt to chart the contours of this curious immanence.

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 181-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
ASTRID HEIDEMANN LASSEN ◽  
SUNA LØWE NIELSEN

In spite of a growing body of knowledge on the importance of innovation and change, firms still experience great difficulties in being continuously entrepreneurial. This article addresses reasons for such difficulties. Building on a conceptual discussion, the article first identifies seemingly opposing forces found at the core of corporate entrepreneurship. These forces are in the article described in terms of 'creative destruction' and 'controlled adaptation'. Both forces are identified as being essential to successful corporate entrepreneurship, but set very different agendas, which can be expected to give rise to tension. Next, a case study of a Danish high-tech SME is introduced in order to identify patterns of practices which are potentially supportive of the creation of balance between the seemingly opposing forces. Based on this, the article introduces a framework for discussion of the two forces and the consequences of how they are approached managerially.


Author(s):  
Barbara Russo ◽  
Marco Scotto ◽  
Alberto Sillitti ◽  
Giancarlo Succi

An informed introduction to AMs requires the ability to determine whether and when AMs are better than traditional software development methodologies. The risk is that AMs are considered just like another tool. Altogether to accredit AMs we need to show the qualified evidence of their effectiveness, performance, productivity, in the different contexts where they can be introduced. This analysis is difficult as such effectiveness varies with the development environment, depending on several aspects, such as skills, resources and culture. However, this analysis is a key ingredient for the creation of a comprehensive body of knowledge on AMs.


Sánchez and Sanchez have selected, edited, translated, and written an introduction to some of the most influential texts in 20th century Mexican philosophy. Together, these texts reveal and give shape to a unique and robust tradition that will certainly challenge and complicate traditional conceptions of philosophy. The texts collected here are organized chronologically and represent a period of Mexican thought and culture that emerges out of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and cultimates in la filosofía de lo mexicano (the philosophy of Mexicanness), which reached its peak in the 1950s. Though the selections respond to a variety of philosophical questions and themes and will be of interest to a wide range of readers, they represent a tendency to take seriously the question of Mexican national identity as a philosophical question—an issue that is complicated by Mexico’s indigenous and European ancestries, its history of colonialism, and its growing dependency on foreign money and culture. More than an attempt simply to describe the national character, however, the texts gathered here represent an optimistic period in Mexican philosophy that aimed to affirm Mexican philosophy as a valuable, if not urgent, contribution to universal thought and culture.


Author(s):  
Jacob Brix ◽  
Sanna Tuurnas ◽  
Nanna Møller Mortensen

This chapter builds a conceptual model for how inter-organizational relationships can be built to enable the creation of learning across administrative and organizational boundaries. The conceptual model is discussed in relation to the body of knowledge concerning co-production and the new roles required of organizational members and frontline staff when services cut across these boundaries. The argument is that it is becoming increasingly important for professional co-producers and their organizations to identify, analyze, and improve the opportunity space for co-production when this opportunity space unfolds beyond one organization.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (142) ◽  
pp. 345
Author(s):  
José Maurício Carvalho

Resumo: Esse artigo examina como Jaspers aborda a totalidade da História e a importância desta questão. Esclarece que tentativas de estabelecer tal unidade pelos fatos empíricos estão fadadas ao fracasso, porque a totalidade somente pode ser buscada como realidade espiritual, ou criação do homem. Assim con­siderada, tal totalidade é resultado da comunicação entre os seres humanos. Isso significa que como jornada humana no tempo, a História não se completa nunca, pois está em processo. Por consequente, indicar-lhe uma meta ou assinalar-lhe uma unidade perfeita significaria o fim da História. Com efeito, todas as repre­sentações da unidade são ideias e se engana quem quiser olhá-las como mais do que isso. Assim é, porque o Uno transcende a origem e a meta da História, caracterizando o problema como questão filosófica fundamental, que envolve a noção de realidade.Abstract: This article examines how Jaspers addresses the whole of history and the importance of the issue. It clarifies that attempts to establish such a unity by empirical facts are doomed to failure, because wholeness can only be sought as spiritual reality, or the creation of man. Thus considered, wholeness is the result of the communication between human beings. It means that, as a human journey in time, history is never completed, since it is in process. Therefore, indicating a goal or a perfect unity would mean the end of History. Indeed, all the representations of unity are ideas and should not be considered otherwise. This is so because the One transcends the origin and goal of History, characte­rizing the problem as a fundamental philosophical question that involves the notion of reality.


2007 ◽  
Vol 60 ◽  
pp. 69-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Goldie

There is a frequently asked philosophical question about our ability to grasp and to predict the thoughts and feelings of other people, an ability that is these days sometimes given the unfortunate name of ‘mentalising’ or ‘mind-reading’–I say ‘unfortunate’ because it makes appear mysterious what is not mysterious. Some philosophers and psychologists argue that this ability is grounded in possession of some kind of theory or body of knowledge about how minds work. Others argue that it is grounded in our capacity to take on in imagination the perspective of others; sometimes called simulating or centrally imagining another person, we entertain in our minds what the other person is thinking about and feeling: if he is thinking ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’, then we think ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’, and if he is feeling angry with someone, then we imagine feeling angry with that person. We thus recreate as well as we can in our imagination his mental life as it is ‘from the inside’. We can do this in two different ways: I can put myself in the other's shoes, simply imagining what I would do were I in his situation, or I can empathise with him, imagining being him, taking on in imagination his relevant traits and other mental dispositions; I will from now on use the term perspective-shifting to cover both of these imaginative activities.


2007 ◽  
Vol 60 ◽  
pp. 69-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Goldie

There is a frequently asked philosophical question about our ability to grasp and to predict the thoughts and feelings of other people, an ability that is these days sometimes given the unfortunate name of ‘mentalising’ or ‘mind-reading’—I say ‘unfortunate’ because it makes appear mysterious what is not mysterious. Some philosophers and psychologists argue that this ability is grounded in possession of some kind of theory or body of knowledge about how minds work. Others argue that it is grounded in our capacity to take on in imagination the perspective of others; sometimes called simulating or centrally imagining another person, we entertain in our minds what the other person is thinking about and feeling: if he is thinking ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’, then we think ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’, and if he is feeling angry with someone, then we imagine feeling angry with that person. We thus recreate as well as we can in our imagination his mental life as it is ‘from the inside’. We can do this in two different ways: I can put myself in the other's shoes, simply imagining what I would do were I in his situation, or I can empathise with him, imagining being him, taking on in imagination his relevant traits and other mental dispositions; I will from now on use the term perspective-shifting to cover both of these imaginative activities.


Author(s):  
Luciano Floridi

There are many ways of understanding the nature of philosophical questions. One may consider their morphology, semantics, relevance, or scope. This chapter introduces a different approach, based on the kind of informational resources required to answer them. The result is a definition of philosophical questions as questions whose answers are in principle open to informed, rational, and honest disagreement, ultimate but not absolute, closed under further questioning, possibly constrained by empirical and logico-mathematical resources, but requiring noetic resources to be answered. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the consequences of this definition for a conception of philosophy as the study (or ‘science’) of open questions, which uses conceptual design to analyse and answer them. That is the topic of Chapter 2.


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