scholarly journals O modularności reprezentacji i procesów umysłowych (w języku i nie tylko)

2021 ◽  
Vol LXXVII (77) ◽  
pp. 43-57
Author(s):  
JOLANTA SĘKOWSKA

Pojęcie modułu i modularności, często używane w aktualnym dyskursie naukowym, dotyczącym m.in. reprezentacji językowych i procesów ich przetwarzania, jest bardzo szerokie. W niniejszym artykule podjęto próbę rozgraniczenia różnych spojrzeń na modularność i odpowiedzi na pytania: Czym jest moduł? W jaki sposób można identyfikować moduły umysłowe i ustalić ich funkcjonalne relacje między sobą? Jakie problemy wiążą się z przyjęciem modularności reprezentacji umysłowych bez równoczesnego przyjęcia modularności ich przetwarzania? On the modularity of representation and mental processes (in language and beyond) Summary: The notion of module and modularity, used frequently in contemporary academic discourse that is related to linguistic representation and language processing, is rather broad. In this paper, an attempt has been made to differentiate between various views on modularity, and to answer the following questions: What is a module? How can we identify cognitive modules and establish their functional interrelations? What problems might arise from assuming the existence of the modularity of mental representations, without simultaneously accepting the modularity of their processing?

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Fodor

AbstractThe paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes to itself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful.


Author(s):  
Yannick Boddez ◽  
Jan De Houwer ◽  
Tom Beckers

Chapter 4 describes the inferential reasoning theory of causal learning and discusses how thinking about this theory has evolved in at least two important ways. First, the authors argue that it is useful to decouple the debate about different possible types of mental representations involved in causal learning (e.g., propositional or associative) from the debate about processes involved therein (e.g., inferential reasoning or attention). Second, at the process level inferential reasoning is embedded within a broad array of mental processes that are all required to provide a full mechanistic account of causal learning. Based on those insights, the authors evaluate five arguments that are often raised against inferential reasoning theory. They conclude that causal learning is best understood as involving the formation and retrieval of propositional representations, both of which depend on multiple cognitive processes (i.e., the multi-process propositional account).


2017 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea E. Martin ◽  
Falk Huettig ◽  
Mante S. Nieuwland

AbstractStructural priming makes a valuable contribution to psycholinguistics, but it taps into implicit memory representations and processes that may differ from what is deployed during online language processing. As a result, the strength of inductive inference regarding linguistic representation is rather limited. We question whether implicit memory for language can and should be equated with linguistic representation or with language processing.


2015 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-106
Author(s):  
Maciej Karpiński

Abstract In the present text, some recent changes in the perspective taken by psycholinguists in the study of language and communication are discussed. T heir interests seem to gradually shift from the study of language processing as an isolated and independent phenomenon towards inclusion of more interactional factors being indispensable components of interpersonal communication and involved in the process of communicative alignment. Alignment is here understood as a complex phenomenon that goes beyond increasing similarity of mental representations and related communicative behaviour. It simultaneously occurs on many levels and in various modalities, including those traditionally excluded from language study. A s a consequence, it implies not only more flexibility in the study of interpersonal communication but it also means a shift in the psycholinguistic methodology and probably also in the widely accepted picture of language and its limits.


Author(s):  
Т.А. Жданова

Постановка задачи. В статье анализируется языковая репрезентация ментальных представлений людей о простейших орудиях труда с целью показать, что данные технические примитивы можно рассматривать в качестве составных элементов знаний людей об окружающей действительности и о самих себе, хранимых в социальной памяти носителей языка. Результаты исследования. В ходе исследования рассмотрено, как знания об орудиях труда представлены в различных письменных источниках. Показана взаимосвязь между востребованностью инструмента в обществе и его словарным описанием. Выявлена антропоцентричность образных переосмыслений орудий труда. Сопоставлено функционирование лексики, репрезентирующей орудия труда, в русском и английском языках. Полученные выводы. Знания об орудиях труда были приобретены людьми в результате знакомства с их устройством, а также в процессе их применения. Именно имеющиеся у людей сведения об их внешних характеристиках (атрибут зрительной памяти человека), а также знания об их функциональной предназначенности (сложившиеся опытным путем) детально прописаны в толковых словарях, художественной литературе, произведениях фольклора. Словарные объективации инструментов отражают уровень представления о них людей. По мере выхода орудий из употребления, их описания в словарных статьях изложены менее детально. В образных переосмыслениях технических примитивов находит подтверждение идея о том, что человек создает их по своему образу и подобию, впоследствии используя свои внешние и внутренние качества как образец для описания созданных им самим орудий. Доказывается аналогичность ментальных репрезентаций орудий труда носителей русской и английской речи. Statement of the problem. The article is devoted to the analysis of people's linguistic representation of mental images of the simplest tools to show that these technical primitives can be considered as components of people's knowledge of the surrounding reality and of themselves stored in the social memory of native speakers. Results. The paper examined the people's knowledge about the tools, presented in various written sources. The relationship between the relevance of the instrument in society and its vocabulary description is shown. The anthropocentricity of figurative reconsideration of tools is revealed. The functioning of this vocabulary in Russian and English is compared. Conclusion. Knowledge of tools includes information about their structure and the principle of working with them. This knowledge is so close and understandable to people that they are described in detail in various written sources. The way how the tools are objectified in lexicographic sources reflects how people perceive them. When tools are no longer used, the detail of their description in dictionaries decreases. The imaginative reconsideration of technical primitives is supported by the idea that a person creates them similar to himself. The opposite is also true. Subsequently, a man himself serves as a model for the tool description. The similarity of tools mental representations of English speakers is proved.


2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prakash Mondal

This paper explores the link between rules of grammar, grammar formalisms and the architecture of the language faculty. In doing so, it provides a flexible meta-level theory of the language faculty through the postulation of general axioms that govern the interaction of different components of grammar. The idea is simply that such an abstract formulation allows us to view the structure of the language faculty independently of specific theoretical frameworks/formalisms. It turns out that the system of rules, axioms and constraints of grammar cannot be explicitly represented in a general architecture of the language faculty — which circumvents the ontological mismatch of mental representations and formal/axiomatic properties of language. Rather, the system of rules, axioms, constraints of grammar is intentionally projected by humans, and this projection realizes/instantiates what Dascal (1992) calls ‘psychopragmatics’. Relevant implications for linguistic theory, learnability and (computational) models of language processing are also explored.


2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 329-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin J. Pickering ◽  
Simon Garrod

AbstractCurrently, production and comprehension are regarded as quite distinct in accounts of language processing. In rejecting this dichotomy, we instead assert that producing and understanding are interwoven, and that this interweaving is what enables people to predict themselves and each other. We start by noting that production and comprehension are forms of action and action perception. We then consider the evidence for interweaving in action, action perception, and joint action, and explain such evidence in terms of prediction. Specifically, we assume that actors construct forward models of their actions before they execute those actions, and that perceivers of others' actions covertly imitate those actions, then construct forward models of those actions. We use these accounts of action, action perception, and joint action to develop accounts of production, comprehension, and interactive language. Importantly, they incorporate well-defined levels of linguistic representation (such as semantics, syntax, and phonology). We show (a) how speakers and comprehenders use covert imitation and forward modeling to make predictions at these levels of representation, (b) how they interweave production and comprehension processes, and (c) how they use these predictions to monitor the upcoming utterances. We show how these accounts explain a range of behavioral and neuroscientific data on language processing and discuss some of the implications of our proposal.


1993 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Fonagy ◽  
George S. Moran ◽  
Rose Edgcumbe ◽  
Hansi Kennedy ◽  
Mary Target

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manami Sato ◽  
Amy J. Schafer ◽  
Benjamin K. Bergen

AbstractWe report on two experiments that ask when and under what linguistic conditions comprehenders construct detailed shape representations of mentioned objects, and whether these can change over the course of a sentence when new information contradicts earlier expectations. We used Japanese because the verb-final word order of Japanese presented a revealing test case where information about objects can radically change with a subsequent verb. The results show that language understanders consistently generate a distinct and detailed shape for an object by integrating the semantic contributions of different sentential elements. These results first confirm that the tendency to generate specific shape information about objects that are involved in described events is not limited to English, but is also present in Japanese, a typologically and genetically distinct language. But more importantly, they shed light on the processing mechanism of object representation, showing that mental representations are initiated sentence medially, and are rapidly revised if followed by a verb that implies a change to an object shape. This work contributes to ongoing research on incremental language processing – comprehenders appear to construct extremely detailed semantic representations early in a sentence, and modify them as needed.


Author(s):  
Daniel Schmidtke ◽  
Victor Kuperman

Lexical representations in an individual mind are not given to direct scrutiny. Thus, in their theorizing of mental representations, researchers must rely on observable and measurable outcomes of language processing, that is, perception, production, storage, access, and retrieval of lexical information. Morphological research pursues these questions utilizing the full arsenal of analytical tools and experimental techniques that are at the disposal of psycholinguistics. This article outlines the most popular approaches, and aims to provide, for each technique, a brief overview of its procedure in experimental practice. Additionally, the article describes the link between the processing effect(s) that the tool can elicit and the representational phenomena that it may shed light on. The article discusses methods of morphological research in the two major human linguistic faculties—production and comprehension—and provides a separate treatment of spoken, written and sign language.


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