The mind and brain in time: implications for modern neuropsychology

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-116
Author(s):  
Jason W. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Fractal Theory ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Brain State ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Self Similar ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

In this paper, I wish to describe the categorical nature of the mind/brain state from its origins in drive to the refinements of human cognition. Categories are concepts with a broader scope. The virtual quality of category members corresponds to the relation of whole and part. A successive individuation of categories is the foundational operation of the mind/brain state. There is a similarity to fractal theory and the mereology of wholes and parts, though categories are not sums or containers, members are virtual and the whole/part specification is qualitative, unlike the self-similar replications of fractal theory. The discussion takes up the problem of causal transmission between the mind and brain and within and across mental states, concluding that an assimilation model has more explanatory power than a strictly causal one, in keeping with the distinction of potential/actual from cause/effect. The idea that mind-brain interaction is causal introduces the possibility of subjectivity independent of a material substrate. This leads to speculation on a world soul animating the brain as part of nature, and conversely, the effort to extract all vestiges of spirit to leave a purely material organism and universe. There is no bifurcation of the mental and physical; rather a graded series of stages with properties of material and subjective entities that eventuate in human mentality. This conforms to a neutral monism. Duration is inherent in nature and evolves in company with organisms of increasing complexity.

scholarly journals DA RELAÇÃO CORPO-ALMA À MENTE-CÉREBRO: A ANTROPOLOGIA CRISTÃ E AS NOVAS ANTROPOLOGIAS

2014 ◽  
Vol 46 (129) ◽  
pp. 215
Author(s):  
Renato Alves De Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Christian Anthropology ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain ◽  
The Way

O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que a questão referente aos dois princípios metafísicos constitutivos da antropologia cristã, o corpo/matéria e a alma/espírito, e a forma de conceber a relação entre eles encontra-se presentes no subsolo das novas antropologias materialistas, mas com um novo verniz através da relação entre a mente e o cérebro. Para a antropologia cristã, a existência do binômio corpo-alma é uma questão resolvida. As discussões se concentram na forma de conceber a relação entre ambos os princípios. Analogamente, para algumas antropologias materialistas atuais, a existência da mente e do cérebro é uma questão fechada. Os confrontos encontram-se na forma de conceber as relações entre a mente e o cérebro: há uma identificação ou distinção entres ambas as realidades? A mente seria uma qualidade emergente do cérebro? ABSTRACT: The purpose of this article is to show that the question concerning the two constituent metaphysical principles of Christian anthropology, body/matter and soul/spirit, and the way of conceiving the relationship between them is presente in the basement of the new materialist anthropologies, but with a new varnish through the relationship between mind and brain. For Christian anthropology, the existence of the binomial soul/body is a settled issue. The discussions focus on how to design the relationship between the two principles. Similarly, for some current materialistic anthropologies, the existence of the mind and the brain is a closed question. The clashes are the way of conceiving the relationship between mind and brain: Is there an identification or a distinction between the two realities? Would be the mind an emergent quality of the brain?

Individual Differences in Conceptions of Soul, Mind, and Brain

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
Tapani Riekki ◽  
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Large Individual ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Lay Conceptions ◽  
Paranormal Beliefs ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

We examined how people see the role of the brain, the mind, and the soul in biological, psychobiological, and mental states. Three clusters of participants were identified. The monists attributed biological, psychobiological, and mental processes only to the brain, the emergentists attributed the processes to the brain and to the mind, and the spiritualists attributed the processes to the brain, the mind, and the soul. Most participants attributed all states more to the brain than to the mind or soul. Beliefs, desires, and emotions were thought of as more likely to continue after death than other states, but belief in immortal souls was rare and only found among those who also held religious and paranormal beliefs. The results indicate that laypeople may see beliefs, desires, and emotions as both states of the mind, of the soul, and of the brain; that there are large individual differences in how the concept of the soul is understood, and that in lay conceptions, the idea that the processes of mind are processes of brain does not exclude supernatural brain-soul dualism.

Why We Should Reject Transhumanists’ Entire Lens on the Mind and Brain

2021 ◽  
pp. 42-84
Author(s):  
Susan B. Levin
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Appraisal Theory ◽  
Basic Emotion ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Mental Operations ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

“Basic-emotion” and “dual-process” theorists, joined by transhumanists, view the mind as a set of compartments whose functionality is explained by dedicated areas or systems in the brain. The two theoretical approaches reflect core misconceptions and have been supplanted by “appraisal theory.” Beyond capturing well the entwining of reason and emotion in our mental operations, Klaus Scherer’s version of appraisal theory is compatible with mounting evidence of the brain’s complexity. Having developed a scientific line of argument against transhumanists’ lens on the mind and brain, the author turns to Aristotle’s rational essentialism. Wrongly invoked to support transhumanists’ extreme version, Aristotle’s rational essentialism incorporates a necessary role for nonrational faculties and intrapsychic harmony. While transhumanists’ lens on the mind and brain is at odds with contemporary findings, Aristotle’s view of the mind shares important commitments with Scherer’s appraisal theory and is broadly compatible with an emerging picture of the brain’s complexity.

Mind, identity theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Ontological Categories ◽  
Great Merit ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?

Conclusion

2017 ◽  
pp. 279-292
Author(s):  
Thomas Fuchs
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Short Circuit ◽  
Living Organism ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

The ‘Conclusion’ summarizes fundamental concepts and insights of the book. The brain is presented as an organ of mediation, transformation, and resonance. Its functions are integrated by the living organism as a whole, or by the embodied person, respectively: persons have brains, they are not brains. The deadlocks of the mind–body problem result from a short circuit between mind and brain which follows as a consequence from the systematic exclusion of life. A combination of phenomenological, embodied, and enactive approaches seems best suited to overcome this deficit. In contrast to naturalistic reductionism, this leads to a personalistic concept of the human being which has its basis in intercorporeality: it is in the concrete bodily encounter that we primarily recognize each other as embodied subjects or persons.

scholarly journals Music Composition from the Brain Signal: Representing the Mental State by Music

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Chaoyi Li ◽  
Yu Yin ◽  
Changzheng Zhou ◽  
Dezhong Yao
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Music Composition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Arousal Level ◽  
Sleep Stages ◽  
Biofeedback Therapy ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Potential Tool

This paper proposes a method to translate human EEG into music, so as to represent mental state by music. The arousal levels of the brain mental state and music emotion are implicitly used as the bridge between the mind world and the music. The arousal level of the brain is based on the EEG features extracted mainly by wavelet analysis, and the music arousal level is related to the musical parameters such as pitch, tempo, rhythm, and tonality. While composing, some music principles (harmonics and structure) were taken into consideration. With EEGs during various sleep stages as an example, the music generated from them had different patterns of pitch, rhythm, and tonality. 35 volunteers listened to the music pieces, and significant difference in music arousal levels was found. It implied that different mental states may be identified by the corresponding music, and so the music from EEG may be a potential tool for EEG monitoring, biofeedback therapy, and so forth.

On the Excitation Processes of the Conscious and Subconscious Mind

1929 ◽  
Vol 75 (310) ◽  
pp. 371-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Burridge
Keyword(s):  
Nerve Cell ◽  
Cell Activity ◽  
Nerve Cells ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Excitable Tissue ◽  
Excitation Processes ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Studies of the mind of man and of the heart of the frog, though normally deeply divided, can be bridged when two postulates are granted. The first postulate is that the quality of excitability, on which nerve-cell activity is based, can be studied in any other excitable tissue; the second is that mental activity, as we know it, depends on the presence of excitable nerve-cells in the brain. The postulates being granted, it becomes legitimate to apply the results of experiments on excitability performed with the frog's heart in explanation of the mode of working of the brain and mind.

scholarly journals The Perception, &c., of Time as a feature in Mental Disease

1874 ◽  
Vol 19 (88) ◽  
pp. 519-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. A. F. Browne
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disease ◽  
Cerebral Arteries ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Regular Sequence ◽  
Anterior Lobe ◽  
Mental Condition ◽  
Subjective Element ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Directing Attention ◽  
The Brain

The power or process by means of which Time is mentally recognised and estimated independently of, or before, its external and artificial measurement, has not received a clear or comprehensive solution at the hands of those who have dealt with the subject. Certain metaphysicians connect the idea of duration with that of extension, and conceive that the child, or the savage, may have acquired a notion of intervals, or interrupted extension, from seeing and feeling through the muscular sense the alternate extension and flexion of his limbs; all comparison of such events with the successive changes in objective phenomena, as in days and nights, being the result of subsequent experience. Certain others conceive that our notion of Time originates in our consciousness and observation of succession in our thoughts, feelings, and mental states, a succession which necessarily involves a series of changes separated in time, and order, and nature. Sir W. Hamilton, apparently aware of the difficulty of the problem, says that “Time is a form of thought,” and “if we attempt to comprehend Time, either in whole or in part, we find that thought is hedged in between two incomprehensibles.” Other philosophers, belonging to a more practical school, who may be claimed as psychologists, contend that the subjective element of Time is imparted by the communication of impressions upon the external senses to the sensorium, coming as these must always do in succession with intervals of different length, and, as they often do, of regular length and intensity. It will be observed that in all these hypotheses it is taken for granted that the mind is capable of directing attention to its own conditions, and, to a certain extent, of analysing these, of marking their course, their swiftness, or slowness, their regularity, or irregularity. On the other hand, the phrenologists contend that there is a primitive and special faculty connected with a portion of the anterior lobe of the brain, by which Time, or the succession of events and intervals, is perceived or becomes known to us. My own speculations formerly led me to the theory that the perception of rhythm, or regular sequence, in sensorial impressions was conveyed by the pulsations of the cerebral arteries, either to the whole brain, or to such portion of it as may take cognisance of internal movements or changes. Sir H. Holland, that noble veteran, that learned and travelled and philosophic physician, who has just passed from amongst us, dedicated a chapter in his “Medical Notes and Reflections,” p. 499, to the exposition of “Time as an element in Mental Functions,” in which his chief object is to show that ideas or different modes of mentalisation arise and are propagated in different degrees of velocity and intensity in Time in different temperaments, and in the same individual at different periods, in accordance with the predominant physical or mental condition.

scholarly journals Emergent processes in cognitive-emotional interactions

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-448 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Basal Forebrain ◽  
Significant Progress ◽  
Brain Organization ◽  
The Past ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Anatomical Evidence ◽  
Made In

Emotion and cognition have been viewed as largely separate entities in the brain. Within this framework, significant progress has been made in understanding specific aspects of behavior. Research in the past two decades, however, has started to paint a different picture of brain organization, one in which network interactions are key to understanding complex behaviors. From both basic and clinical perspectives, the characterization of cognitive-emotional interactions constitutes a fundamental issue in the investigation of the mind and brain. This review will highlight the interactive and integrative potential that exists in the brain to bring together the cognitive and emotional domains. First, anatomical evidence will be provided, focusing on structures such as hypothalamus, basal forebrain, amygdala, cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and insula. Data on functional interactions will then be discussed, followed by a discussion of a dual competition framework, which describes cognitive-emotional interactions in terms of perceptual and cognitive competition mechanisms.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack M. Gorman
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Great Ape ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter concludes the book’s discussion of how experience changes the brain. It summarizes the positions that have been taken in the preceding chapters: that the human brain is unique even in comparison to our nearest genetic neighbors in the great ape family, that the mind is the organ of the brain and all of its functions can be explained by molecular activity within the brain, and that psychotherapy is an experience that changes the brain. It provides a discussion on how neuroscience and psychology are fundamentally intertwined, linking the mind and brain, and it emphasizes the rapidly evolving, changing nature of the field of neuroscience and argues the need for more research linking psychotherapy with neurobiology.

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