The Death Penalty, the “Marriage Penalty” and Some Remarks on the Utility of Senecan Research in the Study of Roman Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 197-214
Author(s):  
Joanna Kulawiak-Cyrankowska

The problem in the 5th controversia from the work of Lucius Annaeus Seneca the Elder, entitled Oratorum et rhetorum sententiae divisiones colores, is presented as follows: one man seduced two women during the same night. According to the law, which in the literature is referred to as lex raptarum, a woman who was kidnapped may choose between the death penalty for the ravisher or marrying him, but without giving him a dowry. Here, two women were granted the right of option and one of them demanded the death of the man, but the other wanted to marry him. The declaimers were trying to find an answer to the question: which solution is worthier to prevail? Since, in fact, the main problem raised in the controversia is the interpretation of law, it constituted quite a significant intellectual challenge. The declaimers employed very impressive legal reasoning techniques. This controversia constitutes then not only an interesting starting point to conduct the research on the borderline of law and declamation, but also might be a strong argument that the law and rhetoric, at least in some aspects, could have been complementary to each other.

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 155
Author(s):  
Zainul Arifin

Kedudukan hukuman mati terhadap pengedaran narkotika di Indonesia  sebagai strategi penanggulangan terhadap pengedaran narkotika  masih menimbulkan pihak yang menyetujui dan menolaknya. Pihak yang  menolak hukuman mati dikenakan pada pengedar nakotika dengan alasan hak asasi manusia atau hak keberlanjutan hidup terpidana, sedangkan ada kelompok yang menyetujui pelaksanaan hukuman mati yang juga dengan alasan demi kepentingan hak asasi manusia. Pihak yang menyetujui hukuman untuk pengedar ini menilai, bahwa sanksi yang dikenakan berupa hukuman mati dapat membuat jera atau takut calon-calon pelaku yang bermaksud mengedarkan narkotika atau hak hidup banyak generasi muda ikut diselamatkan menjadi korban kecanduan narkotika akibat ketakutan di kalangan calon-calon penjahat. hukuman mati bagi pengedar narkotika dalam kajian hukum positip sudah diatur dalam Undang-Undang Nomor. 35 tahun 2009 tentang Narkotika.Kata kunci: narkotika, hukuman, akibat, kedudukan, urgensi The death penalty for narcotics distribution in Indonesia as a counter strategy against narcotics distribution still raises those who approve and reject it. Parties that reject the death penalty are imposed on narcotics distributors on the grounds of human rights or the right to a life sentence, while there are groups that approve the execution of the death sentence as well as for the sake of human rights. The party who approved the sentence for the distributor ruled that sanctions imposed on the death penalty could scare or intimidate potential perpetrators who intend to distribute narcotics or livelihoods for many young people to be rescued as victims of narcotics addiction due to fear among potential criminals. the death penalty for narcotics traffickers in a positive legal study is set out in the Law of Numbers. 35 of 2009 on Narcotics. Keywords: narcotics, punishment, consequences, position, urgency


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.


Author(s):  
Nicole Anderson

In The Death Penalty I, Derrida elucidates Kant’s support of the death penalty as that which “marks the access to what is proper to man and to the dignity of reason or of human logos and nomos.” “Man” is distinguished from animals/the beast, precisely because “man … is a subject of the law who raises himself above natural life.” This law is based on rationality, reason, ethics, right to life, and thus to forgiveness and the right to burial. In modern times the animal is not subject to the same law, and therefore the death penalty not only marks what is “proper to man,” but also frames human and animal life in particular ways. This essay examines the medieval practice of animal trials in order to push back against anthropocentric conceptions of the death penalty and to explore its implications for both human and animal lives.


1945 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lord Wright

In preparing the few and elementary observations which I am about to make to you tonight I have wondered if the title I chose was apt or suitable. The Common Law is generally described as the law of liberty, of freedom and of free peoples. It was a home-made product. In the eighteenth century, foreign lawyers called it an insular and barbarous system; they compared it to their own system of law, developed on the basis of Roman and Civil Law. Many centuries before, and long after Bracton's day, when other civilised European nations ‘received’ the Roman Law, England held back and stood aloof from the Reception. It must have been a near thing. It seems there could have been a Reception here if the Judges had been ecclesiastics, steeped in the Civil Law. But as it turned out they were laymen, and were content as they travelled the country, and in London as well, to adopt what we now know as the Case System, instead of the rules and categories of the Civil Law. Hence the method of threshing out problems by debate in Court, and later on the basis of written pleadings which we find in the Year Books. For present purposes, all I need observe is that the Civil Lawyer had a different idea of the relation of the state or the monarch to the individual from that of the Common Lawyer. To the Civil or Roman Lawyer, the dominant maxim was ‘quod placuit principi legis habet vigorem’; law was the will of the princeps. With this may be compared the rule expressed in Magna Carta in 1215: No freeman, it was there said, was to be taken or imprisoned or exiled or in any way destroyed save by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. Whatever the exact application of that phrase in 1215, it became a text for fixing the relations between the subject and the State. Holdsworth quotes from the Year Book of 1441; the law is the highest English inheritance the King hath, for by the law he and all his subjects are ruled. That was the old medieval doctrine that all things are governed by law, either human or divine. That is the old doctrine of the supremacy of the law, which runs through the whole of English history, and which in the seventeenth century won the day against the un-English doctrine of the divine right of Kings and of their autocratic power over the persons and property of their subjects. The more detailed definition of what all that involved took time to work out. I need scarcely refer to the great cases in the eighteenth century in which the Judges asserted the right of subjects to freedom from arbitrary arrest as against the ministers of state and against the validity of a warrant to seize the papers of a person accused of publishing a seditious libel; in particular Leach v. Money (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1001; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029; Wilkes v. Halifax (1769) 19 St. Tr. 1406. In this connexion may be noted Fox's Libel Act, 1792, which dealt with procedure, but fixed a substantive right to a trial by jury of the main issue in the cases it referred to.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 71-78
Author(s):  
Tetiana Shmariova

The history of law should be viewed not only within the context of the study on the birth of law being one of the social regulators, its emergence and evolution of its certain institutions, but also as an instrument of thorough understanding of legal forms recepted from Roman Law. Certain forms of these include usucapio – limitation of action introduced to Russian Imperial legislation by Article 301 of the Legislation Code of 1832.Ukraine can view the doctrine developed by legal scholars of those times as well as court practice on these issues as part of its own history as it used to be a part of the Russian Empire, where (except for Chernihiv and Poltava regions) Russian Imperial legislation was fully in force. Russian Imperial legal scholarship has adopted the approach applied by Roman law, including usucapio and praescriptio. However, the issue of usucapio existence in legislation acts of the Moscow State as a separate institute before 1832 has provided grounds for discussions.Similarly, the legal essence of the usucapio institute has also provided grounds for scholarly discussions on philosophic grounds regarding the impact of limiting legislation on the application of the limitation institute whether limitation should be similarly the ground for losing or acquiring rights, or regarding the conditions when the appropriate limitations may be applied.The analysis of past scholarly concepts provides possibilities to develop a full picture. Nevertheless, this picture is not without homogeneity of thoughts. The author takes the approach that the usucapio institute in Russian Imperial legislation has appeared and developed for assuring the stability of civil relations. Regardless of the division of providing evidence, the existence of the actual possession by the actual possessor of the mortgage after the 10-year term, the new possessor has been recognized and registered the property rights within time limitation if the conditions prescribed in the law are actually fulfilled. The interest in theoretical development in the limitation issue and the amount of the court practice provides evidence that it was claimed by the society.The definition of the Zemska time limitation has been changing gradually, and it can generally be viewed as calm, non-discussional, and continuous possession within the term developed by the law, in terms of “property”. The law of those times did not demand a fair possession conditions for acquiring the rights on limitation grounds, however this approach has been criticized by scholars.Generally, the author has selected the panoramic approach of constructing her research by paying attention to discussional issues, as well as the issues being of interest nowadays. Specific focus is made on actual inaction of titular proprietors of mortgage as the condition for loss of the right on limitation grounds and non-act possession. The actuality of stability of civil relations remains the same nowadays as it was in the past.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 151-177
Author(s):  
Piotr Niczyporuk ◽  
Piotr Kołodko

In the archaic period violations of the prohibition relating to mourning was regarded as a nefas and hence subject to penalisation under religious law. A widow guilty of an infringement was required to make an expiatory sacrifce known as a piaculum, viz. a bovis feta. This religious and customary practice underwent a series of transformations and eventually became a law (ius). In the pre-classical period the prohibition on the remarriage of widows in the period of mourning was perceived primarily as subject to penalties laid down by civil law. This was due to the question of the paternity of any offspring such a widow might bear in the tempus lugendi. The edictum perpetuum names the persons who were liable to infamy if they committed a breach of the prohibition on the remarriage of a widow within the period of mourning for her deceased husband. Such persons could neither engage in postulare pro aliis nor act as a procurator or cognitor. One of the consequences of a sentence of praetorian infamy was the convicted person’s forfeiture of the right to appoint his or her plenipotentiaries for legal proceedings.The classical period brought fundamental changes in the law on remarriage. Nonetheless, even though Augustus encouraged citizens to remarry, yet his legal provisions left widows a certain period of time following the loss of their husband in which they could refrain from remarrying. The reason behind this legal arrangement was not so much mourning as such; it was rather a question of Augustus wanting to show his respect for univirae (women who had been married only once). Augustus kept in force the provisions that gave a bad reputation to people who violated the prohibition of widows’ remarriage. The significance and effectiveness of these regulations made them a subject for jurists’ commentary, on account of the need to avoid situations where the paternity of children born to widows was uncertain. The prohibition on the remarriage of widows also shows that the creators of these regulations wanted marriage to be contracted primarily for the purpose of procreation, which would ensure the continuation of Roman families, especially as regards the perpetuation of their sacra, nomina, and pecunia.


Verbum Vitae ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-326
Author(s):  
Michał Kosche

The notion of moral fairness of application of capital punishment is stretched between two poles of opposite interpretative meanings. On the one hand, there is an imperative related to maintaining the social order and good that justifies in some specific cases killing an individual for the good of the community; on the other hand, there is the message of the Gospel about holiness of each human life. In this regard, at the attempt to investigate the fairness of death penalty, a certain hermeneutic tension related to the overlapping of rights and obligations both with regard to the criminal and society that needs to be protected against him or her. The starting point of this article is an outlook on death penalty with due regard of a ‘hermeneutic charge’ contained both in the duty to protect common good and each individual’s life. Next, the ‘genuine paradox’ was analysed that emerges in a situation where the right to live and the right to protect overlap. All the considerations are concluded with a question whether the recent abolitionist interpretation of the Catechism of the Catholic Church should be classified as the continuity hermeneutic or rather the discontinuity hermeneutic.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina Amarell

Together with a current account and a debit or credit card, having an overdraft granted and tolerated is a basic element of financial services for consumers. The far-reaching and profound changes to the law on consumer loans connected to the implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC) resulted especially in the redefinition of the right to have an overdraft both granted and tolerated according to §§ 504 and 505 respectively of Germany’s civil code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). In 2016, these reforms were supplemented by further changes to the law, which significantly altered the right to be given an overdraft and which resulted from the implementation of both the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014/17/EU) and the Payment Account Directive (2014/92/EU). Using these changes as a starting point, this study examines the legal dogmatic foundations of having an overdraft granted and tolerated in both a European and a national context. Subsequently, it conducts an empirical investigation into practical experiences with overdrafts, which is based on interviews with experts from both credit institutes from the three banking sectors and consumer advice agencies. As a result of this investigation, the author deals with the points at which the legal dogmatic foundations and the practical experiences overlap and differ by bringing together the diverging results of the study’s initial two main parts in both an academically interesting and innovative way. This book will not only appeal to those in academia, but also to those working in the fields of banking and consumer rights.


Author(s):  
Alexandre Gustavo Melo Franco Bahia ◽  
Diogo Bacha e Silva

Resumo:A projeção de um novo Código de Processo Civil levanta a necessidade de analisar novos e velhos temas na ciência processual. Nessa medida, importa ter presente a necessidade de analisar a delimitação do precedente no novo Código de Processo Civil. É preciso aprender que o precedente não pode ser visto como fechamento argumentativo e sim como ponto de partida para a correta aplicação do direito. O objetivo é passar em revista os principais pontos delimitados pelo novo Código de Processo Civil que tratam de precedentes e estudar a noção do que o código projetado entende por precedente. Por fim, deve-se perguntar se os precedentes no código projetado são formulados democraticamente através da argumentação jurídica ou se são impostos autoritariamente.Palavras-chave: Novo Código de Processo Civil; Precedentes; Integridade jurisprudencial. Abstract:The projection of a new Civil Procedure Code raises the need to analyze new and old themes in the procedural science. To that extent, it is important to bear in mind the need to examine the definition of precedent in the new Civil Procedure Code. One must learn that the precedent cannot be seen as argumentative closing but as a starting point for the correct application of the law. The aim is to review the main points delimited by the new Code of Civil Procedure dealing with precedents and study the notion of what the designed code understands as precedent. Finally, one must ask whether the precedents in the code designed are made democratically by legal reasoning or are authoritatively imposed.Keywords: New Code of Civil Procedure; Precedents; Decisional integrity.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 385
Author(s):  
La Sina

The 1945 Constitution of Indonesia provides for rights to life and to remain free from torture that are fundamental human rights that shall not be curtailed under any circumstance. Since 1945, Indonesia does not regulate the protection of the right of life to the citizens. Until 1946, enacted Law No. 1 of 1946 concerning the Indonesian Criminal Code which in several provisions concerning the death penalty. Death sentences and executions in Indonesia is always debatable. However, it is still implemented and can not be avoided, unless the change of its legal provisions. This study was a normative research or doctrinal research. The results of the study shows that the provisions of death penalty in Indonesia is still enforced because have been regulated in the Criminal Code and several organic laws such as the law of terrorism, narcotics, corruption, and human rights justice. The death penalty is contrary to Article 28I of the 1945 Constitution. It has set the rights to life, so that no one may violate human rights, including the government and the country is not granted the right to revoke rights for every citizen. The Indonesian government should not impose the death penalty contained in the draft new Code, and abolish the death penalty in its organic law that had been imposed on the offenders. Preferably, the death penalty may be replaced by alternative punishment with life imprisonment, a prison within a specified time or according to the judge’s decision.


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