The Consolidation of Hungarian Legal Practice with the Austrian Norms in 1861

2019 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Imre Képessy
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Legal Norm ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Hungarian Revolution ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
To Come ◽  
State Of Affairs

A few months before the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in August 1849, Emperor Franz Joseph issued the Constitution of Olmütz, which suspended the Hungarian constitutional order. After 1850, the Viennese Government aimed to unify the legal system in the whole empire, and as part of the process, many Austrian legal norms were imposed by royal decrees upon the Hungarian territories. This led to fundamental changes in the country’s legal system (the customary law as “law in action” took precedence up until 1848), even though it happened unconstitutionally. The worsening state of affairs and the defeat in the Austro-Sardinian War led the Emperor to promulgate a new constitution which became known as the October Diploma in 1860. Accordingly, Hungary regained its former constitutional status, but Franz Joseph ordered the newly reinstated chief justice to assemble a council that should debate over the most pressing issues regarding the administration of justice. There, the most influential lawyers proposed that the Hungarian laws shall be restored – albeit with several compromises. Most members agreed that an absolute and immediate repeal of every Austrian legal norm would certainly violate the rights of the citizens. Therefore, even though this committee did not accept the validity of these laws, the majority of its members argued that some of them must remain in effect until the Parliament will reconvene. Consequently, the Austrian legal norms as “law in books” deeply influenced the “law in action” in Hungary for the years to come.

Do Discrimination and Inequality Exist in the Russian Legal System? International Law, National Legislation and Judicial Practice

2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-238
Author(s):  
Sergei Iu. Marochkin
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
Russian Constitution ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Negative Phenomena ◽  
Law Making

AbstractIn this article, the author discusses the problem of ensuring equality and non-discrimination in a legal system. Equality and non-discrimination constitute universally recognized standards in the protection of human rights. At the same time, one can hardly assert that the universal community has put an end to discrimination. The author considers the problem as applied to the Russian legal system. The standard is incorporated in the Russian Constitution still remains topical in Russia. Based on his analysis of legislation and judicial practice, the author concludes that the problem reveals itself on the levels of both law-making and law application, the latter including administration of justice. As one of the conclusion, the author raises a question: is legal discrimination inherent in a legal system like other negative phenomena, such as delinquency, incoherencies, lacunas, defects, conflicts of legal norms and breaches of law-making procedural rules?

ON THE PECULIARITIES OF AFGHANISTAN’S LEGAL SYSTEM DURING THE RULE OF THE TALIBAN

2021 ◽  
pp. 120-134
Author(s):  
Boris A. Antonov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Relationship Of

The essence of any legal system in the concrete state depends on what is actually recognized in it as the main source of law. In case of Sharia, such sources are Koran, Sunnah, qiyas, and Yidma. In addition to Sharia, however, pre-Islamic and non-Islamic sources of law – such as adat (custom), firman (decree) and nizam (law) – are actively involved in the legal systems of many Muslim states. The operation of several sources of law in one country is an example char- acteristic for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban there. Lack of balance between the interests of different ethnic groups in Af- ghanistan, the inability of Afghan authorities to compromise and contradic- tions among the competing legal norms have led to destabilizing the legal sys- tem of the country that has finally been transformed into a kind of space where several enclave legal sources operate, being in a conflict with each other at such levels of their interaction as Hanafi-Hanbali (the level of madhhabs), inner- Islamic (Sufi and Wahhabi, Shiite and Sunni), ethno-political (Pashtunization and Talibanization), Sharia -non-Sharia (adat, firman). The last level – which is Sharia – non-Sharia (adat, firman) – has become an illustrative example of a complicated, sometimes conflicting, relationship of Sharia and adat (customary law, enshrined in the code of honor “Pashtunwali”).

The Settlement of Family Disputes in the Kgatla Customary Courts: Some New Approaches

1971 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Family Law ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
African State ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Court Records ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
The Past ◽  
Realistic Assessment

A realistic assessment of the part customary law can be expected to play in the developing legal system of an African state must depend upon the availability of detailed information as to the way in which this body of law is now responding to the problems associated with changing social and economic conditions. Information of this kind can only be obtained through the study of actual disputes and the procedures followed in their settlement. Curiously, lawyers interested in customary law have on the whole neglected such an approach, concentrating their energies upon the discovery and systematic organisation of abstract rules purporting to constitute the legal norms of the society under investigation. Moreover, the method of research followed in most instances has been to question groups of informants assumed, to be knowledgeable about customary law, rather than to search for norms directly in the raw materials provided by the law in action, and this approach has inevitably insulated the investigator still further from actual disputes and the agencies involved in their settlement. Had the only means of finding out how disputes were actually settled been to sit and watch them in progress, lawyers might have been excused for leaving that to the anthropologists. But such information is widely available through other means: informants can be persuaded to reconstruct actual disputes from memory instead of racking their brains for abstract rules, and accounts of such disputes canbe found in the written records kept by many customary courts. This latter source, particularly, seems to merit more serious attention than lawyers have been prepared to give it in the past, and it is with it that this article is concerned. Drawing upon customary court records, it is hoped to illustrate both what this source consists of and the manner in which the customary family law of a single Tswana tribe is developing.

Once the conviction has been set aside, there could be no public policy objection to an action for negligence against the legal advisers. There could be no conflict of judgments. On the other hand, in civil, including matrimonial, cases, it would seldom be possible to say that an action for negligence against a legal adviser or representative would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Whether the original decision was right or wrong was usually a matter of concern only to the parties and had no wider implications. There was no public interest objection to a subsequent finding that, but for the negligence of his lawyers, the losing party would have won. But again there might be exceptions. The action for negligence might be an abuse of process on the ground that it was manifestly unfair to someone else. Take, for example, the case of a defendant who published a serious defamation which he attempted unsuccessfully to justify. Should he be able to sue his lawyers and claim that if the case had been conducted differently, the allegation would have been proved to be true? It seemed unfair to the plaintiff in the defamation action that any court should be allowed to come to such a conclusion in proceedings to which he was not a party. On the other hand, it was equally unfair that he should have to join as a party and rebut the allegation for a second time. A man's reputation was not only a matter between him and the other party. It represented his relationship with the world. So it might be that in such circumstances, an action for negligence would be an abuse of the of the court. Having regard to the power of the court to strike out actions which had no prospect ofsuccess, the doctrine unlikely in that context to be invoked very often. The first step in any application to strike out an action alleging negligence in the conduct of a previous action had to be to ask whether it had a real prospect of success. Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse delivered judgments in which they agreed that the immunity from suit was no longer required in relation to civil proceedings but dissented to the extent of saying that the immunity was still required in the public interest in the administration of justice in relation to criminal proceedings. Comment This decision is of major and historic importance in the English legal system for several reasons. It can be seen as a bold attempt by the senior judiciary to drag the legal profession (often a metonymy for the whole legal system) into the 21st century world of accountability and fair business practice. In his judgment, Lord Steyn makes this dramatic observation:

2012 ◽  
pp. 506-508
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
The Other ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
The Public ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Civil Proceedings ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
Legal Adviser ◽  
To Come

Applicability of Legal Norms

2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo E. Navarro ◽  
Claudina Orunesu ◽  
Jorge L. Rodríguez ◽  
Germán Sucar
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Norm ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Legal Duty ◽  
The Law ◽  
Conceptual Link ◽  
Basic Intuition

It is a basic intuition about the law that organs of adjudication ought to justify their decisions by recourse to the appropriate applicable norms. Nevertheless, a sound reconstruction of the applicability of legal norms has been largely ignored in contemporary legal theory. Different connections between applicable norms and cases are explored in this paper, and a distinction is suggested between internal and external applicability. A legal norm is internally applicable to the cases regulated by its scope of validity (i.e. by its terms the norm fits the facts of the case), and is externally applicable when it has to be used in a certain case as a justification of an institutional decision (i.e. the presiding judge has a legal duty to apply it to the case). A usual claim holds that all and only valid norms which, by their terms, apply to the case at hand must be applied in determining the outcome of the case. However, we try to demonstrate that a valid legal norm that exists as a member in a legal system may be internally applicable to a case and yet not be externally applicable to it. It also may occur that judges sometimes have the legal duty to apply norms that are not part of their own legal system. Consequently, the relations between internal and external applicability and between external applicability and validity deserve a careful examination. In these pages we hold that, though validity plus internal applicability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of the duty to apply a legal norm, there is a complex conceptual link between external applicability and the systematic reconstruction of the law.

scholarly journals Na marginesie koncepcji języka norm prawnych

2020 ◽  
pp. 54-64
Author(s):  
Andrzej Malinowski
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Norm ◽  
Legal Text ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Cognitive Value ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Complete Set ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Interpretation Model

The article presents an attempt at an alternative approach to the scholarly interpretation model, in which statements expressed in the language of norms have been replaced by statements in the language of lawyers. In the proposed approach, the result of the interpretation of a legal text is a set of sentences of the lawyers’ language stating that a specific general legal norm applies at the moment of interpretation due to the validity of the relevant fragment of the legal text. The whole (complete) set of statements in the lawyers’ language whereby legal norms are held to be valid is treated by lawyers as a description of the legal system. It is stated that, considering the law as a system, neither case law nor scholarship in practice refers to the language of norms, but to the results of interpretations described in the lawyers’ language. However, the paradigm of scholarly interpretation using the concept of the language of norms has its undoubted cognitive value and is useful for didactic purposes.

scholarly journals Lawyers’ ethics before a civil court

AUC IURIDICA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 57-69
Author(s):  
Miroslav Sedláček
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Code Of Conduct ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Legal Ethics ◽  
Civil Court ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

Principles of legal ethics, whether written or unwritten, not only regulate the conduct of legal practice but also reflect the basic assumptions, premises, and methods of the legal system within which the lawyer operates. They also reflect the profession’s conception of its own role in the administration of justice. The objective of this paper is to analyse the ethical rules, to define the relationship of a lawyer to the court and his duties in proceedings, competent representation, confidentiality, and personality of the lawyer, and further deal with the legislation contained in the Czech Act on Advocacy and the Code of Conduct.

scholarly journals Principle of Humanism in the Constitutional Law of the Kyrgyz Republic

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 388-392
Author(s):  
N. Sutalinova ◽  
B. Toktobaev
Keyword(s):  
Research Methods ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Direct Action ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
The State ◽  
Kyrgyz Republic ◽  
Entire System ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
To Come

The article is devoted to the study of legal mechanisms for consolidating the principle of humanism in constitutional legislation. The authors, assuming that humanism as a universal, including legal category, is a fundamental guideline for the formation of the legal system of the state, explores the forms of expression of this principle through constitutional and legal norms. At the same time, the authors makes the assumption that humanism, being a comprehensive category, sometimes does not receive that direct fixation in the norms of direct action, which he could count on, given the significance of this principle for the entire system of regulators. In this regard, the author’s sets himself the goal of exploring the mechanisms of legal formation that lead to the desired result of the formation of an array of legal norms that mediate the principle of humanism. To achieve this goal, the author used general and private scientific research methods, which allowed to come to a number of conclusions, including a certain degree of declarativeness in the legal consolidation of the principle of humanism, when it comes to constitutional and legal norms.

Wrongful Treatment of Prisoners: A Case Study of Ch'ing Legal Practice

1964 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judy Feldman Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Central Government ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
The Law ◽  
The One

A Study of the Ch'ing legal system, the culmination of the experience of many dynasties, provides clues to the understanding of Chinese political behavior before extensive Western contact. For this period, the decisions of the Board of Punishments (hsing-fu) recorded in the collection of cases known as the Hsing-an hui-lan form an important body of law. Of these, the cases pertaining to the illegal punishment of prisoners by government officials are particularly interesting. An analysis of thirty of these cases suggests answers to the following questions: 1) Did the Board of Punishments have the attributes of an independent law court? 2) Was the law which the Board of Punishments applied internally consistent and capable of growth ? 3) Was protection from official brutality adequately guaranteed by law?The Board of Punishments, one of the six ministries of the central government, was the formal organ most responsible for the administration of justice. In judicial matters, it served as a buffer between the provincial authorities on the one hand and the emperor on the other.

scholarly journals IS THE LOGIC OF LAW IN CONTRAST TO CHRISTIAN VALUES?

2017 ◽  
pp. 191
Author(s):  
Marko Trajković
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Legal Norm ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Squeeze Out ◽  
Real Behavior ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government

Is it possible for logic of law to squeeze out Christian values, given that the nihilism towards values leads towards the rejection of the major role of the law, which is the protection and realization of values? Is the actual goal of the legal norm, as part of law and logical legal system turned into a command, to establish the behavior which carries out the Christian values it contains? Is the constitution, the law or some other act as the embodiment of the legal norm, really based on certain social and legal values? As opposed to the law, there is a man able to ponder and wonder. Does he live in accordance with the legal norms only out of fear of punishment? Would it be possible for the government to establish the legal system which would be totally based on the fear of sanctions? Can that kind of legal system ever become a stable whole, or might it be destroyed by itself? Is the reason for the failure of the system of the state and law insufficiently centralized government, for example, or the lack of Christian values in their very grounds? The answer to the question posed by St. Thomas Aquinas depends on the answers to the previously posed questions. The question posed by St. Thomas Aquinas is: is the law made only for the evil and the wicked?  However, it would be naive to rely on the tendency of correlation between human behavior and his moral principles. The entire human history confirms the result. We are well equipped to find reasons for what we do, but we are not so good when we are to do something for which we see good reasons, for which the reasons are obvious. We often say to our children: “Do as I tell you”, forgetting that they watch and copy exactly what we do. One of the ways to strengthen the bonds between values-attitudes-behavior is to apply signs for encouragement which are supposed to empower the real behavior.

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