International Real Estate Review

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-523
Author(s):  
Fukuju Yamazaki ◽  
◽  
Taisuke Sadayuki: ◽  

Condominium reconstruction involves a difficult collective decision-making process among owners, which prevents older condominiums from being redeveloped efficiently. This paper aims to examine whether this type of collective action cost exists for Japanese condominiums. First, we discuss in the literature review and an empirical analysis that the number of units in a condominium complex is an appropriate proxy for the collective action problem. Then, by using the rent in the price function to control for housing characteristics, we show that the number of units has a negative impact on condominium price. Furthermore, the price function for condominiums is compared with that for single-owner rental apartments that are free from the collective action problem. The estimation results show that the number of units only negatively affects the price of condominiums and that the depreciation rate for the condominium price is greater than that for single-owner apartments. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that a significant cost is associated with collective action problems in condominium reconstruction. Lastly, we conduct a comparative examination of condominiums in Japan and the United States, and the result suggests that revising the current Japanese condominium law could induce more efficient redevelopment of old condominiums.

Author(s):  
Alan Patten

This chapter explores an important but understudied argument in favor of protections for vulnerable languages. The argument observes that speakers of such languages can face a collective action problem. The question is what interventions by the state to correct such a problem would be consistent with, or even required by, a broadly liberal and egalitarian conception of justice. The chapter identifies two principles that are relevant to answering this question: the unanimity principle, which places strict limits on interventions, and the principle of correction, which licenses a more extensive range of interventions on behalf of vulnerable languages. The principles are in tension with one another but derive from a common source in liberal egalitarian thought. Overall, the right approach is to forge a compromise between the two principles, thus allowing for some interventions on behalf of vulnerable languages to protect against collective action problems.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-555
Author(s):  
Jocelyn Sage Mitchell

ABSTRACTThis article modifies the classic “Isle of Ted” simulation to teach students about the collective action problems associated with climate change. Modifications include the introduction of a common-pool resource (i.e., fish) and increased pirate attacks to model rising climate threats and unequal distribution of risk. A return to the Isle of Ted enables a deeper engagement with specific collective action problems of climate change, including the tragedy of the commons and issues of global inequality. This article provides a road map for the incorporation of this modified simulation into active-learning classrooms.


AMBIO ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (7) ◽  
pp. 1282-1296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sverker C. Jagers ◽  
Niklas Harring ◽  
Åsa Löfgren ◽  
Martin Sjöstedt ◽  
Francisco Alpizar ◽  
...  

Abstract The phenomenon of collective action and the origin of collective action problems have been extensively and systematically studied in the social sciences. Yet, while we have substantial knowledge about the factors promoting collective action at the local level, we know far less about how these insights travel to large-scale collective action problems. Such problems, however, are at the heart of humanity’s most pressing challenges, including climate change, large-scale natural resource depletion, biodiversity loss, nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance due to overconsumption of antibiotics, and pollution. In this paper, we suggest an analytical framework that captures the theoretical understanding of preconditions for large-scale collective action. This analytical framework aims at supporting future empirical analyses of how to cope with and overcome larger-scale collective action problems. More specifically, we (i) define and describe the main characteristics of a large-scale collective action problem and (ii) explain why voluntary and, in particular, spontaneous large-scale collective action among individual actors becomes more improbable as the collective action problem becomes larger, thus demanding interventions by an external authority (a third party) for such action to be generated. Based on this, we (iii) outline an analytical framework that illustrates the connection between third-party interventions and large-scale collective action. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cooper Smout ◽  
Dawn Liu Holford ◽  
Kelly Garner ◽  
ruddy manuel illanes beyuma ◽  
Paula Andrea Martinez ◽  
...  

Sharing of research code would greatly benefit neuroscience, but this practice is hampered by a collective action problem. Since the development of the internet, conditional pledge platforms (e.g., Kickstarter) have increasingly been used to solve globally-dispersed collective action problems (Hallam, 2016). However, this strategy has yet to be implemented within academia. In this brief paper, we introduce a general purpose conditional pledge platform for the research community: Project Free Our Knowledge. We highlight a new conditional pledge campaign that was initiated at Brainhack 2021 and aims to motivate a critical mass of neuroscientists to share their research code. Crucially, this commitment activates only when a user-defined threshold of support is reached. We conclude by sharing our vision for how the research community could use collective action campaigns to create a sustained, evidence-based movement for social change in academia.


Food Security ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Garcia-Figuera ◽  
Elizabeth E. Grafton-Cardwell ◽  
Bruce A. Babcock ◽  
Mark N. Lubell ◽  
Neil McRoberts

AbstractThe provision of plant health has public good attributes when nobody can be excluded from enjoying its benefits and individual benefits do not reduce the ability of others to also benefit. These attributes increase risk of free-riding on plant health services provided by others, giving rise to a collective action problem when trying to ensure plant health in a region threatened by an emerging plant disease. This problem has traditionally been addressed by government intervention, but top-down approaches to plant health are often insufficient and are increasingly combined with bottom-up approaches that promote self-organization by affected individuals. The challenge is how to design plant health institutions that effectively deal with the spatial and temporal dynamics of plant diseases, while staying aligned with the preferences, values and needs of affected societies. Here, we illustrate how Ostrom’s design principles for collective action can be used to guide the incorporation of bottom-up approaches to plant health governance in order to improve institutional fit. Using the ongoing epidemic of huanglongbing (HLB) as a case study, we examine existing institutions designed to ensure citrus health under HLB in Brazil, Mexico, the United States and Argentina, and discuss potential implications of Ostrom’s design principles for the collective provision of plant health under HLB and other plant diseases that are threatening food security worldwide. The discussion leads to an outline for the interdisciplinary research agenda that would be needed to establish the link between institutional approaches and plant health outcomes in the context of global food security.


Author(s):  
Keith Dowding ◽  
Patrick Dunleavy ◽  
Desmond King ◽  
Helen Margetts

This chapter applies Dowding’s analysis of power to the community power debate. It demonstrates the importance of the collective action problem to our understanding of power in society, showing that both pluralists and their radical critics misinterpret power in society by ignoring collective action problems. It demonstrates the nature of luck and systematic luck in the power structure.


2021 ◽  
pp. 61-85
Author(s):  
David Madland

This chapter explains why policies that encourage union membership and promote broad-based bargaining would enable labor to deliver much more for workers and the economy than they can under the current system. The chapter discusses why labor has been in decline in the United States and elsewhere but has been able to maintain strength in a few other countries with favorable policies. Policies that actively encourage union membership are needed to counteract the collective action problem unions present. The chapter also discusses why collective bargaining currently does not work very well in the United States but could be much improved by shifting toward broader-based bargaining. Compared to worksite bargaining, broad-based bargaining raises wages for more workers, reduces economic inequality as well as gender and racial pay gaps to a greater degree, and is better suited to the way firms are structured in the modern economy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
John McCaskill ◽  
Julie Haworth ◽  
James Harrington

Public trust is a critical component in the governance of public resources. The structure of that governance can have a profound impact on the level of trust citizens have in the way resources are allocated. This study relates the findings of an exit poll conducted during the primaries for the 2016 presidential elections. The questions related to the level of trust voters had regarding their local government and their subsequent attitudes toward the water conservation messaging from those governments. The findings support national survey findings that citizens in the United States have a high level of trust in local government, which enables longer-term solutions to collective action problems.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
JESSICA TROUNSTINE

Public goods in the United States are largely funded and delivered at the local level. Local public goods are valuable, but their production requires overcoming several collective action problems including coordinating supply and minimizing congestion, free-riding, and peer effects. Land use regulations, promulgated by local governments, allow communities to solve the collective action problems inherent in the provision of local public goods and maintenance of property values. A consequence of these efforts is residential segregation between cities along racial lines. I provide evidence that more stringent land use regulations are supported by whiter communities and that they preserve racial homogeneity. First, I show that cities that were whiter than their metropolitan area in 1970 are more likely to have restrictive land use patterns in 2006. Then, relying on Federal Fair Housing Act lawsuits to generate changes in land use policy, I show that restrictive land use helps to explain metropolitan area segregation patterns over time. Finally, I draw on precinct level initiative elections from several California cities to show that whiter neighborhoods are more supportive of restricting development. These results strongly suggest that even facially race-neutral land use policies have contributed to racial segregation.


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